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Abstract 
During the so-called ‘golden age’ of piracy that occurred in the Atlantic and 
Indian Oceans in the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, several 
thousands of men and a handful of women sailed aboard pirate ships. The 
narrative, operational techniques, and economic repercussions of the waves 
of piracy that threatened maritime trade during the ‘golden age’ have 
fascinated researchers, and so too has the social history of the people 
involved. Traditionally, the historiography of the social history of pirates has 
portrayed them as democratic and highly egalitarian bandits, divided their 
spoil fairly amongst their number, offered compensation for comrades injured 
in battle, and appointed their own officers by popular vote. They have been 
presented in contrast to the legitimate societies of Europe and America, and 
as revolutionaries, eschewing the unfair and harsh practices prevalent in 
legitimate maritime employment. This study, however, argues that the 
‘revolutionary’ model of ‘golden age’ pirates is not an accurate reflection of 
reality. By using the ‘articles’ or shipboard rules created by pirates, this thesis 
explores the questions of pirates’ hierarchy, economic practices, social 
control, and systems of justice, and contextualises the pirates’ society within 
legitimate society to show that pirates were not as egalitarian or democratic as 
they have been portrayed, and that virtually all of their social practices were 
based heavily on, or copied directly from, their experiences in legitimate 
society, on land and at sea. In doing so, this thesis argues that far from being 
social revolutionaries, pirates sought to improve their own status, within the 
pre-existing social framework of legitimate society. 
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Introduction. 
‘As trade followed the flag, so the black flag followed trade’.1 
 
Piracy, loosely defined as robbery at sea, is as old as maritime trade and has, 
at one time or another, occurred on virtually every waterway in the world. One 
period, however, has become so notorious in the history of piracy that it has 
become known as the ‘golden age’ of piracy. The exact limits of the ‘golden 
age’ have proven hard to define: at its longest, some historians have seen the 
‘golden age’ as lasting from the Elizabethan period until the eighteenth 
century,2 while others have chosen the narrowest definition, beginning no 
earlier than 1714 and ending no later than 1726, encompassing a great wave 
of Atlantic and, to a lesser extent, Indian Ocean piracy, when the most 
notorious pirates, such as Blackbeard and Bartholomew Roberts, were 
active.3 A wider definition, encompassing several waves of piracy in the later 
seventeenth century and first quarter of the eighteenth century, has also been 
adopted.4 
The difference in definitions of this ‘golden age’ of piracy arises partly from 
differences in how the golden age is defined, be it numbers or notoriety of 
active pirates, or differences in the pirates’ operational techniques, and partly 
from the whims or interests of individual authors. This study, which is primarily 
concerned with the social history of piracy as illuminated by the ‘articles’ or 
shipboard rules, adopts a loose definition of the ‘golden age’ based largely on 
the ages of sets of articles that have survived to the present day, and other 
references to the use of articles by pirates, from the period immediately 
following the Restoration of the Stuart dynasty to the throne of England in 
1660 to the end of the last great wave of Anglo-American piracy some time in 
the 1720s. 
                                                 
1
 Patrick Pringle Jolly Roger (Mineola, 2001), p. 9 
2
 Pringle, Jolly Roger, p. 9 
3
 Peter Earle, The Pirate Wars (London, 2004), pp. 159, 176; Colin Woodard, The Republic of 
Pirates (Orlando, 2007), p. 1 
4
 Russell K. Skowronek and Charles R. Ewen (eds). X Marks the Spot: The Archaeology of 
Piracy (Gainesville, 2006), p. 3; Patrick Lizé, ‘Piracy in the Indian Ocean: Mauritius and the 
Speaker’, in Skowronek and Ewen, X Marks the Spot, p. 81 
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This study will focus primarily on the activities and social history of Anglo-
American pirates for four reasons. Firstly, the availability and accessibility of 
English-language primary sources regarding pirates is much greater than that 
of non-English language sources. Secondly, all of the sets of pirate articles 
known to have survived were created by predominantly Anglophone pirate 
companies. Thirdly, the historiography within which this study must be 
situated has largely concerned Anglo-American pirates. Fourthly, and in many 
ways related to the previous point, an overwhelming majority of pirates active 
during the period under study were English speakers. No analysis of the 
nationalities of pirates from the whole of the period 1660-1730 has been 
undertaken, and to do so would be beyond the scope of the present study, but 
Marcus Rediker’s excellent analysis of the nationalities of Atlantic pirates in 
the 1716-1726 period will amply illustrate the point. According to Rediker’s 
analysis, 47.4% of pirates were English, 9.8% were Irish, 6.3% were Scottish, 
and 4% were Welsh, that is, 67.5% came from the British Isles; ‘about one-
quarter’ came from the Americas, including the West Indian and North 
American colonies; only 6.9% originated in other European countries or Africa. 
Rediker acknowledges that his analysis is not perfect or complete, but the 
preponderance of Anglophone pirates in the eighteenth century is well 
illustrated.5 
Some difficulty is also attached to the definition of ‘pirate’ itself, and the words 
‘pirate’, ‘buccaneer’, and sometimes ‘privateer’ have, at times, been used 
indiscriminately. Privateers, whilst sharing some operational similarities with 
pirates, especially being primarily concerned with raiding commerce at sea, 
differed from pirates most by being legally sanctioned. David Starkey defined 
privateers as ‘privately owned vessels licensed by the state to set out with the 
specific intention of seizing enemy property on the high seas’.6 That is to say, 
not only did privateers operate in possession of a legal commission or ‘Letter 
of Marque’ issued by the state, but they were discriminatory, at least in theory, 
in their choice of targets, and limited their attacks to the shipping of an enemy 
                                                 
5
 Marcus Rediker, Villains of all Nations: Atlantic Pirates in the Golden Age (London, 2004), 
pp. 51-53 
6
 David J. Starkey, ‘The Origins and Regulation of Eighteenth-Century British Privateering’, in 
C.R. Pennell (ed.), Bandits at Sea, a Pirates Reader (New York, 2001), p. 69 
 9 
state specified in their commission. On occasion, a privateer exceeded the 
terms of its commission and turned to piracy, at which point it became, both 
morally and legally, a pirate and was no longer considered a privateer.7 
Pirates were not always indiscriminate in their choice of victims: Benjamin 
Hornigold, for example, was an associate and possibly mentor of a number of 
well-known pirates of the ‘golden age’, such as Blackbeard and Samuel 
Bellamy, but ‘refused to take and plunder English vessels’.8 However, pirates 
frequently had no scruples about attacking ships of any nationality, or made 
any distinction between them. What really set pirates of the ‘golden age’ apart 
from privateers of the same period, then, was the fact that when they attacked 
shipping they did so illegally, without sanction from any state. 
Buccaneers, however synonymous with ‘pirates’ the term has since become, 
were originally a loose community of soldiers, seamen, and hunters, 
dedicated to attacking Spanish interests in the Americas, sometimes by sea, 
but more often on land. The first buccaneer companies grew from bands of 
French settlers on Tortuga, forced to turn to armed defence in response to 
Spanish attempts to extirpate them in the second quarter of the seventeenth 
century. Over the subsequent decades the French buccaneers were joined by 
English and Dutch ‘outcasts’, until international forces numbering several 
thousands of men could be raised for large campaigns. In the years following 
the English settlement of Jamaica in 1655, colonial governments, particularly 
the English and French, recognised the value of the large amphibious 
irregular forces the buccaneers could provide, not only to augment regular 
forces in their attacks on Spanish interests, but also in a defensive and 
deterrent capacity to safeguard their often precariously held colonies against 
Spanish encroachment.9 In support of this policy the French government of 
Tortuga and the English government of Jamaica regularly issued letters of 
marque to buccaneer companies, making them legitimate belligerents in the 
wars against Spain. Spurred on by official sanction of their depredations, the 
                                                 
7
 N.A.M. Rodger, Command of the Ocean, a Naval history of Britain, 1649-1815 (London, 
2004), pp. 289-290. 
8
 The Trials of Eight Persons Indited for Piracy (Boston, 1718), p. 23 
9
 Joel Baer, Pirates (Stroud, 2007), pp.29-31; Peter Kemp and Christopher Lloyd, Brethren of 
the Coast, the British and French Buccaneers in the South Seas (London 1960), pp. 1-3, 7-10 
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buccaneers made the acquisition of such documents of legality an important 
feature of many of their expeditions. Commissions were bought and sold, and 
when no legitimate commissions were available because of periods of 
nominal peace with Spain the buccaneers were not beyond using forged or 
expired documents.10 One buccaneer wrote 
This [commission] we had purchased at a cheap rate, having given for it 
only the sum of ten ducats, or pieces of eight. But the truth of the thing 
was that at first our commission was made only for the space of three 
months, …whereas among ourselves we had contrived to make it last for 
three years – for with this we were resolved to seek our fortunes.11 
One company were happy ‘to list [them]selves in the service of… the Emperor 
of Darien’, a Cuna Indian and escaped slave waging a war of resistance 
against Spain, in their quest for legitimacy.12 
These attempts to retain a veneer of legitimacy whatever their actual legal 
status, the nature of the depredations, extending many miles inland as well as 
on the sea, and their practice of generally restricting their attacks to Spanish 
targets, all set the buccaneers apart from the pirates of their own time and 
later. What links buccaneers and pirates is that they were often the same 
people in practice: among the first of the European raiders to exploit the riches 
of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean in the 1680s and 1690s were former 
buccaneer companies who had been forced to operate further afield by the 
diminishing returns from raids on Spanish America. The famous buccaneer 
William Dampier carried out part of his first circumnavigation with Captain 
Swan’s company as they sailed to the Philippines and Madagascar,13 and the 
crew of the Jacob moved from buccaneering in the Caribbean to piracy in the 
Indian Ocean, by way of a spell of privateering against the French around 
North America.14 The ‘golden age’ of piracy that is the focus of this study, 
                                                 
10
 Kemp and Lloyd, Brethren of the Coast, p. 3 
11
 Alexander Esquemeling, The Buccaneers of America (London, 1684: Glorieta, 1992 
reprint), pp. 257-258 
12
 Kemp and Lloyd, Brethren of the Coast, p. 35 
13
 Kemp and Lloyd, Brethren of the Coast, pp. 114-121 
14
 Robert C. Ritchie, Captain Kidd and the War Against the Pirates (Cambridge, Mass., 1986), 
pp. 32-37 
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then, does not include the activities of either privateers or buccaneers, except 
when those people exceeded the terms of their commissions, or gave up land 
raiding to take to the sea, and became, in the true sense of the word, pirates. 
If pirates of the ‘golden age’ were mostly Anglophones, they also mostly  
shared other demographic traits. Referring again to Marcus Rediker’s analysis 
of eighteenth-century pirates, they were mostly men in their twenties, and 
were more likely to be older than younger. They came, overwhelmingly, from 
a maritime background, ‘almost all pirates had been working in a seafaring 
occupation, probably for several years’, before turning to piracy. And they 
were, on the whole, unmarried. And, ‘almost without exception [they] came 
from the lowest social classes’.15 There were, of course, exceptions to every 
one of these trends: trial accounts list defendants in their thirties, and a few in 
the forties as well as some teenagers;16 some pirate companies contained 
landsmen in varying proportions, such as George Lowther’s company which 
included numerous soldiers as well as seamen;17 And a number of pirates, 
albeit a very small number, were described as ‘gentlemen’.18 These, then, 
were the men who made up the pirate companies which form the subject of 
this study.  
Throughout the text I will refer both to pirate ‘companies’ and pirate ‘crews’. 
Except when quoting directly from another source, I will use the word ‘crew’ to 
denote the collection of individuals sailing on one particular vessel, and 
‘company’ to denote a collection of individuals operating under a single 
command structure. Frequently, a pirate ‘company’ consisted of only one 
‘crew’, and the terms could be used interchangeably, but often several vessels 
were used simultaneously by the same group of pirates unified under the 
command of a single captain, and in these cases the distinction between 
‘crew’ and ‘company’ will become relevant. 
                                                 
15
 Rediker, Villains of all Nations, pp. 49-50 
16
 see, for example, The Arraignment, Tryal, and Condemnation of Capt. John Quelch and 
Others of his Company (London, 1704), p. 24 
17
 [Charles Johnson], Manuel Schonhorn (ed.). A General History of the Pyrates (Mineola, 
1999), pp. 304-307 
18
 for example, William Snelgrave, A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea, and the Slave 
Trade (London, 1734), p. 199 
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The Social World of Anglo-American Pirates, an Historiographical Problem 
Contemporary publications and Captain Charles Johnson’s General History 
The study of piracy has such a long tradition that it is difficult to determine to 
point at which contemporary reports of pirate activity gave way accounts of 
pirate history. Long before the mass outbreak of piracy which took place in the 
early eighteenth century occurred, former buccaneers began to put quill to 
paper and record their experiences for the edification of the reading public, 
whose appetite for such accounts was, to judge by the number of publications, 
voracious. The earliest significant publication by a former buccaneer was 
published in Amsterdam in 1678 under the title of De Americaensche 
Zeerovers, written by Alexander Esquemeling, a surgeon who had crossed 
the Isthmus of Panama with the famous Welsh buccaneer, Sir Henry Morgan 
in 1670. It was translated into Spanish in 1681, and into English in 1684, 
under the title of The Buccaneers of America, and remains in print today. The 
second English edition, also published in 1684, contained an additional 
number of chapters relating to another English buccaneering voyage into the 
Pacific, and penned by Basil Ringrose, who had accompanied the 
expedition.19 In the following years, numerous first-hand accounts of 
buccaneer ventures around the coast of America went into print, such as 
William Hack’s collection of ‘voyages’, and Raveneau de Lussan’s journal, 
translated from the French.20 
The sensationalising of pirate activity in second-hand accounts, published for 
popular consumption, has perhaps a longer history. In 1674 the arrival of the 
Irish pirate George Cusack, who had been plundering shipping in the waters 
around England, so close to the capital as Leigh-on-Sea in Essex, and his 
subsequent arrest, caught the imagination of the public. Cusack and his men 
were tried in London in January 1675 and a printed account of their trial 
appeared soon afterwards, followed some months later by an anonymous 
                                                 
19
 Esquemeling, Buccaneers of America, p. v 
20
 William Hack. A Collection of Original Voyages (London, 1699); Raveneau de Lussan. A 
Journal of a Voyage Made into the South Sea (London, 1698) 
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account of Cusack’s life and career. The information contained in the account 
exhibits a level of detail suggestive either of extensive interviews with Cusack 
and his crew, and other witnesses, or of extensive fabrication: quite possibly a 
mixture of the two.21 Whenever a pirate rose to prominence in the public’s 
attention one or more accounts of their life were sure to follow, and this is 
exemplified best by the spate of publications concerning the career of Henry 
Every, an English pirate who conducted a short, but highly successful, 
piratical cruise in the Indian Ocean. The first ballad about Every appeared in 
print within weeks of the mutiny which sparked his piratical career, and even 
before he had actually committed any further act of piracy.22 Every’s 
spectacular career and subsequent disappearance enabled two early 
eighteenth-century authors to compose highly fictionalised accounts of his life, 
which were presented to their readers as fact, the first supposedly written by 
one of Every’s captives and the second on the form of two letters, purportedly 
by Every himself.23  
By far the fullest, and subsequently most significant, of these early second-
hand accounts, was published in 1724, in the closing years of the ‘golden age’ 
of piracy, and deserves a more detailed examination. The General History of 
the Robberies and Murders of the Most Notorious Pyrates, by the 
pseudonymous Captain Charles Johnson, published in May of that year, was 
popular enough to warrant a second, corrected and expanded edition in 
August. A third, slightly expanded, edition followed in 1725, and a fourth, with 
minor corrections, in 1726. A second volume of new material was published in 
1728.24  
The General History consists of short biographies of the most famous pirates 
of the day, including relatively successful pirates such as Henry Every and 
Bartholomew Roberts, alongside less successful men like Richard Worley and 
Jack Rackham. Volume I deals mostly with pirates active between 1716 and 
                                                 
21
 The Grand Pyrate: or, the Life and Death of Capt. George Cusack (London, 1675) 
22
 Joel Baer. ‘Bold Captain Avery in the Privy Council: Early Variants of a Broadside Ballad 
from the Pepys Collection’, Folk Music Journal, 7 (1995), p. 4 
23
 Adrian van Broeck. The Life and Adventures of Captain John Avery (London, 1709); The 
King of the Pirates: Being an Account of the Famous Enterprises of Captain Avery (London, 
1719) 
24
 Johnson, General History, pp. xxxiii-xxxvi  
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1724 in the Caribbean and Atlantic (with one or two exceptions), while volume 
II is more concerned with pirates of the Indian Ocean, several of whose 
careers began and ended in the closing years of the seventeenth century. In 
all, chapters on thirty-five pirates make up the bulk of the General History.25 
The General History has been used so extensively, by popular and academic 
historians, that scarcely a page of it has not been cited several times, and in 
some cases whole books have been written based almost entirely on it. This 
is all the more surprising considering its reputation for poor levels of factual 
accuracy: one historian, who freely cites the work, labelled its author (whose 
real identity has been extensively debated) ‘the greatest liar that ever lived’.26 
In fact, much of the information contained in the books is more-or-less 
factually accurate, or at least, compares well with other independent sources, 
but an equally significant proportion of it is demonstrably embellished, 
factually incorrect, or just pure fantasy. Considering the General History, Joel 
Baer was ‘inclined to doubt what is not otherwise corroborated’.27  
Johnson almost certainly interviewed several people well placed to give him 
information, including John Atkins, register of the court at the mass trial of 
Bartholomew Roberts’ men, and Woodes Rogers, privateer and Governor of 
the Bahamas charged with eradicating piracy from the colony.28 Johnson’s 
claim to have spoken to captured pirates also has a ring of truth about it. In 
the years immediately prior to the publication of the General History a number 
of pirates languished in Newgate or Marshalsea prison, London. Walter 
Kennedy, for example, was arrested in March 1721 and held in Newgate until 
his execution in July, a period of almost five months.29 Corrections made 
between the first and second editions in the chapters relating to Howell Davis, 
Roberts, and Thomas Anstis were coincidental with the imprisonment of 
Thomas Jones who sailed under those captains and was held in the 
                                                 
25
 Johnson, General History, pp. vii-viii.  
26
 Jan Rogozinski, Honor Among Thieves: Captain Kidd, Henry Every, and the Pirate 
Democracy in the Indian Ocean (Mechanicsburg, 2000), p. iii 
27
 Baer, Pirates, p. 27 
28
 Johnson, General History, p. 371; John Atkins, A Voyage to Guinea, Brasil, and the West-
Indies (2
nd
 ed. York, 1737), p. 48, 188; Colin Woodard, The Republic of Pirates (Orlando, 
2007), p. 348 
29
 Aubrey Burl,  Black Barty: Bartholomew Roberts and his Pirate Crew 1718-1723 (Stroud, 
2006), pp. 98-99 
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Marshalsea for several months from his arrest in late 1723 until his death in 
May 1724.30 The debate about the identity of Johnson may be particularly 
relevant to the question of potential interviewees: the candidate with the best 
supporting evidence is Jacobite journalist and printer Nathaniel Mist, who was 
actually incarcerated in Newgate at the same time as Walter Kennedy.31 
Johnson also noted in the preface to the second edition that 
…several Persons who had been taken by the Pyrates, as well as others 
who had been concerned in taking of them, have been so kind to 
communicate several Facts and Circumstances to us, which had escaped 
us in the first Impression.32 
As noted above, certain corrections and alterations were made to the text 
between 1724 and 1726, and it seems reasonable that Johnson was being 
honest about his sources when he ascribed the new information to witnesses 
and victims of the pirates. Included in Volume II was also a large appendix of 
more information, newly received by Johnson from similar sources, relating to 
the pirates discussed in Volume I. 
In his edition of the General History, Manuel Schonhorn has compared 
Johnson’s text with other published material available at the time and has 
shown that a great deal of information contained in the book tallies with 
previously published matter. Schonhorn notes Johnson’s use of printed trial 
reports such as those of Stede Bonnet, John Rackham, Charles Vane, and 
their crews, as well as his use of London and colonial newspapers such as 
The Post-Boy, Mist’s Weekly Journal, Boston News-Letter, and The Weekly 
Journal: or British Gazetteer.33 Schonhorn also suggested that Johnson had 
interviewed Woodes Rogers or someone else in a similar position, but 
acknowledged that at times Johnson was reporting ‘common gossip’.34 The 
second volume of the General History is perhaps less reliable than the first, 
not least because a large part of it is devoted to the story of Captain Misson, a 
                                                 
30
 Johnson, General History, p. xxxiii 
31
 Arne Bialuschewski, ‘Daniel Defoe, Nathaniel Mist, and the General History of the Pyrates’, 
Papers of the Bibliographical Society of America, 98 (2004), p. 28 
32
 Johnson, General History, p. 7 
33
 Johnson, General History, pp. xxxiv-xxxv, 669 
34
 Johnson, General History, pp. 667, 673 
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French pirate whose settlement on Madagascar was run on somewhat radical 
principles of liberty and equality, but whose life, career, and very existence are 
entirely unsupported by any independent primary source. Schonhorn was able 
to dismiss Misson’s story as ‘a fiction to which [the author] gave the illusion of 
history by introducing a few easily recallable facts’.35 
It seems clear, then, that ‘Johnson’ had access to sources, probably including 
oral interviews with pirates imprisoned in London, no longer available for 
corroboration, and so it is likely that the book is a more accurate account of 
events than can be proven. Doubt remains because of the entirely fictional 
nature of some sections of the book, but Baer’s stance above, is probably too 
simplistic to be of real value. So, too, is the stance adopted by numerous 
historians that the General History can be seen as largely accurate. When 
Johnson was able to interview witnesses to, or participants in, the piracies he 
described, we may expect a greater degree of accuracy in his reporting that 
can fully be corroborated. He almost certainly repeated errors that were made 
either deliberately or unwittingly by his interviewees, but in this respect 
Johnson’s work need not be considered any better or worse than any other 
contemporary source. Johnson, of course, edited the interviews to a greater or 
lesser extent in order to include the information he was given in the General 
History, but this too is a potential problem with many other sources. In some 
cases, the identity of Johnson’s witness can be found stated within the text, 
and in other cases can be inferred from the information given. Pirate John 
Massey, for example, is never mentioned by name as a source of information 
in the General History, but Johnson’s account of the mutiny led by Massey 
and George Lowther tallies so closely with Massey’s own account that, given 
the fact that Massey was imprisoned and tried in London in the early 1720s 
when the General History must have been in preparation, Massey seems a 
likely source.36 In other cases, the identity of a witness may be obscure, but 
the information given by Johnson makes it clear that somebody was 
interviewed. Without knowing, in detail, who was interviewed by Johnson, or 
who exactly Johnson was, it is impossible to determine how much information 
                                                 
35
 Johnson, General History, p. 683 
36
 Johnson, General History, pp. 304-309, 678; National Archives, EXT 1/261, ff. 197-199 
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he was given, how accurate it may have been, or how much it was edited, but 
it would be unwise to simply dismiss without further investigation any of 
Johnson’s work that cannot be otherwise corroborated, just as it would be to 
accept his every word as factually accurate. 
Johnson’s portrayal of pirates in the first volume is one of muted neutrality, 
and the pirates are described as both ‘bold Adventurers’ and ‘Tyrant like’; 
‘rogues’ who would torture a man until he revealed his valuables or in ‘justice’ 
for his mistreatment of others. The pirates’ society is several times described 
as a ‘Commonwealth’, and frequent references are made to pirates voting on 
important matters.37 When it came to the matter of choosing a captain, it was 
argued  
That it was not of any great Signification who was dignify’d with Title; for 
really and in Truth, all good Governments had (like theirs) the supream 
Power lodged with the Community , who might doubtless depute and 
revoke as suited Interest or Humour. We are the Original of this claim 
[said one of the pirates].38 
The pirates of Johnson’s first volume, then, lived in a unique pioneering 
community in which each man was imbued with equal rights and rights of 
equality, was able to express his opinion through voting. Captains and other 
officers had no powers that were not vested in them, and liable to be taken 
away, by the rest of the community. Johnson may or may not have intended 
his portrayal of pirates to be seen in contrast to the mores of legitimate society 
in England, but if he did then the message was perhaps too subtle for his 
readers. In August, 1724, an article appeared in The Weekly Journal, or 
Saturday’s Post, a London newspaper published by Johnson candidate 
Nathaniel Mist, in the form of a (probably apocryphal) letter telling how a 
country gentleman and Justice of the Peace, upon being read the General 
History, flew into a rage over the ‘impudent Libel upon great Men’, perceiving 
the book to be a thinly veiled attack on the ruling elite.39 
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The second volume of the General History contains accounts explicitly, and 
favourably, contrasting pirates’ society and legitimate society. In his account 
of Samuel Bellamy, Johnson describes the pirates, allegedly in their ‘own 
Terms’, as ‘Marine Heroes, the Scourge of Tyrants and Avarice, and the brave 
Asserters of Liberty’. Words placed in Bellamy’s own mouth by Johnson were 
used to damnify 
all those who will submit to be governed by Laws which rich Men have 
made for their own Security, for the cowardly Whelps have not the 
Courage otherwise to defend what they get by their Knavery… I am a 
free Prince, and I have as much Authority to make War on the whole 
World, as he who has a hundred Sail of Ships at Sea, and an Army of 
100,000 Men in the Field; …but there is no arguing with such sniveling 
Puppies, who allow Superiors to kick them about Deck at Pleasure; and 
pin their Faith upon a Pimp of a Parson; a Squab, who neither practices 
nor believes what he puts upon the chuckle-headed Fools he preaches 
to.40 
The radical sentiments espoused by Captain Misson in the second volume’s 
lengthiest chapter are even more explicit. Misson’s pirates, ‘Men who were 
resolved to assert that Liberty which God and Nature gave them’, settled a 
colony, which they called ‘Libertalia’, in which ‘every man was born free, and 
had as much Right to what would support him, as to the Air he respired’.41 So 
attractive were the charms of Libertalia, where all men were equal, regardless 
of race or nationality, and slavery was abolished, that many of the pirates’ 
victims leaped at the chance to join them. When animosity between the 
English and French members of the community of Libertalia broke out, the 
Commanders propos’d a Form of Government, being taken up, as 
necessary to their Conservation; for where there were no coercive Laws, 
the weakest would always be the Sufferers, and every Thing must tend 
to Confusion: That Men’s Passions blinding them to Justice, and making 
them ever partial to themselves, they ought to submit the Differences 
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which might arise to calm and disinterested Persons, who could examine 
with Temper, and determine according to Reason and Equity: That they 
look’d upon a Democratic Form, where the People were themselves the 
Makers and Judges of their own Laws, the most agreeable; and 
therefore, desired they would divide themselves into Companies of ten 
Men, and every such Company choose one to assist in the settling a 
Form of Government, and in making wholesome Laws for the Good of 
the whole: That the Treasure and Cattle they were Masters of should be 
equally divided.42 
Neither Misson nor the egalitarian commune of Libertalia really existed, but by 
this fiction, presented to his readers as fact, Johnson imbued the pirates with 
enlightened principles radically different from, and in stark contrast to, the 
implied tyranny of the European ancien régime. Taken as a whole, then, 
Johnson’s pirates lived as part of a community (or communities), run along 
highly egalitarian principles, in which spoil was evenly divided, major 
decisions settled by majority vote; where officers were the servants of the 
people and had few, if any, rights of social superiority, and could be, indeed 
were, replaced by popular vote if they overstepped their strictly delineated 
bounds or failed to live up to their crew’s expectations. The significance of the 
General History to the historiography of piracy cannot be underestimated, for 
until comparatively recently it remained the principal source from which 
historians drew, rightly or wrongly, much or all of their information about the 
pirates of the early eighteenth century, and the society in which they lived. 
 
Modern Historiography.  
Narrative history dominated the study of piracy of piracy for most of the 
twentieth century, much of it related to a specific geographical area or time-
period. Among the earliest publications of the last century G.F. Dow and J.H. 
Edmonds’ The Pirates of the New England Coast 1630-1730, originally 
published in 1923, stands out: partly as a comprehensive study of a region 
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and era well populated by pirates, but also because of the authors’ pioneering 
use of manuscript and other sources in their research. Much of Dow and 
Edmonds’ work was based on accounts from Johnson’s General History, but a 
greater amount was based on printed trial accounts, the published accounts of 
pirates’ victims, contemporary newspapers such as the Boston Gazette and 
Boston News-Letter, and manuscript sources from the Massachusetts State 
Archive, and from other archive sources relating to the various courts of law 
operating in New England.43 Several long sections of the book consisted of 
transcriptions from Johnson’s General History, and the memoirs of George 
Roberts, Philip Ashton, and Nicholas Merritt, all captives of pirate Edward Low 
and his associates. The following year The Pirates’ Who’s Who, by general 
practitioner and naturalist Philip Gosse,44 was published. Gosse’s 
‘encyclopaedia-like treatment’ of pirate history was clearly drawn from 
numerous sources, including, but not limited to, the General History. Internal 
evidence suggests that Gosse was familiar with the numerous buccaneers’ 
published accounts, as well as with a multitude of other sources, but his 
failure to cite any references makes it extremely difficult to determine the 
extent of his scholarship.45 A decade after the publication of Dow and 
Edmonds’ book, Indian Army officer Charles Grey published Pirates of the 
Eastern Seas (1618-1723): a Lurid Page of History, using a similar 
methodology to Dow and Edmonds to tell the story of European pirates in the 
Indian Ocean and Red Sea. Grey himself saw the book as ‘ a continuation 
and amplification of Johnson’s “History of the Most Notorious Pirates”… 
adding some unknown to him and additional details to the history of others, 
gleaned from sources inaccessible to, or unknown to Johnson.’ These 
sources were largely published accounts by buccaneers such as William 
Dampier and others collected by the Rev. Harris, pirates’ captives including 
William Snelgrave, and naval officers like Sir William Monson and midshipman 
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Clement Downing, but also included manuscript sources from the records of 
the East India Company. Like Dow and Edmonds, Grey quoted contemporary 
accounts of piracy at length, some from previously published sources such as 
the General History and Clement Downing’s Compendious History of the 
Indian Wars, and others from manuscript sources, such as Richard Lazenby’s 
narrative, written for the East India Company, of time spent with pirate John 
Taylor.46  
By breaking away from a reliance on the General History and introducing new 
sources which, until that time had remained unused by historians, Grey, Dow 
and Edmonds, and to a lesser extent Gosse, were able to look beyond the 
image of pirates provided by Johnson, and at some aspects of pirate history 
largely overlooked in Johnson’s work. Charles Grey devoted a number of 
pages to inquiring firstly why some men chose to turn to piracy – essentially 
attracted by the potential for large profits, and to escape excessive and 
sometimes arbitrary punishment found in legitimate employment - and 
secondly, why many men chose not to. Dow and Edmonds concluded their 
study with a chapter entitled ‘Pirate Life and Death’, in which they explored the 
‘well-ordered government’ and social structure of the pirate crew, the 
significance of pirate flags, the law as it related to piracy, and the experience 
of captured and condemned pirates. These early works, among the first to 
take pirate history beyond pure narrative, not only pioneered a more scholarly 
level of research, but also the first tentative steps towards the academic study 
of piracy.  
The standards set by Grey, Dow and Edmonds were maintained (though by 
no means universally) in the second half of the twentieth century, which saw 
the publication of numerous works similar to the earlier geographically-specific 
studies, amongst which Peter Kemp and Christopher Lloyd’s Brethren of the 
Coast, the British and French Buccaneers in the South Seas stands out as a 
fine example of an analytical, narrative, and ‘biographical approach’47 to 
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Pacific piracy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.48 A much greater 
step from the narrative to the academic approach to pirate history was taken 
by Patrick Pringle, whose 1953 publication Jolly Roger: the Story of the 
Golden Age of Piracy contained a fair amount of narrative history, but placed it 
alongside chapters relating to the causes of waves of piracy and their decline, 
the social and professional background of pirates, their social structure and 
the government of their ships, and ‘The Character of the Pirate’.49 
Dow and Edmonds saw pirate society as an ‘ideal commonwealth where 
everything is held in common and where everyone has an equal voice in 
public affairs’, a ‘well-ordered government’, very much in the manner of 
Johnson’s pirates. Captains and quartermasters were elected, and could be 
deposed, and the quartermaster acted as a ‘magistrate’, defending the 
interests of the crew who had elected him. Merchant seamen were protected 
from abusive captains by pirate justice, but the fate of a ship could be decided 
‘by a caprice or through sheer destructiveness’ on occasion.50 Pringle, in his 
all too brief analysis, took a much more prosaic approach: ‘the pirates were 
conservative and imitative… They had no discipline, and therefore much self-
discipline… had no sentimental feeling for their ship and no love of piracy. 
Their motive was gain, and those who saved their share of the plunder retired 
as soon as they could’.51 Pringle made a far greater effort to break free from a 
reliance on Johnson’s General History than any of his predecessors, and 
indeed many of his successors, and though his conclusions about pirate 
society were brief and perhaps simplistic, it is significant that he was one of 
the earliest historians to dispute the egalitarian, anti-authoritarian model of 
pirate society which has persisted since 1724. 
In 1977 B.R. Burg published an article entitled ‘Legitimacy and Authority: A 
Case Study of Pirate Commanders in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Century’, in which he posited the idea that trends in the social background and 
earlier experience of pirate and buccaneer captains could be detected, and 
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used to explain, to some extent, their decision to turn to piracy and 
subsequent actions.52 Using demographic and anecdotal information, Burg 
attempted to explain ‘why pirates would adopt a style of command that was 
contrary to their own experiences at sea’, noting in the process that ‘there is 
not a scruple of evidence to explain the growth of a democratic command 
system by charging pirates with an excess of Lockean liberalism or of 
premature Enlightenment social concern.’53 Burg failed to question whether 
the notion of pirate democracy that he found himself presented with by various 
works of popular history was an accurate representation, but nevertheless 
produced some interesting conclusions. A demographic survey of thirty pirate 
captains showed that they came overwhelmingly from the lower classes, and 
that almost all had been low-ranking officer-mariners prior to turning pirate. 
The facts that Burg drew heavily on the General History for his information, 
and that at least two of his thirty captains were, in fact, fictional characters, 
does not necessarily impair the truth behind the general trends he detected, 
though his simplistic association of skilled sea-officers with the working class 
would stand revision. As a result of the same survey Burg was able to argue 
that many of the pirate captains came from seafaring communities, in which 
work meant more than subsistence labour, and in which it was natural to try to 
improve one’s own position by the accumulation of wages and trade-profit. 
Furthermore, many of those communities, he argued, were hotbeds of 
religious dissent, and it was from these dissenting communities that pirates 
drew their own ideas of democratic government by the will of the governed. 
Since 1981 the study of piratical society in the early-eighteenth century has 
been dominated by the work of Marcus Rediker. In his groundbreaking article 
‘“Under the Banner of King Death”: The Social World of Anglo-American 
Pirates, 1716-1726’, Rediker introduced ideas which have been dominant in 
his own later writings, and in the work of others.54 Rediker argued that a large 
bank of evidence, ‘a plentiful body of written testimony’ by ‘officials and 
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merchants’, had hitherto been underused by historians,55 and that by making 
fuller use of it, together, it must be added, with a certain amount of evidence 
gathered from printed works, including a significant measure from Johnson’s 
General History, a case could be made for presenting pirates of the early 
eighteenth century as lower class men rebelling against ‘harsh, often deadly’ 
experience in legitimate employment, and creating a community ‘in defiant 
contradistinction to the ways of the world they left behind them’.56 To support 
his interpretation Rediker drew attention to the role of the quarter-master 
aboard pirate ships as an arbiter between the crew and their captain, who in 
any case had been elected by common consent, and as an overseer of the 
division of the pirates’ spoil, which was apportioned fairly to each man, 
according to his share, with strict impartiality. Attention was also drawn to the 
establishment of a common fund, into which went a part of the spoil, as the 
basis for a welfare system for the support of injured pirates. A new social 
order was ‘deliberately constructed’ along egalitarian lines ‘that placed 
authority in the collective hands of the crew’.57 Pirates, according to Rediker’s 
analysis, conform to the ‘social bandit’ model proposed by Eric Hobsbawm, in 
which ‘revolutionary traditionalists’ sought a ‘world in which men were justly 
dealt with’ and rallied to a ‘protest against oppression and poverty: a cry for 
vengeance on the rich and the oppressors’.58 What drove Rediker’s social 
bandit pirates to establish their defiantly contradistinctive society was this ‘cry 
for vengeance’, aimed primarily against the masters and owners of the 
vessels they captured, objects by proxy of the ‘justice’ inflicted by pirates in 
response to the poor conditions and arbitrary discipline that they had 
experienced in the merchant, naval, and privateer vessels on which they had 
formerly served. These young men banded together in a ‘fraternity’, a 
distinctive community, linked and defined by the symbolism of their flags, their 
distinctive language, and, more convincingly, their mutually supportive 
actions. 
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Apart from his demographic analysis, which was far more detailed and far-
reaching than Burg’s, and was further expanded (though with much the same 
conclusions) in his 2004 book, Villains of All Nations,59 the most significant 
part of Rediker’s study is his identification of two ‘lines of descent’, each 
comprising pirate companies connected by having sailed together, used the 
same bases on land, shared crew members, or splintered from one another. 
The two ‘lines of descent’, one beginning with the arrival of several pirate 
companies in the Bahamas around 1715, and the other springing from the 
alliance formed between George Lowther and Edward Low’s companies in 
1722, incorporated, by Rediker’s calculation, over seventy percent of the 
Anglo-American pirates active during the decade covered by his study.60 
These ‘lines of descent’ are crucial to Rediker’s own interpretation of the 
pirate community, extending across several companies over a period of 
several years, but are also crucial to understanding the flow of ideas between 
different pirate companies, irrespective of Rediker’s interpretation. 
Rediker’s study of the social history of pirates in the early eighteenth century 
was expanded in Villains of All Nations, in which he made even greater use of 
the same set of sources used in his earlier work, to add considerable detail to 
the arguments presented in ‘Under the Banner of King Death’. Explored in 
much greater detail were the demographic background of the pirates, their 
motivations for turning to piracy, the social organisation of pirate companies, 
and the ‘justice’ meted out by pirates to those whom Rediker views as their 
oppressors. New aspects of pirate lifestyle scrutinised by Rediker in this fuller 
study included the role of women in the pirate community, and the way in 
which that community was perceived by the government and mercantile 
community, leading to their attempted extermination of the pirates. The new 
arguments and evidence presented by Rediker do nothing to contradict his 
earlier work, but rather maintain his interpretation that pirates 
were rebels. They challenged, in one way or another, the conventions of 
class, race, gender, and nation. They were poor and in low 
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circumstances, but they expressed high ideals. Exploited and often 
abused by merchant captains, they abolished the wage, established a 
different discipline, practiced their own kind of democracy and equality, 
and provided an alternative model for running the deep-sea ship… 
opposed the high and mighty of their day.61 
Rediker’s work is not without its critics. Several of the ideas behind his 
interpretation of pirates were called into question in a roundtable review of his 
work on eighteenth century sailors (including pirates), Between the Devil and 
the Deep Blue Sea.62 Not least among the issues raised was Rediker’s 
assessment of seamen’s protest as a response to the rise of capitalism. Lewis 
Fischer and Sean Cadigan both argued that the state of capitalism was not 
sufficiently advanced in the early-eighteenth century to be considered the 
major factor in seamen’s collectivisation and protest, as Rediker posited.63 
Rediker’s analysis was based, at least in part, on the similarities between the 
ship as a workplace and later factories that were the scenes of class-
conscious protest, but Cadigan argued that the resemblance was purely 
superficial. In fact, the nature and extent of the ‘acquisitive, intimidating and 
oppressive character of capitalist accumulation… taken for granted at every 
turn’ by Rediker, and used by him to explain the behaviour of seamen, was 
also called into question. The master of the sailing ship, like the crew an 
employee of the owners, ‘was rarely the “Devil” invoked to shape the labour 
force into a submissive factor of production’, argued David Starkey.64  
Burg’s theme of religious dissent, and indeed political dissent, as a progenitor 
of piratical democracy, was continued by Christopher Hill and J.S. Bromley in 
their respective essays ‘Radical Pirates?’ and ‘Outlaws at Sea, 1660-1720: 
Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity among Caribbean Freebooters’. Hill looked 
for, and found, evidence of large numbers of religious and political radical 
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dissenters emigrating to the Caribbean colonies in the wake of the English 
civil war, and used that as the basis for arguing that the piratical democracy 
may have been born of the ideologies of the Ranters, Levellers, Quakers, and 
other groups and sects. His argument is principally focussed on the influence 
of post-Revolution idealists on the buccaneers of the third quarter of the 
seventeenth century, and he is quick to note that many of the men who 
accompanied Henry Morgan across the Isthmus of Panama wore ‘the faded 
red coats of the New Model Army’.65 
Bromley, whose essay first appeared in Krantz (ed.)’s History From Below, 
Studies in Popular Ideology in Honour of George Rudé, also found evidence 
of the presence of French and English radicals in the Caribbean colonies, and 
was able to place these radicals, more convincingly than Hill, in the ranks of 
the buccaneers.66 His main argument, however, was concerned with the 
apparently egalitarian way that buccaneers, and later pirates, divided their 
plunder, and only to a lesser extent with the nature and origins of their society. 
Hill’s pirates followed very much the model provided by Johnson, which can 
be explained by Hill’s almost uncritical use of the General History, and his 
acceptance of the story of Libertalia as essentially grounded in historical fact. 
In both ‘Radical Pirates?’ and a later essay,67 Hill argued, based on his 
readings of the General History and other contemporary works such as 
Esquemeling’s Buccaneers of America, that pirates were highly democratic, 
egalitarian, and were the champions of slaves and the oppressed. Bromley’s 
pirates were much in the same mould, ‘they practised notions of liberty and 
equality, even of fraternity’:68 they carefully and equally divided their spoil, 
elected their officers, and voted on important issues. Most importantly for 
Bromley, they were at great pains to provide financial compensation for those 
of their comrades who were wounded or disabled in action. Bromley and Hill, 
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like Rediker, both drew attention to the similarities between buccaneers and 
pirates and the ‘social bandits’ described by Eric Hobsbawm.69 
Dow and Edmonds were writing before Hobsbawm formulated his social 
bandits model, but their pirates, as well as Rediker’s, Hill’s and Bromley’s, 
would have fitted into the model as much as Pringle’s would not. Social 
banditry, as described by Hobsbawm in his 1969 work, Bandits, is ‘one of the 
most universal phenomena known to history’, in which the landless poor, 
‘oppressed and exploited’ by their class- or economic-superiors, turn to 
banditry and manage, by means of primitive rebellion, to ascend above the 
level of ‘common criminal’ in public opinion.70 Pirates, according to Rediker et 
al, shared many of the features of Hobsbawm’s social bandits, and not only in 
their ‘protest against oppression’ and ‘cry for vengeance’ identified by Rediker. 
Social banditry, for example, ‘tended to become epidemic in times of 
pauperisation and economic crisis’, and men were often driven to piracy by 
post-war slumps in trade and consequent unemployment and low wages, as 
we have been told by historians from Johnson to Rediker.71 Inasmuch as a 
social bandit gang ‘is outside the social order which fetters the poor, a 
brotherhood of the free, not a community of the subject’,72 the pirates 
described by Rediker, Hill, and Bromley fit rather well, if perhaps superficially, 
into the model. 
Hobsbawm’s description of social banditry is not without its critics, foremost 
among whom is Anton Blok, who considered the many forms of banditry not 
included in Hobsbawm’s analysis, and pronounced social banditry to be ‘a 
construct, stereotype, or figment of human imagination’.73 Blok argued that the 
true social bandit did not, in reality, exist, but that bandits who did not 
(perhaps could not) actually fit into Hobsbawm’s model might be raised to the 
status of social bandit in the consciousness of the peasants they moved 
amongst. Blok’s argument was rooted in the assumption that no bandit could 
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survive for long without the support of a powerful, non-peasant, protector. 
Once a bandit was drawn into a state of protection by some overlord, he was 
no longer a social bandit in Hobsbawm’s sense.74 
The labelling of pirates as social bandits is problematic, and not only because 
of the criticisms of Hobsbawm’s model. Even accepting that model, the extent 
to which pirates can really be fitted in needs some reassessment. It is 
significant that Hobsbawm himself did not include pirates in his own study of 
the social bandit phenomena, and even wrote that England ‘has no record of 
actual social bandits after, say, the early seventeenth century’.75 Pirates were 
not, as Rediker concedes, rural peasants as Hobsbawm’s social bandits are,76 
and they fail to fulfil other criteria set forth by Hobsbawm for the true social 
bandit. The pirates’ banditry was not always directed only at their superiors, or 
‘oppressors’, but at times also at their social and economic equals, the crews 
of merchant ships. Most important, is the idea that social bandits are ‘outlaws 
whom the lord and state regard as criminals, but who remain within peasant 
society, and are considered by their people as heroes, as champions, 
avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation’.77 Pirates 
were certainly regarded as criminals by lord and state, but did not spend much 
of their time living, in a physical sense, ‘within peasant society’. Most of their 
time was spent at sea, or amongst pirate-friendly communities in remote 
locations, only re-entering society on any permanent basis if they were 
fortunate enough to be able to retire from their banditry. Whether pirates were 
seen ‘by their people’ in the positive light required for inclusion in the social 
bandit model is also in doubt. Some pirates, at some times, acted in a way 
likely to inspire the hearts and minds of the crews of vessels they captured: as 
Rediker highlighted, they sometimes cast themselves as avengers or ‘fighters 
for justice’ on behalf of the crew against cruel masters and owners of 
merchantmen. The fact that many captured merchant sailors voluntarily joined 
pirate crews suggests that to some they were considered heroic to some 
extent, but to counter this argument it could be suggested that such 
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volunteers were lured by the prospect of quick riches and an easy work-load 
rather than lofty ideals, and that a very significant number of merchant-sailors 
chose not to join the pirates at all.78  
The model of pirate society, first put forward by Dow and Edmonds, but most 
deeply explored and illustrated by Rediker, has largely been accepted by 
historians whose primary focus has not necessarily been the social order of 
pirates, but upon whose work that social order has had some bearing. The 
two most recent studies of the groups of pirates who infested the Indian 
Ocean and the Caribbean respectively in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, have each borne hints of Rediker’s pirate social order in their titles: 
Jan Rogozinski’s Honor Among Thieves: Captain Kidd, Henry Every, and the 
Pirate Democracy in the Indian Ocean, and The Republic of Pirates, by Colin 
Woodard. Both books, in fact, are less about democracy and republicanism in 
the pirates’ social order than about the narrative history of piracy in particular 
regions, but nonetheless the egalitarian and democratic nature of pirate 
society espoused by Rediker et al influenced the way Rogozinski and 
Woodard perceived and understood the pirates’ activities. Woodard described 
Caribbean piracy of the eighteenth century as ‘resistance, a maritime revolt 
that shook the very foundations of the newly formed British Empire… fuelling 
the democratic sentiments that would later drive the American revolution. At 
its centre was a pirate republic, a zone of freedom in the midst of an 
authoritarian age’, and it was this quest for ‘freedom’ and democracy that 
drove Woodard’s pirates.79 On the other side of the world, in the Indian 
Ocean, Rogozinski’s pirates ‘created a way of life totally unlike anything back 
home or on other vessels’, leading ultimately to ‘absolute democracy’.80 For 
Rogozinski, the pirates’ democratic and egalitarian society was not 
necessarily what drove men to piracy, but was what enabled pirates to 
operate successfully for years on end, as lone crews and in consortship, at 
sea and ashore in their settlement at St. Mary’s Island, Madagascar. 
                                                 
78
 Grey, Pirates of the Eastern Seas, pp. 13-17 
79
 Woodard, Republic of Pirates, p. 1 
80
 Rogozinski, Honor Among Thieves, pp. 166-167 
 31 
Other historians, taking a more academic, less narrative, approach to pirate 
history, have also accepted Rediker’s model of a democratic and egalitarian 
pirate society. Kenneth J. Kinkor, in his study of racial tolerance and black 
pirates, assumes without explanation that pirates were social bandits, and a 
‘socially deviant subculture engaged in an inchoate maritime revolt’.81 Kinkor’s 
pirates, black and white, ‘adopted social mechanisms which can be 
summarized as libertarian, democratic, federal, egalitarian, fraternal, and 
communal’, in which men rejected the monarchical authority of the ancien 
régime in favour of a multi-cultural and international community, free from the 
hierarchies imposed by Church and state. It should be no surprise that 
Kinkor’s endnotes are filled with references to Hill, Bromley, and Rediker, but 
none of those authors are cited as often as Johnson. One important feature of 
Kinkor’s study, though, is that despite his central argument that ‘the deck of a 
pirate ship was the most empowering place for blacks’ in the eighteenth 
century, he is prepared to acknowledge that the lot of a black man captured 
by pirates was unpredictable, and he might just as easily be sold into slavery 
as invited to join the pirate crew.82 This admittance that the nature of pirate 
tolerance, their notions of equality and fraternity, might vary from ship to ship, 
might have been carried further had not the study been concerned primarily 
with the position of black pirates but with the nature of piratical society as a 
whole. Nonetheless, Kinkor used the evidence of a high proportion of black 
crewmen and even a few black officers on pirate ships to conclude that pirates 
were ‘unselfconsciously engaged in a unique social experiment’, but ‘were not 
a fully organized society of their own despite their conscious separation from 
society at large’.83 
Kinkor’s argument, and by association his interpretation of pirate society as 
truly egalitarian, has recently been criticised by Arne Bialuschewski who used 
an examination of the activities of one particular group of pirates to argue that 
pirates did not differ significantly from other inhabitants of the Atlantic world in 
their prejudice towards, and treatment of, black Africans and slaves. The 
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Anglo-American pirates who raided on the West-African coast in the few years 
after 1718, according to Bialuschewski, made no attempt to liberate the 
human cargo of captured slave-ships, but on the contrary exhibited an equal, 
or greater, disdain for their well-being. Slaves captured by pirates might be 
bartered for other commodities or simply abandoned, black women were 
objects of lust, and free black Africans who fell into the pirates hands might be 
sold into slavery. Pirates, according to Bialuschewski, ‘could embrace the 
brutal and atrocious practices of the slave trade’.84 In this article, and others, 
Bialuschewski questions the general acceptance of the egalitarian social 
revolutionary model of pirate society and the accepted motivations for the 
creation of that society, stating, for example, that ‘it is not so clear whether 
pirates and their associates ashore operated, over a longer time period, under 
their own hierarchies, and apart from traditional and legal structures’, and that 
‘there can be little doubt that a large number, probably an overwhelming 
majority of sea rovers, were driven by plain mercenary motives’.85 Excepting 
his work on pirates’ racial tolerance, or lack of it, Bialuschewski has not 
sought, however, to provide an answer to his questions about the nature of 
pirate society to any meaningful extent. 
Peter Earle and Joel Baer have been less concerned with the nature of pirate 
society than with the means and reasons for the suppression of piracy, and 
the relationship between pirates and the British legal system respectively. 
Nevertheless, their work could not be completed without reference to that 
society, and they too have largely accepted Rediker’s interpretation, insofar as 
they have accepted any. In attempting to answer the question of what 
motivated men to turn to piracy in the first place Earle gives the attraction of 
the pirate lifestyle more attention than potential monetary gain. A large part of 
this attraction was the relatively easy life, with a reduced workload and 
plentiful food and drink, the fact that a pirate ‘ship always sailed in pleasant 
weather’, freedom from ‘irksome discipline’, camaraderie, and an easy 
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informality.86 On the other hand, Earle also argued that there was a ‘political 
and ideological motive for joining a pirate crew’, in order to escape from the 
authoritarian and arbitrary discipline found in legitimate service, and to enter, 
instead, a community in which officers were routinely elected, and held in 
check by the threat of removal from office, and in which ‘collective decisions’ 
were made by majority vote.87 Baer, too, considered the egalitarian system 
enshrined in the pirates’ articles of agreement to be one of the causes of their 
long-term success, even suggesting the removal of a ship’s upper deck – a 
common practice amongst pirates – was as much about levelling class 
distinctions by the removal of officers’ cabins, as it was about improving the 
handling and speed of the vessel.88 
Not all of Rediker’s interpretations of the lot of eighteenth-century seamen 
have, as we have seen, met with universal acceptance, but only with the 2007 
publication of ‘Nascent Socialists or Resourceful Criminals?’ by Crystal 
Williams89 have his interpretations of pirate social history been directly 
challenged. Using evidence culled from printed trial reports, Rediker’s own 
work, and extensively from Johnson’s General History, Williams argued that 
‘Rediker obscures the truth by insisting on finding noble motivations behind 
the activities of pirates’.90 Instead, she argued that pirates were driven 
primarily by financial avarice rather than by lofty ideals. To Rediker’s 
arguments that pirates were banded together in a community, Williams 
responded by highlighting a number of desertions and mutinies that occurred 
aboard pirate vessels, and the high incidence of forced conscripts in the 
pirates’ ranks, to argue that there was ‘no common ethos’ to be found 
amongst the pirates, whose ‘ships were characterized by a lack of unity in 
purpose’.91 Williams accepted Rediker’s assessment that the social order of 
pirate ships was ‘unique’, but suggested that it was far from being as 
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egalitarian as Rediker posits, pointing to the arbitrariness and cruelty of some 
pirate captains such as Blackbeard. Rediker’s interpretation of the ‘justice’ 
inflicted by pirates upon ship masters who had mistreated their crews was 
convincingly countered by the citation of several instances of pirates cruelly 
treating, even torturing and murdering their captives of all ranks for numerous 
reasons, including ‘purely for pleasure’.92 Williams concluded that piracy was 
a product of ‘aberrant, criminal personalities rather than simple dissatisfaction 
with the social order’ of legitimate society. Rediker’s interpretation, she 
concluded, may hold true for certain pirates, ‘operating in large crews in the 
short time-frame prior to 1726’, but are ‘less valid’ for other pirates who did not 
fit into Rediker’s parameters.93 
By broadening the focus of research from the ten years examined by Rediker 
to a thirty-six year period, Williams drew attention to, but did not fully exploit, 
one of the critical weak-points of Rediker’s work: that the limits of his study do 
not allow for a proper exploration of the nature of Anglo-American pirate 
society as a whole, which certainly existed prior to 1716, or the ways in which 
the pirates’ social order developed and evolved over time. Williams’ study, 
while it presented several material facts omitted by Rediker, failed to overturn 
Rediker’s interpretation, but has provided an alternative model of pirates as 
greedy and bloodthirsty villains. As a study of pirate social history in its own 
right, Williams’ essay is a credible and well-reasoned analysis, but is marred 
firstly by the limited amount of archival source material, and secondly by an 
uncritical use of other sources, particularly Johnson’s General History, which 
she accepts as ‘mostly factual’.94 
The most recent development in the study of pirate society is to be found in 
the work of economist Peter T. Leeson. In a series of articles and a book, 
which contains a significant distillation of several of his earlier articles, Leeson 
has employed economic theory to explain the motivations behind certain 
pirate activities and some aspects of their social system. Leeson’s central 
argument is that the reasons for the pirates’ systems of democracy, racial 
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tolerance, behaviour towards their victims, and the institution of articles of 
agreement, can best be explained by means of ‘rational choice’ decision 
making processes. The theory of ‘rational choice’ as applied by Leeson to 
pirates, argues firstly that individuals (including pirates) are essentially self-
interested, secondly that they will choose the best (or most rational) way to 
achieve their self-interested ends, and thirdly that the rationale behind those 
choices will be based to some extent on the balance between the cost and 
benefit of any given activity: thus, the most rational decision for the self-
interested individual to make may vary over time as the costs and benefits of 
different activities fluctuate.95 Leeson argues ‘not just that economics can be 
applied to pirates, but that rational choice is the only way to truly understand 
flamboyant, bizarre, and downright shocking pirate practices’.96 As a means of 
understanding why pirates behaved in the ways they did, Leeson’s application 
of ‘rational choice’ is sensible, and to some extent self-evident. Exactly why 
certain choices made by pirates can be considered ‘rational’ is the subject of 
Leeson’s work, and his arguments are compelling. His assertion that  
while greater liberty, power sharing, and unity did prevail aboard pirate 
ships… these were piratical means, used to secure cooperation within 
pirates’ criminal organization, rather than piratical ends, as they’re often 
depicted,97 
is a refreshing foil to the traditional historiography. 
However, if Leeson’s work presents an interesting new interpretation of why 
pirates behaved in certain ways, it has made little attempt to re-assess how 
they behaved. For all that Leeson provides an alternative interpretation of 
pirate motives, his understanding of pirates’ activities and the nature of their 
social order is essentially the same as that of Rediker and Johnson, whom he 
cites freely and regularly. Leeson’s pirates routinely elected and deposed their 
officers, made important decisions by majority vote, were scrupulously 
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egalitarian in their division of plunder, and, like Kinkor’s maritime 
revolutionaries, were remarkably racially indiscriminate. 
The historiography of piratical society has, from the eighteenth century until 
today, largely been a picture of egalitarian and democratic community in 
which spoil was evenly shared and a hierarchical authority was eschewed in 
favour of elected officers, whose separated powers ensured that they could 
not abuse the power given to them by the collective will of the crew. Decisions 
not requiring an immediate resolution were referred to a public ballot in which 
universal suffrage ensured that the majority vote truly represented the will of 
the community. Punishment, when necessary, was only inflicted for infractions 
of the pirates’ own rules and sense of justice, and each infraction was judged 
impartially by a committee of pirates before punishment was carried out in the 
prescribed manner by the officer elected for that purpose. To a great extent, 
the nature of pirate society has been seen as a reaction to the undesirable 
elements of life in legitimate seafaring society, which could be cruel and 
arbitrary for the inhabitants of the lower deck, or, indeed, life in legitimate 
European society in general. By breaking with perceived societal norms the 
pirates created a unique and progressive community with enlightened ideas 
and ideals, far in advance of their time, from workers’ compensation to 
universal plebeian suffrage. Some historians have taken this contradistinction 
between pirate society and legitimate society as significant of a revolutionary 
spirit, in which pirates deliberately contravened the mores of their time as 
much for the sake of doing so as for any material benefit to be gained thereby. 
Recently, others have rejected this interpretation, such as Arne 
Bialuschewski, who wrote that the ‘trend in historiography to romanticize 
pirate bands as revolutionaries is not particularly helpful’.98 Nevertheless, the 
image of pirate communities as essentially egalitarian, democratic, and 
libertarian has dominated historiography. There has been some debate over 
the origins of, and motivations behind, this social system, but the model itself 
remains virtually intact. 
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In this thesis I will use pirates’ articles, or shipboard rules, to argue that the 
historiographical trend of portraying piratical society as somehow unique and 
defiant towards the mores of legitimate society is unrealistic. I will argue firstly 
that several of the concepts which have dominated the study of pirate social 
history, such as their perceived democracy and egalitarian division of profit, 
have been over-stated and that they were, in fact, much less prevalent than 
hitherto believed. Secondly, I will argue that pirates were not the innovative 
radicals with progressive ideas and social systems that they have been 
portrayed as, but that virtually all of their social systems were adopted or 
adapted from the systems of the legitimate societies of which they had been 
members before turning to piracy. Thirdly, I will argue that the actions of the 
pirates are most indicative of their desire to improve their own personal 
standing within the framework of legitimate society, that their society was 
formed not in ‘contradistinction’ to legitimate society but in emulation of it, and 
that their principal motivation in creating their piratical society in the manner in 
which they did was to elevate themselves to the ‘middling sort’. 
 
Primary sources. 
In addition to the much-used General History there are numerous primary and 
contemporary sources relating to pirates’ activities in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. There are, for example, many witness accounts written 
or dictated by the victims of piracy and those who were captured and spent 
time as prisoners of the pirates. Some, such as the accounts of William 
Snelgrave and Philip Ashton were published as books or pamphlets,99 others 
were written as private correspondence, often to employers, others were 
dictated to the forces of law and order under the auspices of the High Court of 
Admiralty, the Royal Navy, or colonial governments. Many appeared in the 
numerous newspapers printed in London, the provinces, and the colonies. 
Most of these accounts are naturally defensive and in many cases are likely to 
exaggerate the force of the pirate company, or their cruelty or fearsomeness, 
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to show the writer in the best light. In the case of correspondence between, 
say, a ship’s master and the vessels owners, the future employment of the 
writer might depend in great measure on his appearing blameless in the loss 
of his employers’ ship. But accounts written for the general public, either as 
pamphlets or as pieces for a newspaper, suffer the same problem: anybody 
who was not confident of hiding their own faults was unlikely to put pen to 
paper to broadcast their shortcomings. Accounts given by pirates’ victims to 
agents of the state, such as colonial governors or officers of the High Court of 
Admiralty, are even more loaded. Although some of these official witness 
statements were given by ships’ masters, many were also given by junior 
officers and foremastmen100 who were unlikely to be held responsible for the 
loss of their vessel or the cargo it carried. Nevertheless, by placing 
themselves in the hands of the authorities they risked being accused of 
complicity, and so as well as the natural desire to show oneself in the best 
light, they also had to avoid any hint that they might have been anything but 
completely unwilling victims. It was literally more than their life was worth to 
give even a suggestion of admiration or approval of anything the pirates did. 
This is particularly unfortunate for the researcher of pirate social history, as 
there were doubtless aspects of the pirates’ lifestyle about which these victim-
witnesses could have told a great deal had it been in their interests to do so. 
This is a problem with most sources relating to the pirates’ every day life: it 
was rarely in anybody’s interest to say anything good about piracy. The 
papers of the High Court of Admiralty, and some of the correspondence 
between colonial officials and their overseers, the Lords of Trade and 
Plantations, contain many witness reports given not only by the pirates’ 
victims, but also by captured pirates themselves. For the pirates, the only real 
hope of mercy lay in gaining the sympathy of the court that was to try them, 
which was unlikely if they appeared to fond of the piratical life. Nonetheless, 
many witness accounts do contain numerous useful details about how pirate 
society was organised and how piratical communities operated on a day to 
day basis. Frequently this collateral information is used to illustrate the 
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witness’s innocence, or for some other purpose of either self-defence or 
vilifying the pirates, and there must be cases where a hidden agenda exists 
but is undecipherable to the modern researcher, but on the whole much of the 
information about social aspects of the pirates’ life is believable and realistic, 
especially where more than one independent source makes the same point, 
even if it must sometimes be treated with caution. 
Written transcripts of trials for piracy are also a bountiful source of information 
about pirate society, especially as they often contain dialogue between both 
victims and accused, but again caution must be exercised because of the 
highly charged nature of the event. For the pirates it was a matter of life and 
death to be seen in the best light, and it was often in the witnesses’ interests 
to paint the pirates in the worst light possible. Even pirates who had managed 
to acquire a pardon or early acquittal in exchange for testifying against their 
former shipmates had an interest in keeping the court happy and seeing the 
men they had betrayed executed. 
The primary sources used in this study include many witness statements and 
statements from the pirates themselves. In manuscript form the Oyer and 
Terminer ‘informations’ (statements voluntarily given) and ‘examinations’ 
(statements obtained by interrogation) given in Doctors’ Commons are the 
most numerous and are preserved in the papers of the High Court of 
Admiralty at the National Archives (HCA 1/51 – HCA 1/56), and others may be 
found in correspondence between colonial officials and the Lords of Trade 
and Plantations, also preserved in the National Archives (CO series). Other 
documents held at the National Archives include a number of trial transcripts, 
also found in the colonial correspondence and in the High Court of Admiralty 
papers (HCA 1/99), and in-letters from Royal Navy captains to the Lords of 
the Admiralty held in the ADM series, along with other useful Admiralty 
correspondence. 
Other piracy trials were of sufficient interest to the public, or politically 
important enough, to warrant printing and publication. There is no way to tell 
how much, if at all, the transcripts of the trial were edited before they were 
published, and how much information may have been expunged as a result. 
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However, the trial of Bartholomew Roberts’ crew appeared in no fewer than 
three different sources: a manuscript transcript was sent to the High Court of 
Admiralty and is preserved in HCA 1/99; a second version was printed for 
general publication;101 and the third was given to Johnson for his General 
History,102 presumably by John Atkins who originally transcribed the trial. 
Differences between the three accounts are minimal and insignificant, so if 
one trial can be taken as indicative of the others we may conclude that there 
was very little editing between the trial itself and the publication of its 
transcript. Several printed trial accounts include copies of testimonies given 
before the trial, and some include biographical or demographical information 
about the defendants. 
In this study I shall also make extensive use of the many newspaper reports of 
piratical activity, a printed resource which has been much neglected. 
Newspapers preserved in the Burney Collection and other collections contain 
literally hundreds of references to pirates, some of which contain very 
significant amounts of detail. These newspaper articles take a number of 
forms, from first-hand witness reports and second-hand articles based on 
witness reports, to anecdotes whose original source is unclear and may be 
little more than hearsay. Like most of the sources used, consideration must be 
given to the whims and mores of the editor and his intended audience, but 
taken as a body the newspaper reports are a very valuable resource. 
A full list of primary sources used in this study, both printed and manuscript, 
will be found in the bibliography. 
 
The ‘Golden Age’ of Piracy. 
The chronological limits of this thesis, determined largely by the survival of 
several sets of articles from the period between 1660 and 1730, are more or 
less coincidental with a period of maritime lawlessness that has come to be 
known as the ‘golden age’ of piracy. Historians have ascribed different limits 
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to the ‘golden age’, from the very broad, such as Patrick Pringle’s ‘great age’ 
of piracy which ‘began in the reign of Queen Elizabeth I and ended in the 
second decade of the eighteenth century,’103 to the very narrow, ten years or 
so from the middle of the second decade of the eighteenth century to the 
middle of the third decade, espoused by Rediker, Earle.104 A more moderate 
middle-ground can be found in the works of Joel Baer and others, whose 
‘golden ages’ begin sometime in the second half of the seventeenth century 
and end in the 1720s.105  
If there is no consensus on when the ‘golden age’ was, there is little argument 
on what it was. Most historians who have considered the question are unlikely 
to argue with Sherry’s assertion that during the ‘golden age’ the ‘world 
experienced the most intense outbreak of [Anglo-American] seaborne banditry 
ever recorded.’106 But the intensity of piracy during the ‘golden age’ was not 
merely a result of the number of pirates active during the period. Rediker’s 
quantitive analysis of the ‘golden age’ suggests that at its peak, between 1719 
and 1724, as many as 2,400 Anglophone pirates may have been active 
globally, but only around 4,000 in total for the decade between 1716 and 
1726,107 while Bialuschewski estimated that up to 1,500 European and 
American pirates were active in the Indian Ocean between 1695 and 1700. 
Between 1716 and 1725, by way of comparison, the Royal Navy employed 
around 13,000 seamen, and between 38,000 and 45,000 men sailed on 
merchant vessels from the British Isles alone.108 The number of pirates was 
formidable during the ‘golden age’, but not exceptionally high when compared 
to other periods in which piracy was rife, such as the early years of the 
seventeenth century when William Bishop was appointed admiral of a pirate 
fleet believed to number eleven ships and 1,000 men, who were expected to 
meet up with a further ten pirate companies, and Peter Easton alone was 
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rumoured to command 2,000 men.109 Quantitive analysis is therefore not 
enough to explain the phenomenon of the ‘golden age’, and the features that 
differentiate the period from other outbreaks of Anglophone piracy must be 
found in qualitative analysis. 
Several reasons can be found for the intensity of pirate activity during the 
‘golden age’ and its effect on English trade. In the first place, the growth of the 
English shipping enterprise during the seventeenth century meant that there 
were a great many more vessels on which pirates could prey. Between 1629 
and 1686 the total tonnage of English shipping nearly tripled, from 115,000 
tons to 340,000 tons, making potential targets substantially more numerous. 
Not only was there an absolute increase in shipping, but there was also a 
relative and absolute increase in vessels making deep-sea trans-oceanic 
voyages as the seventeenth-century colonisation of North America and the 
Caribbean served to increase trans-Atlantic trade, and the activities of the 
East India Company and its rivals had the same effect on trade with the Indian 
Ocean region.110 There were thus more English ships plying the world’s 
oceans, away from the immediate protection of the Royal Navy or other 
friendly ally and vulnerable to pirates, at the end of the seventeenth century 
than at the beginning.  
A second distinct feature of the ‘golden age’ of piracy was the establishment 
of a succession of bases, close to busy trade routes but remote from centres 
of authority and defensible enough to prevent easy capture, to which pirates 
could return to resupply and realise the value of their accumulated spoil. The 
first of these bases, and probably the most successful, was established on St. 
Mary’s Island, Madagascar, by Adam Baldridge, an agent of New York 
merchant Frederick Phillipse, in 1691. From then until 1697 pirate ships 
cruising in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea regularly visited Baldridge’s fortified 
trading post to exchange their spoil for food, drink, gunpowder, and a variety 
of commodities supplied from New York including clothes, tools and books. 
Under the protection of Baldridge’s guns, pirates could beach their vessels for 
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cleaning and refitting.111 After Baldridge as forced to flee St. Mary’s following a 
violent disagreement with the local Malagasy, to subsequent attempts to re-
establish a pirate base on the island met with some reasonable success, from 
1698-1708 and again in 1720-1722.112 In the Caribbean, the arrival of pirates 
under Hornigold’s command at New Providence in the Bahamas in late 1715 
marked the beginning of the settlement of that island by pirates who continued 
there, turning it into what one contemporary observer described as ‘a second 
Madagascar’, until the arrival of Woodes Rogers in 1718 with a squadron of 
naval warships and a company of soldiers to restore order and reclaim the 
island for the crown.113 Several other locations, such as the mouth of the 
Sierra Leone in Africa and Ocracoke Island in North America, were used as 
rendezvous and short-term bases by pirates throughout the ‘golden age’ of 
piracy, and the existence of these bases fundamentally changed the nature of 
piratical operations. Prior to the establishment of Baldridge’s trading post most 
pirates sailed on short cruises, from anywhere between a few months and a 
year or two, but always eventually returning to a ‘home’ port in England or the 
colonies, but once the market and stores of St. Mary’s became available to 
them pirates could cruise for prolonged periods, with many years elapsing 
between visits to legitimate ports. During the ‘golden age’, many men 
managed to spend their entire piratical careers away from a ‘home’ port. In 
some cases this meant several years: Robert Culliford, for example, left 
Rhode Island aboard the pirate ship Jacob in December 1690 and remained 
in the Indian Ocean until accepting a pardon nearly nine years later, having 
visited St. Mary’s island on several occasions in the intervening time.114 
The fact that these bases were spread across the world illustrates the 
expansion of the spatial limits of Anglo-American piracy, beginning in the 
second half of the seventeenth century. Although various individual ships 
made long voyages across the Atlantic or into the Indian Ocean, up to the 
middle of the seventeenth century the majority of English piracy occurred in 
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the waters around Europe and North Africa, preying on shipping in the 
Mediterranean, English Channel, Irish Channel, and Eastern Atlantic.115 
However, during the latter half of the seventeenth century pirates gradually 
abandoned their hunting grounds around Europe, though some piracy still 
occurred there, and began to explore the opportunities presented by the 
expansion of English trade with the Americas and East Indies, and by the end 
of the ‘golden age’ Anglo-American pirates had threatened shipping from 
Newfoundland to the Red Sea. On a scale not seen before or since, pirates 
broke out of essentially local waters, and groups of pirates, many of them 
known to one another, sailed many thousands of miles in search of spoil. 
Within three years of the arrival of Woodes Rogers in the New Providence, for 
example, pirates who had at some time used the Bahamas as a base had 
plundered shipping in the waters surrounding Newfoundland, West Africa, 
East Africa, India, North America, South America, the Caribbean, and the East 
Indies.116
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1. Pirate Articles. 
Pirate articles, by the simplest definition, were sets of rules, drawn up by 
pirates to maintain order and regulate behaviour that might be prejudicial to 
the safety of their vessel or the harmony of their community. Different groups 
of pirates drew up different sets of articles according to their differing 
convictions and circumstances, each set placing more or less emphasis on 
different aspects of their professional and social lives. Articles were 
formulated to apply to one pirate crew (that is, a collection of pirates all sailing 
on one vessel), but as crews grew bigger and eventually subdivided, the 
articles of the original crew might be applied to the whole company (a group of 
pirates sailing on two or more vessels, but under one overall command 
structure).117 On other occasions, when a pirate crew split into two or more 
separate crews, each under their own command, entirely new sets of articles 
might be drawn up,118 or the old articles revised.119 The evolution of pirate 
articles will be explored more fully in the Chapter 1.5. Rogozinski suggests 
that the fact that new crews tended to draw up their own articles rather than 
rely on those drawn up by their predecessors points to the important status 
these ship-board rules were imbued with by the pirates, who ‘did not simply 
copy the articles used on prior voyages. They discussed the usefulness of 
various provisions, adding or deleting as seemed best to the company’.120 
Nevertheless, points of correlation between the articles of Anstis and Philips, 
and especially between Lowther and Low’s articles, suggests that this was not 
always the case. 
What proportion of pirate crews made use of articles to regulate their society 
is impossible to quantify, but evidence suggests that an overwhelming 
majority did so. The surviving articles account for only a small fraction of the 
number of pirate crews active in the period, but other references to the use of 
articles by other pirate companies suggest that the practice was widespread. 
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Stede Bonnet’s articles do not survive, for example, but the signing of articles 
was an important indicator of guilt in the trial of some of his men.121 Phillip 
Lyne’s pirates forced captured sailors of the merchantman Thomasine to sign 
their articles in 1725;122 John Fenn’s company, which consisted of the 
remnants of Thomas Anstis’ company, had a contract ‘according to which they 
manag’d’.123 Du Bucquoy, the memorialist captive of John Taylor’s company, 
declared that every pirate ‘band or association has its laws and statutes’.124 
Bonnet and Fenn both belonged to the first ‘line of descent’ described by 
Rediker, along with Davis, Roberts, Anstis, Taylor and Phillips, and Lyne was 
a protégé of Low and Lowther, members of Rediker’s second line. The use of 
articles by these numerous pirates from both of the major groups operating in 
the eighteenth century suggests that the use of articles was widespread 
amongst them. Evidence for the use of articles amongst earlier pirates is more 
scant, but nevertheless suggests that articles were employed by them. 
Cusack’s company and the crew of the Camelion had little contact with other 
pirates of the age, but the fact that both crews independently drew up articles 
is indicative of common practice. Before setting off on his disastrous 
privateering voyage, Captain William Kidd and his backers agreed the ship’s 
articles, and at New York Kidd supplemented his crew with extra men, many 
of whom were recruited from amongst former buccaneers, privateers and 
pirates. Four days out of port the new elements of the crew insisted on 
altering the ship’s articles, bringing them more in line with the buccaneering 
articles they were familiar with.125 Some of the pirates operating in the Indian 
Ocean, which Kidd was sent to hunt down, had connections with the 
Caribbean buccaneers, whose use of articles was, according to Esquemeling, 
widespread.126 
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1.1. The Origin and History of Pirate Articles. 
The idea of a community of outlaws drawing up rules and regulations on such 
a large scale seems, at first, a little incongruous. Nevertheless, the evidence 
that several hundreds, if not thousands, of pirates did so is extensive. It is 
difficult for pirates to be credited with much originality in this respects, as 
many occupational groups were, at this time, in the habit of using rules or 
articles similar to those of the pirates, and the existence of articles amongst 
these other groups has led to speculation whether pirates were inspired to 
create their own articles by one or more of them. Many of the pirate 
companies who cruised in the Indian Ocean during the 1680s and early 1690s 
had their origins in the bands of Caribbean buccaneers displaced from their 
cruising grounds around South America,127 and so it is reasonable to assume, 
as some historians have, that pirate articles had their origins in the 
buccaneering articles, such as those described by Esquemeling.128 There are, 
however, some problems with the application of this hypothesis to other 
pirates. While it is probable that some sets of pirate articles were influenced in 
their content by earlier buccaneering articles, it is unlikely that the concept of 
creating articles was passed directly from buccaneers to the majority of 
pirates. Of the pirate crews whose articles survive, none had any direct root in 
the buccaneer companies of the seventeenth-century Caribbean, or indeed 
with Indian Ocean pirates of the 1690s. More importantly, the earliest 
recorded pirate articles (George Cusack’s) are roughly contemporaneous with 
the earliest recorded buccaneer articles (those described by Esquemeling), 
suggesting that pirate articles and buccaneer articles shared a common 
predecessor. 
This is the stance taken by Pringle, who states that ‘like the articles of the 
buccaneers, [pirate articles] were based on the articles normally in force on 
privateers, with which many of the pirates were familiar’, a view shared by 
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other historians.129 Many buccaneers and pirates alike were familiar with the 
practices of privateers: the buccaneers because they went to such lengths to 
secure the status afforded by privateering commissions, and pirates because 
many of them had served on privateers before turning to piracy.130 Privateers 
frequently operated under codified articles, and the practice went back at least 
to the Elizabethan period. The set of privateer articles preserved in the tracts 
of Sir William Monson contains several clauses very similar to those found in 
the articles of later privateers and pirates, dealing with matters such as 
mutiny, fighting amongst the crew, division of plunder, and theft from the 
company or comrades.131 The presence of these similar clauses in many, or 
most, sets of articles suggests a rough continuity about some of the kinds of 
issues that articles were intended to deal with.  
Privateers’ articles were the closest in form to those adopted by buccaneers 
and pirates, but almost every seaman would, at some point, have come into 
contact with some form of written agreement, or formalised rules governing 
behaviour. Any sailor passing through the Royal Navy after the Restoration 
would have found themselves subject to the various regulations and 
instructions introduced at various times from 1663 and eventually codified and 
printed in 1731.132 Wage contracts for merchant seamen were not regulated 
by act of Parliament until 1729,133 but had been employed by ship-masters 
increasingly throughout the seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries. 
These wage contracts usually stipulated the nature of the voyage to be 
undertaken, destination and ports of call, and, of course, the wages payable 
to each man.134 Similar contracts, stipulating shares rather than wages, were 
also regularly used in the Newfoundland fishery from the second half of the 
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seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth.135 On occasion, the 
crews of privateering vessels signed individual contracts in place of their 
communal articles, and in these cases the contracts might also be used to 
regulate behaviour. Sailors of the ‘Spanish Expedition’ of 1694, for example, 
signed contracts which set down their monthly wage and the destination and 
duration of the proposed voyage, but also required them to ‘civilly and 
courteously behave and demean’ themselves toward the officers, to render a 
‘just and true Account’ of all money and goods which came into their hands, 
and to ‘observe all such Rules as the Commander shall direct’.136 It could be 
argued that the content of privateering articles was influenced by pirate 
articles, but the similarities between pirate articles and earlier privateering 
articles, such as those described by Sir William Monson in the early 
seventeenth century suggest that privateering articles influenced the content 
of pirate articles, rather than the other way round.137 
If pirates were inspired directly by privateering practice in their creation of 
articles to regulate behaviour, the same cannot be said of other, non-maritime 
criminal groups. As early as 1657, before Cusack’s pirates or Morgan’s 
buccaneers drew up their articles, highwaymen and other robbers around the 
London area were, according to a pamphlet purporting to have been written 
by a retired highwayman, operating under a codified set of practices. The 
pamphlet was ostensibly written to inform the public of the practices of 
highwaymen and other robbers so that they might be on their guard, but it also 
served to vilify the criminal underworld, and the inclusion of the oaths and 
rules adopted by highwaymen was part of that process, to terrify the reading 
public by highlighting just how well organised the criminal gangs were. 
Nevertheless, the fact of their inclusion serves to show how widespread the 
use of formal articles was, even at that relatively early date.  
New robbers admitted to a gang were administered an oath 
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by reading a charge of secrecy that what ever misfortune happens to 
cloud their freedom by rendering them as an object to Justice and Law, 
they shall conceal their complices to the death, burying in oblivion not 
onely his confederates, but also the manner of his enterance into that 
accursed way, and further they proceed to swear him, that if the Judges 
should further presse you on to a discovery of particulars, then you must 
cunningly create some men in your fancy… nor must conscience trouble 
you, but dispence with every impiety, and glory in the greatest 
iniquities.138 
With such an oath, the highwaymen sought to preserve the integrity of their 
outlaw community, and their declared intention to ‘grow old in the most 
exquisite practice of vice’ is similar to, for example, Cusack’s pirates’ 
resolution ‘to live and die with them in this their present design’, or the second 
of John Taylor’s articles, obliging ‘all to remain loyal and to assist their 
brethren in danger, on pain of death’. But oaths alone were not enough to 
ensure the integrity they sought, and the ‘converted’ highwayman went on to 
outline ‘some of the laws and customes of the City Thieves’. 
they are Governed by Laws and Orders, as an historian of that fraternity 
relateth. First, they have a Captain or Superior, whom all Thieves 
observantly obey, and he is the cunningest and oldest of that Trade; who 
appoints each man his station, reserving the wisest for the most 
desperate and most dangerous thefts, which their Law makes them 
submit unto, not passing his limits, nor undertaking greater matters than 
he is capable of.139 
Thus, within the ‘fraternity’ of highwaymen, a hierarchy was established, each 
man knowing his place as, as we shall see in Chapter 2, was the practice 
amongst pirate companies. To maintain the ‘fraternity’ highwaymen were 
required, like pirates, to suborn their personal quarrels, and ‘they never fall out 
one with another unlesse feignedly to avoyd suspition’. Avoiding suspicion 
was an elementary practical requirement of remaining in trade as a 
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highwayman, and just as some pirate articles dealt with the practical matters 
of remaining afloat, so the laws and orders of the highwaymen laid down rules 
governing how many of their number could visit taverns together, and how 
frequently. ‘Neither must they go two of them together through the City, or to 
speak familiarly together when they meet’. Instead, ‘they have their certain 
meeting places on every Satturday night, to give account of each exploit, the 
manner and the purchase of it’. For each successful robbery, like the pirates 
whose articles demanded frank and careful accounting, the highwaymen were 
required to declare all that they had taken, so that, like the pirates, it might be 
divided ‘amongst themselves according to their several shares’.140 If the 
content of the Devil’s Cabinet can be believed, then, highwaymen saw the 
cohesion and integrity of their society, the establishment of their hierarchy, the 
fair and proper division of spoil, and the practical requirements of their trade 
as important as the pirates did when it came to codifying their regulations. 
Other criminal groups may not have codified their practices into a set of 
written rules, but had similar concerns that were addressed in similar ways. 
The Blacks, a phrase used to describe several gangs of poachers and deer-
stealers who ravaged private parks in Hampshire and Berkshire in the early 
1720s, established their own hierarchies by electing their leaders and ‘Kingly 
Government’. Oaths were administered to new members, binding them to 
promises of obedience to ‘King John’ and their other leaders, and ‘to stand by 
one another to the last Extremity’.141 One young Black was sworn to ‘obey 
orders… and to make a faithful oath to be true.’142  
It appears then that articles, written or verbal, were used not only by pirates, 
but by other outlaws as well, to establish chains of command or hierarchies, 
and to prevent indiscipline that might lead to anarchy. But the necessity for 
order might also be felt by those who, while not in themselves criminals, were 
nevertheless outlaws in the sense that they were beyond the reach of the laws 
they would otherwise have been subject to, and protected by. One of the most 
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striking examples of these groups comprised the American seamen, naval 
and privateer, who were captured and held as prisoners of war in English 
prisons during the American War of Independence (1775-1783) and the War 
of 1812 (1812-1814). In the course of those two conflicts many thousands of 
American seamen were captured and incarcerated in prison ships or purpose-
built prisons such as Dartmoor.143 In overcrowded and unpleasant conditions 
these men were forced, for their own survival, to co-exist as peacefully as 
possible. As Dartmoor inmate Charles Andrews explained, ‘honesty and 
integrity are but mere chimeras in dire necessity. Such was our situation, that 
it resembled more a state of nature than a civilised society’, and in order to 
‘provide a remedy against this evil, we appointed a legislative body, to form a 
code of laws’.144 Similar practices had been used in the Mill Prison during the 
War of Independence, where ‘the prisoners… adventured to form themselves 
into a republic, framed a constitution and enacted wholesome laws, with 
suitable penalties’.145 
The articles drawn up by prisoners of war held in the Mill and aboard the 
prison ship Jersey during the War of Independence, and in Dartmoor during 
the War of 1812 largely dealt with the familiar subjects of the preservation of 
the community and the practical necessities of surviving confinement. In the 
Mill and in Dartmoor gambling was prohibited, and in Dartmoor and on the 
Jersey smoking was restricted to outside spaces, and theft and fraud 
punished severely. Personal cleanliness held a high priority for men confined 
in close proximity to one another: aboard the Jersey ‘personal cleanliness 
should be observed, as far as was possible’, and in Dartmoor anyone found 
washing in the communal well was fined. Likewise, in Dartmoor, any prisoner 
‘found guilty of makeing any neusance [i.e. defecating] (except in the 
Necessary), shall be made to clean the same and pay one Shilling’. These 
articles were enforced by the prisoners themselves and overseen by their own 
elected representatives. In Dartmoor a ‘committee’ was elected by majority 
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vote, while in the Mill two men from each ship’s crew were appointed for the 
task. Aboard the Jersey, each punishment was approved by general 
consensus, with the senior officer present acting as judge. In each of these 
cases the articles were written down and, in the Mill and on the Jersey at 
least, were read out to the assembled prisoners before being ‘stuck up’, and 
before any punishment for their infraction was carried out.146 The extent to 
which these voluntary laws were adhered to is difficult to gauge.  
It is an astonishing fact that any rules, thus made, should have so long 
existed and been enforced among a multitude of men situated as we 
were; so numerous, and composed of individuals of that class of human 
beings who are not easily controlled, and usually not the most ardent 
supporters of good order 
but on the Jersey they seem to have been voluntarily complied with, even by 
the ‘many foreigners among our number’.147 
 
1.2. Drawing Up and Signing Articles. 
Because of the practical necessity of maintaining some kind of order aboard 
any ship, including pirate vessels, the drawing up of articles was often among 
the first acts of a new pirate crew. The ‘obligation’ subscribed to by Cusack’s 
crew was drawn up on the very day of the mutiny which led to their piracy, and 
the crew of the Camelion drew up their articles only a day after their own 
mutiny.148 According to Charles Johnson, Howell Davis’s crew drew up their 
articles immediately after taking over their ship and electing Davis 
commander. Johnson probably had a good witness in John Massey for his 
account of the early part of Lowther’s career, so is fairly credible when he 
describes how Lowther and his crew drew up their articles shortly after getting 
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to sea, following their mutiny on the African coast.149 Not all of the surviving 
sets of articles were drawn up at the beginning of piratical cruises. John 
Gow’s articles make reference to his ship being aground, suggesting that they 
were drawn up towards the end of his short career, and at a time when his 
hitherto autocratic command was disintegrating.150 Bartholomew Roberts’ 
articles, according to Johnson, were also drawn up long after the start of that 
pirate’s command, following the supposed desertion of Kennedy, his Irish 
lieutenant, and also perhaps at a time when the command structure and 
former articles were slipping into disarray.151 In these cases, the articles were 
drawn up not to establish order, but because the system of maintaining order 
which had already been in place was becoming, or believed to be becoming, 
progressively less stable. The similarity of Low’s articles to Lowther’s 
suggests that the former crew adopted their articles when they met the latter, 
probably as a condition of being allowed to join with them, and retained them 
after the two crews parted company. 
Having established the need for some mechanism to maintain order the 
pirates’ next task was to draw up the content of their articles. Whether this 
was done by one person, a select committee, or by the whole crew, varied 
from ship to ship. Cusack and his lieutenant perhaps devised the obligation 
subscribed to by Cusack’s crew.152 The articles aboard the Revenge ‘were 
written with Gow’s own Hand’, while John Copping, a member of the crew with 
no apparent command role, drew up the articles of the Camelion.153 In the 
case of John Phillips and his crew, Johnson recounts that ‘the first Thing they 
now to do, was to choose Officers, draw up articles, and settle their little 
Commonwealth’, suggesting that, at least in a small crew (Phillips and his 
crew numbered only five at this point), articles might be the product of the 
collective will.154 Whoever devised and wrote the articles, though, was less 
significant than the fact that they had to be agreed upon, more or less, by the 
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whole company if they were to be subscribed to. The signing of articles was a 
ceremony conducted in a solemn and earnest manner, usually attended by 
the company making an oath in turn, which was ‘sworn to upon the Bible’, 
perhaps consummated with a glass of sea-water and gunpowder.155 The 
articles of John Taylor’s company were ‘agreed by consensus and signed by 
the interested parties who intend to uphold them by placing, in the English 
fashion, two fingers on a bible’.156 John Phillips’ company were somewhat less 
orthodox and, having drawn up their articles, ‘all swore to ‘em upon a Hatchet 
for want of a Bible’.157 
For newly joined members of a pre-existing pirate company, subscription to 
the articles was an important part of their induction. Clement Downing wrote 
‘when ever any enter on board of these [pirate] ships voluntarily, they are 
obliged to sign all their Articles of Agreement’.158 This was certainly true of 
Roberts’ crew, in which ‘all are obliged’ to sign articles, and of many others.159 
In the courts appointed for the trial of pirates the signing of articles was just as 
significant an indicator of guilt as actually having taken part in piratical 
robbery. William Ingrams, a volunteer pirate whose claims to have been 
forcibly conscripted were dismissed at his trial, claimed that upon his capture 
he was forced ‘to sign their Articles of Piracy, and also to swear to be true to 
that Crew’.160 The court chose not to believe him and he was ‘Condemn’d for 
voluntarily, going on board a pirate-ship… and signing the Articles’.161 William 
Blades tried, albeit in vain, to use the fact that he had not signed articles as a 
defence in court.162 Some new recruits ‘signed the Pyrates Articles very 
willingly’, even ‘with a great deal of Alacrity’,163 but not all new members of a 
pirate company were willing volunteers: many were men forcibly conscripted 
either because of their specialist trade or to make up numbers. These men 
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were also required to sign the articles, but often needed persuasion, the threat 
of violence, actual violence, or a combination of those things, as 
encouragement to do so. When Phillip Ashton was taken by Ned Low’s 
pirates, Low ‘according to the Pirates usual Custom, and in their proper 
Dialect, asked me If I would sign their Articles, and go along with them’. Later 
Low ‘came up to us again, and asked the old Question, Whether we would 
sign their Articles’, and when Ashton persisted in his refusal he ‘was assaulted 
with Temptations of another kind, in hopes to win me over’. Despite being 
plied with drink and promised spoil, Ashton continued to refuse and was finally 
dragged up on deck where Low pointed a pistol at him and exclaimed ‘if you 
will not sign our Articles, and go along with me, I’ll shoot you thro’ the Head’. 
Still Ashton refused, but the pirates continued ‘once a Week of Fortnight, as 
the Evil Spirit moved them, to… anew demand my signing their Articles and 
joining with them’.164 Bridstock Weaver was called into the cabin of the 
Roberts’ ship, from where, ‘two Negroes with loaded Pistols were presently 
afterward called’, where ‘they put Pistols to the Breaste of the Examinate’, and 
threatened to shoot ‘if they refused to sign their Articles’.165 The threat of 
violence to induce unwilling conscripts to sign articles was common but the 
method used could be more subtle. When William Phillips was captured by 
Roberts’ crew he was ‘obliged to Sign the Pyrates Articles that Night, for that a 
pistol was laid upon the Table to force him to it’.166 William Ingrams described 
a highly elaborate ceremony, in which he was probably a participant, but 
probably not the victim as he claimed: ‘When I came on board the Good 
Fortune, they gave me their articles to sign, seating me with a Bible to swear 
upon before a large looking-glass, and placing two men behind me with 
loaded pistols to shoot me if I refused’.167 While the original members of a 
pirate company drawing up articles may have had some say in their content, 
new subscribers to the articles, whether volunteer of forced, had no means at 
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their disposal to dictate any part of them before signing, and indeed may not 
have even known their contents before agreeing to sign: in Low’s company, 
new recruits were kept ‘ignorant of our Articles, we never exposing them to 
any till they are going to sign them’.168 
 
1.3. The Stated Importance of Articles.  
The question remains, though, whether, having drawn up articles, agreed to 
them and signed them, pirates afterwards paid any heed to them, or whether 
they could be conveniently ignored as it suited their purposes. Ned Low told 
George Roberts that the articles ‘cemented them together’, and ‘were signed 
and swore to by them all, as the standing rule of their duty, by which only they 
could decide and settle controversies and differences among themselves; the 
least breach of which would be a precedent for the like infractions’, while 
another member of his company explained that ‘if it were once admitted that a 
man, through passion, or the like, should be excused breaking [the articles], 
there would be an end to their society’. Strong sentiments indeed, and 
perhaps not entirely devoid of rhetoric, but Roberts’ experiences as a prisoner 
of Low suggest that the articles really were applied with rigour. Roberts was 
approached by three of his old shipmates who had turned to piracy and told 
that if he pretended to be married he could not be forced to join Low’s crew, 
for they had all sworn an article ‘not to force any married man, against his will’. 
Furthermore, the three men hoped that Roberts would be freed and while they 
wished they could go with him they could not, for it was forbidden by the 
articles. They also begged Roberts not to tell anyone they had spoken to him, 
as another article made it punishable by death ‘to hold any secret 
correspondence with a prisoner’, and they ‘were sure it would cost them no 
smaller a price… than their lives’.169 Philip Ashton also knew enough of the 
pirates’ adherence to their articles to be relieved for his physical safety when 
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he learned that ‘it was one of their Articles, Not to draw Blood, or take away 
the Life of any Man, after they had given him Quarter’.170 
Adherence to the articles was not limited to Low’s company, and William 
Snelgrave’s experiences as a captive of Cocklyn and Davis were similar in 
this respect to George Roberts’. On Davis’ ship it was a rule not to allow 
women, nor to rape any woman they came across, and ‘being a good political 
rule, to prevent disturbances amongst them, it is strictly observed’. On another 
occasion, when Cocklyn’s boatswain attempted to kill Snelgrave, many of the 
crew voted to have him flogged for violating ‘that maxim established amongst 
them, not to permit any ill usage of their prisoners after quarter given’.171 
Evidence given at the trial of Bartholomew Roberts’ crew suggests that 
articles specifying rewards rather than punishments were also applied in 
practice, each member of a boarding party actually receiving the suit of 
clothes to which he was entitled.172 
Low’s powerful sentiments notwithstanding, the general adherence to the 
articles does not necessarily mean that they were inviolable. In the incident 
mentioned above between Snelgrave and the pirate boatswain, the 
transgressor of the articles was saved from punishment by Snelgrave’s own 
intervention. Du Bucquoy noted that Taylor’s article guaranteeing the safety of 
those who surrendered was ‘not generally applied to pirates who are drunk’.173 
Neither were the articles immutable, and in cases where one individual clause 
came into conflict with another, there was plenty of room for the articles to be 
manipulated to serve a particular purpose. Quartermaster John Russell, for 
example, was accused of trying to break the articles, which his office was 
charged to uphold, when he tried to force George Roberts to serve as a 
navigator to the pirate company. Russell then resolved to make Roberts 
volunteer (which was perfectly permissible) by making his alternative 
prospects as bleak as possible, allowing Roberts the return of his vessel and 
a boy to help sail her, but not his stores or mate, who had entered with the 
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pirates. This might, claimed some of the pirates, be construed as condemning 
a man who had been given quarter to a lingering death from starvation at sea, 
a violation of a second article not to harm surrendering prisoners. Russell, 
however, successfully argued his case, that to force the mate to go with 
Roberts, after he had volunteered to join the pirates, was equally an infraction 
of their articles. He was, in fact, upholding the articles in the face of opposition 
from many of the rest of the company: if he was not to be permitted to break 
the articles for the good of the company, then he would prevent anyone else 
from doing so for the good of their victim.174 
Russell’s gun-deck lawyering aside, pirates knew that the articles had been 
drawn up for the good of the company, regulating behaviour that was, or might 
turn, prejudicial to the ongoing cohesion and success of their community. If 
pirates had been willing to ignore or dispense with the articles when they did 
not suit their immediate whims then there would have been no point in 
creating them in the first place. 
 
1.4. The Surviving Articles. 
Of all the sets of pirate articles that must have existed in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries only nine have survived in a complete form to the present 
day: those of George Cusack and Nicholas Clough from the seventeenth 
century, and from the eighteenth century, those of John Taylor, Bartholomew 
Roberts, Thomas Anstis, George Lowther, Edward Low, John Philips and 
John Gow. Other pirate articles, particularly those of Howell Davis and 
Thomas Cocklyn have survived in partial form. Numerous sets of privateer 
articles have also survived, including at least two sets used by privateer 
companies who later turned to piracy: of these, it is not at all clear that 
Thomas Tew’s privateering articles remained in force after the transition from 
legitimate plundering to piracy, but evidence from the trial of William Kidd 
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suggests that his privateering articles were retained after his privateering 
company turned pirate.175 
Of the surviving sets of pirate articles, those of Roberts, Lowther, and Philips 
have been most often quoted by historians,176 not because they possess any 
intrinsic value, but because they were originally printed in the General History, 
and are thus the most accessible and familiar. Low’s articles, originally printed 
in the Boston News-Letter and reprinted in Dow and Edmonds’ Pirates of the 
New England Coast,177 have also been quoted on occasion. The other 
surviving sets of articles have been virtually overlooked: Clough’s articles 
were quoted in full by Pringle;178 Taylor’s articles formed part of the basis for 
Rogozinski’s discussion of pirate social structure;179 and Peter Earle appears 
to have been the first historian to recognize the existence of Anstis’ articles.180 
With those exceptions, none of the articles written by the companies of 
Cusack, Clough, Taylor, Anstis, or Gow have received any attention from 
historians. The reason for this omission is explained by the fact that the 
articles printed in the General History, and to a lesser extent Low’s articles, 
are so much more easily accessible. This sub-chapter will consider the origin 
and means of survival to the present day of all nine sets of pirate articles. 
The arrest in the Thames of George Cusack and several of his, largely Irish, 
pirate crew was the cause of a minor sensation in 1674. The trial of the 
captured pirates in January 1675 was one of the earliest piracy trials to 
appear in print for the consumption of the general public. Through the printed 
trial account and two contemporaneous news pamphlets, the details of the 
latter part of Cusack’s piratical career are well attested to. The first of these 
pamphlets, News from Sea: or, The Takeing of the Cruel Pirate, was published 
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between the pirates’ arrest and their trial, and describes in detail the chain of 
events leading to their downfall. It also hints that Cusack’s career as a pirate 
had begun much earlier, and that he had for some time practised his trade in 
the Caribbean.181 The six-page pamphlet contained all the information then 
available, but being printed so soon after the arrest of the pirates, the 
anonymous author had little time to flesh out the earlier part of Cusack’s 
career. 
Readers interested in Cusack’s early life had to wait until the publication, 
following his trial, of a second, considerably longer, pamphlet entitled The 
Grand Pyrate: or, the Life and Death of Capt. George Cusack. Claims about 
Cusack’s early career in the Caribbean were given more detail in this second 
pamphlet, which detailed Cusack’s career from the time he turned pirate in 
1668. According to The Grand Pyrate, Cusack, then gunner of the Hopewell of 
Tangier, led a violent mutiny in the Atlantic and took command of the vessel. 
The officers and men opposed to the mutiny were cast adrift in the ship’s long-
boat, while the mutineers rifled the captain’s papers and possessions. 
Resolved to embark on a course of piracy, Cusack and the mutineers drew up 
an ‘Obligation’, or charter, agreeing on the division of spoil and declaring 
obedience to Cusack, as captain, and one Richard Parslow as lieutenant.182 
How accurate the story of Cusack’s early career, as told in The Grand Pyrate, 
may be, is hard to determine. The level of detail given by the ‘Impartial Hand’ 
who penned the account suggests a certain amount of research or a great 
dedication to meticulous invention. Where the Obligation is concerned, for 
example, The Grand Pyrate not only lists the members of the crew who 
signed the document, but also whether they were willing volunteers or 
constrained to do so, as well as listing all those crew members that did not 
sign. About the latter part of Cusack’s career, The Grand Pyrate is 
substantially in agreement with both the earlier pamphlet and the printed 
account of the trial, but since both those accounts were readily available 
before the publication of The Grand Pyrate, this correlation tells us little about 
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the veracity of the latter pamphlet, except that its author chose to use 
accurate source material when it was available. Other small points may 
indicate that Cusack’s early career was well researched. For example, the 
account contains a transcript of a letter from one Richard Wharton of New 
England.183 Not only was Wharton a genuine inhabitant of Boston, he was 
involved in the shadier side of that city’s maritime economy and was 
described by a contemporary as ‘a great undertaker for pirates and promoter 
of irregular trade’.184 Whether or not Wharton really wrote the letter attributed 
to him, he was certainly a person who might have done, so if that part of the 
account is not true then it is, at least, an entirely believable piece of fiction. 
The same conclusion can be drawn of the Obligation written by Cusack’s 
crew. There is no empirical corroborative evidence that ‘Impartial Hand’s’ 
sources of information were reliable, but neither is there any real reason to 
doubt them. The anonymous author would certainly have had the opportunity 
to meet and interview Cusack and his pirates while they were incarcerated in 
the Marshalsea prison awaiting trial, and it may be that, if his account of the 
Obligation was not pure invention, it came from the personal recollection of 
Cusack or another. Two key facts stand out that may be indicative of how 
reliable The Grand Pyrate might be in respect of the existence and contents of 
Cusack’s Obligation. Firstly, there is nothing in the Obligation that might be 
deemed particularly progressive or radical for the time in which they were 
supposedly written. The most unusual thing about the Obligation is that it was 
drawn up by pirates. This in itself is the second point of interest. Accepting 
that the Obligation really existed, and in the form presented in The Grand 
Pyrate, it is the earliest such agreement recorded as being created and used 
by pirates. Even if the Obligation was invented for the purposes of the story, it 
was still the first such agreement to appear in print. Thus, the pirates, or the 
author, were not drawing on an earlier tradition, and the Obligation was not 
inserted into the text to make it more believable to readers.  
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We can be on much surer ground with the articles drawn up by the crew of the 
Camelion, a London slave-ship who mutinied against the ship’s owners and 
turned to piracy in 1683 under the command of Nicholas Clough, who had 
been master of the ship since she left London. Following their capture, Clough 
and his company were tried in New York and the original signed copy of their 
articles was preserved amongst the indictments. It was originally reprinted in 
1892, along with other documents relating to the case, in a collection of legal 
documents from the Surrogate’s Office, New York,185 and again in Jameson’s 
Privateering and Piracy in 1923. Clough’s articles are the only set to have 
survived intact. 
No pirate articles have survived from the great wave of piracy in the Indian 
Ocean in the 1690s, or from the early part of the eighteenth century, and the 
next sets of articles of whose content we are aware are those of Howell Davis 
and Thomas Cocklyn, from 1719. Howell Davis left New Providence in 1718 
as mate of the Buck, a privateer sent out by Woodes Rogers, by that time 
Governor of the Bahamas, on a trading voyage. On the coast of Hispaniola he 
led a mutiny, took command of the vessel, and led the crew on a course of 
piracy that ranged from the Caribbean to the coast of Africa until his death in 
July 1719.186 During his career Davis consorted and associated with a number 
of other pirate crews, including those of Thomas Cocklyn and Oliver la Buse, 
who had been members of the Flying Gang.187 The articles of Howell Davis’ 
company, unfortunately, have not survived in any complete form, but three 
clauses were recorded by William Snelgrave, one time captive of Thomas 
Cocklyn, which may have been in force in Davis’ crew.188 Of all the pirate-
captive memorialists, Snelgrave appears to have been the most 
straightforwardly honest. To be sure, he was writing for an audience who were 
antagonistic towards pirates, but characterised individual pirates in a good 
light nearly as often as he condemned them. There was also undoubtedly an 
element of self-justification in his work, though it was published 15 years after 
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the events it describes, but this need not have affected the collateral 
information contained in his account. 
John Taylor’s articles, too, were recorded by a captive, who, like Snelgrave, 
painted a very balanced picture of life aboard the pirate ship, praising Taylor 
for his qualities as well as criticizing him for his faults. Taylor was one of the 
crew of the Buck who joined in the mutiny led by Davis, and by the time they 
captured William Snelgrave held the rank of sailing master.189 In the early 
summer of 1719 Davis was deposed from his command and Taylor elected in 
his place. Taylor’s first stint in command of a pirate crew was short-lived, and 
within a few days he too was voted out of office and Davis resumed 
command. Apparently dissatisfied by this turn of events, Taylor and some of 
his followers left  Davis’ crew and transferred themselves to the ship 
commanded by Thomas Cocklyn, which was then sailing in consort with 
Davis.190 Shortly afterwards, Cocklyn and la Buse parted company with 
Davis,191 and sailed for the Indian Ocean, where Cocklyn died and Taylor was 
elected to replace him.192 In July 1720, now sailing in consort with Edward 
England, they met with two East India Company vessels and fought a fierce 
engagement, during which the Cassandra was captured and the Greenwich 
fled.193 Following the battle, England was deposed from his command and 
Taylor eventually transferred himself to the refitted Cassandra.194  
While cruising in the Indian Ocean Taylor’s company attacked a small Dutch 
settlement in Delagoa (now Maputo) Bay, Mozambique, and carried off many 
of the settlement’s officers, including a hydrographer named Jacob de 
Bucquoy, whose account of his time as a captive of the pirates, first published 
in French in 1744, is enlightening. De Bucquoy spent several months in the 
company of Taylor and his men, mingling freely, and sleeping in the captain’s 
cabin.195 His commentary on the personality of Taylor, and the social mores of 
the pirate company, as well as the narrative of their activities, is insightful and 
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extensive. De Bucquoy, naturally, claimed to detest the pirates’ chosen 
career, but comes across as very fair-minded and honest when describing 
Taylor personally. His portrayal of Taylor as a tough and efficient sailor and a 
leader of great courage is also borne out by descriptions of the pirate written 
by other captives who had met him, such as the East India Company officer 
Richard Lazenby,196 and particularly William Snelgrave, who described Taylor 
as ‘brisk and courageous’.197 There need be little doubt, then, of the integrity 
of this observant memorialist in the matter of his recitation of the articles in 
force under Taylor’s command.  
Another of Davis’ protégés, Bartholomew Roberts, entered a life of piracy 
when the merchantman, of which he was an officer, was captured by Davis, 
and he and several others joined the pirates. When Davis was killed during an 
attack on the Portuguese island of Principe, Roberts was elected to take over 
command.198 At some point during Roberts’ extensive career, possibly 
(according to Charles Johnson) following the supposed desertion in late 1719 
of one of Roberts’ lieutenants, Walter Kennedy, with most of the company’s 
accumulated spoil, new articles were drawn up.199 According to Johnson, 
Irishmen were excluded ‘from the benefit of’ the articles, on account of 
Kennedy’s desertion.200 
The articles drawn up by Bartholomew Roberts’ crew are quoted in the 
General History, and thus the accuracy of their recording is in some doubt. 
However, a careful analysis of the articles themselves and the background to 
Johnson’s chapter on Roberts’ crew suggests that they were faithfully 
recorded. In the first place, although Johnson wrote chapters about the 
exploits of thirty-four different pirate crews, he only included descriptions of 
their articles in three chapters. Thus, it can be surmised that Johnson was not 
habitually inclined to invent articles (as he did so much other material) where 
none were available for him to recount. In itself, this does not prove the 
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accuracy of Johnson’s recording, but it is suggestive. In the second place, 
Johnson has been described as ‘more reliable about Bartholomew Roberts 
than of other pirates’.201 As well as his probable association with captured 
pirates from Roberts’ crew such as Thomas Jones, Johnson almost certainly 
met and interviewed John Atkins, who was not only present at the eventual 
destruction of Roberts’ gang, but also acted as Register at their trial in 
1722.202 It was probably from Atkins that Johnson received his information 
about the content of the articles, so some doubt must still exist as to how 
much Atkins could have learned about the articles from the pirates he met, 
who would have been in no way keen to provide him with evidence against 
themselves, but several of Roberts’ men had been forced into the company 
and may have chosen to provide Atkins with information in the hopes of 
proving their own innocence. Furthermore, the published account of the trial 
contains evidence that directly corroborates some of the material in Johnson’s 
version of the articles. For example, Thomas Stretton deposed that ‘it was 
death or marooning to be found’ consulting with one another about ‘some 
manner of escape’, and two others deposed that each pirate was called in turn 
aboard a prize and ‘was allowed a shift… that is, a suit from top to toe’.203 By 
comparison, the articles recorded by Johnson include clauses stipulating that 
‘No man [was] to talk of breaking up their way of living’, and that ‘Every man 
[was] to be called fairly in turn, by list, on board of prizes… [and] allowed a 
shift of clothes’.  
The early careers of Thomas Anstis and many of his crew were spent as 
members of the crew of Howell Davis and subsequently Bartholomew 
Roberts.204 In April 1721 Roberts ordered Anstis to take command of the 
Good Fortune, one of his consort vessels, with a crew of about forty pirates, 
including a number of forced men and Thomas Jones, who had earlier fought 
with Roberts and been severely punished. Charles Johnson claimed that 
Anstis himself was also discontented with Roberts’ command because of ‘the 
inferiority he stood in, with respect to Roberts, who carried himself with a 
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haughty and magisterial air’ and ‘left [the crew of the Good Fortune] no more 
than the refuse of their plunder’. Johnson’s evidence here is, as always, 
inherently unreliable, and no other evidence exists to corroborate Anstis’ 
motives, but there was certainly some disagreement between Roberts and 
Anstis, for three nights after being appointed to command the Good Fortune, 
Anstis and his followers slipped away in the dark.205  
Anstis and his men later claimed that they ran away from Roberts in order to 
petition for a pardon, but their petition was not written until they had pursued 
an independent course of piracy for fourteen months. After sending their 
petition by a ship they met with, the pirates proceeded to the island of Rattan, 
where they waited for a response and their hoped-for pardon. When no such 
response was forthcoming after eighteen months they put to sea again and 
enquired for news of the first English ship they came across. Informed by the 
crew of that ship that there was no news of a pardon, nineteen pirates elected 
to return to England in order to surrender themselves to ‘the King’s Mercy’.206 
These pirates came ashore near Minehead in Somerset and dispersed.207 
Several were apprehended or voluntarily surrendered themselves: two were 
tried and condemned, and one, Thomas Jones, died in the Marshalsea prison 
before being brought to trial.208 One of those pirates who surrendered was 
William Whelks, a sea-officer from Minehead, who claimed to have been 
captured by Anstis’ crew in 1721 and kept prisoner for a period of twenty 
months, during which time he was ‘compelled’ to sign the crew’s articles. 
From the evidence given by other pirates of Anstis’ crew it seems that all new 
recruits were required to sign the articles, at gunpoint if they were unwilling,209 
so it is certain that Whelks would have seen the articles and as an officer of 
merchantmen would probably have been literate enough to have been able to 
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read and understand them.210 Appended to the deposition given by Whelks to 
Somerset magistrate William Blake is a copy of the ‘Articles made on board 
the Good Fortune’.211  
The accuracy of Whelks’ memory cannot, of course, be determined, except to 
say that in other respects his testimony correlates well when compared to the 
testimony given by the other pirates of Anstis’ crew, and there seems little 
reason to doubt Whelks’ honesty, at least as far as the substance of the 
articles is concerned. One piece of evidence corroborating at least part of 
Whelks’ recollection of the articles can be found in a contemporary newspaper 
report of the capture of Anstis’ successor, John Fenn. Fenn and the remnants 
of Anstis’ crew were taken to Antigua where the public learned of the contents 
of their articles, which had been found among their papers when captured. 
The ninth clause of the articles recounted by Whelks specified execution for 
any pirate who should ‘meet with any gentlewoman or lady of honour and 
should force them against their will to lie with them’, while Fenn and his men 
gained popularity amongst the women of Antigua because of the clause in 
their articles stating that they should not ‘abuse any woman that should fall 
into their power’.212 Of the sets of articles dating from the 1720s Anstis’ are 
the only set recorded by someone who actually signed them. This does not 
necessarily make Whelks’ testimony as to their contents any more or less 
reliable, but his apparent innocence of piracy suggests that he had little 
reason for deliberate fabrication or omission.  
Like Roberts’ articles, the preserved version of George Lowther’s articles also 
originated in the General History, and like Roberts’ can also be partly 
corroborated from other sources, suggesting a substantially accurate 
rendition. In the early summer of 1721 the Bumper was engaged in 
transporting stores and soldiers on behalf of the Royal African Company from 
England to the company’s settlement on the river Gambia. Dissatisfied with 
the conditions they found there, the crew, led by second mate George 
Lowther and captain of the soldiers John Massey, mutinied and turned to 
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piracy.213 According to Charles Johnson’s account, Lowther and his crew drew 
up their articles very shortly after their mutiny.214 Near the end of the year 
Lowther was cruising around the Cayman Islands where he met with a smaller 
pirate crew commanded by Edward Low. Low had been gathering logwood in 
the bay of Honduras when he and some of his crewmates stole a boat and 
turned to piracy. Both pirate crews were in need of more men, and since 
Low’s crew were ill supplied for an independent cruise they agreed to join 
Lowther’s, with Low serving as lieutenant.215 On 19 May 1722 Low took 
command of a brigantine, Rebecca, and left Lowther’s company.216 Lowther 
continued his career of piracy until 5 October 1723, when he and his crew 
were surprised ashore by a Barbados sloop commanded by Walter Moore. 
Sixteen of Lowther’s crew were taken to St. Kitts and tried, while Lowther 
himself committed suicide.217  
The articles of Edward Low’s company were printed in the Boston News-
Letter of 8 August 1723,218 following the capture and trial of Low’s consort, 
Charles Harris, and his crew. They were printed along with a list of ships 
captured by the pirates, supplied in the form of a deposition by one of Harris’ 
crew who had recently been executed. This is the source from which they 
have usually been quoted, however, they were also included as an appendix 
to the printed account of the trial of Harris and his crew, also published in 
1723. Although the two versions tally almost exactly, there are some slight 
differences of wording, and the individual clauses are not listed in exactly the 
same order. Neither was the accompanying deposition printed in the Boston 
News-Letter printed in the trial account, suggesting that the editor of that 
newspaper may have had a source of information other than the trial account. 
There is no indication in the newspaper who that source might have been, but 
one or more of the pirates might have been interviewed in prison during the 
month between their capture and trial, or the week between their trial and 
execution, or one of the acquitted men might have been interviewed in Boston 
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during the four weeks between their trial and the publication of the newspaper. 
We can be on surer ground with the version of the articles printed in the trial 
account, which were provided, ‘to the best of his remembrance’ by John 
Kencate, a surgeon who had been forced to join the pirates and ‘had often 
seen them’.219 The fact that two versions of Low’s articles have been 
preserved in apparently independent sources, and the fact that both versions 
are identical in spirit, but not quite identical in text suggests a reasonable 
measure of accuracy in their recording. 
Of the ten articles ascribed to Low’s company, eight were ascribed to George 
Lowther’s company the following year in Johnson’s General History.220 
Because of the association between Lowther and Low there is nothing 
surprising about their articles being similar, except for the dissimilarities 
already mentioned between the articles of other pirates who sailed together, 
such as Roberts and Anstis. As noted, there is no reason to suppose that 
Johnson deliberately fabricated any of the sets of articles he recorded, and it 
seems unlikely that he copied Lowther’s articles from either version of Low’s 
then printed: if he did, then he did not copy them in full and he inexplicably 
ascribed them to the wrong pirate crew. More likely is that he had a third 
source of information, possibly connected with arrest of Lowther’s associate, 
John Massey, whose trial took place in London in 1723. In the early part of 
Johnson’s account of Lowther a long description of Massey’s exploits is 
prominent, which, together with many similarities between Johnson’s account 
and the petition written by John Massey,221 tend to support the hypothesis that 
Johnson interviewed Massey at some point during the proceedings. That 
being the case, and Lowther’s articles being described by Johnson during the 
early part of his account, it is likely that the articles were described to Johnson 
by Massey himself, who probably had a hand in their creation.  
Of the three sets of articles recorded in the General History, John Phillips’ is 
the least corroborated by other evidence. However, some points may give 
clues as to Johnson’s accuracy as far as Phillips’ articles are concerned. 
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Firstly, as we have seen, Johnson does not appear to have been in the habit 
of inventing articles, and based on the corroborative evidence supporting the 
authenticity of the other sets of articles in the General History, it seems 
Johnson only included descriptions of articles if he had some source of 
information about them. Who or what the source for Johnson’s rendition of 
Philips’ articles might have been is uncertain, but it would not be 
unreasonable to assume, based on the argument above, that some source 
existed. Without knowing where Johnson got his information about Philips’ 
articles it is impossible to determine how reliable his source might have been, 
but it seems reasonable to conclude that Johnson at least found him credible. 
Secondly, the articles themselves are fairly typical, and do not contain any 
clauses which cannot be found in a similar form in other, better attested, 
articles. Thirdly, seven of the nine clauses which comprised Phillips articles 
were similar, in some cases almost identical, to clauses in Anstis’ articles. 
Philips began his piratical career as carpenter in Anstis’ company,222 and 
presumably his own articles were influenced by those of his mentor. Crucially, 
though, Johnson does not appear to have been aware of the content of 
Anstis’ articles, so the high incidence of correlation between the two sets 
suggests a degree of authenticity to Philips’ articles that cannot otherwise be 
corroborated.  
The last surviving set of articles to be drawn up during the ‘golden age’ of 
piracy was that belonging to the company of John Gow. Gow was serving as 
second mate and gunner of a merchantman when, in November 1724, he led 
a mutiny that resulted in the deaths of the ship’s captain and doctor, and took 
command of the vessel.223 His subsequent spate of piracy was marked with 
cruelty and a marked lack of regard for his fellows. When he quarrelled with 
James Williams, the pirates’ lieutenant and his confederate in the mutiny, the 
latter was locked in irons and surrendered up to the master of the next English 
merchantman they met, with instructions to hand him over to a British man of 
war so that he could be taken home for trial.224 After a short cruise Gow made 
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his way to his native Orkney Islands, under the pretence of being a legitimate 
trader, to careen the hull of his ship. Part way through the cleaning process 
several of his men deserted, and their confessions to the local authorities 
forced Gow to set sail for another island, but he ran his ship aground and, 
helpless, was eventually arrested in February 1725.225 While the ship was 
aground, Gow apparently drew up a set of articles, ‘written with [his] own 
hand’, and regulating conduct aboard the stranded pirate vessel.226 
Gow turned to piracy after the publication of the General History, and by that 
time the public’s appetite for tales of piracy had been whetted, so that when 
Gow was arrested and tried a spate of publications about his career 
appeared, including An Account of the Conduct and Proceedings of the Late 
John Gow, which contains a record of Gow’s articles.227 The Account was 
published within a few weeks of the pirates’ execution, and has since been 
attributed to Daniel Defoe. That attribution was first made in 1869, based on 
the idea that Defoe was an employee of John Applebee, the Account’s 
publisher. Since then, both the specific attribution and the notion of Defoe 
working for Applebee have been called into question.228 No other 
corroboration of these articles exists, so their potential accuracy relies on the 
accuracy of the rest of the Account. Fortunately, the sheer amount of material 
relating to Gow and his men allows the information in the Account to be cross-
checked against newspaper reports, trial accounts, and an account written by 
the Ordinary of Newgate who attended the pirates during their incarceration. 
The Account bears up well to such scrutiny, which, together with the fact that 
John Applebee, who has been described as ‘the official printer of Newgate’,229 
was the publisher suggests that the author was able to interview some of the 
key characters in the episode. According to the Account, the articles were 
found with the rest of the pirates’ papers after their capture, drawn up but not 
signed. Nevertheless, despite the apparent accuracy of the Account, some 
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doubt must remain about the accuracy of the articles, as they represent one of 
the few details that cannot be corroborated from another source.  
 
1.5. The Evolution of Articles. 
Pirate articles were neither immutable nor standardized: although the 
surviving sets all share certain similarities, they are all unique to a greater or 
lesser degree. The most significant similarity shared by all of the articles is 
that every surviving set can be seen to have been drawn up in accordance 
with the pirates’ experiences in legitimate society. Through their emulation of 
legitimate systems of hierarchy and authority, social control, justice and 
punishment, and even the very use of a contract to define and maintain their 
rules, pirates based their society on the societies in which they had grown up 
and lived before turning to crime. Although Rediker’s excellent analysis of the 
nationalities of pirates in the early eighteenth century suggests that more than 
93% were Anglophones,230 even within the English-speaking world the 
different societies of England, Scotland, the various North American colonies, 
and numerous colonies in the West Indies all contributed to the pirates’ 
collective experience. Rediker concedes, too, that the actual number of non-
Anglophone pirates was probably higher than the recorded 6.9%, and these 
pirates would have brought still different experiences into the pirates’ 
communities.  
Even within an individual society, one person’s body of experience is unlikely 
to be the same as another’s, and so it is unsurprising that different pirate 
companies produced different articles, usually similar in scope and style, but 
differing in the details. Philips’ company and Lowther’s company, for example, 
both originated in the legitimate community of Anglophone deep-sea sailors of 
the 1720s, and the similarities in their articles, such as division of profit, 
provision for the injured, restrictions on gambling, and fear of fire below-decks, 
reflect this shared background. However, the two companies originated on 
opposite sides of the Atlantic Ocean; Philips was a carpenter who had 
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previously been a pirate himself while Lowther was an officer who had not; 
Lowther’s company contained soldiers as well as seamen, which Philips’ did 
not, and a myriad other differences between the collective experience of the 
two companies existed, and this is reflected in the good quarters guaranteed 
to victims by Lowther’s articles and the injunctions against desertion and 
disobedience included in Philips’.  
However, these differences in previous experience are not enough to explain 
the differences that exist between the articles of pirate companies which 
evolved from one another. Specifically, Roberts’ and Taylor’s companies both 
had roots in Howell Davis’ company, and Thomas Anstis’ company originated 
in Roberts’, yet the articles of all of these companies are different. John 
Philips himself had been a member of Anstis company, though his men had 
not, and his articles are different still. There are two likely explanations for 
these differences between the articles of pirate companies with a shared 
origin: firstly, each set of articles was drawn up at a different time, and in the 
intervening periods new recruits joined the pirate companies, bringing with 
them their own experiences and ideas, and secondly, in the same periods the 
pirates who had been members of the company since the previous articles 
were drawn up gained new experiences themselves. 
To facilitate an understanding of how each of the companies whose articles 
have survived in full, Figure 1 shows the relationships between those pirate 
companies who were members of either the ‘Flying Gang’ group or the 
Lowther-Low group, and their relationship to other pirate companies whose 
articles have survived in part or not at all. Cusack, Clough, and Gow, whose 
articles have survived, all sailed independently and so are not included in 
Figure 1, but all of the other companies whose articles have survived were 
members either of the Flying Gang group, which forms part A of Figure 1, or 
the Lowther/Low group, which forms part B. The pirate companies in Figure 1 
include only those within two degrees of connection to a company whose 
articles have survived: Benjamin Hornigold, for example, is not included in 
Figure 1, despite his close association with Blackbeard, Bellamy, and 
Williams. Even so, Figure 1 serves to illustrate the complexity of the 
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interconnections between companies This is more pertinent to the Flying 
Gang group: the Lowther/Low group was relatively small, and all of the 
companies associated in any way with the group are shown in Figure 1, but 
the Flying Gang group consisted of many more companies than are shown in 
Figure 1, some of whose articles may have influenced, or been influenced by, 
the surviving articles of Taylor, Roberts, Anstis and Philips 
 
Figure 1. Connections between article-writing companies. 
 
Sources. Snelgrave, A New Account, pp. 198, 257-258, 272; Grey, Pirates of the 
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1.5.1. Case study: Thomas Anstis’ articles. 
According to Johnson, Thomas Anstis was one of the original crew members 
of the Buck when Howell Davis led a mutiny and turned to piracy. As an old 
hand he was a respected member of the company and one of the ‘lords’ of 
Davis’ council. Upon Davis’ death Anstis may have been one of those 
proposed as his successor, and was certainly present at the election of 
Roberts.231 Thus, when Anstis rose to command on his own account, in April 
1721,232 he himself and some of his men had lived bound by two sets of 
articles – Davis’ and Roberts’ – and the rest of his men had been bound at 
least by Roberts’ articles. After parting company with Roberts, Anstis’ 
company drew up their own articles. By examining Anstis’ articles in the light 
of the shared experience of his company since its beginning under the 
command of Howell Davis, and comparing them with the articles of Davis and 
Roberts, as well as those of John Taylor, who also sailed under Davis, it is 
possible to track how and why certain changes in the articles were made, and 
whether specific incidences and people contributed to those changes. 
When Davis and Anstis, along with a handful of others, stole the Buck in 1718, 
the great days of the pirates’ base at Nassau and the original Flying Gang 
were past. Woodes Rogers had arrived with a company of soldiers and the 
might of the Royal Navy and convinced the Bahamian pirates to surrender or 
leave the islands.233 The company of the Buck had sailed from England as 
part of Woodes Rogers’ expeditionary force to suppress the pirates, but at 
least one of the crew, Walter Kennedy, later claimed that he had joined the 
expedition precisely because he ‘coveted to be one of those Petty Princes’,234 
and it is likely that during the weeks they spent at Nassau some of the 
company came under the influence of former members of the Flying Gang. 
Even if they were not influenced by former Flying Gang pirates at this stage, 
they certainly entered the sphere of the Flying Gang pirates who had left the 
Bahamas before Rogers’ arrival when, in early 1719, they met and temporarily 
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joined with Thomas Cocklyn’s and Oliver la Buse’s companies at the mouth of 
the Sierra Leone river.235  
The articles in force at this stage of Anstis’ pirate career have not survived, 
except for Johnson’s assertions that ‘according to Davis’s Articles, it was 
agreed, that Quarters should be given whenever it was called for, upon Pain 
of Death’, and that ‘according to their Articles, he who first espies a Sail, if she 
proves a Prize, is entitled to the best Pair of Pistols on board, over and above 
his Dividend’.236 No articles relating to the pre-1718 Flying Gang have 
survived in full, so it is impossible to make any comparison which might 
determine the influence the Flying Gang pirates had over Davis’ company, but 
Cocklyn’s company, with whom Davis’ men consorted, had a ‘maxim 
established amongst them, not to permit any ill usage to their prisoners after 
quarter given,’ which, though not exactly the same as Davis’ article above, is 
similar enough in spirit to suggest that pirates in both companies placed the 
same sanctity on the promise of good quarter.  
How many other clauses were shared by the articles of Davis’ and Cocklyn’s 
companies remains unknown because of the incomplete nature of both sets. 
However, some light may be shed on Cocklyn’s articles at least by an 
examination of John Taylor’s. Taylor succeeded Cocklyn on the latter’s death, 
but had earlier served as sailing master in Davis’ company,237 and the articles 
employed by his company are probably the earliest set from the eighteenth 
century that have survived in a complete form. Three articles are ascribed to 
Cocklyn’s company in William Snelgrave’s account of his time as a captive of 
Cocklyn: firstly the article prohibiting abuse of prisoners quoted above, 
secondly an article prohibiting members of the company renouncing their 
membership, and thirdly an injunction against women being allowed aboard 
ship.238 Taylor’s articles also include all three of these clauses, suggesting 
that, to some extent at least, the company commanded first by Cocklyn and 
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later by Taylor, retained their articles despite the transition of command. 
Furthermore, several of the clauses in Taylor’s articles can be compared to 
the behaviour or expressed attitudes of the company when it was under 
Cocklyn’s command. Taylor’s articles, for example, enjoined the pirates to ‘put 
to death any who resist or defend themselves,’ while Cocklyn’s boatswain was 
recorded by Snelgrave as saying that ‘no Quarter should be given to any 
Captain that offered to defend his ship’.239 Under Taylor’s command the 
company’s articles specified that ‘all plunder taken from a prize must be 
handed over to the quartermaster’, and when Cocklyn, la Buse, and Davis 
took three coats from Snelgrave, ‘without leave from the Quartermaster, it 
gave great Offence to all the Crew’.240 Nothing contained in the rest of 
Taylor’s articles contradicts anything known about the mores of the company 
when it was under Cocklyn’s command. 
What is significant about this fact is that Taylor succeeded Cocklyn when the 
latter died;241 there was no conflict, no acrimonious deposition of one captain 
and replacement with another, no trauma that led to a change in command. 
The smooth transition between commanders meant that no circumstances 
arose in which alterations to the article became necessary, and there is no 
evidence that any such alteration took place. It is not at all clear that pirates 
always chose to rewrite their articles even when a captain was deposed 
acrimoniously, or that they never rewrote their articles when a captain was 
replaced amicably. It is one of the limitations of the available evidence that no 
complete sets of articles have survived which show continuity of articles 
following and acrimonious or violent change in command, or, with the minor 
exception of Low’s additional clauses not found in Lowther’s articles, 
discontinuity following an amicable change in command. If the articles were 
satisfactory but the captain was not, there would have been no need to 
change the articles, only the captain. The evidence of the surviving articles, 
however, shows that, as in the case of Cocklyn and Taylor, a change of 
command did not necessarily entail a change of articles. The same is true of 
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Davis and his ultimate successor, Bartholomew Roberts: Roberts rose to 
command following the death of Davis at the hands of the Portuguese at the 
island of Principe in 1719.242 There is no evidence to suggest that Roberts or 
his company instigated any new articles, or abandoned any of their old 
articles, at the time of the change in command. Up to that point the articles 
already in force had, presumably, served their purpose well, and in the 
absence of any dissatisfaction there was no reason to change them. A similar 
state of affairs existed in the group of pirate companies commanded originally 
by George Lowther and Edward Low. Lowther and Low joined forces early in 
1722 and sailed together until May of that year, when, finding that they could 
not agree, they parted amicably.243 Lowther’s articles, reported to Johnson by 
his erstwhile colleague John Massey, consisted of eight clauses, all of which 
were adopted by Low when his company parted from Lowther’s. Lowther’s 
company adopted two additional articles proscribing drunkenness in battle 
and ‘Snaping244 of Guns in the Hould’. These same ten articles were also 
used by the men sailing under Charles Harris, a consort of Low. Harris himself 
had originally turned to piracy when he was captured by Lowther and Low in 
January 1722, and several of his crew had also served with Lowther before 
joining Low.245 Despite the divisions that occurred in the companies 
descended from Lowther’s, Johnson believed that a spirit of friendship and 
camaraderie was maintained amongst them. The original split of Low’s 
company from Lowther’s was, apparently, the result of a vote in which each 
man was free to choose which captain to follow, and even after Low’s demise, 
the men who had followed him still considered Lowther a ‘Friend and 
Brother.’246 The use of virtually identical articles by Lowther, Low and Harris is 
reflective of the amicable way in which Lowther’s company was divided in two 
on Low’s departure, and the state of consortship that existed between Low 
and Harris. 
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Pirates, then, did not see the need to rewrite their articles at every opportunity 
or break in continuity, but if the division of a company was acrimonious or 
some other trauma occurred, then a revision of the articles to reflect changed 
attitudes was a possible course of action. This is seen most clearly in the 
articles of Bartholomew Roberts’ and Thomas Anstis’ companies. 
Roberts took over command of Davis’ company on the latter’s death, but, 
according to Johnson again, it was not until Walter Kennedy and several of his 
followers deserted the company, taking with them a large proportion of the 
company’s accumulated wealth, that Roberts and the remains of the band, 
which included Thomas Anstis,  
formed a [new] Set of Articles, to be signed and sworn to, for the better 
Conservation of their Society, and doing Justice to one another; 
excluding all Irish Men from the Benefit of it, to whom they had an 
implacable Aversion upon the Account of Kennedy.247 
The fragmentary nature of Davis’ surviving articles prevents any assessment 
of how radically different Roberts’ new articles were from his old ones, but five 
of the eleven clauses contained in the new articles are also present, in slightly 
modified form, in Taylor’s articles, perhaps suggesting a common root in the 
articles of Cocklyn and Davis. Four of these five articles, which between them 
restrict or prohibit gambling, fighting and desertion, and stipulate division of 
shares (albeit the actual size of shares are different in each set) are also 
contained, sometimes in a modified form, in several other sets of articles, 
including Anstis’ and Philips’, suggesting further a continuity which might have 
extended back to Davis’ articles aboard the Buck, and even to the Flying 
Gang of New Providence. However, four of the clauses in Roberts’ articles are 
unique amongst surviving articles, and were probably the new additions to the 
articles. They are the clauses guaranteeing each man ‘a vote in the affairs of 
the moment’, granting each member of a boarding party the right to choose a 
new suit of clothes from among the plunder, and those stipulating lights out at 
eight o’clock in the evening and preventing musicians from playing on a 
Sunday. 
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Of these, the last is virtually the only evidence of sabbatarianism amongst 
pirates, and has caused Roberts to be credited with a reputation for deeper 
religious tendencies than is strictly supported by other evidence, but which 
may not be inaccurate for all that. Patrick Pringle, as usual, summed up the 
situation when he wrote, 
The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath. The original 
purpose of the Jewish Sabbath was to give people a weekly rest from 
work. In the eighteenth century, as now, Sunday was the usual day off 
from work. There is no reason to believe that Roberts was a sabbatarian. 
Nor was he a puritan or an ascetic.248 
However, the real point in Roberts’ article was not to ensure that the 
musicians were able to rest once a week, or to prevent gaiety on a holy day, 
but is summed up in the second half of the article which stipulates that ‘the 
other six Days and Night, [no rest] without special Favour.’ The article was 
designed therefore, not only to ensure a day of rest for some of the crew, but 
also to ensure that they fulfilled their duties the rest of the time. Roberts’ 
choice of Sunday as the day of rest may have been a religious decision, but 
may simply have been based on the pirates’ experience of general practice in 
most Anglophone society.  
The article stipulating ‘lights and candles to be put out at eight o’clock at 
night’, and insisting that any late-night carousers did so on the open deck, was 
a practical measure to prevent disastrous fires that might have been caused 
by drunken pirates stumbling below decks with naked flames, but may, 
particularly in its second part, have been a product of Roberts’ own 
tendencies. According to Johnson, Roberts ‘was a sober Man himself’, who 
‘drank his Tea constantly’,249 and in addition to the very real risk of fire may 
have sought peace and quiet below decks by banishing the drinkers to the 
upper levels. If he had hoped to discourage his men from drunkenness then 
he faced a stiff challenge, for these were the very men who, under Davis’ 
command plundered Snelgrave’s ship and  
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hoisted upon Deck a great many half Hogsheads of Claret, and French 
Brandy; knock’d their Heads out, and dipped Canns and Bowls into them 
to drink out of: And in their Wantonness threw full Buckets of each sort 
upon one another. As soon as they had emptied what was on the Deck, 
they hoisted up more: And in the evening they washed the Decks with 
what remained in the Casks. As to bottled Liquor of many sorts, they 
made such havock of it, that in a few days they had not one Bottle left.250 
For Joseph Mansfield, one of Roberts’ company, drink was even a professed 
motive for having joined the pirates: ‘he was drunk and asleep, and aforetime 
[had] been too guilty of that Vice, which had a great Share in drawing him into 
such Company.’ On the day of the pirates’ final battle against HMS Swallow 
Mansfield claimed in his defence to have been so drunk that he didn’t venture 
from below decks until the battle was lost, ‘and it was some time before they 
[the rest of the company] could perswade him to the truth of their 
Condition.’251 Small wonder, then, that Roberts ‘found at length, that all his 
Endeavours to put an End to this Debauch, proved ineffectual.’252 
Nevertheless, the restriction on drinking after eight o’clock may not have been 
anathema to many members of the company, for as the day’s drinking could 
commence over breakfast, late nights may have been the exception in any 
case. Aboard Ned Low’s ships, George Roberts observed,  
Before it was quite dark, every one repaired on Board their respective 
Vessels, and about Eight a-Clock at Night I went to my Hammock, 
without observing, as I remember, any thing worth remarking, save, that 
Captain Loe, and I, and three or four more, drank a couple of Bottles of 
Wine after the Company were gone, before we went to Sleep.253 
Roberts’ article granting boarders the right to choose a new suit of clothes 
from amongst the plunder of a captured vessel is unique in its particulars, but 
not unusual in its spirit. Bravery and skill were rewarded in many sets of 
articles, both privateer and pirate: in Kidd’s articles the man who first sighted a 
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prize was granted one hundred pieces of eight in addition to his share, while 
Woodes Rogers’ articles were less generous and only awarded twenty pieces 
of eight for the same service, providing that the prize was greater than fifty 
tons; Davis, Lowther, and Low all granted the ‘best pair of pistols’ to the man 
who spotted a prize. Explored more deeply in Chapter 3.1, the significance of 
clothing to pirates was threefold: firstly it served a practical purpose, and 
stolen clothing enabled pirates to replace their own worn out clothing with 
new, while far away from any regular supply; secondly, clothing was a 
valuable commodity and so constituted a form of portable wealth, the worth of 
which could be realised in almost any legitimate community; and thirdly, 
clothing was an important signifier of social status, so the wearing of new 
clothes, especially clothes taken from ships’ officers or passengers, was one 
of the ways in which pirates could assert their own ‘middling sort’ status. 
Roberts’ article offering a reward of clothing to members of a boarding party 
encouraged men to take a vigorous part in the action and resulted in such 
enthusiasm for boarding that the only fair way to determine the make up of 
boarding parties was to call each man ‘fairly in Turn, by List’, ensuring that 
every man had the opportunity to earn himself a new ‘shift, as they call it, that 
is, a Suit from top to toe’. The effectiveness of the system at producing willing 
volunteers for the sometimes dangerous job of boarding can be judged by the 
assertion of one conscripted member of the company ‘that they are so far 
from being forced upon his turn, that they often jangled among themselves, 
and challenged it before it was really their due.’254 
The last of Roberts’ unique articles is by far the most contentious, and 
probably the most often quoted, guaranteeing universal suffrage. The broader 
implications of this article will be explored at length in Chapter 2.3, but its 
place in the chronology of Roberts’ company will bear further examination 
here. Voting on important matters certainly took place before Roberts’ articles 
were redrawn, so the concept of each man having a vote (with the exceptions 
noted in Chapter 2.3) was not new: according to Johnson, Davis was originally 
elected ‘by a great Majority of legal Pollers’, and Roberts himself was elected 
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to command.255 But on lesser issues, prior to the composition of the new 
articles at least, a decision was often reached by a selected jury or committee 
of men, as, for example, when ‘Cannady and eleven others of [the] Crew were 
chose by [the] said Crew to determine whether the Informant’s said ship 
should be kept or burnt and they all voted her to be burnt and she was 
burnt’.256  
The decision by Roberts’ company to make future decisions by the vote of the 
whole company, or at least such of the company as were actually given a 
vote, rather than by the vote of a select committee, following the departure of 
Kennedy and his supporters, is difficult to explain satisfactorily. In practice, the 
new article did not necessarily extend the franchise to include those members 
of the company who, for one reason or another, had no right to vote under 
Davis’ command as outlined in Chapter 2.3, the inclusive wording of the 
clause notwithstanding, but it did theoretically enlarge the scope of issues on 
which they might vote, though exactly what constituted ‘Affairs of Moment’ 
remained ambiguously defined. Perhaps some decision reached by a select 
committee of the company had gone awry and the article was intended to 
prevent a similar occurrence in the future, or perhaps it was intended to mollify 
members of the company who were rarely or never chosen to sit on such a 
committee; in either case, no reasonable explanation is recorded in the 
relatively voluminous body of evidence relating to Roberts’ company.  
Roberts’ article guaranteeing universal suffrage, and the extent to which it was 
applied, both by pirates in general and by Roberts’ company in particular, will 
be discussed in Chapters 2.2 and 2.3 Despite the fact that six of the eleven 
clauses contained in Roberts’ articles, including the suffrage clause, are 
unique, Roberts’ articles have been quoted often, and described as ‘typical’ on 
several occasions.257 The frequency with which Roberts’ articles alone have 
been quoted by historians is rooted in the fact that, having been printed in the 
General History, they are easily accessible and, of the three sets in the 
General History, are the most comprehensive. The question of just how 
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‘typical’ Roberts’ articles were has not previously been satisfactorily 
examined, or even really questioned: indeed, Konstam wrote of Roberts’ 
articles that although ‘not all articles were as detailed, the basic tenets were 
the same’.258 Comparison with other surviving sets of articles, even with the 
other two sets included in the General History, shows that Roberts’ articles, 
including the guarantee of universal suffrage, were far from typical. 
What is most significant, though, about the rights of suffrage apparently 
granted to Roberts’ company is that the system was found to be unworkable 
in practice, at least by the forty or so men who, along with Thomas Anstis, 
deserted Roberts in a brigantine in April 1721.259 Anstis’ company’s articles 
bear no trace of a guarantee of suffrage in ‘affairs of moment’ to anybody, and 
in fact take the diametrically opposite stance that ‘if any man should Disobey 
and Lawful Command of the Commanding Officers’ then they would be 
punished. Only under two circumstances do Anstis’ articles suggest any kind 
of collective voice for the company: those who disobeyed such ‘lawful 
commands’ were to suffer whatever punishment ‘the Company and Captain’ 
thought meet, and anyone wishing to leave the company and join another 
pirate company required ‘the consent of the Company’. 
Anstis’ men also did away with Roberts’ two articles establishing a routine 
timetable on board ship. No longer was the company encouraged to go to bed 
at eight o’clock, or forced onto the open deck if they would not, and Sunday 
held no promise of rest for anyone. Anstis presumably did not share Roberts’ 
sober tendencies, or lacked the force to impose his will if he did, and in any 
case, Roberts so failed to impose sobriety on the rest of his company that the 
article was observed mostly in the breach, and just as unworkable in practice 
as endless referenda and universal suffrage. 
Of the twelve clauses that were included in Anstis’ articles, nine followed more 
or less the conventions that were common in other companies’ articles, and 
were included in Roberts’. The first article dealt with the familiar subject of 
dividing spoils into shares, and other articles covered theft, desertion, 
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cowardice, maintenance of arms, treatment of women, compensation for 
wounds received, and surrendering plunder to the quartermaster. One new 
innovation that appeared for the first time in Anstis’ articles was the prohibition 
of snapping or cleaning their weapons below decks. Presumably this was a 
precaution against fire, and although a similar clause was included in Low’s 
articles it was not to be found in any other of the surviving articles, and there 
is no evidence to suggest that Low’s and Anstis’ companies ever met or 
shared members in common, so it appears to have been independently 
thought of by both companies.  
Apart from abandoning the notion of always voting on important issues and 
strict routines of work, recreation, and rest, the most radical difference 
between Anstis’ articles and Roberts’ was probably a reflection of one of the 
reasons behind Anstis’ desertion. Roberts’ articles stipulated that no man was 
to ‘talk of breaking up their way of living, till each had shared one thousand 
pounds’, and while that sum was not strictly unobtainable, the size of Roberts’ 
company if nothing else virtually precluded it. It would have been natural for at 
least a portion of the company to tire of crime and start to think about rejoining 
legitimate society, but the articles prohibited even discussing the matter. Even 
if they had dared to broach the subject it is unlikely that Roberts himself would 
ever have agreed to seeking a pardon, for according to Walter Kennedy, 
Roberts often ‘us’d to say, nothing from the King of England should content 
him, but the Government of the Leeward Islands’.260 
Roberts placed Anstis in command of his consort vessel, the brigantine Good 
Fortune, and included several forced men in her crew, as well as disaffected 
elements like Thomas Lawrence Jones who had fought with Roberts and 
been punished for it.261 Anstis himself, as one of the original members of the 
company that had stolen the Buck, may have hoped for command following 
Davis’ death, and, according to Johnson, was discontent because of ‘the 
Inferiority he stood in, with Respect to Roberts, who carry’d himself with a 
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haughty and magisterial air, to him and his Crew’.262 The ambitious captain, 
disaffected pirates, and forced men between them conspired to steal the 
Good Fortune and, Jones later claimed, ‘agreed to run away with her to the 
West Indias and to live a marooning Life till they could have an Answer to a 
Petition to his Majestie for a Pardon’.263 
Such a course of action would have been entirely contrary to Roberts’ articles, 
and although it sounds like an attempt at self-justification by a man being 
interrogated for piracy, Anstis’ company did in fact submit such a petition, via 
Sir Nicholas Lawes, Governor of Jamaica.264 The petition was not drawn up 
and signed until more than a year had passed since their desertion of 
Roberts, but the willingness of Anstis’ men to accept a pardon, even if they 
were not at first eager to seek one, was enshrined in the last of their articles 
which granted that if at any time they heard of an Act of Pardon, ‘they that are 
amind to receive it shall go with their money and goods.’ 
This clause, more than the other differences between Roberts’ and Anstis’ 
articles, points to the difficulties pirates faced when they opposed or disagreed 
with the tenets of their articles. Some, such as Bridstock Weaver, had not 
been members of the company when Kennedy left and the new articles were 
drawn up, and had probably signed the articles only under threat of death.265 
They could not be expected to agree to an article that kept them bound to the 
pirate company, as far as they knew for the rest of their lives, but they courted 
the risk of severe punishment if they even discussed an alternative. The only 
way they could abandon an article with which many of them disagreed was to 
abandon the pirate company, which, as soon as they were able, they did.  
Anstis was eventually turned out of command, possibly murdered in his bed, 
and John Fenn was chosen to replace him.266 Under Fenn there appears to 
have been no drastic changes made to the articles. At least some of Anstis’ 
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articles were still in place when the remnants of Fenn’s company were 
captured and brought to trial,267 and the article allowing members of the 
company to seek a pardon was invoked after Anstis’ demise when nineteen 
men, despairing of a response to their petition, elected to ship themselves 
aboard a prize vessel and sail for England in the hope of obtaining a 
pardon.268 One of these nineteen men was John Philips, carpenter of the 
company, who had been captured just the day after Anstis had left Roberts, 
and had joined the pirates.269 In England, several of the men who had 
returned were arrested and, according to Johnson, when news of this reached 
Philips he fled to Newfoundland where, having recruited a handful of fellows, 
he stole a schooner and set off with his new company, embarked upon a new 
course of piracy.270  
Phillips was the only one of the new company who had served under Anstis 
and, until the arrival in the company of one of Blackbeard’s former crewmen, 
the only man who had been a pirate, so his experience was probably 
significant in the drawing up of his company’s articles. As Philips had not 
served under any captain except Anstis and Fenn, his experience did not 
include any earlier set of articles than Anstis’. It is therefore unsurprising that 
Philips’ articles follow Anstis’ articles so closely in their scope and content 
and, in places, even in their wording. Only two of Anstis’ articles were omitted 
from Philips’, that which proscribed cowardice in battle and that which granted 
members of the company the right to seek a pardon. Philips had been one of 
those who had invoked the right to seek a pardon, and it had done him little 
good, so the omission of that clause from his own articles can probably be 
explained as a result of that experience. Only one new clause was added to 
Philips’ articles, stipulating that no ‘Man shall strike another whilst these 
Articles are in force.’ As a precaution against faction and division, the 
prohibition of physical violence was a sensible and practical rule, but it is 
difficult to identify any particular incident that led to its inclusion in Philips’ 
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articles. Certainly, physical violence between crewmates had occurred 
amongst the pirates with whom Philips learned his trade: the fight between 
Jones and Roberts which led to Jones joining Anstis’ deserters, for example. 
Whether this incident, or one like it, was enough to inspire Philips to suggest 
the clause in his articles, or whether it was suggested by one of his less 
experienced company as nothing more than a sensible precaution, is 
impossible to tell. 
That some of Philips’ recorded articles so closely follow those of Anstis and 
Fenn, even in their very wording,271 suggests most strongly that Philip’s 
articles were, by and large, drawn from those of his piratical mentor and 
applied to a completely new company. As in the case of Cocklyn and Taylor, 
or Davis and Roberts, no conflict or trauma existed between Fenn and Philips, 
and so, with the exception of the clause relating to seeking a pardon, which 
Philips’ experience suggested was not worth including, the articles remained 
virtually unchanged, and those changes that were made can be ascribed to 
the input of new members with no former experience of pirate articles. 
Discounting Philips’ articles, which were drawn up at a time and place 
removed from the influence of any existing pirate company’s articles, Anstis’ 
articles are the last complete surviving set in a chain beginning with the 
incomplete articles of Howell Davis, drawn up by men, of whom some at least, 
had lived under three different sets, each changed to suit their circumstances 
and new experiences. Some clauses were included, albeit in modified forms, 
in each subsequent set of articles, and these must represent the articles that 
the pirates found most useful, most workable, or touched subjects they 
considered most important, such as theft from the company and the division of 
pay. Other articles were found to be unworkable or impractical, or went 
against the general feeling of the company who subscribed to them, and so 
were altered, sometimes drastically, or simply abandoned. Roberts’ 
experiments at keeping his men sober and early to bed, for example, were 
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half-hearted and ineffectual in the face of the company’s general love of 
drunkenness and mayhem, and so were abandoned by Anstis’ men at the first 
opportunity.  
The personalities of the captains and members of constantly evolving 
companies may also have had an influence in the alteration of articles. Of 
Davis’ articles which have survived, only that one which proscribed desertion 
was included in every subsequent set, while the articles set out to protect the 
lives and health of the pirates’ victims were abandoned by Roberts and not 
reinstated by Anstis. Davis himself was described by Snelgrave as ‘a 
generous man, [who] kept his Crew, which consisted of near 150 men, in 
good order’, and who was ‘ashamed to hear how [Snelgrave] had been used’ 
by Cocklyn’s  men.272 John Taylor’s articles also contained a clause protecting 
prisoners, and he too was described by his captive, du Bucquoy, as a 
gentleman, a former Royal Navy officer and ‘skilful politician’, who ‘was polite 
towards prisoners.’273 Neither Roberts nor Anstis are particularly recorded as 
being bullies in the mould of the ‘basest and most cruel Villains that ever 
were,’ as Cocklyn’s company were described,274 but neither do they seem to 
have been noted for their humanity and generosity, and the absence of 
clauses in their articles protecting their victims, with the exception of Anstis’ 
article prohibiting the rape of ‘gentlewomen’ or ‘ladies of honour’, may reflect 
that flaw in their personalities. 
 
1.6. The Literacy of Pirates. 
The study of the significance of a set of written documents to members of an 
occupational group must inevitably involve the study of literacy within that 
group. More than one study of the literacy of English speaking seamen of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries has already been undertaken, based 
largely on what has been described as ‘signature literacy’, or the ability to 
either sign one’s own name or only to make a mark in place of a signature. In 
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his study of English merchant seamen, 1650-1775, Peter Earle calculated that 
‘some two thirds of ordinary foremastmen and over 90 percent of men who 
held any type of office in a ship could sign their names’.275 These figures 
accord very well with Marcus Rediker’s more detailed breakdown of literacy 
amongst seafarers, 1700-1750, which suggests that all masters, mates, and 
surgeons were able to sign their name. Even when taken in conjunction with 
the less literate boatswains, gunners, carpenters and coopers, the signature 
literacy of officers and skilled workers reached 95.6 percent. Among the lower 
ranks, Rediker found that literacy levels varied from 100 percent (amongst 
cooks and quartermasters) to 62.5 percent (apprentices), with ordinary 
foremastmen displaying signature literacy levels of 67.6 percent, or around 
two thirds, as Earle suggests. Signature literacy of merchant seamen of all 
ranks and grades, according to Rediker’s figures, was 75.4 percent.276 
These figures seem fairly straightforward: more seamen were ‘literate’ than 
were not, and among the officers the ‘literate’ were in an overwhelming 
majority. The reasons for these high levels of literacy are not hard to see. For 
masters, mates, and to a lesser extent, quartermasters, navigation was a skill 
essential to their trade, requiring the reading of charts, tables, and 
navigational treatises, as well as the writing up of the ship’s log book. A ship’s 
master also needed to be able to read and understand the owners’ instruction, 
and was frequently called upon to undertake commerce in foreign ports on 
their behalf.277 Boatswains, and other low ranking officers not required to 
navigate, were also required to engage with the written word during the 
course of their professional activity: stores and cargoes were listed, and the 
boatswain had some responsibility in that direction, as well as having to be 
able to give receipts for goods delivered aboard. Some level of literacy 
amongst ordinary foremastmen is not particularly surprising, in spite of the fact 
that the ability to read and write did not constitute an essential skill for the 
conduct of their labour. Free or cheap schooling was available in most parts of 
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England and the American colonies, providing at least a basic primary 
education to the majority of children, and children might also learn some level 
of literacy in the less formal environment of the home.278  
The use of signature literacy as a means of measurement has two distinct 
advantages: firstly, the number of signatures or marks as a proportion of the 
number of signatories is an easily quantifiable set of data, allowing the 
creation of sets of comparative tables and easily understood percentages, 
such as those of Rediker and Earle. Secondly, it is ‘universal, standard and 
direct’,279 and signatures or marks gathered from a spectrum of different 
sources can be used for comparison by geography, chronology, and social 
status, for example.  
Figure 2. The signatures of Phillip Middleton and William Bishop. Source: 
HCA 1/53. 
 
 
Nevertheless, in many other respects the use of signature literacy as a 
measurement is seriously flawed for a number of reasons, not the least of 
which is that the ability to write one’s own name is not necessarily indicative of 
the ability to write anything else. Figure 2 shows the signatures of Phillip 
Middleton and William Bishop, both pirates who sailed on the Fancy, 
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commanded by Henry Every, and who were both signature literate. 
Middleton’s signature is elegant and suggests confidence and an easy 
familiarity with the pen. Bishop’s, on the other hand, is shaky and is 
suggestive of a signature learned but not comprehended: in other words, 
Bishop perhaps learned only how to write his own name, without any great 
understanding of the individual letters, or how they could be used to write 
other words. Indicative though the quality of individual signatures might be, it 
cannot be measured accurately and thus cannot be used to precisely quantify 
the functionally literate among the signature-literate. The problem is further 
compounded by men like Jacob Mason, who was able to sign his own name 
in a hand less elegant than Middleton’s, but nonetheless clear and confident 
(Figure 3), but claimed in his deposition that he ‘cannot read written hand’.280 
Thus, the ability to sign one’s name cannot be taken as a reliable indicator of 
the ability to write, or even to read.  
 
Figure 3. The signature of Jacob Mason. Source: HCA 1/55, f. 33 
 
 
The second problem with trying to use signature literacy to ascertain the level 
of literacy within any one group is that, even if it were possible to accurately 
ascertain the number of people who were able to write, the skills of reading 
and writing were not inextricably linked in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The ability to read does not necessarily imply the ability to write, 
and so the inability to write does not necessarily imply the inability to read. 
This is not just a theoretical truth, for in the eighteenth century reading and 
writing were taught separately and consecutively, and instruction in writing 
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was only begun ‘once the art of reading had been mastered’. Numeracy, 
essential to the understanding and practice of navigation, was taught only 
after a pupil had successfully mastered writing.281 Sea-officers, whose work 
required them to be literate, may have learned to write as well as read at one 
of the many specialist schools available, or at the instruction of their master 
during the long period of their apprenticeship.282 For the foremastman who 
received his education in a free school or at home, that education may well 
have stopped once proficiency in reading was attained. In the rhetoric of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century educators the ability to read was closely 
linked with religion. Children were taught to read so that they might engage 
with the Bible and other religious texts,283 for which no skill at writing was 
necessary. The ability to understand the law was also important, and also 
required the ability to read, but not necessarily to write. In some colonies, this 
attitude was enshrined in law in the seventeenth century, and children were to 
be taught ‘to read and understand the principles of religion & the capitall lawes 
of this country’. No similar reasons could be found for teaching children to 
write.284 
The third problem with the use of signature literacy in a non-comparative way, 
such as within one occupational group confined to one relatively small period, 
is that if the ability to sign one’s own name tells us little about actual ability to 
read and write, it tells us even less about the practice of literacy. The fact that 
a man once signed his own name cannot tell us, for example, whether he 
wrote letters to his wife, read newspapers, or owned books. Such information 
might be gleaned from anecdotal evidence, or the existence of letters, or wills 
which mention the ownership of books, but this kind of information is 
impossible to quantify, and thus cannot be used for comparative purposes in 
the same way that signature literacy is. In this study, however, we are not 
concerned with comparing the literacy of seamen or pirates with other 
occupational groups so much as with the practice of literacy within their 
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occupational group. Not all seafarers were able to sign their name, and a 
proportion of those who could were unable to write any more than that. The 
proportion of seamen who could write was less, perhaps significantly so, than 
the two thirds suggested by Earle and Rediker. But the proportion of seamen 
who could read was probably greater than the proportion of those who could 
write. It is impossible to quantify with any degree of accuracy the number of 
seamen who could read, but it seems reasonable to suppose that more than 
half of foremastmen, and most officers who were required by the necessities 
of their employment to read, were able to do so. 
In some respects a pirate vessel was no different than any other sailing ship, 
inasmuch as the ability to read and write were practical requirements for the 
successful prosecution of some necessary tasks, and thus a required skill for 
some pirate officers. Many of these tasks precisely mirrored the 
responsibilities of officers aboard merchant and Naval vessels. The ability to 
navigate, with its attendant requirements of reading and writing, for example, 
was essential for at least some members of a pirate crew, in order for them to 
be able to successfully cruise between islands or to cross oceans, find places 
suitable for careening and cleaning their vessels, and to place themselves in 
the vicinity of the trade routes that were their hunting grounds.285 The day-to-
day engagement with the written word in a working context extended beyond 
navigation to include, even on pirate ships, the administration of the vessel 
and its personnel. Like the crews of most ships, pirates divided themselves 
into watches,286 in order to distribute evenly the labour required in working 
their vessel. Watch-bills were kept,287 and it was by these lists that men were 
selected for boarding parties and called fairly in turn to receive their share of 
spoil.288 The names of all newly recruited pirates, willing volunteers and 
conscripts, were entered into ‘their Roll-Book’.289 Pirates also made use of 
written text in ways more specific to the course of their work. When a ship was 
captured it was common for the master of the victim to be ordered aboard the 
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pirate vessel to give them an account of his ship and cargo, and he was often 
required to take his ship’s papers with him in order to verify the truth of his 
account. Whether papers were volunteered or not, the pirates ‘always took 
care to seize upon’ them.290 When Thomas Cocklyn’s pirate company took 
William Snelgrave he was asked about the sailing qualities of his ship, and 
thought it best not to lie for fear the pirates would compare what he told them 
with what was written in his journal.291 Pirates might also use the written word 
to assist their victims if they felt so inclined. Three men who were unwilling to 
assist in a mutiny and subsequent piracies aboard the East-Indiaman 
Adventure were given a certificate testifying to their innocence,292 and 
merchant captain George Roberts was offered a forged bill of sale and other 
papers necessary to prove his apparent legal ownership of a vessel and cargo 
Ned Low’s pirates proposed to give him.293 
Several copies of letters written by pirates to colonial governors have 
survived, indicating that pirates considered themselves literate enough to 
enter into formal correspondence. When a pardon was offered to pirates in 
1717, several wrote to Governor Bennett of Bermuda intimating their desire to 
surrender themselves. One such letter, from Captain Leslie, begins ‘most 
humbly asking Pardon for my rudeness in troubling you at this present’, 
suggesting that someone amongst his crew knew not only how to write, but 
how to write well.294 In 1720 Bartholomew Roberts sent an indignant and 
threatening letter to Lieutenant-General Mathew of St. Kitts, outlining the 
strength of his force and demanding fair treatment of an innocent ‘poor fellow’ 
imprisoned on the island.295 Pirates’ correspondence could also be more 
personal: when the Committee of Trade and Plantations instigated an 
investigation into the mutiny and piracy of the Fancy, Henry Every’s wife was 
summoned to appear before them, bringing with her the letters she had 
                                                 
290
 Trials of Eight Persons, p. 9; Tryals of Major Stede Bonnet, p. 12; Roberts, Four Years 
Voyages, p. 66 
291
 Snelgrave, New Account, p. 213 
292
 A True Relation of a most Horrid Conspiracy and Running away with the Ship Adventure 
(London, 1700), p. 3 
293
 Roberts, Four Years Voyages, p. 66 
294
 Thomas Nichols to Benjamin Bennett, 10/1/1717, and F. Leslie to Benjamin Bennett, 
7/1/1717, National Archives, CO 37/10, ff. 23, 25 
295
 Bartholomew Roberts to Lt.-General Mathew, 27/9/1720, CO 152/13, f. 34 
 97 
received from her husband.296 Pirates who cruised for extended periods, but 
who used a semi-permanent base such as St. Mary’s Island or New 
Providence may have been in a position to receive letters from home. In 1698 
Samuel Burgess commanded the Margaret, a vessel set out by New York 
merchant Frederick Phillipse to trade with pirates in the Indian Ocean, and 
carrying a cargo of commodities suitable for that purpose. Sarah Horne took 
the opportunity presented by Burgess’ departure for St. Mary’s to send a letter 
to her pirate husband, Jacob, with news of his family and neighbours.297 Had 
Jacob Horne received his wife’s letter, he would have been able to write back 
to her, perhaps purchasing some of the three reams of writing paper also 
carried by Burgess in the Margaret.298 Phillipse’s first shipment of trade goods 
to St. Mary’s was carried by the Charles, commanded by John Churcher, and 
consigned there to Adam Baldridge, a former pirate who acted as a local 
factor, stockpiling desirable European commodities and sending back to New 
York slaves and pirate spoil. The cargo of the Charles, which Baldridge must 
have considered viable for trade with the pirates, included ‘some books, 
Catechisms, primers and horne books, [and] two Bibles’.299 While the books 
suggest that pirates not only exercised their reading skills, sometimes perhaps 
even using them to engage with religion as their childhood instructors had 
intended, the presence of horn books, a type of teaching tool used to 
inculcate the rudiments of reading, suggests that the pirates of St. Mary’s 
sought either to improve literacy skills amongst their own number, or possibly 
to begin to teach the local Malagasy to read English.  
Pirates also realised that written text could be dangerous to them and their 
community, either because of its potentially divisive nature, or because it 
might be used as evidence against them in the event of their capture. When 
two large chests full of books were found aboard William Snelgrave’s ship,  
one of the pirates, upon opening them, swore ‘There was Jaw-work 
enough (as he called it) to serve a Nation, and proposed they might be 
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cast into the sea; for he feared, there might be some Books amongst 
them, that might breed Mischief enough; and prevent some of their 
Comrades from going on in their Voyage…’300 
So the books were heaved out of the cabin window into the river below. 
The fear of writings being used against them in court was perhaps even 
greater. The crew of the Adventure, having given certificates of innocence to 
their three unwilling crew-mates, later agreed to destroy all of the journals and 
other written documents aboard, ‘which they did by putting them into a Bagg, 
and sinking them with Shot, saying, They should not rise up against them.’301 
Matthew Pymer, ‘a skilful Mariner’, who secured his acquittal in court by giving 
evidence of the piracies committed by his crew-mates following the death of 
their captain, refused to hand over his journals to his fellows, who feared that 
he ‘had Writ something that might do them damage’. The new captain, John 
Quelch, tore the potentially dangerous pages out of the journal.302 
Pirates, then, engaged in the practice of literacy in several ways: officers 
professionally, in their work with navigation and the administration of their 
vessels, as well as in their correspondence with colonial governments and 
dealing with their victims; others socially, in their reading the books and Bibles 
supplied by Adam Baldridge and in their letters to and from their wives and 
families; educationally in their use of horn books to teach others to read; and 
negatively in their destruction of potentially incriminating documents. But as 
Rediker’s and Earle’s figures show, not all pirates were able to sign their own 
names, and many probably could not read. For these men, engagement with 
the written word was nonetheless possible with the assistance of their more 
literate crew-mates, and this collaborative literacy was an important feature of 
ship-board life. When pirate John Taylor accidentally received 
correspondence intended for the Royal Navy squadron pursuing him, he had it 
read out at the mast, so that the whole company would know its contents. The 
members of the company who were not able to read the letters for themselves 
were thus able to understand them just as well as those who could read them. 
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The same pirates, now aware of the Naval squadron’s rendezvous, left a 
taunting note there for their pursuers.303 Collaborative literacy could extend 
into the realms of social engagement with writing. For example, a 
matelotage304 agreement between Francis Hood and John Beavis, by which 
they made each other mutual beneficiaries in the event of one of their deaths, 
was signed by Hood, while Beavis marked only with his initials, but appears to 
have actually been written by Robert Arnott, one of the witnesses (Figure 
4).305 Contemporary satirist Ned Ward wrote that sailors and their wives 
enjoyed a regular correspondence, and that if the wife was unable to write for 
herself she could employ ‘some two-penny scriber’ to take down her 
dictation.306 In the close community of a ship, in which some men could write 
and others could not, the same must have been possible. While pirate Phillip 
Roche languished in Newgate ‘he very much delighted himself with the 
Exercise of his Pen, …often assisting his Fellow Prisoners in writing letters or 
whatever else they wanted.’307 
Rediker suggests that one reason for seamen learning to sign their own 
names, but little else, was because of the importance of the contract, ‘so 
essential to free wage labour, [which] loomed large in the sailor’s life’.308 
There may be some truth in this, but the sailor who could not read what he 
was signing might find himself at a serious disadvantage, if he could not rely 
on the collaborative literacy of his crew-mates. One of the complaints alleged 
by the mutinous crew of the Speedwell in 1719 was ‘that the articles we 
signed to at Plymouth, were never read in our hearing’, neither were the 
literate members of the crew allowed to read them for themselves.309 For 
some, the latter complaint may have been more significant, but for the 
Speedwell’s company as a whole, it was the restriction of their collective, 
collaborative literacy that caused affront. The men were accustomed to having 
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the articles they were required to sign read out loud, and by this mean the 
literate and illiterate alike could understand the written document. Unless the 
whole of a crew were totally unable to read (which, given the general levels of 
literacy outlined above, was unlikely) the literacy of the individual assumes a 
diminished importance. Letters could be understood, and written, by those 
who could not read or write; incriminating journals could be enough to hang 
anyone, literate or not; and books could be enjoyed in a communal setting. 
Most importantly, for this study and for many seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century seamen, contracts and articles of agreement could be read by some, 
signed by many, but engaged with and understood by all. 
 
Figure 4. Matelotage agreement between Francis Hood and John Beavis. 
Source: HCA 1/98, f. 193 
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• • • 
 
Pirates’ articles, then, were an important document, written and implemented 
by many, probably the majority, of pirate crews. The ability of the individual to 
personally read the articles was of limited importance because the articles 
were, above all, a collective document, sometime devised by individuals, but 
often the product of group consultation, and in either case, subscribed to 
collectively by the group to whom they applied. Subscription to the articles, 
voluntary or coerced, was a requirement of admission into the group. The 
concept of using articles to regulate behaviour was probably transmitted 
directly to pirates by their experience of privateering and other maritime 
service. They were created at times when a pirate company felt the need to 
establish a regular order, which was frequently at the very beginning of their 
piratical enterprise, but could be revised or entirely rewritten at times of crisis 
when the already established order seemed in danger of breaking down. The 
maintenance of social order was necessary, not just for pirates, but for other 
outlaw groups such as highwaymen and prisoners of war, who were equally 
divorced from external law, and amongst these groups the physical safety and 
social cohesion of the community was regulated by the use of written articles 
or some similar mechanism. The content of the individual sets of articles were 
determined largely by the experience of the men who created them, 
sometimes drawing directly on their experience of ‘legitimate’ articles, such as 
those of the privateers, but also suited to the unique circumstances each 
group or pirate company found themselves in. The articles were drawn up 
voluntarily, devoid of external pressure, and were, for the most part, willingly 
adhered to. Adherence by pirates to their articles is indicative of the fragility of 
their society, and of their awareness of that fragility, for ‘if we once take the 
Liberty of Breaking our Articles and Oath, then there is none of us can be sure 
of any thing’.310
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2. Command, Hierarchy, and the Pirate ‘Democracy’ 
It should be self-evident that a sailing vessel required a large degree of 
coordinated collaborative labour in its management. Every day tasks such as 
trimming and balancing sails, steering the ship and maintaining the ship’s 
fabric, as well as extraordinary tasks like loading and unloading cargo and 
supplies, or manning cannon in battle, all required coordination and direction, 
and so it was inevitable that some kind of command structure should exist to 
provide them. The nature and size of this command structure varied 
depending on a number of factors, such as whether the vessel was a naval 
one or merchant, the size of the vessel, and the nature of her employment. 
The largest command structures were employed by naval vessels, and the 
smallest by small merchantmen and fishing vessels: the largest naval ships at 
the end of the seventeenth century might carry as many as ninety-four officers 
of all classes, including specialist tradesmen, while a medium-sized 
merchantman of the same period employed perhaps only half a dozen, and 
the smallest merchantmen perhaps only two.311 The way these command 
structures functioned also varied. On a naval vessel or very large 
merchantman with a large officer contingent and a large crew to be managed, 
orders were passed down a definite chain of command, or command 
hierarchy, supposed to ensure that jobs were correctly allocated to the right 
people, while on a small merchantman the master or mate, having decided 
what was to be done and given orders to that effect, might then join in with the 
physical work himself if the task was a heavy one.312 
All ships required a commander, a leader whose decisions were final. In ships 
with a primarily combative role such as naval vessels or privateers the 
supreme command fell to the captain, often assisted by one or more 
lieutenants. The master, who in turn was usually assisted by one or more 
mates, carried out the tasks of actually managing the ship and directing 
navigation. In most non-combative ships such as merchantmen and fishing 
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vessels, the master was the highest-ranking officer and fulfilled the role of 
commander, usually taking the title of ‘captain’ to reflect this. Somewhere 
beneath the master’s mates came the apprentices, or their naval equivalent 
midshipmen, men and boys learning the arts of seamanship and command. 
The exact position of these young officers in the command structure was often 
ambiguous and could vary from ship to ship. The senior of the ship’s petty 
officers was the boatswain, who acted rather as a foreman of the vessel, but 
was also responsible for the ship’s boats and the maintenance of the rigging. 
Other specialist tradesmen also contributed to the smooth running of the 
vessel: the carpenter, a trained shipwright, maintained the vessel’s wooden 
fabric; the gunner maintained the ship’s armament and often trained the crew 
in its use; the cooper was responsible for the casks which contained many of 
the ship’s stores and much cargo; and the sailmaker oversaw work repairing 
and replacing sails. On larger vessels these tradesmen, including the 
boatswain, were often assisted by mates or a ‘gang’ of seamen detailed to 
their department. Quartermasters were, on most vessels, petty officers who 
undertook duties related to the navigation and steering of the vessel, and to 
the stowing of cargo, and naval crews habitually included a coxswain, who 
commanded the smaller of the ship’s boats. Naval rations were ultimately the 
responsibility of the purser, an officer who kept the ship’s accounts of stores 
and men, but were tended to in practice by the steward, who released 
foodstuffs to the ship’s cook, who in turn rationed them out to the crew. 
Merchant vessels generally made do with a cook only, though the role of the 
naval purser was often fulfilled by the merchant supercargo, whose duties 
included marine accountancy. The arduous work of actually sailing the vessel 
– heaving lines, trimming sails, raising and lowering the anchor, and a 
thousand other tasks – was carried out by the foremastmen who made up the 
largest and lowest group in the command structure. Foremastmen might be 
experienced seamen, landsmen on their first voyage, or boys working for a 
pittance in exchange for the skills and experience that would later enable 
them to gain employment as men.313 
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External to the ship existed another, more senior command structure. While 
the captain and his officers were responsible for the running of the vessel 
itself, only rarely was the captain in sole control of such matters as where the 
vessel sailed or what tasks it performed when it got there. These decisions 
were generally made by agencies not found on the ship itself. In the case of 
naval vessels, the captain received orders about where to sail and who to fight 
from his commanding admiral, who in turn received his orders from one or 
more of the many agencies with jurisdiction over the navy: the Admiralty, the 
Navy Board, Parliament, the Privy Council, the Council of Trade and 
Plantations, Secretaries of State, or the Crown.314 Privately owned merchant 
or privateer vessels were managed, ultimately, by the owners, investors, and 
charterers.315 The captain or master naturally had some leeway as to how 
orders were to be carried out, and this is particularly true of merchant ships 
whose master often had a great deal of autonomy in determining which ports 
to visit, but ultimately, whether naval ship or merchant, the commander was 
responsible to a higher, external, authority.  
Parallel to the shipboard command hierarchy ran a hierarchy determined by 
the wage scale of the crew, and frequently a social hierarchy, which did not 
always reflect precisely either the chain of command or pay hierarchy. To take 
a naval example, the position of midshipmen in the command structure and 
hierarchies of the ship could be ambiguous. Midshipmen, in the latter half of 
the seventeenth century, were sometimes young men of good patronage who 
were secured the post in order to make possible their progression to 
lieutenant and command, but could also be experienced hands who had risen 
through the lower decks and were on their way to becoming a mate, and 
eventually master. A midshipman’s duties were those of a lower ranking 
officer, below the mates and lieutenants, but an officer nonetheless, but his 
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pay was only the same as that of some of the senior lower-deck hands.316 
Thus, the midshipman stood below the mate and above the boatswain in the 
chain of command, might be socially inferior or superior to both of them, and 
was paid less than either of them. 
The command hierarchy extended downwards from the captain, through the 
officers and petty officers, and ultimately to the foremastmen who constituted 
the labouring force of the vessel. However, not all foremastmen were 
considered equal, and the lack of a rigid and regularized chain of command 
amongst the lower-deck seamen was filled with a third, professional, 
hierarchy. Again, this is best exemplified by the naval system, but similar 
situations could be found on most vessels, even outside the naval regulations. 
In the Royal Navy pay scale, able seamen were paid more than ordinary 
seamen, and almost twice the wage of landsmen, who in turn were paid more 
than boys.317 Socially there was little to tell between the orders of the lower 
decks, but it was natural that labour should be divided according to ability. On 
merchantmen the differences in wages between different grades of seaman 
were less marked, if at all, but occasionally existed according to experience, 
and frequently wages differed between men and boys.318 There existed, then, 
in virtually every sailing vessel of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
command and pay hierarchies, and in all the largest and many of the smaller 
vessels, additional social and professional hierarchies.  
Pirate ships were much like any other sailing vessel, inasmuch as their 
management required collaborative and collective labour, which in turn 
required coordination by some form of command structure. For the pirates, the 
biggest difference between their command structure and those of legitimate 
vessels was that the pirates’ command structure had to be maintained by the 
pirates themselves without any external agency at work. In the navy, officers 
were appointed by the Admiralty, and so were able to maintain their command 
                                                 
316
 H.W. Hodges and E.A. Hughes (eds), Select Naval Documents (Cambridge, 1922), pp. 71-
72; Bernard Capp, Cromwell’s Navy, the Fleet and the English Revolution, 1648-1660 
(Oxford, 1992), p. 206; Rodger, Wooden World, pp. 26, 54, 216-217; Rodger, Command of 
the Ocean, p. 620 
317
 Rodger, Command of the Ocean, pp. 621, 624 
318
 Rediker, Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, pp. 116-121; Davis, English Shipping Industry, p. 
135; Vickers and Walsh, Young Men, pp. 81, 265; Hustwick, The George, p. 41 
 106 
with the support of the State; the master of a merchantman was usually 
appointed by the vessel’s owners, if he were not an owner himself, while the 
junior officers were appointed either by the owners or by the master, and the 
command structure was thus maintained by virtue of the ownership of the 
vessel and the wages paid by owner to crew.319 Pirates were not able to turn 
to the State for help in maintaining their command structure, and neither did 
pirate vessels have wage-paying owners, except for the pirates themselves, 
but they nonetheless required a command structure to ensure their successful 
operational management. The other hierarchies found in legitimate seafaring, 
while strongly related to the command structure, were not a matter of purely 
practical necessity in the same way as the command structure was. This is an 
important distinction: the command structure was a function of the ship itself, 
and the need for such a structure remained unchanged, though the form that 
structure took might not, regardless of who sailed the vessel and to what 
purpose. The hierarchies, however, were functions of the crew, and not only 
the nature of the hierarchies, but their very existence, might depend on the 
social make-up of the crew, the nature of their social order, and the methods 
by which their social order was maintained. Theoretically at least, the pay and 
social hierarchies could be dispensed with without impairing the efficient 
running of the vessel, and the effects of the professional hierarchy could be 
suborned if the crew were made up entirely of men with similar levels of skill 
and experience. Traditional pirate historiography has highlighted the equality 
prevalent on pirate ships, and argues that the division of power pirates 
practised reduced the command structure to such an extent that it could be 
managed effectually by the whole crew, entirely doing away with the social 
hierarchy attendant on the command structures of legitimate seafaring.320 This 
chapter will explore the nature of pirates’ command structures, and attempt to 
reassess the extent and significance of their social and professional 
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hierarchies. Pirates’ pay hierarchies, because of their essentially economic 
interest, will be dealt with separately in Chapter 3.4. 
 
2.1. The Hierarchy of Command 
The senior officer of the shipboard command structure on any sailing vessel 
might be termed ‘captain’. In the naval command structure the captain and 
master were two different people, the master responsible for navigation and 
handling the vessel and the captain in overall command. On most 
merchantmen the same individual usually exercised the offices of captain and 
master.321 Pirates employed both methods at different times and under 
different circumstances. 
Charles Johnson wrote that the rank of captain of a pirate ship was ‘obtained 
by the suffrage of the majority’, and another contemporary account recorded 
that pirates ‘chose a Captain from amongst themselves’.322 References such 
as these to the democratic selection of commanders have led to two general 
assumptions: firstly that the election of pirate officers was a routine, perhaps 
even universal practice within such vessels, and, secondly, that anyone within 
the company might be considered a candidate under the right 
circumstances.323 In fact, the evidence of elected captains is limited to a 
minority of pirate companies,324 though the practice may well have been more 
widespread. Pirate captains rose to command under myriad different 
circumstances – at the formation of an entirely new pirate company, on the 
division of an existing pirate company into two or more companies, or on the 
death or deposition of their predecessor, for example – and the method of 
their taking command might depend heavily on the nature of those 
circumstances. 
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In the event of a completely new pirate company being formed, either when a 
whole ship’s crew turned to piracy from legitimate employment, or when a 
portion of the crew mutinied against their officers prior to turning pirate, the 
person most likely to become commander of the new pirate crew was the 
person that had held the highest office onboard before the shift from 
legitimacy to piracy. Thomas Tew and other Indian Ocean pirate captains 
began their voyages as commanders of privateers, and retained their 
command when they led their men into piracy, Thomas Shafto and Nicholas 
Clough, masters of a merchantmen, likewise remained in command when 
their crews turned to piracy.325 Captain Kidd’s men were ‘very desirous to put 
off their yoak’ of his command, even before their transition from pirate-hunting 
to piracy, but he nevertheless retained the command to which his privateering 
commission appointed him.326 After the death of Captain Plowman of the 
privateer Charles in 1703, the crew turned to piracy under the command of 
John Quelch, formerly the Charles’ lieutenant.327 Of the pirate captains, such 
as Jennings and Hornigold, whose arrival in the Bahamas in 1715-1716 
sparked a great wave of piracy, several had begun their piratical careers in 
possession of Jamaican privateering commissions.328  
It was not uncommon for mutinies to be led by one of the ship’s officers or 
petty officers, or for them to assume command when the turn to piracy 
occurred. Cusack was the gunner of his vessel before leading a mutiny in 
which all of the senior officers were thrown overboard, and in the subsequent 
piracies command was exercised by Cusack and one of the mates, the only 
other officer to survive.329 Henry Every’s spectacular career as a pirate 
captain began when, as first mate of a privateer, he led a mutiny that 
overthrew the captain.330 William Fly was only the boatswain of the Elizabeth 
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when he led a mutiny in 1726 but, once the master and mate had been killed, 
was the senior remaining officer and took command.331 George Lowther and 
John Massey seem to have shared command over a mixed crew of seamen 
and soldiers following their seizure of the Bumper, having previously been 
second mate of the ship and second in command of the soldiers 
respectively.332 Howell Davis, whose turn to piracy was the beginning of one 
of the most successful and long-lived pirate companies of the period, was a 
mate before he ‘took command’ of the Buck.333  
When a pirate company divided itself into two or more crews, the original 
commander of the company often appointed the commanders of the new 
crews. Blackbeard was a member of Hornigold’s crew and, according to 
Johnson at least, was given his first command by Hornigold, with whom he 
sailed in consort for some time.334 Thomas Anstis, having been ‘sometimes 
quartermaster, and often Boatswain, and foremastman’, was placed by 
Bartholomew Roberts in command of a consort vessel before he used her to 
desert Roberts’ company. When Roberts later placed another of his officers, 
lieutenant Walter Kennedy, in command of a prize, exactly the same thing 
occurred and Kennedy made off with the vessel and a large part of Roberts’ 
company.335 
None of this is to say that pirates did not elect their commanders, and several 
of those mentioned above may well have been elected into the position that 
would naturally have been theirs, but it does suggest that command of a new 
crew or company was frequently taken, assumed, or granted, rather than 
invested by majority vote. Appendix 16 contains data relating to the career 
paths of 82 pirate captains. It is impossible to gauge accurately the exact 
proportion of pirate captains active between 1660 and 1730 represented by 
this sample. Contemporary estimates of 30-32 companies active at the height 
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of piratical activity seem a little enthusiastic and can only be reconciled with 
difficulty with other estimates of the number of individual pirates active at the 
same time, and not at all with any list of pirate captains known by name. 
Rediker quotes one contemporary estimate of 2,000 pirates, and calculates 
that 32 pirate ships would be crewed by approximately 2,400 men (an 
average of 75 men per crew). However, the estimate of 2,000 pirates related 
to a two-year period, and the highest figure quoted by Rediker for pirates 
active at one time was 1,500. Using Rediker’s calculations, this suggests a 
figure closer to 20 pirate companies active at one time.336 Rediker’s figures 
address the number of pirates active in one the busiest parts of the ‘golden 
age’ of piracy, between 1716 and 1726. Based on contemporary estimates, 
Bialuschewski suggests that between 1695 and 1700, when Indian Ocean 
piracy was at its height, around 1,500 pirates may have been active in the 
region.337 Accepting that many pirate captains’ names may have been lost to 
posterity, and that an estimate of 30 pirate companies represents the 
maximum number at the very peak of piratical activity, it seems reasonable to 
suppose that a sample of 82 captains represents more, probably much more, 
than half of the number of pirate captains active. Of these captains, then, the 
method by which they arrived at command can be ascertained in 64 (78.1%) 
cases. 39 (60.9%) of these captains either retained the previously-held 
command, or rose to command from a position of superior rank, without any 
evidence that they did so democratically, while only 19 (29.7%) were voted 
into command. The remaining 6 (9.4%) captains were given command by a 
superior. 
However, without recourse to any higher authority than themselves, even 
those captains who were not initially voted into their command must have 
commanded by the consent of the crew, or at least, by absence of dissent. 
This point is well illustrated by the fact that several pirate commanders were 
voted out of their post, and their successors nominated by popular vote. 
Edward England was ‘turned out of command’ and replaced by Jasper 
Seagar, who then sailed in consort with John Taylor. Taylor had briefly 
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replaced Howell Davis in command and later succeeded Thomas Cocklyn on 
the latter’s death.338 Cocklyn had originally risen to command when a small 
band of pirates ‘chose’ him as their captain, though the exact manner of his 
selection is unclear. La Buse, who consorted with Cocklyn and Taylor, had 
been elected into his command after his predecessor had been overthrown 
and set adrift in a boat, and was eventually deprived of his command by the 
will of a pirate ‘council’.339 Many of Hornigold’s crew did not share his 
principles about not attacking English shipping, and so Samuel Bellamy ‘was 
chosen by a great Majority their Captain, and Hornygold departed’.340 Ned 
Low’s company ‘disbanded Low from his office and sent him away… and put 
one Shipton Capt[ain] in his Stead’.341 Some pirate captains, then, rose to 
command at the formation of a new crew because it was a natural progression 
that they should do so, having previously been in a position of authority, as 
commander or a senior officer, before any piracy was committed. But when an 
existing crew required a new captain, because the former captain had been 
deposed or had died, some form of democratic election was sometimes, 
though by no means always, used to select him.  
The captain’s position in the command structure and hierarchies of the pirate 
ship was ambiguous. Charles Johnson, in relating the ‘principal Customs, and 
Government, of this roguish Commonwealth’, first explained the role, not of 
the captain, but of the quartermaster, ‘who claims all Authority… (excepting in 
Time of Battle)’, by virtue of having been elected by the company. According 
to Johnson, the quartermaster not only held supreme command, but was also 
the overseer of law and justice, and ‘trustee’ of the company’s accumulated 
spoil. The captain was reduced to purely military command, when the pirates 
entered the fray of battle, but otherwise had ‘truly very little’ authority, except 
apparently over the treatment of prisoners. Ambiguous syntax makes it 
unclear whether Johnson’s words are meant to apply to pirates in general, or 
specifically Roberts’ company, but a later chapter adds that ‘on board the 
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West-India privateers and Free Booters… the Captain can undertake nothing 
which the Quarter-Master does not approve’.342 Johnson’s words, and similar 
evidence from other contemporary reports, have been used by subsequent 
historians to depict a pirate command structure in which the captain 
commanded only in battle, and the day-to-day command of the vessel was 
exercised by the quartermaster, a separation of power designed to restrict the 
captain’s opportunity for predation upon the company. The fact that both 
captain and quartermaster were, according to traditional historiography at 
least, elected by common consent, further restricted the power of the officers 
and placed more control in the hands of the company as a whole.343 The role 
of the company in collective long-term planning and decision-making will be 
explored more fully later in this chapter, but on a day-to-day basis, whether 
they were implementing their own long-term intentions or the collective will of 
the company, it appears that the captain and quartermaster between them 
exercised command. 
There are, however, a number of problems with this hypothesis, not the least 
of which is that many pirates sailed independently of others and may have 
used systems more suited to their own circumstances and experience. 
Virtually all pirate ships were commanded by a captain but not all companies 
appointed a quartermaster. Other ships had many more officers besides 
captain and quartermaster, all of whom must be fitted into the chain of 
command in order to understand how pirate authority was constructed. Stede 
Bonnet, for example, was supported in his command not only by a 
quartermaster, but also by a ‘chief mate’, gunner, boatswain, gunner’s mate, 
and boatswain’s mate, and his sometime consort Blackbeard’s company of 
around twenty men included a sailing master, quartermaster, gunner, 
boatswain, carpenter, and sailmaker. On some pirate ships a lieutenant also 
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assisted the captain.344 Some sets of articles, too, make mention of various 
officers: the captain of the Camelion was entitled to have a ‘master under 
him’, Taylor’s articles established the presence of a boatswain, gunner, pilot 
(navigator) and quartermaster, Anstis’ and Philips’ articles both provided for a 
master, gunner, carpenter and boatswain, and those of Lowther and Low 
mention, amongst other officers, a master, master’s mate, gunner and 
boatswain, besides the captain. William Snelgrave summed up the situation: 
‘Besides the Captain and Quarter-master, the Pirates had all other Officers as 
is usual on board Men of War’.345 
Of these officers, the carpenter, gunner and sailmaker probably only 
exercised any form of command within their own spheres of expertise, but the 
lieutenant, master or pilot, mate, quartermaster, boatswain, and boatswain’s 
mates were functional roles in the operational command of a vessel in 
legitimate seafaring, and this practice was probably reflected on pirate vessels 
as well – if it had not been then their presence would have been superfluous. 
In some cases these officers may have been appointed to a purely functional 
role, without any form of authority beyond that necessary for the performance 
of their immediate duties, and this is best illustrated by examples of pirate 
‘officers’ who were not necessarily volunteer pirates. Bridstock Weaver, 
having been forcibly conscripted into Anstis’ company, was ‘forced by the 
pirates to be commander’ of their consort vessel, and at the same time 
William Whelks, another forced man, was made quartermaster.346 Henry 
Glasby, whose forced status was attested to by several witnesses at his trial, 
‘acted as Master of the said Pyrate-ship’.347 These forced officers wielded no 
authority in terms of long-term decision-making, and since their role was, in 
these cases, purely a functional one, the fact that they were not willing 
volunteers was relatively insignificant. The sailing master was quite able to 
direct the working and navigation of the vessel, acting under orders from the 
other authority figures in the pirate company, just as the quartermaster was 
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able to oversee the division of spoil and the maintenance of discipline, even if 
he did so under duress. The appointment of forced men as pirate officers 
leads to the conclusion that such appointments were made primarily, and 
occasionally solely, on the basis of skill and experience, rather than popularity 
or ambition. This, in turn, explains why so many pirate captains had formerly 
possessed legitimate officer status before turning to piracy, enabling them to 
bring the requisite skills of seamanship and leadership to their piratical 
command. 
Forced officers, however, were in a minority, and most men selected for any 
kind of command position were voluntary pirates. Volunteers would, in 
general, make more loyal and efficient officers since their own interest was to 
ensure the greatest possible success of the company, as opposed to an 
unwilling conscript whose first thought might be to remain alive long enough to 
escape his situation. Did volunteer officers, then, fill only a functional role, or 
did their status enable them to exercise command? Given that the running of 
a sailing vessel requires at least some people to wield authority, it is logical 
that that authority was wielded by the officers, and this is borne out by the 
presence, in various sets of pirate articles, of clauses calling for general 
obedience to the officers. The very first clause of John Phillips’ articles 
demands that ‘every man shall obey civil Command’, which article was 
probably inherited from those of Phillips’ mentor, Thomas Anstis, whose 
second clause gives the company the right to punish any man who ‘should 
Disobey any Lawful Command of the Commanding Officers’. The articles of 
John Gow are the most specific on this point, stating that ‘every Man shall 
obey his Commander in all Respects, as if the Ship was his own, and we 
under Monthly Pay’. 
The recreation on pirate vessels of the style of command hierarchy employed 
in legitimate shipping is an important indicator of how pirate companies 
functioned. While Gow’s crew and others perhaps modelled their command 
structure on their experience in merchant shipping, with the crew enjoined to 
behave as though they were ‘under Monthly Pay’, and Gow himself 
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considered the ‘Sole Director, as well as Commander’,348 other companies, 
such as that of Bartholomew Roberts, modelled their command structure 
along lines more akin to that of the Royal Navy. The rank of lieutenant was 
primarily a martial one, found only on vessels, such as naval ships and 
privateers, whose principal employments entailed combat. Some pirate 
companies, including Roberts’, appointed a lieutenant, whose duties mirrored 
that of his counterpart in a legitimate vessel. A lieutenant was supposed to 
assist the captain in his duties and deputize for him in the case of the latter’s 
absence or death, and this was exactly the role filled by Roberts’ lieutenant, 
Walter Kennedy, who, for example, was given command of the pirates’ 
flagship and one already captured prize while the captain took a faster vessel 
to pursue another prize.349 Moreover, in battle, while a naval captain directed 
the fighting from the quarterdeck, the lieutenants were placed on the other 
decks to oversee the operation of the ship’s guns: Kennedy, as the pirates’ 
lieutenant, ‘commanded upon the main deck’.350 Similarly, the place of a naval 
quartermaster in battle was at the helm,351 and Charles Johnson explained 
that a pirate quartermaster was ‘to be at the Helm in Time of Chase or 
Engagement, according to the Rules of the Pyrates’.352 William Main, the 
boatswain of Roberts’ flagship, also behaved in a manner that reflected that of 
his counterpart in naval service. An officer of HMS Swallow, rounding up 
survivors of the pirates’ last battle noted ‘a Silver Call hang[ing]’ at his waist: 
the boatswain’s call, or whistle, was a functional item used to transmit orders, 
but was also a symbol of the boatswain’s authority. At his trial, Main was 
described as ‘acting briskly on all Occasions, on board the Pyrate Ship, like a 
Man of War’s Officer’. The cooper of the same crew maintained the authority 
of his own office with ‘a Rattan like an Officer’.353 
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The adoption of a naval style command structure by pirates was certainly 
logical, as pirate and naval vessels shared several operational similarities: 
both types of ship were engaged primarily in martial exercise rather than 
trade, or at least had to be prepared for martial exercise, and both enjoyed, on 
the whole, relatively large crews amongst whom discipline had to be 
maintained. Nevertheless, contemporaries, such as the privateer officers 
William Betagh and George Taylor, compared the command structures of 
pirate ships unfavourably to that of a ‘well regulated private ship of war’, and 
concluded that pirates had ‘no regular command among them’.354 These 
comments, however, should not be taken at face value. In the first place, both 
observers were using pirates to illustrate the degeneration of their own 
commanders’ command. Similar arguments could be made about other 
observers, such as John Atkins, who was attempting to highlight the perceived 
natural superiority of the Royal Navy when he wrote that ‘the Pyrates, tho’ 
singly Fellows of Courage, yet wanting such a tye [tie] of Order, some Director 
to unite that Force, were a contemptible Enemy’.355 In the second place, such 
observers were often writing from a very limited experience of pirate society, 
or nothing more than hearsay, and were confusing a less formal discipline 
with a lack of command structure. And thirdly, it is very likely that they mistook 
an absence of visual signifiers of hierarchy for an absence of command 
hierarchy itself. True, William Main wore his boatswain’s call, but, as noted 
above, the call served a functional as well as symbolic process. Although the 
Royal Navy had no specified uniform to distinguish officers at this time, 
officers were nonetheless expected to clothe themselves in a fashion 
appropriate to their rank. A midshipman was not allowed to assume his post 
until he was able to ‘appear properly as a quarter deck officer’, and 
contemporary satirist Ned Ward wrote that ‘to walk the Quarter-deck in 
Quirpo356 is to walk against the rules of the Navy’.357 On some privateers the 
officers were given items of uniform by which they could be distinguished: on 
Shelvocke’s voyage the officers were given scarlet suits, and sea officers 
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were distinguished from marine officers by different coloured silk facings on 
the pocket flaps and cuffs. Even the petty officers and boat’s crew were given 
silk waistcoats, caps and breeches.358  
Pirates, by contrast, had no such dress code, and their clothing was 
determined by what was available to them as much as anything else. Pirate 
captains and officers had no hierarchical right, much less responsibility, to 
dress better than their crews, and indeed there was nothing to prevent even 
the lowest member of a pirate company from dressing how he pleased. When 
William Snelgrave was captured by pirates he had in his possession ‘three 
second hand embroidered Coats’. The captains of the three pirate ships 
present, learning of these coats, decided to appropriate them in order to 
impress the African women ashore, which being done ‘without leave from the 
Quartermaster, it gave great offence to all the Crew’. The following morning, 
when the captains returned from their amorous adventures, ‘the Coats were 
taken from them, and put into the common Chest, to be sold at the Mast’, to 
any pirate who wanted to buy them.359 In outward appearance, then, there 
was little to tell between the captain and a foremastman of a pirate ship, but 
that does not imply that there was no difference between them, or that a 
command hierarchy almost as formalised as that of the navy did not exist. 
 
2.2. The external command problem and pirate ‘democracy’. 
If pirates adopted internal command structures similar to those found in naval 
and merchant shipping, they could not do the same with their external 
command structure. And yet, the external command structure was just as 
much a function of the ship as the internal. Like legitimate shipping, pirate 
ships needed to be directed, decisions had to be made regarding 
destinations, operations, and policy. In the absence of any external agency 
such as Admiralty, State, or owner, these decisions had to be made internally, 
by the pirates themselves. These decisions could have been made by the 
pirates’ captain, but this would have led to what Leeson has identified as a 
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piratical ‘paradox of power’, which is to say that a pirate captain unchecked by 
any external agency could have acted entirely in his own self-interests, and 
some form of external agency had thus to be fabricated internally to prevent 
this happening.360 As the de facto owners of their vessels, each member of a 
pirate company had a theoretical right to consultation in the decision making 
process. In practical terms, however, this might not always be possible. A 
pirate ship with a large crew could be ‘owned’ by several hundred men, far in 
excess of the traditional maximum in merchant shipping enterprise of sixty-
four owners’ shares. In the field of merchant shipping even this number was 
found to be unwieldy for the purposes of decision-making and strategy-
forming, and a smaller core of ‘managing owners’ was usually employed to 
actually direct the ship’s operations.361 Pirates, at different times, used all 
three methods: autocratic captain’s command, command by a committee of 
shareholders, and command by every shareholder. 
The first of these, autocratic command, is best exemplified by the case of the 
infamous Captain William Kidd. Kidd’s piratical cruise began as a private 
pirate-hunting expedition when he left New York in September 1696 in 
possession of a Royal Patent and a mixed crew of seamen, landsmen, former 
privateers, and would-be pirates.362 Four days after leaving New York, Kidd’s 
crew demanded a new set of articles, depriving the owners of some of their 
shares and redistributing them to the crew.363 Acquiescence to the new 
articles by Kidd served both the crew and the captain. By agreeing to the 
demands of the crew Kidd empowered them to make more demands later, but 
at the same time was firmly established in his command, not only by the will of 
the owners, but also by the consent of the crew. Kidd’s style of command left 
no doubt, no room for popular politics. William Mason, an acquaintance of 
Kidd and sometimes a pirate himself, reported, after encountering the pirates, 
that 
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Kidd carries a very different command from what other pirates use to do, 
his commission having heretofore procured respect and awe, and this 
being added to by his own strength, being a very lusty man, fighting with 
his men on any little occasion, often calling for his pistols and threatening 
anyone that durst speak of anything contrary to his mind to knock out 
their brains, causing them to dread him.364 
Kidd, then, kept his crew in order, not so much by allowing them a voice in the 
decision-making processes that directed the ship, but by the use of strong 
words and physical violence. When some of Kidd’s men were in favour of 
attacking a pirate ship during their cruise, Kidd refused, and threatened the 
men. Later, accused of ‘ruining’ his men by this action he called the gunner a 
‘lousie dog’ and struck him on the head with an iron-bound bucket.365 At 
Madagascar, Kidd moved from his leaking vessel into one of his prizes, and 
managed to retain command in the process; though many of his men deserted 
him at the first opportunity, they did not, or could not, remove him from his 
command.366 
Mason was right to highlight Kidd’s command style as unusual, but it was far 
from unique. Johnson’s anecdote that Blackbeard once shot at two of his 
officers during a drinking session, because ‘if he did not now and then kill one 
of them, they would forget who he was’,367 might well be as fanciful as it 
sounds, but, when faced with discontentment amongst his own crew, John 
Taylor would throw ‘himself boldly into the midst of the mutinous pirates whom 
he struck left and right’. Taylor was well liked and respected by his men 
though, ‘in spite of the severity that he deemed necessary’.368 John Phillips, 
by contrast, was ‘so arbitrary as to be hated by his own crew’.369 
The other system of external command structure – command by 
shareholders, either a managing committee or the whole body  – is commonly 
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suggested as the most usual amongst pirates.370 In legitimate shipping, 
whether naval or merchant, the selection of officers, employment terms of 
seamen, and long-term operational planning, were all functions of the external 
command agency that exercised control over any given vessel. This is also 
true, to some extent, of determining the punishments meted out to recalcitrant 
seamen, which were laid down by the laws of the State and the orders of the 
Admiralty. The external command agencies of pirate ships therefore had to 
exercise fundamentally the same functions as their counterparts in legitimate 
shipping, the only major difference between them being that the pirates’ 
external command structure was physically located within the ship in a way 
that it usually was not in legitimate ships. The functions of the internal 
command structure, from the captain down, were also essentially the same on 
pirate ships as in legitimate shipping. A pirate vessel, though, had no owners 
or shareholders. Prior to being turned into a pirate vessel each ship had a 
legitimate owner or owners, but from the moment the vessel began to be used 
for piracy, whether by capture or mutiny, the original owners could no longer 
exercise any control over the vessel or crew. De facto ownership of the 
vessel, marked by the ability to exercise control over it, then devolved to the 
crew. Seamen on pirate vessels therefore filled two different roles. As 
individuals, they were employees of the ship in exactly the same sense as 
seamen employed in legitimate shipping, ruled by the internal command 
structures that took the same form, more or less, in both pirate and legitimate 
vessels. As a group, however, they were the de facto co-owners of their own 
vessels and often constituted the ‘external’ command structure, by which the 
officers of the internal command structure were ruled. 
The clause in Bartholomew Roberts’ articles guaranteeing that ‘Every man 
has a vote in affairs of moment’ has frequently been cited as evidence of 
universal suffrage amongst pirate crews. Much of the evidence relating to a 
democratic voting process concerns the election or deposition of officers: 
Bridstock Weaver ‘was Voted to’ the post of sailing master, and Roberts’ crew 
voted for their mate, quartermaster, boatswain’s mate, and presumably other 
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officers as well.371 But pirate crews, in their capacity as de facto owners, also 
voted on other matters of policy, such as where best to hunt for prizes. 
Edward England proposed attacking the Portuguese settlement at Goa, so the 
matter was put up for discussion amongst the company.  A pirate crew in the 
South Atlantic in 1690 ‘putt to the Vote’ whether to sail East into the Indian 
Ocean, or West to South America and the Pacific. More detailed long-term 
planning was also decided by popular opinion: Ned Low’s company called ‘a 
Consultation where to go [and] they Concluded to go through the Gulf & so on 
the American coast to the Northward and from thence to Ruby and there to 
heave down and [careen]’.372 
One other thing that pirate companies regularly voted on was the punishment 
of offenders, and their right, or duty, to do so was enshrined in several sets of 
articles. Disobedience and mutiny on Kidd’s Adventure Galley were to be 
punished by ‘such corporall punishment as the Capt and major part of the 
company shall think fit’, and a similar phrase appears several times in the 
articles of Anstis, Lowther, Low, and Phillips, relating to infractions such as 
desertion, fraud, concealment of plunder, and brawling with weapons. This 
practice, which will be explored more fully in Chapter 5.3 may have been more 
widespread than the sample of articles suggests; for example, Thomas 
Cocklyn’s crew voted to have their boatswain whipped for mistreating a 
prisoner.373 Aside from punishments, the fates of individual members of the 
company were also at stake when pirates voted on matters that might best be 
called ‘terms of employment’: whether an individual should be allowed to join 
or leave a pirate company, and what share of spoil they should receive for 
their service. When Harry Glasby attempted to move from one crew to 
another, within the same company, the captain and quartermaster, ‘conceived 
a jealousy, [and] put it to the Vote of the Company, and Glasby was stopt’. 
When a Dutchman tried to join the company of John Quelch, ‘the Company 
voted he should not have a full share’, and when he then threatened to inform 
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the authorities of the company’s piracy, ‘they Voted him to be put on Shoar’.374 
The fate of the pirates’ victims might also be a matter for referendum: one 
captured master who hoped for decent treatment was told that ‘all Business of 
this Nature must be done in Publick, and by a Majority of Votes by the whole 
Company’.375 
Despite the phrasing of the articles, it is clear that punishments were not 
always decided on by the vote of the whole company. Four forced men who 
attempted to escape from Roberts’ company were ‘tried by them for their lives 
by a Jury of twelve men’. On another occasion a jury of twelve of Roberts’ 
company sentenced three other deserters to death.376 The use of a jury to try 
offenders was also the practice in John Taylor’s company: the role of 
prosecutor was filled by the quartermaster, ‘in front of a jury of a dozen 
members, of whom half are chosen by the accused’.377 The use of a jury or 
selected group of ‘managing owners’ by pirates was not limited to the 
conviction and sentencing of wrong-doers, however, and neither were juries 
on land.  Throughout Britain and the colonies trial by jury was one of the 
safeguards that theoretically prevented abuse of position by arbitrary judges, 
and its use was standard in most criminal and many civil cases, but some 
juries, and in particular the county grand juries, also fulfilled an administrative 
function at a local level.378 Non-judicial functions were also served by pirate 
juries, as, for example, when Thomas Grant’s ship was captured, Walter 
Kennedy and ‘eleven others of [the pirate] Crew were chose by her said Crew 
to determine whether the Informant’s said ship should be kept or burnt & they 
all voted her to be burnt’.379 Bartholomew Roberts, according to Johnson, was 
assisted in his command by a committee of select pirates, ‘that were 
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distinguish’d by the Title of Lords’,380 and John Taylor sought the advice of a 
‘council’ before launching an attack against a far superior force.381 John 
Phillips’ crew was directed by a cabal consisting of the captain, sailing master, 
and two other pirates.382 
Whether they ran their ship by vote of the whole company or by a select 
committee, the concepts of elected officers and occasional referenda were 
neither new nor unique to pirates, of course. The very word ‘democracy’ has 
its origins in ancient Greece, and by the end of the seventeenth century voting 
was, in one form or another, a feature of life for many adult males. If a pirate 
company is considered as an institution or a community then the 
enfranchisement of part or all of the company is comparable with common 
practice elsewhere in society. In medieval England, for example, until at least 
the seventeenth century, meetings were convened in many rural villages for 
the election of local officials and ‘there was a custom for the inhabitants to 
assemble regularly to draft by-laws for the common good’.383 In larger towns 
and cities the establishment of by-laws was the prerogative of the corporation, 
a group of officers including mayor and aldermen, who were chosen by the 
town’s electorate.384 How far down the social and economic scales the 
franchise was extended in these towns and villages varied, from only the most 
significant property-owners in some cases to ‘the whole township’ in others, 
but it is clear that the concept, and often the practice, of democratic choice 
would have been familiar to most English pirates before they embarked on 
their criminal careers. 
Similar traditions were carried to the New World by the early colonists, and 
remained features of government throughout the American colonial period. 
William Penn, at the founding of Pennsylvania in 1682, wrote that ‘any 
Government is Free to the People under it… where the Laws rule and the 
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People are a party to those Laws’. From the beginning of the colony, laws 
were enacted by the Provincial Council of 72 freemen and a General 
Assembly of two hundred representatives, both bodies having been elected by 
the freemen of the colony. Qualification as a freeman required either that an 
inhabitant owned and cultivated a certain amount of land, or simply that he 
paid taxes.385 Between 1682 and 1701 the constitutional basis for the 
government of the colony went through several revisions, but freemen 
retained the right to elect their representatives to the General Assembly, as 
well as local officers such as sheriffs and coroners, throughout the eighteenth 
century.386 In Massachusetts the town meeting, first enshrined in legislation in 
1635, existed as a forum in which ‘every man, whether inhabitant or foreigner, 
free or not free, shall have liberty’ to raise issues or complaints, present 
petitions, and propose motions, and although only the freemen of the town 
had the right to vote on the issues raised, from the middle of the seventeenth 
century at least, the qualifications for freemanship were as liberal as 
Pennsylvania’s.387 In Virginia, representatives to the General Assembly were 
‘chosen by the inhabitants’, though the franchise became more restricted in 
the second half of the seventeenth century; in Maryland new laws required the 
‘advice, assent, and approbation of the freemen of the… province, or the 
greater part of them’; prospective colonists of Carolina were promised a 
representative assembly as an incentive; and in Bermuda the assembly of 48 
representatives was elected by ‘persons over eighteen who owned at least 
one 25-acre share of land’.388 Rhode Island, described in 1705 as ‘a 
receptacle of pirates’, enjoyed a government that proclaimed itself 
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‘democratical; that is to say, a government held by the free and voluntary 
consent of all, or the greater part of the free inhabitants.’389 
There existed, then, a tradition on both sides of the Atlantic of communities, 
and eligible individuals within each community, taking control of purely local 
affairs, exercising democratic decision making in the creation of laws by which 
their community was regulated, and in the election of officers to maintain the 
laws and lead the community. Moreover, the tradition was so widespread that 
virtually every pirate of Anglophone origin must have been aware of it, even if 
they had not participated in it directly.  
The tradition existed too at a micro-level within institutions whose jurisdiction 
and electorate were smaller than the local governments outlined above. The 
practice of incorporation was not limited to towns and cities, but might also be 
applied to guilds,  
groups of men, pursuing a specific craft, [who] joined with their fellows in 
exclusive associations which were designed to protect their interests 
against competition as well as to provide mutual support and 
friendship.390 
The guilds served social functions, bringing together individuals with a 
common interest and ‘relating households to the community’, and charitable 
functions, such as the provision of almshouses and ‘relief’ to distressed 
members.391 Their most ostensible purposes however were related to their 
trade, and included governing apprenticeships, regulating prices, and the 
‘defence of an occupational jurisdiction’, by which they sought to minimise 
competition, maintain standards of work, and punish, usually by means of a 
fine, transgressors and ‘delinquent members’.392 The regulations by which the 
guilds were governed were maintained, enforced, and revised by the guild’s 
own officers, led by a master, who was assisted by a select body of members 
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known variously as wardens, brothers, or by some other title. These officers 
were chosen from within the guild’s membership by an electorate that often 
included all guild members who had completed their apprenticeship and 
advanced beyond the stage of journeyman, or day worker, to conduct their 
own business, but sometimes consisted of ‘a select number of the principal’ 
members.393 That guild elections and votes were intended to be honest and 
free from external coercion is suggested by the fact that they were, by the 
seventeenth century, often secret: Charles I professed an ‘utter dislike’ of ‘the 
use of balloting boxes, which is of late begin to be practised by some 
corporations and companies’.394 
At an institutional level though, a better comparison to pirate companies might 
be made by dissenting churches, those which did not subscribe to Anglican 
tenets. Indeed, Burg argued that such democratic principles as were practiced 
by pirates might have had their genesis in the practices of the dissenting and 
Congregationalist churches prevalent in southern England and the American 
colonies, who 
chose their own ministers, ignored legally constituted ecclesiastical 
authority, gave legitimacy to their churches by founding them with the 
consent of the membership, and usually subscribed to a covenant, a set 
of written articles in which all agreed to worship together and observe the 
regulations and practices specified by their own elected leaders.395 
Congregationalist churches faced similar external command problems to 
pirates. Without an Episcopal hierarchy extending far above and beyond the 
confines of the individual congregation, there was no instruction in matters of 
church policy, practice, or the appointment of leaders, forthcoming from 
outside the church itself. Each church had therefore to solve these leadership 
problems internally. In 1648 a synod of the Congregationalist churches of 
Massachusetts and Connecticut went some way to overcoming the external 
command problem by subscribing to the ‘Cambridge Platform’, and other 
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similar ‘platforms’ appeared in other colonies in ensuing decades. The 
Cambridge Platform was an attempt to produce a church constitution to limit 
the authority of the clergy and place some measure of the control of each 
church in the hands of its congregation. In practice, the Cambridge Platform 
ratified practices that had been commonplace amongst its subscribers and in 
other Congregationalist churches for some decades. 
Like the pirates, Congregationalist churches each drew up an agreement, the 
‘covenant’, which gave church members the right to exercise ‘Church power 
one over the other mutually’, and was intended to put parishioners ‘in minde of 
our mutual duty, and stirreth us up to it’. The Cambridge Platform insisted that 
church officers should be chosen ‘by a free election’, and argued that ‘if the 
Church have power to chuse their Officers and Ministers, then… they have 
power also to depose them’.396 
There was nothing especially radical, then, about the systems employed by 
pirates to ensure that their ships functioned properly; they were simply the 
systems long employed in legitimate seafaring and in land-based 
communities, adapted to suit a company in which the crew were also de facto 
owners, and the pirates filled both roles at different times and in different 
circumstances. The ‘democracy’ extant in some pirate crews is therefore 
comparable to the decision-making processes utilised by the owners, or 
managing owners, of legitimate private ships, and was based on the pirates’ 
experiences as members of legitimate society. 
 
2.3. The extent of pirate ‘democracy’. 
If the actual methods by which pirates directed their activities were not radical, 
but instead were based on practices commonly found elsewhere in the 
maritime world or in society at large, the extension of the franchise to the 
entire company may have been. However, it is not at all certain that pirates 
did offer the right to participate in the decision-making to everyone that those 
decisions would affect. The extent to which Roberts’ article guaranteeing 
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universal suffrage ‘in affairs of the moment’ is indicative of similar practice in 
other pirate companies is unclear. Not all owners of merchant vessels took an 
active role in the direction of their vessel’s affairs, and there is little reason to 
suppose that the owners of pirate vessels operated any differently. Of all the 
surviving sets of pirate articles, Roberts’ is the only one to include such a 
clause, and although other pirates’ articles do place the right to make 
decisions on certain issues, such as punishment of wrong-doers, in the 
collective hands of the company, they also call for general obedience to 
officers’ commands. 
Moreover, it is not at all clear that the right to vote on important issues was 
extended to every man.  It is unsurprising that a boy in Quelch’s company 
‘had no Vote with the rest of the Company’,397 since children have rarely been 
considered mature enough to take part in democratic process. Surgeons in 
Taylor’s crew ‘had no vote’,398 presumably not because pirates bore a 
particular animosity to members of the medical profession, but because 
surgeons, on the whole, were rarely volunteer members of a pirate 
company.399 Allowing forced men to vote on affairs relating to the direction of 
the company and ship might have disastrous consequences, especially for 
companies in which forced men constituted a majority. The evidence given by 
Thomas Davis, a forced member of Bellamy’s company, reinforces this point: 
When the company was called together to Consuls, and each Man to 
give his Vote, they would not allow the forced men to have a Vote. There 
were one hundred and thirty forced Men in all, and Eighty of the Old 
company; and this examinate being a forced Man had no opportunity to 
discover his Mind.400 
In addition to the forced men there were other groups within various pirate 
companies who had no right to vote. Several pirate companies kept slaves to 
carry out the arduous, unskilled, labour such as cleaning and pumping, such 
as the black men on Philip Lyne’s ship, ‘whom they forced to do all the 
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Work’,401 and, on occasion, pirates treated free men, both black and white, in 
a manner that was, to all intents and purposes, slavery, and put them to 
menial tasks.402 It is highly unlikely that slaves had any right to vote in the 
affairs of the pirate ship, and probable that the ‘free’ menial servants were 
also denied suffrage. Newly recruited members of a pirate company may also 
have had to prove themselves before being granted a vote in shipboard 
affairs: according to Johnson, ‘the old Pyrates were always jealous of the new 
Comers’.403 In some cases other, less obvious, groups were treated with such 
contempt by the pirates that it is difficult to imagine they were given a voice in 
the running of the ship. In Roberts’ crew, for example, soldiers and Irishmen 
were theoretically prohibited from joining, and if they did manage to work their 
way into the crew were so discriminated against in general that they might as 
well have been treated as forced men.404 Even in Roberts’ ostensibly 
egalitarian crew, which included large numbers of forced men, several slaves, 
‘free’ men treated as slaves, some soldiers, and a steady influx of new 
recruits, suffrage was not universal. 
There were some good sound reasons for not including every person on 
board a ship in the decision-making process. Forced men and slaves had no 
interest in promoting the well being of the pirate company in which they found 
themselves, and neither necessarily did menial servants. In some cases 
slaves were unable to understand sufficient English to comprehend the issues 
being voted on: when a captured pirate tried to enlist the aid of several black 
men to escape, he was forced to converse with them in ‘a Smattering he had 
of the Angolan Language’.405 Boys and soldiers may have been denied voting 
rights on the practical grounds that they did not possess sufficient knowledge 
or experience of nautical affairs to make an informed decision, and new 
recruits may not have had a sufficient understanding of the exigencies of 
piracy, besides the fact that the older hands regarded them with caution. 
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None of these exclusions from the decision making process are surprising: 
children, servants, and slaves, were rarely, if ever, given the vote in 
contemporary society. In general terms, the right to vote, whether in matters of 
local government, corporate or guild policy, or church practices, was awarded 
to those who had shown themselves eligible by their commitment to the 
community. Land owners and tax payers had a physical and financial 
investment in the community, qualified craftsmen had made both a 
professional and a financial investment in their trade, and church members 
made a spiritual (and often financial) commitment to their church. This was not 
always the case; in some villages byelaws were enacted by all the inhabitants, 
regardless of property, and it was argued during the Parliamentary franchise 
reform movement of the 1620s ‘that in the absence of specific provisions to 
the contrary, every man had the right to vote’.406 Nevertheless, although they 
were sometimes easily obtained, as in the case of Pennsylvania noted above 
for example, there were usually qualifications for membership of the 
electorate. This is as true of pirates as it is of town meeting or 
Congregationalist church: voters had to be of a certain age; they had to be 
free men and not servants; they had to have voluntarily entered into the 
company; and they must have made some outwardly recognisable 
commitment of membership such as swearing an oath, signing articles, or 
serving a probationary period. Without these qualifications and commitments 
a man on board a pirate ship had no more freedom to take part in making the 
decisions that affected his life than his counterpart on land. The extent of 
pirate suffrage was no greater than that of the suffrage enjoyed by men on 
land. Of the 210 men on board Bellamy’s ships in 1717, according to Thomas 
Davis, only thirty-eight percent enjoyed voting rights. By way of comparison, it 
has been argued that between 28.4 and 41 percent of the adult male 
population of a colonial Massachusetts town had the right to vote, and 
possibly as many as 77.6 percent did.407 
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Table 1 shows the number of forced men, slaves and boys on board fourteen 
eighteenth-century pirate ships compared with the total crew sizes. Where the 
information regarding forced men has been taken from trial accounts it has 
been assumed, perhaps arbitrarily, that men who managed to convince the 
court of their forced status genuinely were unwilling conscripts, while those 
who claimed to have been forced but were unable to convince the court were 
voluntary members of the company. It is quite probable that the various courts 
made errors in the matter of forcing, but on the whole courts were unwilling to 
accept that a defendant truly had been forced unless he could produce 
satisfactory witnesses that it was so, therefore any error in Table 1 is likely to 
skew the data in favour of a larger proportion of willing volunteers. Data drawn 
from sources other than trials may include a significant number of forced men 
who are not recognised as such, skewing the proportion still further. The 
question of black crew-members is equally problematic, as their status has 
been shown to have varied greatly from company to company.408 Some black 
men appear to have enjoyed all the rights of membership of the company, 
such as receipt of a share of the spoil, and were fully trusted to carry arms. In 
other cases, black men were kept as slaves, deprived of free will and forced to 
menial service before, often, being sold. Only black pirates who appear to 
have been kept in a state of slavery have been considered in Table 1. It is 
possible that some pirate companies may have included free blacks and 
slaves together, in which case the data may be slightly skewed in favour of a 
larger proportion of non-voters. Finally, only four boys appear in Table 1, and 
it is probable that several boys whose ages were not clearly recorded have 
been included as willing volunteers, when in fact they had no vote. For these 
reasons, the data is most likely to be skewed most heavily in favour of a larger 
proportion of eligible voters, and the percentages given should be considered 
approximately the maximum. Nevertheless, despite these problems, the data 
are broadly accurate and, assuming that boys, slaves and forced men did not 
enjoy voting privileges, show the varying extent of piratical suffrage, from 18 
percent of the community, to 87 percent. Doubtless there were pirate 
companies in which every man was a voluntary enfranchised adult, and 
                                                 
408
 Kinkor, ‘Black Men’, p. 201; Bialuschewski, ‘Black People’, p. 461 
 132 
others, such as John Gow’s, in which formal voting does not appear to have 
taken place at all. In Roberts’ company, ‘every man’ had the right to vote in 
theory, but less than half did in practice. 
Table 1. Suffrage in pirate companies, 1704-1724 
Captain Date Crew Size Forced 
men, 
slaves, 
boys. 
Others 
(presumed 
voters) 
% voters 
Quelch 1704 31 7 24 77 
Bellamy 1717 210 130 80 38 
Williams 1717    50 
Greenway 1718 56 20 36 64 
Jones 1718 12 2 10 83 
Yeats 1718 110 90 20 18 
Teach 1718 100 60 40 40 
Taylor and 
Seagar 
1720 300 40 260 87 
Condent 1720 195 60 135 69 
Roberts 1722 267 144 123 46 
Phillips 1723 8 3 5 62 
Phillips 1724 19 12 7 37 
Spriggs 1725 70 20 50 71 
Lyne 1725 44 18 26 59 
Sources: Trials of Eight Persons, p. 24; Boston News Letter, 11/8/1718; Minutes of the 
Provincial Council of Pennsylvania, vol. 3 (Philadelphia, 1852), pp. 50-53; Boston 
Gazette, 4/5/1724; Boston Gazette, 17/5/1725; Boston News Letter, 18/8/1718; Weekly 
Journal or Saturday’s Post, 6/12/1718; Tryals of Stede Bonnet, p. 46; Tryal of John 
Quelch; Johnson, General History, p. 285; Rogozinski, Honor Among Thieves, p. 208; 
Tryal of the Pyrates taken by Captain Ogle; Grey, Pirates of the Eastern Seas, p. 318; 
Weekly Journal or British Gazetteer, 10/8/1717; Parker’s Penny Post, 23/6/1725 
 
Regardless of who was and was not allowed a vote, there were other practical 
concerns which allowing the entire company to take part in the decision-
making process would have entailed. Even with a traditional maximum of 
sixty-four owners, the management of legitimate shipping was found to be 
unwieldy if every owner were allowed a say in the running of a vessel: ‘the 
owning group was often too large to exercise control efficiently’.409 One 
debate, over whether to sink a captured vessel or return it to its master, was 
reported to have lasted five hours.410 For pirate companies such as that 
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commanded by Thomas Cocklyn, which contained only twenty-five men,411 
this would not have presented such a problem, and decisions could have 
been made by the whole company fairly simply based on a brief discussion 
and a show of hands. For a company such as Blackbeard’s which, at its 
height, consisted of over 400 men,412 such a simple system could easily have 
become impractical, debates might have lasted days, and the voting process 
would have been impossible to monitor effectively. In such cases a council 
consisting of chosen representatives, officers, or a number of the older 
members of the company may have been the only practical solution if the 
captain himself did not take sole control of planning and decision-making. The 
drawing up of articles, which set out pre-agreed responses to particular events 
or circumstances, alleviated the need to call the whole company to vote 
except on extraordinary issues.  
Allowing the whole company to vote could also have potentially divisive 
effects. One of the most powerful pirate companies in the Indian Ocean was 
rent asunder in 1722 when they voted on whether to remain in the region and 
continue pillaging or make for the Caribbean in search of a pardon and 
retirement. No unanimous decision could be reached so 156 men, led by John 
Taylor, left in one ship for the Caribbean while the rest of the company 
remained in the Indian Ocean in a larger vessel with Oliver La Buse.413 If the 
company were unwilling or unable to divide after a hung ballot then they might 
be forced to agree to differ, which could result in them sailing aimlessly until 
some other decision could be reached, as happened when England’s crew 
could not agree about whether to attack Goa.414 
Even when a decision was reached by common vote, there was no guarantee 
that it would be adhered to if the officers who controlled the vessel did not 
support it. When Kidd’s crew were invited to vote on whether to return their 
prize, the Quedah Merchant, to its owners or take it to Madagascar, Kidd’s 
party prevailed and the prize was carried off, in spite of the fact that less than 
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a quarter of the crew had voted to do so.415 Kidd’s command, we have seen, 
was perhaps more autocratic than many other pirate captains, but the man 
who highlighted that point, William Mason, was involved in a similar incident 
when a pirate captain himself. Faced with the decision of whether to sail East 
to the Indian Ocean or West to the Pacific, the officers voted for the East while 
the majority of the foremastmen voted for the West, 
it was carried for the Westward, which the officers were all against, and 
when wee steered Westward they refused to take Charge of the Ship, so 
that wee were forced to submit to them, and our Course was directed 
round the Cape and so to Madagascar.416 
The officers, in this case, were able to impose their will against the wishes of 
the crew, not through force, but because they alone possessed the necessary 
skills to successfully direct the navigation of the ship. 
The external command of pirate vessels, then, was sometimes, but not 
always, placed in the hands of the de facto owners of the vessel, the company 
themselves. In some cases the company exercised external command as a 
body, but not all the members of the company were necessarily considered 
owners. Forced men, slaves, and new recruits, amongst others, had little or 
no stake in the vessel and thus no say in its direction. In other cases, a group 
of managing owners was found from within the company to manage affairs of 
external command, whose decisions were implemented by the internal 
command structure led by the captain and officers. As in legitimate shipping, 
the ownership of a share in a vessel did not necessarily entail a say in the 
decision making process, largely for reasons of practical management 
efficiency. Also as in legitimate shipping, the commander of a vessel was in a 
position to overrule the wishes of the external command agency if he chose to 
do so. In both legitimate and criminal shipping enterprises, he might risk 
incurring the displeasure of his employers by doing so, but, as the senior 
member of the internal command structure, was well placed to impose himself 
on the direction of the vessel if he felt it expedient, and the wrath of the 
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shareholders could only be exercised after their decisions had been 
overturned and the captain’s new commands executed. The pirate company, 
as shareholders in the vessel, may have technically been the highest authority 
commanding the direction of the vessel, but at times their seniority was purely 
theoretical. 
 
2.4. Professional hierarchy. 
Parallel to, and extending beneath, the chain of command in legitimate 
shipping lay a more informal professional hierarchy, in which men were 
respected, and often rewarded, for their professional abilities, but did not 
necessarily obtain any formalised authority over others by it. This is 
particularly evident amongst the foremastmen of a ship who, in naval or 
merchant service, were distinguished from one another and rated as boy, 
landsman or grommet, ordinary or half seaman, or able seaman.417 When the 
rank of able-seaman was introduced into the navy in the seventeenth century, 
it carried a slightly higher wage than the rank of ordinary seaman and was 
applied to men ‘fit for helm, lead, top, and yards’418 – the tasks which required 
a greater degree of skill than mere hauling on ropes, and thus carried a 
correspondingly greater responsibility. It was thus a higher position than 
ordinary seaman and landsman in both the pay hierarchy and professional 
hierarchy, and able seaman status constituted membership of ‘the natural 
aristocracy of the lower deck’.419 It is probable, at least in this case, that 
seniority in the professional hierarchy carried with it a certain measure of 
informal authority based on greater experience and skill, but was not 
distinguished by formalised authority in the command hierarchy. On naval 
ships that carried marines as part of their complement, the marines were 
exempted from the skilled work of the seaman, and were not assigned to 
watches with the rest of the crew, but were nevertheless employed in the 
least-skilled physical labour of hauling ropes and turning the heavy capstan. It 
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was hoped at one time that marine regiments would prove to be a ‘nursery of 
seamen’, and marines were encouraged to acquire maritime skills. In practice, 
the nursery produced few graduates, and the marines’ duties consisted largely 
of unskilled labouring and providing musketeers in battle.420 That the 
Admiralty, as much as their shipmates, viewed marines as unskilled labourers 
is illustrated by their employment as dockyard labourers when they were not 
assigned to ships at sea.421 The position of the cooper on some merchant 
vessels is also illustrative of the nature of the professional hierarchy. The 
cooper had no formalised authority outside his own department, but was 
nonetheless a crucially important member of the crew: many tradable 
commodities were stored and transported in casks, as were the victuals of the 
crew, and it was the cooper’s special responsibility to keep these casks in 
good repair. Without his work the crew might starve and the cargo be lost, in 
either case leading to a disastrous voyage, so the cooper was therefore 
essential in a way that no other member of the crew was, not even the master 
(whose navigational skills were usually shared at least by the mate). The 
professional importance of the cooper was usually reflected in his higher 
wage, in some cases higher even than the master’s.422  
A similar hierarchy existed aboard pirate ships. For example, cooper Abraham 
Harper used his rattan cane ‘directing about the provisions, and what else 
immediately related to his Office’423 without fear of retribution, not because the 
cane was a practically essential tool to his job, but because his professional 
skills were fundamental to the well-being of the whole company. One of the 
most telling clues regarding the value and importance ascribed to specialist 
officers such as coopers, ‘Carpenters, Cawlkers, Armorers, Surgeons, and 
Musicians’,424 was the regularity with which they were forced to join a pirate 
crew against their will. Until volunteer recruits started to become scarce in the 
1720s, pirates were often reluctant to conscript unwilling men. At the height of 
their strength, Bellamy’s company, for example, ‘said they would take nobody 
                                                 
420
 Rodger, Wooden World, p. 28; Rodger, Command of the Ocean, pp. 129, 210-211 
421
 R.D. Merriman (ed.). The Sergison Papers (Navy Records Society, 1950), p. 316 
422
 Vickers and Walsh, Young Men, p. 64 
423
 Tryal of the Pirates taken by Captain Ogle, p. 48 
424
 Johnson, General History, p. 489 
 137 
against their wills’,425 and earlier Henry Every granted ‘Liberty for any of them 
that’ were not voluntary pirates.426 Nevertheless, Bellamy conscripted a 
carpenter, Every conscripted a cooper, and Bellamy’s consort, Paul Williams, 
forced a carpenter and a drummer. 427 Other pirate crews were not averse to 
forcing specialists; many carpenters and surgeons were conscripted, and one 
pirate acquitted in court because of his forced status claimed that he was 
conscripted ‘because he could play upon a violin’.428 In general, there were 
good reasons for pirates to avoid conscripting if possible: forced men could 
not wholly be trusted, were opposed to the pirates and their principles, would 
undermine the cohesion of the company, would be more likely than volunteers 
to give evidence in court in the event of capture and, if sufficient in number, 
might rise up against their pirate masters. Pirates, then, quite naturally 
preferred not to force men to join them if it could be avoided, but still they 
regularly forced specialist officers. Because their skills were essential or highly 
desirable to the practical well being of their ships and company, pirates were 
willing to risk the dangers inherent in forcing skilled men. 
Apart from the specialist officers, pirates used different markers to those used 
in legitimate shipping to differentiate between stations in their professional 
hierarchy. Experience as a pirate was just as important, perhaps more so, as 
years spent at sea in any other form of employment. When John Rose Archer 
joined John Phillips’ company he, ‘having been a Pyrate under the famous 
Black-beard, was immediately preferr’d over other People’s Heads, to be 
Quarter-Master to the company’.429 John Miller bragged to his comrades in 
John Quelch’s company that he had formerly been a pirate under Henry 
Every, and Peter Divine of Roberts’ company told anyone who would listen 
that he ‘had been twice a Pyrating before’.430 Long-term members of a 
particular pirate company might also enjoy respect that was not paid to newer 
members, the older hands who were so jealous of the newcomers mentioned 
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earlier were ‘consequently observant of their behaviour’.431 Before their first 
engagement, Thomas Cocklyn told new recruits ‘That now they should learn 
to smell Gunpowder, and caned them heartily’, and in Roberts’ company, ‘no 
New-Comer amongst the company were suffered to go plundering of any 
prize’.432 New recruits had, therefore, to prove themselves before they could 
earn the respect of their comrades, and pirates of particularly long standing, or 
who had previously belonged to the companies commanded by particularly 
notorious pirates such as Every or Blackbeard, were accorded an even 
greater degree of professional respect. As in legitimate shipping, specific 
maritime experience also contributed to an individual’s professional status in a 
pirate company, and one observer remarked that pirates were ‘the very flower 
of our Sailors’.433 Being a prime seaman may even have been one of the 
requirements for joining some pirate companies, such as Roberts’, who ‘took 
none but Sailors into their Company’, and in which ‘most of the Company of 
Pyrates were against entering’ soldiers, though they did occasionally accept 
some ‘out of pure Charity’.434 Roberts’ company, however, was sufficiently 
large to allow them to discriminate in their choice of new recruits and, other 
companies may not have been so exclusive: for example, soldiers made up a 
proportion of the men who mutinied and turned pirate under George Lowther 
and John Massey.435 Lowther, the leader of the seamen-mutineers, took 
command though. A striking example of the professional hierarchy extant on 
pirate ships is the respect accorded to Paul Williams, both on account of his 
maritime experience and skill, and of his association with the well-known 
pirate Samuel Bellamy. Despite Williams having fallen from command, 
Snelgrave was nonetheless advised to address Williams as ‘Captain’, as the 
other pirates did.436 Williams had been a silversmith rather than a seaman 
before he began his piratical career as a close associate of Bellamy in 1716, 
and for a short while the two men sailed in consort with other pirates, including 
Oliver La Buse. After La Buse left their company Bellamy and Williams 
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continued to sail together, and captured the large slave ship Whydah in early 
1717, which they fitted out as a pirate vessel under Bellamy’s command, while 
Williams took command of the vessel they had formerly shared.437 Within only 
a few weeks Bellamy and Williams lost contact, and Bellamy, aboard the 
Whydah, was drowned with almost all of his crew when the ship was wrecked 
in a storm. After the loss of the Whydah, Williams continued to cruise 
southwards down the American coast towards the pirates’ haven at New 
Providence. In his cruise he took several ships and for a short time renewed 
his consortship with La Buse. Discord broke out between those members of 
Williams’ company who were in favour of remaining at sea and those who 
wanted to go ashore, in the midst of which, the forced men, who constituted 
half of the company, rebelled against the pirates. Five or six forced men were 
killed during the ensuing fight, and Williams re-established his command by 
hanging three more for mutiny.438 By the time Williams reached New 
Providence his ship was in a sorry state, battered by the ravages of sea and 
storm, and his crew were rent asunder by dissent and probably more than a 
little dismayed at the fate of their comrades.439 They appear to have 
temporarily settled amongst the other pirates, and when Captain Pearse of 
HMS Phoenix arrived at the island with news of a Royal pardon in February 
1718, Williams was the ninth man to surrender himself.440 However, he soon 
repented of his decision and joined the crew of William Moody, along with his 
old colleague La Buse who had abandoned his own ship when confronted by 
HMS Scarborough in June 1718. In due course La Buse took over command 
from Moody, and Williams became his quartermaster, retaining the courtesy 
title of ‘captain’ in recognition of his not inconsiderable achievements. 
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2.5. Social Hierarchy. 
The command hierarchy was entirely, and the professional hierarchy mostly, a 
function of the ship rather than of the crew itself. The management of a sailing 
vessel required that some men were in positions of authority over others, and 
that some men possessed skills and experience which were not essential 
prerequisites of every member of the crew and which thus gave their 
possessors a certain unofficial seniority. The social divisions that were 
prevalent in legitimate shipping to a greater or lesser degree were, however, a 
function of the crew rather than the ship. Theoretically, the successful 
management of the ship did not require the captain and officers to have their 
own cabins and living space, first pick of the food supplies, or the bonus 
gratuities of average and portage.441 Nevertheless, officers in both naval and 
merchant service regularly enjoyed these perquisites.442  
It has been argued that pirates discarded the social hierarchies of legitimate 
shipping in favour of ‘a rough, improvised, but effective egalitarianism’,443 and 
there is some compelling evidence that this was so. On Cocklyn’s ship, for 
example, ‘every one lay rough, as they called it, that is, on the Deck; the 
Captain himself not being allowed a bed’.444 According to Johnson, in Roberts’ 
company the pirates ‘separated to his [Roberts’] Use the great Cabin… but 
then every Man, as the Humour takes him, will use the Plate and China, 
intrude into his Apartment, swear at him, seize a Part of his Victuals and 
Drink, if they like it’. That Roberts had no right to extra or special victuals over 
any other member of the company was the practical application of his 
company’s article granting every man ‘equal Title to the Fresh Provisions, or 
strong Liquors’.445 Naval officer Clement Downing observed that the 
quartermaster of pirate ships in the Indian Ocean divided  
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all things with an Equality to them all, every Man and Boy sharing alike; 
and not even their Captain, or any other Officer, is allowed any more 
than another Man; nay, the Captain cannot keep his own Cabbin to 
himself, for their bulkheads are all down, and every man stands to his 
Quarters, where they lie and mess, and they take the liberty of ranging 
all over their ships.446 
Pirates’ structural alterations to their vessels such as the levelling of upper-
works and removal of bulkheads, Joel Baer has argued, might have resulted 
in the ‘the reduction of distinctions between the officers and people’.447 
However, it is more likely that any reduction of distinctions was a mere bye-
product of improving the ship’s sailing or fighting qualities, matters of great 
practical importance to pirates. Removing the upper decks of a large vessel 
would make her faster and more manoeuvrable, an important consideration 
for men whose livelihood and personal safety depended on being equally able 
to catch a fleeing prize or escape from a naval pursuer. It was usual aboard 
legitimate ships, when combat was imminent, for a ship’s captain to order ‘the 
Bulkhead and Cabbins knock’d down, the Deck clear’d Fore and Aft, for every 
Man to have free access to his Business’,448 so for pirates, whose articles 
often enjoined them to ‘keep their piece, pistols, and cutlass clean and fit for 
service’, keeping their ship ready for action would have been a natural 
extension of sensible working practice. The absence of beds on Cocklyn’s 
ship was also probably more to do with fighting efficiency than social levelling, 
for the same account tells us that ‘there was not in the Cabbin either Chair, or 
any thing else to sit upon; for they always kept a clear Ship ready for an 
Engagement’.449  
Nevertheless, evidence such as this has been seized on by historians to 
portray piratical society in an egalitarian light, as a society devoid of social 
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differences.450 Even accepting, though, that the structural alterations and 
public nature of captains’ cabins were primarily social, rather than practical, 
phenomena, there is still a large body of evidence pointing to the fact that 
social differences did exist aboard pirate vessels. Downing had never spent 
any time aboard a pirate ship himself, so his evidence was probably based on 
hearsay, and it is clear that other pirate captains, in the Atlantic and Indian 
Oceans, did have the use of cabins. Roberts, we have seen, had the use of 
the great cabin, even if he was not allowed to keep it private, and du Bucquoy, 
who did spend a prolonged time on a pirate ship, wrote that Taylor was ‘often 
discarding his prerogatives as captain by coming down into the ‘tween-decks 
to converse, play, eat from the common pot or drink with’ the rest of the 
company. Taylor, then, not only had a cabin, but also was able to retain his 
privacy except when he himself chose not to. In fact, Taylor ran his cabin like 
an officer in legitimate service, inviting officer-captives to dine ‘at his table’, 
and sharing his cabin only with du Bucquoy himself during the time of the 
latter’s captivity.451 Edward Low ran his cabin within an even more formalised 
social hierarchy. When a captive was brought aboard Low’s ship he was met 
first by the gunner, ‘who, by his Deportment, acted as though he had been 
Master of the Ceremonies’, and was told that he ‘must go to pay my Respects 
to the Captain, who was in the Cabbin’. The gunner conducted him to the 
cabin door, introduced him to Low, ‘and then withdrew out of the Cabbin’. Low 
invited him to sit in one of the many chairs in the cabin, and after 
commiserating him on his loss, rang ‘the Cabbin-bell, and one of his Valet de 
Chambres, or rather Valets de Cabins, appearing, he commanded him to 
make a Bowl of Punch’.452  
Low was not the only pirate officer to have servants. Richard Barlicorn, for 
example, had been Captain Kidd’s servant for six years before his arrest, and 
Darby Mullins received only a half share of the pirates’ spoil because of his 
status as Kidd’s servant.453 Nor was it only pirate captains who kept servants: 
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the quartermaster of Cocklyn’s company had a boy servant who was used to 
fetch things from the quartermaster’s chest, the boatswain of Roberts’ ship 
had a ‘boy’ who was employed ‘chiefly as Yeoman of his Stores’, and one of 
Kidd’s company was indentured as a servant to another, and forced to give 
his share of spoil to his master.454 The position of boys on some pirate ships 
was ambiguous and some undoubtedly acted as cabin servants. James 
Sparks originally shipped as a captain’s cabin boy, but after the mutiny led by 
Henry Every ‘was kept onb[oar]d by ye Comp[any] but as a kind of slave to 
wash their clothes, sweep ye Decks and light their pipes’.455 Several 
witnesses at the trial of Charles Harris’ pirate company deposed that ‘John 
Fletcher was as a Boy on Board, and no otherwise’,456 suggesting that his 
status was similar to Sparks’. John Templeton’s status in Quelch’s company 
was determined by the fact that he was not only a boy, but also an indentured 
servant. He was required to cook for the pirates, ‘was ordered as everyone 
pleased’, and his share of spoil was handed over to his master on shore when 
the pirates landed at Boston.457 
The most marked social differences to be perceived in legitimate shipping 
were found in the Royal Navy where, throughout the second half of the 
seventeenth century the great social debate of ‘gentleman’ versus ‘tarpaulin’ 
officers raged. Briefly, the question centred on whether it was better for a 
ship’s company to be led by a gentleman, ‘the natural leaders of society, 
possessors of the hereditary military virtues of honour and courage’, or by 
professional seamen, ‘tarpaulin’ officers, who stemmed largely from the 
middle, and sometimes from the lower, class, and had often begun their 
careers in merchant ships. Recently it has been argued that the debate was 
more about political rhetoric than practical exigency, but to some 
contemporaries, notably Samuel Pepys, the matter was of extreme 
importance. Pepys, a gifted naval administrator and himself from a middle-
class background, tended to side with the ‘tarpaulins’, but his opinion was not 
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universal. Related to the question was the system of patronage, by which 
influential connections were used to further a sea-officer’s career, and here 
the well-born perhaps had a slight natural advantage over those officers who 
had risen from the lower-deck. ‘Tarpaulin’ officers who ascended to seniority 
were, of course, in a position to bestow their patronage on other social 
climbers, but the path was perhaps harder.458 Social status ashore, then, was 
reflected to some extent aboard ship in the Navy, but perhaps less so in the 
merchant service, for two reasons. Firstly, only in the largest merchant ships 
was there room for social division: officers may have enjoyed private cabins, 
but they were rarely large enough to house more than a bunk, chest, and 
desk. Officers were thus forced to pass whatever social time they had in the 
same physical space as the rest of the crew. Often they worked alongside the 
rest of the crew, and usually they ate the same food.459 Secondly, although 
the master of a merchant ship might have obtained his post through the 
influence of his contacts in the ship-owning community, often he, and regularly 
the other officers, were men who had worked their way up through the ranks 
and had no natural superiority of birth over the men they commanded, and 
being even master of a merchantman was not considered a respectable 
career for anyone who was born above the middle-class.460 A seaman who 
was able to ascend from foremastman to master raised himself from the 
working-class into middle-class respectability, but no higher. The master of a 
merchantman who transferred to the Navy often took with him a diminished 
sense of social difference, and it was common for ‘tarpaulin’ captains to dine 
and drink with their lower-ranking officers.461 A middle-class ‘tarpaulin’ officer 
who had learned his trade in the merchant service might adopt the trappings 
of nobility if he was lucky enough to obtain command in the Navy, but he was 
never ‘likely to be reckoned a gentleman’.462 
Any attempt to explore the significance of social class by birth within a pirate 
company is fraught with difficulty, partly because such biographical data is 
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lacking for the vast majority of pirates, and partly because where such data 
exists it tends to show an overwhelming preponderance of plebeian 
backgrounds.463 This is hardly surprising, as the majority of pirates were 
drawn from the ranks of merchant seamen, soldiers, indentured servants, and 
naval deserters.464 Some petty officers in legitimate service gave up their 
hard-gained position to join a pirate company, but almost no masters and 
even fewer naval officers did. The reasons that officers were more reluctant to 
join pirates than their crews were are not hard to imagine. Officers generally 
received a higher wage than their men, giving them more financial security 
which they may have been reluctant to abandon, and the right of officers on 
many ships to carry a private cargo of their own bound their own fortunes up 
with the fate of their vessel in a way that the crew’s fortunes were not.465 It is 
probable, too, that marine officers had risen in rank at least partly due to some 
show of honesty and integrity that were not conducive to criminal undertaking. 
There were doubtless many dishonest officers, but for the most part they were 
on a path to social and financial betterment that was surer and less risky than 
any opportunity piracy was likely to offer them. 
Nevertheless, there were some exceptions, and the experiences of those few 
pirates who did not come from a working-class origin may shed some light on 
the pirates’ perceptions of social order. Paul Williams, whose career is 
outlined above, expected and received the respect of a courtesy title and, 
from the very beginning of his career was appointed to the post of 
quartermaster, for which his former experience did not qualify him. By the time 
Snelgrave met Williams and was instructed to humour him by addressing him 
as ‘captain’, Williams had served several years as a pirate, some time as a 
captain, and was associated with other well-respected pirates such as 
Bellamy and La Buse. But at the beginning of his career in 1716 Williams had 
no experience of piracy, no experience of seamanship, and no experience of 
military command, and yet was appointed quartermaster under Bellamy, and 
later captain. In fact there is no suggestion that Williams ever served as a 
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pirate foremastman during his whole career, a fact probably not unrelated to 
his social status as the son of Rhode Island Attorney-General and merchant, 
John Williams, owner of a mansion in Boston and estates in Rhode Island.466 
Williams was the ‘gentleman’ officer to balance the ‘tarpaulin’ captain Bellamy, 
and pirates, it would seem, were more ready to accept the inherent leadership 
skills of gentle birth than Pepys was. 
Captain Kidd, before turning pirate, was a well-known figure in New York 
society, and described as ‘gentleman’ in such official documents as, for 
example, his licence to marry wealthy society widow, Sarah Oort.467 Kidd was 
a ship-owner as well as a captain, and we have seen how he was able to 
retain the traditional trappings of command after he and his crew turned to 
piracy. As well as retaining his servants Kidd was allowed to receive 
substantial personal gifts from other pirate captains, which were not divided 
amongst the crew, but kept for Kidd’s own use, and when he brutally 
assaulted a crew-member nobody attempted to intervene, accepting, 
apparently, Kidd’s right to behave in that way. When Kidd’s crew demanded 
the drawing up of new articles they were content to allow Kidd forty shares, or 
one quarter of the total profit.468 
Henry Every had spent some time serving as a midshipman and mate in the 
Royal Navy before turning to piracy, but was also the owner of ‘some Estate’ 
in Devon. Every’s ‘estate’ cannot have been very large, for his home was in a 
small village, but it was, perhaps, enough when coupled with his naval service 
and master-mariner status, to elevate him above the rest of the company 
socially.469 Certainly, Every also possessed valuable seamanship skills, but 
other members of the company could have navigated and handled the ship, 
so it may have been because Every came from a class supposed to be 
naturally imbued with leadership skills that disgruntled seamen on the Charles 
II, singled Every out and proposed that he lead them in a mutiny. Another 
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pirate captain who claimed to have previously been a Royal Naval officer was 
John Taylor.470 Taylor, as we have seen was allowed his own cabin and other 
perks of command, and when wealthy and distinguished prisoners were 
brought aboard his ship they were entertained in his cabin with ‘witty 
conversation and his kind of music’.471 Distinguished prisoners, after their 
entertainment, were carried ashore in the captain’s barge, the ownership of 
which was another perk Taylor would have been familiar with from his Navy 
days. Du Buquoy’s assertion that Taylor sometimes left his cabin to eat from 
the common pot implies that sometimes he did not, preferring to eat his own 
food in the sanctity of his private cabin. When Taylor tired of piracy he sought 
and received a Spanish pardon and, allowed to keep most his spoil, retired to 
a plantation that he bought on Cuba, and ended his days a wealthy land- and 
ship-owner.472 
Perhaps the most remarkable ‘gentleman’ pirate captain was a wealthy 
Barbadian planter, militia officer, and slave-owner, Major Stede Bonnet. Even 
as the leader of a pirate band Bonnet preferred to retain his militia rank, and is 
referred to frequently as ‘Major Bonnet’, rather than the more appropriate 
‘captain’, a practice adopted by at least one other pirate proud of his place in 
colonial society, Major Penner.473 At Bonnet’s trial the Attorney-General of 
South Carolina described him as ‘a Gentleman, a Man of Honour, a Man of 
Fortune, and one that has had a liberal Education.’474 Bonnet was a most 
unusual pirate, not only because of his social standing, but also because he 
began his piratical career by buying and outfitting a sloop specifically for the 
purpose. What drove him to undertake such a surprising course of action is 
unclear, he certainly had no need of the money. Friends and neighbours 
believed that for some time before he took to sea they had been able to detect 
in him some ‘Disorder in his Mind’, and which the uncharitable attributed to 
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‘some Discomforts he found in a married State’.475 Whether or not his wife 
really did drive him to insanity, he left her and their small children and 
embarked on a short piratical cruise before meeting the notorious Blackbeard. 
Bonnet’s lack of skill and experience probably became apparent during his 
cruise, because Blackbeard took over command of his sloop, and Bonnet 
remained a supernumerary passenger until Blackbeard was able to capture a 
large slave-ship, which he converted for use as his flagship. During the time 
that Blackbeard commanded Bonnet’s sloop Bonnet does not seem to have 
been demoted and put to work as other deposed pirate captains might be, but 
instead strolled about the deck ‘in his Morning Gown, and then to his Books, 
of which he has a good Library on Board’.476 That Bonnet was allowed to 
enjoy a life of leisure may have been because he was the owner of the sloop, 
but it seems unlikely that pirates would have such respect for property, and it 
was more likely due to Bonnet’s own social standing. Once again, pirates 
faced with a choice between ‘gentleman’ and ‘tarpaulin’ commander chose the 
seaman, but as with Paul Williams, the gentleman was allowed to retain some 
of the privileges of rank, and was eventually reinstated to command. 
The nature of the social hierarchy aboard pirate ships, therefore, was varied. 
At times, the captain was not even able to keep his cabin for his own private 
use, but in some cases this was probably no more than a by-product of the 
pirates’ desire to keep their vessels in a state of fighting efficiency and 
readiness. The fact that Taylor often discarded his ‘prerogatives’ to join his 
company in their messes below decks implies that he did manage to retain the 
use of his cabin for himself and that he had an access to supplies of food 
which would have been anathema to the pirates of Roberts’ company, who 
claimed equal share of all provisions. Other pirate officers kept servants, in 
some cases more than one servant, who fetched and carried and made bowls 
of punch on demand, and if bound by indenture had to give their share of spoil 
to their masters. Perhaps most significantly, the apparent lack of social 
hierarchy is an illusion caused by the essentially plebeian nature of most 
pirate companies, and when ‘gentlemen’ did join the pirates they were 
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accorded the respect and privileges of their rank, allowed as a courtesy to 
retain titles which were not strictly relevant or accurate, allowed on occasion 
to behave as if they were paying passengers rather than members of a pirate 
company, and were generally treated in the way to which they were 
accustomed. 
 
• • •. 
To deal with a community, especially so complex a community as a shipboard 
one, in terms of a single hierarchical structure is to overlook the different ways 
in which status can be defined, economically, socially, professionally, or in 
terms of authority. It would be similarly naïve to confuse authority with, say, 
social status, for although the two often, even usually, go hand in hand, they 
are not the same thing. The hierarchies of a shipboard community ran more or 
less parallel, but not entirely: a man might be allocated extra responsibility, 
extra rights, and extra rewards, based on his skill and experience, without 
being awarded extra authority; or in a different scenario he might be allotted 
less responsibility and fewer rewards without losing any of the basic rights 
enjoyed by his shipmates. This was certainly the case in legitimate shipping 
and, we have seen, in pirate companies as well. 
Pirates, then, ran their ships more or less in imitation of their experience in 
legitimate shipping enterprises and adopted practices wholesale, particularly 
command structure, from naval or merchant service. In the absence of an 
external authority pirates had to construct their own, and they naturally did so 
internally. Fears of captains and other officers exceeding the authority granted 
them by the ship’s owners – the pirates themselves – were concerns of the 
pirate company on two counts, both as the crew under the captain’s authority, 
and as the owners with authority over him. The restrictions that pirates placed, 
then, on their officers’ authority can be seen in the light of either stance. The 
articles suggest that pirates, as a crew, preferred their officers to be invested 
with the authority that enabled them to do their jobs effectively, and demanded 
obedience to the officers by the company to ensure the day-to-day smooth 
running of their vessel, and if the captain or any other officer exceeded his 
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remit then it was a matter for the owners to deal with. It was only in their 
capacity as owners that pirates were able to exercise authority over their 
officers, and then usually only in matters of long-term policy. Like merchant or 
naval captains, pirate captains were allowed to exercise day-to-day control 
over their crews, giving orders, directing operations, and instigating 
punishments for minor violations of discipline. More serious infractions were 
referred to the external command agency in legitimate and pirate companies. 
Since pirate vessels most closely resembled naval or privateer vessels it was 
natural that that should be reflected in their command hierarchy, and having 
established such a hierarchy is was natural that it should operate in the same 
way. The only real difference between the command of a pirate ship and 
command in legitimate shipping was the immediate presence of the external 
command authority which, by means of its physical presence within the ship, 
was much more able to interfere with the captain’s authority while the vessel 
was in transit. Nevertheless, the pirate-owners, like merchant ship-owners or 
the Admiralty, were not always able to effectively restrict the captain or 
officers, and those officers were sometimes able to over-rule the owners by 
superior skill or use of force. 
Professional and social hierarchies, too, were just as prevalent in pirate 
companies as they were in legitimate shipping, though perhaps less obviously 
so, and were perhaps more mitigated by the peculiar circumstances pirates 
lived in. The need for fighting efficiency, for example, was relatively more 
important than the maintenance of the markers of social hierarchy to pirates, 
and this led to some pirate captains having to give up their rights to a private 
cabin, and the fact that pirates’ food supplies for both officers and men were 
maintained from the same sources, the merchant ships they captured, 
effectively levelled any social distinction in victuals. Still, pirate officers were 
able to maintain some level of social superiority when, in other cases, they did 
retain the use of a cabin, or kept boys and servants to wait upon them. 
Similarly, experience at sea did not, in legitimate service, automatically lead to 
a greater degree of formal authority, but did lead to greater responsibilities 
and respect, as well as a presumed level of informal authority. In pirate 
companies a similar system existed in which possession of valued skills, 
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experience at sea, and especially experience of piracy, was reflected in a 
higher status, greater respect, and more informal authority, even if it did not 
necessarily entail greater rewards. In respect of the various hierarchies 
prevalent in shipboard communities, then, the only real differences between 
legitimate shipping and piracy were brought about by purely practical 
demands and, from a certain viewpoint, were not great. 
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3. Pirate Economy. 
If the prevalence of a particular clause in several different sets of pirate 
articles can be taken as indicative of the importance ascribed to that issue by 
pirates, then the division of spoil must have been the most important concern 
of pirates, for it is dealt with by every surviving set of pirate articles bar one. 
This in turn suggests that from the pirates’ own point of view, their activities 
were primarily economic, rather than social or political. Whatever their feelings 
about social injustice or political dissent may or may not have been, the most 
important goal of their criminal lifestyle was the accumulation of spoil.477 This 
historical truism is, of course, reflected most strongly by popular portrayals of 
pirates in literature, film, and the media, which have highlighted the pirates’ 
quest for Spanish bullion, Oriental jewels, and the ubiquitous buried treasure. 
In the light of the historical and fictional importance of pirate spoil, it is 
surprising, then, that historians have traditionally either ignored or briefly 
skimmed over the questions of what commodities pirates actually sought to 
plunder, how they converted their spoil into usable wealth, how they divided it 
amongst themselves, how and where they spent it, and what they spent it on. 
John L. Anderson, David J. Starkey, Arne Bialuschewski, and others have 
considered piracy within the broader context of seventeenth and eighteenth-
century economics,478 and pirate biographers such as Robert C. Ritchie and 
Clifford Beal have considered specific examples of piracy within specific sets 
of economic circumstances,479 but little satisfactory work has been undertaken 
on the question of economic activity within the broader context of seventeenth 
and eighteenth-century piracy. Peter T. Leeson’s book, subtitled ‘The Hidden 
Economics of Pirates’, barely touches on the questions outlined above.480 
The clauses in pirate articles relating to their spoil largely deal with two 
themes: the establishment of a common fund out of the gross profits of their 
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cruises, out of which were paid the expenses of maintaining vessel and 
company, and particularly establishing a system of payments for men 
seriously injured in the course of their criminal activities; and the division of 
spoil, assigning each member of the company a specific proportion of their net 
profits for his own use, creating the pay hierarchy mentioned in Chapter 2. To 
understand how the profits of piracy were employed and distributed, it is first 
necessary to understand just what those profits consisted of, the commodities 
on which the pirate economy was based, and how the value of those 
commodities was realised. This chapter will explore each of these questions in 
turn, first examining the nature of pirates’ spoil and the markets in which its 
value was realised, then examining how the gross profits accruing from the 
spoil was employed in a common fund, and finally exploring the nature of the 
pirates’ pay hierarchies and the distribution of their net profits.  
 
3.1. Pirate Spoil. 
Piracy was essentially an opportunistic crime, insofar as pirates were not able 
to decide in advance which ship to attack and at what time: their attacks on 
merchant shipping were determined only when their victim appeared on the 
horizon. They did not know until they had captured the ship what cargo they 
would find aboard, or what resistance they would meet with, unlike, say, a 
house-breaker, who could plan his raid, taking into account the layout of the 
house, the number of inhabitants, and the most profitable time for the robbery 
to occur, all of which factors could be ascertained long in advance of the crime 
being committed. 
Nevertheless, despite the uncertainty inherent in piracy, pirates did not merely 
cruise aimlessly hoping to snap up a prize here and there, but, in general, 
chose specific areas of ocean in which to cruise, in which they could expect to 
meet vessels carrying particular commodities. Their choice of hunting grounds 
was, therefore, dictated to some extent by the kinds of spoil they were hoping 
to accumulate. There were other factors, too, which pirates necessarily had to 
take into consideration, including the nature of the opposition or resistance 
they were likely to meet, and, particularly, the access to a market for their 
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stolen commodities. It is probably true, then, that the kinds of commodities the 
pirates sought can be ascertained by an examination of the commodities they 
actually took. Pirates’ spoil can be divided into four categories: personal 
necessities; professional necessities; tradable goods and commodities; and 
expendable currency such as precious metals and cash money. The first two 
of these categories included the things that enabled the pirates firstly to 
survive, and secondly to operate successfully and profitably. The third and 
fourth of these categories enabled pirates to accumulate enough wealth to 
enjoy life and, if they were lucky, retire from crime. 
Table 2 shows the nature of goods taken from vessels in eighty-eight piratical 
attacks. Since many accounts of these attacks record only the nature of the 
stolen goods and not their quantities the figures provided relate to the number 
of attacks involving the theft of a particular commodity rather the amounts and 
the value of the goods taken. This is significant, for example, in considering 
the theft of precious metals, which varied in quantity from ‘gold and silver to 
the value of one thousand pounds’,481 to smaller amounts which were 
probably the portable wealth of individual seamen. Coined money, too, was 
taken in varying quantities from, for example, the 1,000 pistoles taken by Ned 
Low’s pirates from a Jamaica sloop, to the private money stolen from the crew 
of the Samuel by Bartholomew Roberts’ men, which probably amounted to a 
much smaller sum.482 In the case of coined money, those seizures that 
included large sums of money have been treated separately in Table 2, while 
the theft of small sums from individual seamen has been treated as 
‘plunder’,483 along with items such as watches, buckles, and rings. The 
relative importance of the lost goods to the original owners who were, in most 
cases, the authors of the reports from which the data have been drawn, may 
also have served to skew the data somewhat, for it is probable that when the 
master of a merchantman was reporting the loss of a valuable cargo of sugar, 
slaves, or gold dust, the fact that the pirates had also taken a couple of barrels 
                                                 
481
 HCA 1/55 f. 76 
482
 Weekly Journal or British Gazetteer, 31/8/1723; Boston News Letter, 22/8/1720 
483
 ‘Plunder’, at least on privateering cruises such as Woodes Rogers’ voyage, specifically 
referred to privately owned goods seized from the decks and cabins of a privateer’s victim 
and treated as a perk of the crew, as opposed to the victim’s cargo, which went first to the 
privateer’s owners before being divided between investors and crew. 
 155 
of beef or the crew’s spare shirts was too insignificant to warrant mention in 
some cases. The figures given in each category do not add up to the total 
because in many cases commodities of more than one type were taken in a 
single attack, and the ‘total’ figure relates to the number of attacks rather than 
the number of different commodities taken. 
 
Table 2. Goods stolen in 88 piratical seizures, 1690-1726 
 
Personal 
Necessities 
  Clothing Provisions Alcohol Medicine  Total 
Number   15 29 16 2  46 
Percent.   17% 33% 18% 2%  52% 
         
Professional 
Necessities 
Rigging 
and 
cordage 
Sails Small 
Arms 
Artillery Powder 
and Shot 
Instruments 
Tools and 
Books 
Other 
Ship’s 
Equipment 
Total 
Number 10 6 6 4 4 2 6 21 
Percent. 11% 7% 7% 5% 5% 2% 7% 24% 
         
Tradable 
Commodities 
Tobacco Sugar Cloth Flour Slaves Other goods 
 Total 
Number 3 13 10 5 10 16  37 
Percent. 3% 15% 11% 6% 11% 18%  42% 
         
Expendable 
Wealth 
  Gold and 
Silver 
Coined 
Money 
Precious 
Stones 
Plunder 
 Total 
Number   16 9 2 9  33 
Percent.   18% 10% 2% 10%  38% 
 
Sources: Boston News Letter, 11/8/1718, 18/8/1718, 22/8/1720, 29/8/1720, 
21/11/1720, 23/4/1724, 7/5/1724; Daily Courant, 15/11/1717, 31/8/1720, 21/3/1722; 
Boston Gazette, 4/5/1724; Weekly Journal or British Gazetteer, 22/12/1716, 
27/12/1718, 31/8/1723; Weekly Journal or Saturday’s Post, 5/10/1717, 14/12/1717; 
Post Boy, 31/7/1718; American Weekly Mercury, 17/3/1720; London Journal, 2/8/1720, 
10/8/1723, 5/10/1723; Daily Post, 20/1/1721, 22/6/1721; Dublin Mercury, 21/2/1724; 
Evening Post, 29/8/1724; Tryal of John Quelch, pp. 2-4; Tryals of Thirty-Six Persons, p. 
175; CO 37/10, ff. 35, 36, 168; The Tryals of Captain John Rackham, and other Pirates 
(Jamaica, 1721), pp. 18, 21, 49); HCA 1/55 ff. 54, 76; Tryal of Captain Kidd, p. 40; 
Trials of Eight Persons, pp. 3, 9, 24-25; Tryals of Sixteen Persons, p. 4; Johnson, 
General History, pp. 67, 71, 74, 75,76, 130, 298, 399; Jameson, Privateering and 
Piracy; pp. 170, 190-191, 206, 208, 210, 337, 340, 373-4, 379, 380; Proceedings on the 
King’s Commission, p. 5; At a Court Held at Williamsburg, 15/8/1728 HCA 1/99; At a 
Court of Admiralty held at Williamsburg 14/8/1729, HCA 1/99; Tryals of Stede Bonnet, 
pp. 7, 21; At a Court of Admiralty held at Nassau, 11/10/1722, CO 23/1 f. 32; The 
Humble Petition of Francis Sittwell, CO 28/15, f. 390 
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It is clear from the Table 2 that the most commonly pillaged commodities were 
the personal necessities, such as food and clothing, which were recorded as 
taken in over half of the attacks, and in particular provisions (which, for the 
purpose of Table 2 can be taken to include food and water but not alcoholic 
beverages), which were taken in one third of piratical seizures. Uncoined gold 
and silver, and alcoholic drinks such as wine, brandy and rum, were the next 
most commonly taken commodities, but were seized in considerably fewer 
attacks than provisions were. The ‘other goods’, which were also taken in 18% 
of attacks, cannot be counted as a single commodity, as the data includes 
such various commodities as logwood, ivory, molasses, kettles, and 
indeterminate articles described under such headings as ‘English goods’. Only 
slightly less regularly taken was clothing, which the pirates sought out 
rapaciously: the crew of one merchantman claimed to have been robbed ‘of all 
they had, even to their very Shoes’.484 The relative prevalence of the theft of 
these items of personal necessity and expendable wealth may be due in part 
to the fact that these commodities were present on most or all merchant 
vessels, whatever their primary cargo and whichever region of the world they 
were trading in, whereas commodities such as tobacco and slaves were each 
associated with a particular region or trade route. This is borne out in part by 
the fact that arms and ships’ equipment such as cordage, sails, and anchors, 
when considered as a single homogenous commodity, were taken in nearly a 
quarter of piratical seizures – more often than coined or uncoined specie, and 
less frequently only than provisions. It is easy to understand the importance 
ascribed to all of these commodities by pirates. Provisions were an absolute 
necessity for men who might wish to remain at sea indefinitely, and strong 
drink, while not exactly a necessity of life, was probably a necessity of 
lifestyle. The upkeep of their vessels and weapons enabled pirates to continue 
their business, and indeed preventing their vessels from sinking beneath their 
feet or floundering in a storm was of vital importance, so the theft of ships’ 
equipment and arms with which pirates could repair and enhance their 
vessels, or replace worn-out parts, should also be considered a necessity.  
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I have treated clothing as a personal necessity because seamen must be 
clothed, the ‘simple exercise of keeping warm is indeed one of the basic 
needs of the human species,’485 and although a seaman ‘has the least 
Occasion of any Man living for [a wife], for he has everything made and 
dress’d to his own Hand; and he that cannot be his own Laundress, is no 
Sailor’,486 worn-out clothing had to be replaced from somewhere. However, 
clothing might, in some cases, also be considered a tradable commodity. 
Popular consumerism swept through England during the early modern 
period, centring first on appropriate apparel. Attractive clothing was the 
article of choice among the middling and labouring classes: this held true 
as much for shoppers in the marts around the kingdom, as it did for 
thieves working in town and country.487 
Clothing played an important role as a signifier of status, it ‘was the apparent 
making of the man or woman – by all public calculations at any rate’.488 The 
great desire across all classes for a good wardrobe gave rise to a flourishing 
market for second-hand clothes,489 which, although well supplied by legitimate 
means, also gave rise to a flourishing trade in stolen clothes. ‘Clothing was 
the most sought-after, and at the same time, the most easily disposable 
commodity in this period’.490 For seamen, the cost of new clothing can be 
ascertained from the numerous contracts awarded throughout the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the Admiralty to clothing suppliers to 
supply the ‘slop’ clothing to ships’ pursers for eventual resale to the seamen 
who manned the ships of the navy. The slop contracts specified not only the 
type of clothing to be offered and the materials to be used in its construction, 
but also the retail value of each item, from neckcloths at 5d and stockings at 
3s each, to kersey waistcoats at 7s and broadcloth breeches at 12s, with the 
most expensive item being broadcloth coats, which sold for £1 at the turn of 
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the eighteenth century, when an ordinary seaman was paid only 19s per 
month.491 The value of second-hand clothing for the seaman is indicated in 
the probate inventory of Joseph Haycock, owner of a sailors’ ‘slop shop’, 
where 26 waistcoats, 23 jackets, five pairs of breeches and 11 pairs of 
stockings (albeit of different materials to those specified in the slop contracts) 
were valued at only £7 10s 10d.492 
The monetary value of clothing, even second-hand clothing, to pirates, must 
not therefore be underestimated. For pirates seeking new clothing to wear, 
stolen garments were not only cheaper but also more accessible, and they 
also possessed a monetary value that could easily be realised at a later date: 
‘a good wardrobe could be the equivalent to a savings account.’493 Neither 
should the status value of clothing be overlooked. Pirates of the ‘golden age’ 
lived in a society which placed great emphasis on being seen in the best 
clothes, and eighteenth century commentators criticised the desire of even the 
poorest members of society to own and wear the ‘correct dress.’494 For 
pirates, then, who stole clothing from their victims or were awarded a ‘suit 
from top to toe’495 for having taken part in a boarding party, clothes had a 
threefold value: firstly, they served their most basic purpose in keeping out the 
cold and wet; secondly they served as a form of very portable wealth which 
could be realised easily if and when the pirate reached a market; and thirdly, 
they served to signify to any observer that the wearer was a man of means, 
and thus worthy of respect. 
Table 3 shows the same data used in Table 2, broken down differently, to 
illustrate the number of piratical seizures in which only necessities such as 
provisions and ships’ equipment were taken, compared to the number of 
seizures in which only tradable commodities or expendable wealth were 
taken, and seizures in which the stolen goods included both necessities and 
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wealth. In Table 3, data concerning the theft of low-value plunder, such as 
rings and personal cash, have been ignored, as none of the eighty-eight 
seizures considered resulted in the theft of only small plunder, and its theft 
was a crime of opportunity rather than the primary object of the pirates’ 
capturing a vessel. Whether the other goods taken were necessities or wealth, 
their value generally far outstripped the value of the plunder. 
 
Table 3. Necessities, commodities and wealth stolen in piratical seizures 
Personal and 
Professional Necessities 
Only 
Tradable Commodities 
and Expendable Wealth 
Only 
Both 
45 30 13 
51% 34% 15% 
Sources: as in Table 2. 
 
From Table 3 it is clear that in around half of their attacks the pirates’ primary 
aim was to maintain their stores and their vessels, and in less than half the 
total number of attacks did they take the valuable commodities that provided 
them with their ‘profit’. Nevertheless, the prospect of illicit riches must have 
been a more attractive lure to potential pirates than the prospect of illicit 
bread, or pitch. Bartholomew Roberts’ articles make this point explicitly by 
defining the pirates’ goal of £1,000 accrued wealth per man before they 
allowed themselves to retire. This accrued wealth was to be found in many 
forms, the most obvious and apparently preferred of which were either coined 
money or uncoined gold and silver, both of which were taken in a statistically 
significant number of attacks. The attraction of specie and uncoined metals 
lay in their universal acceptance as currency in virtually every market the 
pirates were likely to encounter: gold was valuable to the natives of East-
Africa, in colonial American markets, and to masters of trading vessels who 
could be persuaded to sell part of their cargo or provisions to pirates at sea. 
Its high value and low bulk also made it the most easily portable form of 
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wealth that pirates could hope to accrue, an important consideration for those 
who wished eventually to retire from piracy and slip ashore unnoticed. 
However, such simple profit was not always to be found on a captured 
merchantman, and the pirates’ spoil frequently took the form of cargoes, 
which could later be exchanged for other goods, including provisions and 
supplies, with ships they met at sea, or traded in markets on land. 
These commodities naturally included the kinds of articles that were carried in 
bulk in trans-Atlantic and inter-colonial merchant vessels, and it is 
unsurprising, in an economy as heavily dependent on tobacco and sugar as 
the colonial economy was, that those commodities should represent a 
considerable proportion of the pirates’ spoil. Occasionally, valuable 
commodities were misused by pirates in place of essential supplies which, 
while much lower in value, were temporarily unavailable for the pirates’ use. 
Captain Kidd’s men, for example, used £15 worth of exotic myrrh as a 
substitute for pitch, and the company of the Nicholas under the command of 
John Eaton replaced their worn out sails with new ones of Chinese silk. 
Splendour did not make for efficiency, as Eaton’s men exchanged their silk 
sails for canvas as soon as they could, and Kidd’s ship leaked so much that it 
had to be abandoned.496 
One commodity, apart from clothing, that served a useful purpose onboard 
ship and yet retained a resale value was a human one. Slaves could be 
employed in arduous tasks such as pumping or rowing, but could also be 
exchanged for cash if a suitable market could be found, and the social value 
of slave-ownership must not be overlooked. Furthermore, slaves did not even 
require the same amount of effort to unload from the ship as, say, tobacco or 
sugar. It is no wonder, then, that a self-propelled, labour-saving, form of spoil 
attracted many pirates. Of course, slaves presented other difficulties to the 
pirates: the presence of large numbers of slaves might have posed a grave 
physical danger, and this may explain why slaves were often taken only in 
small numbers such as the ‘ten Negroe Slaves’ taken by John Rackham’s 
company, the ‘one Negro Man Slave named Dick of the value of Fifty Pounds’ 
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taken by Charles Harris, or the ‘Negro Man Slave named Francisco, of the 
value of One hundred pounds’ taken by John Phillips’ men.497 Rackham, 
Harris, and Phillips all commanded relatively small pirate companies, but there 
is evidence to suggest that larger companies occasionally employed 
significant slave forces. When Bartholomew Roberts’ company was defeated 
in battle the Royal Naval victors found onboard his ships ‘about 200 
Englishmen, [and] 60 or 70 stout Negro slaves’, and Henry Every’s company 
carried 90 slaves from the French island of Réunion to the Bahamas, where 
they probably constituted part of a large bribe paid to Governor Trott in 
exchange for safe passage.498 Slaves, and the realisation of their value, will 
be more fully considered in a case-study below. 
 
3.2. Realising Profits 
The great difficulty pirates faced when dealing with tradable commodities was 
how to realise their value. Pirates who captured a cargo consisting of 120 
barrels of flour,499 for example, might use some of it to replenish their store of 
bread, but probably sought to use the major part either to trade for other 
provisions or more valuable commodities, or to sell for cash profit. However, 
pirates, by their very nature, were disbarred from most legitimate market 
places, and without access to a market the pirates’ captured commodities 
were entirely devoid of value. Pirates therefore sought to exploit illicit markets, 
where fewer questions were asked, or they used their strength and firepower 
to force trade upon unwilling partners. They did this in a number of ways. 
Firstly, they traded with ships they met at sea. Sometimes the merchant 
masters who traded with pirates did so under threats of violence and the 
terms of the barter were largely dictated by the pirates, but frequently ship 
masters were only too happy to trade with pirates, often making a handsome 
profit. Secondly, they were able to trade on land, either secretly, or with the 
compliance of corrupt local officials, of whom there were many, or by force 
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and threats of violence. Finally, the pirates could attempt to slip ashore singly 
or in small groups, and use whatever spoil they had brought with them to 
establish themselves in legitimate society. 
The simplest and most convenient method was to trade with ships met with at 
sea. When pirates took Captain Knott’s ship bound from Virginia for London, 
for example, they ‘took what they wanted out of the Merchantman and gave 
him Money and goods of a very considerable value for the same’.500 The 
payment of money, or exchange of goods, worth more than the commodities 
being bartered for was a common feature of trading encounters between 
pirates and merchantmen. The Mitchel was captured in the mid-Atlantic by 
pirates, who kept the master prisoner for a short while, but freed him ‘after 
taking out some provisions, and other necessaries, which [they] paid [him] 
well for’.501 
Not all pirates were so generous, and sales or trade were often forced on 
unwilling merchants by threats of force: the crew of one captured fishing 
vessel were forced to accept only two bottles of brandy in exchange for £10 
worth of their catch.502 On land as at sea, it was not necessary that the 
pirates’ trading partners were willing and corrupt. Pirates were quite willing to 
use violence, or the threat of violence, to force through a transaction. When 
Henry Every arrived at the Isle of May, for example, he had onboard plenty of 
water and bread, but only one barrel of beef and a little fish with which to feed 
his crew. Three English merchant ships were anchored at the island, from 
which they took various provisions, an anchor and a cable. They also took 
some linen, presumably part of a cargo intended for legitimate trade on the 
African coast. The linen was immediately taken ashore by the pirates, who 
forced the inhabitants to buy it from them at twice its value.503 
Nevertheless, the general willingness of pirates to pay excessive sums for 
provisions and other supplies encouraged merchants to set ships out in the 
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specific hope of meeting with pirates to trade with. Near the Bahamas, in 
1718, pirates spoiled the cargo of a merchantman in order to pay for goods 
supplied by a ship which had sailed from Providence for that purpose.504 
Governor of the Bahamas, Woodes Rogers, impounded the ship, and colonial 
officials clearly saw the trade between pirates and colonial merchants as a 
serious obstacle to the eradication of piracy, for one wrote later that it was 
essential  
to find out some Expedient to prevent the Trade with them [the pirates] 
from Rhoad [sic] Island, New York, Pensilvania [sic] etc. for the Pirates 
themselves have often told me that if they had not been supported by the 
Traders from thence with Ammunition and Provisions according to their 
Direction, they could never have become so formidable, nor arrived to 
that degree that they have.505 
The willingness of unscrupulous traders to deal with pirates went so far as to 
include trading with pirates on land as well as at sea where there were fewer 
witnesses.506 The inhabitants of Gardner’s Island, New York, were more than 
once embroiled in scandals involving the receipt of pirate goods.  In 1699 
William Kidd arrived at Gardner’s Island and exchanged several pieces of 
valuable fabric and some Arabian gold coins for a barrel of cider and six 
sheep, and left four slaves and a multitude of other goods for safekeeping with 
John Gardner, the owner of the island. Gardner excused himself by denying 
the knowledge that Kidd was a pirate and delivered the goods Kidd left to 
Governor Bellomont.507 The island was obviously a suitable point for pirates 
sailing the American coast to resupply, for in 1717 pirates ‘landed on 
Gardner’s Island, purchased some fresh Provisions, and [were] gone 
again’.508 John Quelch and his men secured the services of a goldsmith in 
Puritan, but cash-starved, Boston to melt down Portuguese moidores into less 
distinctive and incriminating bullion, which may have reduced the value of the 
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gold, but nevertheless made it safer to dispose of.509 These, and other 
examples of illicit trading between pirates and land-based merchants, came to 
light either because the pirates were captured or the traders themselves 
reported their activities to the authorities, but there were doubtless many more 
incidents that never made it into the paper record.  
Illicit trading was made easier, and the evidence more easily suppressed, 
when it involved the collusion of the very officials supposed to prevent it. At 
the same time as some of his men were hunting down Blackbeard in bloody 
battle, Royal Navy Captain Ellis Brand devoted some of his attention to 
uncovering evidence of collusion between pirates and customs officials in 
Virginia and North Carolina. In Virginia, Collector of Customs Richard 
Fitzwilliams acted as an ‘agent and soliciter for the Pirats in those parts’, going 
so far as to have a writ taken out against Captain Pearse of HMS Phoenix and 
having Captain Gordon of HMS Pearl arrested for false imprisonment. For a 
fee of three ounces of gold dust, Blackbeard’s quartermaster, William Howard, 
retained Fitzwilliams’ services as a lawyer. Pirates were assisted in North 
Carolina by Tobias Knight, Collector of Customs, Council member, Secretary 
to the Colony, and former Chief Justice. In a letter to the pirates, Knight 
described himself as Blackbeard’s ‘real ffriend [sic] and Servant’, and his 
services to the pirates included not only obstructing Brand’s investigations, but 
also storing and concealing stolen sugar and cotton in his own barn.510 On 
occasion, even colonial governors were not above corruption by pirates: 
Nicholas Trott’s government of the Bahamas crumbled in the face of charges 
that he had allowed Henry Every and his men to settle and trade in the islands 
in return for a hefty bribe. Trott’s defence rested on the facts that he could not 
be sure the men were pirates, and that in any case he did not have the forces 
at his disposal to oppose the pirates’ landing.511 Benjamin Fletcher’s 
government of New York was even more embroiled in ‘corrupt and unjust 
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practices’, and his dismissal occurred in the wake of no fewer than twelve 
specific charges of connivance with pirates.512 
Neither were corrupt traders willing to engage in illicit trade found only in the 
American colonies. When Thomas Shafto and his company arrived in Torbay 
with a cargo of stolen merchandise they were met by a trader, ‘one Matthews 
of Brixham’, who agreed to find buyers for their wares. Matthews travelled to 
Exeter, where he persuaded two ‘tradesmen’, Mr Vicary and Mr Yard, to meet 
with Shafto and negotiate the sale of several hundred pounds’ worth of 
cinnamon, cloves, and nutmeg, ‘for 6d in the pound less than they could buy 
of the Merchant, upon the account of ready money’.513 A few years earlier, 
George Cusack had sold some stolen deal boards in Aberdeen for £219, and 
a captured ship and her remaining cargo ‘for betwixt 2 and 3 hundred pound, 
though she was esteemed worth about three thousand pound’. Sailing south, 
Cusack sold more of his spoil at Alford Creek in Lincolnshire, before putting 
into Leigh-on-Sea, where he and his crew were captured while spending their 
profits.514 
The willingness of pirates to sell their spoiled cargoes at prices well below the 
market standard, and of unscrupulous traders to exploit the illicit trade for the 
sake of the large profits, led to such encounters occurring all over the world. In 
Africa, for example, the fragile monopoly of the Royal African Company 
encouraged independent traders to transact commerce with visiting pirate 
companies. William Snelgrave discovered that ‘several parcels of Goods’ 
taken from him by Cocklyn’s company had found their way into the 
possession of Edward Hogbin, a roguish Englishman living on the banks of 
the Sierra Leone river.515 In fact, according to Johnson, the river was a 
favourite spot for pirates to anchor, re-supply, and clean their vessels 
precisely because 
the Traders settled here, are naturally their Friends. There are about 30 
English Men in all, Men who in some Part of their Lives, have been either 
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privateering, buccaneering, or pyrating, and still retain and love the Riots 
and Humours, common to that Sort of Life… Here lives at this Place an 
old Fellow, who goes by the name of Crackers, who was formerly a 
noted Buccaneer, and while he followed the Calling, robb’d and 
plundered many a Man; he keeps the best House in the Place, has two 
or three Guns before his Door, with which he salutes his Friends, the 
Pyrates, when they put in, and lives a jovial Life with them, all the while 
they are there.516 
In the Indian Ocean, Dutch traders were willing to supply pirates with 
necessary goods such as pitch and tar in exchange for pirated goods, not only 
because of the financial benefits of the transactions, but also because the 
depredations of apparently English pirates weakened the standing of the 
English East India Company with the Mughal court in India, and improved 
their own relative standing. In particular, one Dutch broker named Malpa was 
accused by one of the pirates’ victims not only of colluding with the pirates in 
the disposal of their spoil, but also providing them with intelligence on suitable 
targets in the vicinity.517 
One of the most remarkable places that pirates were able to trade their spoil 
for supplies and European commodities was a trading post on St. Mary’s 
Island, Madagascar, run by former buccaneer Adam Baldridge and financed 
by New York merchant Frederick Phillipse, for the ostensible purpose of 
slave-trading, but in reality situated by a defensible anchorage to facilitate 
trade with pirates. Baldridge arrived at St. Mary’s in July 1690, immediately 
forged a friendship with the local Malagasy inhabitants, and accompanied 
them to war against other rival Malagasy who lived to the North. Equipped 
with cattle and slaves, the spoils of his military exploits, he returned to St. 
Mary’s and began a settlement. In October 1691 the pirate company 
commanded by George Raynor in the Batchelor’s Delight arrived at St. Mary’s 
to clean their ship and were supplied by Baldridge with cattle in exchange for 
five cannon, which he used to fortify his settlement. A year later he 
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augmented his fortification with six more guns from the pirate ship Nassau, 
and was joined by around thirty pirates. In the summer of 1693 the first of 
several vessels sent by Phillipse arrived at St. Mary’s with a cargo of 
European clothes, spirits and wine, tools, gunpowder, agricultural supplies, 
and ‘two old stills’, for which Baldridge paid 1,100 pieces of eight, 34 slaves, 
and some beef: the coined money was almost certainly the proceeds of 
Baldridge’s trade with pirates.518 From then until the end of the century a 
regular trade was maintained between the pirates and the New York 
merchant, with Baldridge acting as a middle-man, supplying Phillipse with 
slaves and money, and supplying the pirates with a bewildering array of 
commodities, from clothing, spirituous liquor, guns and tar, to scissors, thread, 
combs and writing paper. Governor Bellomont of New York was moved, in 
1698, to report  
the frequent trade between this [port] and Madagascar; the pirates, who 
fitted out in this port, bringing their spoils taken in the East Indies and the 
Red Sea to that island, whence merchant-ships from this port, publicly 
loaded with goods useful to the pirates, brought them back here for 
sale.519  
Baldridge’s trading post was so well established as an entrepôt that he was 
able to offer credit to pirates whose voyages had been unsuccessful. By the 
time Phillipse sent his last shipment of goods to Baldridge, the latter had been 
forced to desert his settlement after hearing that several of the pirate 
inhabitants had had their throats cut by the Malagasy in revenge for 
Baldridge’s having unscrupulously sold many of his neighbours into slavery. 
However, a new agent, Edward Welsh, was soon ready to take over, and the 
trading post at St. Mary’s remained a successful business venture for all 
concerned until the end of the century.520  
The disposal of spoil and the realisation of its value depended, of course, on 
the availability of a market, so when the St. Mary’s trading post finally went out 
                                                 
518
 Jameson, Privateering and Piracy, pp. 206-213 
519
 CSPC, 1697-1698, item. 593 
520
 Jameson, Privateering and Piracy, pp. 212-213; Invoice of Sundry goods, 9/6/1698, HCA 
1/98, ff. 135-137; A List of the Prices that Capt. Jacobs sold Liquors and other goods att, at 
St. Mary’s, 9/6/1698, HCA 1/98, f. 142; Ritchie, Captain Kidd, pp. 113-116 
 168 
of business sometime around 1700 the Indian Ocean pirates were unable to 
make full use of the treasure they had accumulated. By 1707 the heyday of 
piracy in the Eastern seas was over, but many pirates had settled on St. 
Mary’s and the Madagascan mainland, and one of the concerns voiced in 
England about their permanent settlement of the island was that their treasure 
‘now lies buried or useless’, as ‘unprofitable as the Earth that covers it’.521 
Buried treasure has traditionally been the preserve of the novelist rather than 
the historian, but contemporary belief in buried pirates’ treasure was 
surprisingly widespread, and affected several otherwise credible people, in 
addition to the author of the pamphlet quoted above, who was probably 
Admiral Lord Carmarthen. In 1701, Secretary of State James Vernon gave 
instructions to the justices of Cornwall to search there for ‘treasure said to be 
hid by some of the pirates of Every’s crew’, and offered a reward for its 
recovery.522 In the summer of 1723 the British vice-consul at Vigo went even 
further, and, having been assured ‘by a Mulatto, a Native of St. Antonio one of 
the Cape de Verde Islands, that he knew of a considerable Treasure which 
had been buried in that Island by a Crew of Pyrates’, set sail with thirteen 
other Englishmen to recover it.523 In this case the ‘treasure’ was a ruse by the 
Cape Verde islander to secure a free passage home, and the actions of the 
vice-consul sparked a diplomatic incident with the Portuguese crown but, 
along with other incidents, it shows that there was a contemporary awareness 
that pirates could not always realise the value of their spoil and were, on 
occasion, forced to conceal it until, presumably, a favourable opportunity 
could be found.  
3.2.1. The market for slaves: a case study. 
Slaves, treated as a form of spoil, make an interesting case study, illuminating 
some of the problems pirates faced when trying to realise the value of their 
profits, as well as some of the ways in which pirates used great ingenuity to 
make the best possible advantage for themselves. One of the great attractions 
of slaves to pirates must have been that their value was not restricted solely to 
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their inherent monetary worth, and by putting captured slaves to work aboard 
their ships pirates were able to realise part of their value without necessarily 
endangering their ultimate resale value. Other commodities might also have 
had a practical value to the pirates in addition to their monetary value but, in 
the case of cloth for example, the realisation of the practical value to, say, 
make clothes as John Quelch’s company did with a consignment of spoiled 
silk,524 may have reduced or negated the ultimate resale value. Slaves, by 
contrast, could be used for pumping or other arduous work, and still be sold at 
a later date. 
The great difficulty that pirates faced in the sale of slaves was the availability 
of a suitable market. In 1719, for example, the pirate companies of Cocklyn, 
England, and la Buse spent several weeks capturing slaving vessels on the 
West coast of Africa, from which they selected 900 of the most valuable 
slaves. Since the pirates were at that time en route to the Indian Ocean it is 
probable that they hoped to sell the slaves to the Portuguese in Africa, but a 
recent violent clash between other pirates and Portuguese settlers on the 
island of Principe prevented any possibility of such a trade taking place. 
Unable to sell their slaves in Africa, and unwilling to cross the Atlantic to sell 
them in the Americas, the pirates were forced to abandon most of their human 
cargo before rounding the Cape.525 Of other pirates who raided amongst the 
slavers of the African coast, it was ‘thought they design to range the Coast, 
and then go to Brasil [sic] with their Negroes’.526 The difficulty of finding a 
suitable market, even in the West Indies, sometimes made the sale of slaves 
more trouble than it was worth as, for example, when a pirate company ‘got 
ashore with their Riches, leaving on board fifteen Negroes’ near the island of 
St. Thomas in 1720.527 
The pirates’ difficulty in finding a market for captured slaves stemmed largely 
from the necessity of finding corrupt customers willing to purchase from 
pirates, and corrupt officials willing to oversee or affect ignorance of the sale. 
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The high-bulk nature of slaves made it difficult for their sale to be conducted 
covertly, and so their sale was perforce limited to markets in which demand 
was high enough to overcome scruples and fear of legal retribution. Such 
markets could occasionally be found and exploited by pirates, but perhaps 
none so successfully as Blackbeard found in North Carolina. In May 1718 
Blackbeard blockaded Charleston, South Carolina, and ‘took a Brigantine with 
Negroes’ and several other vessels. A few days later, around 10 June, his 
flagship, Queen Anne’s Revenge, was lost when she ran aground on a sand 
bar at the entrance to Topsail (now Beaufort) Inlet, North Carolina. Blackbeard 
shifted his command to a smaller vessel and left the inlet with ‘forty White 
Men, and sixty Negroes’, leaving the majority of his company stranded on a 
stretch of coast where ‘there was no Inhabitant, nor Provisions’.528 From 
Topsail Inlet Blackbeard sailed north along the coast and arrived in Bath, 
North Carolina’s principal town, later in the same month, where he and his 
company surrendered themselves to Governor Eden and received pardons 
from him, the terms of which they breached flagrantly over the following 
months. From June until November the company based themselves in the 
Pamlico Sound, sometimes visiting Bath, but establishing themselves 
principally on Ocracoke Island at the entrance to the Sound.529  
In the five months that the pirates spent in the Pamlico Sound their numbers 
dwindled until, by the time they were defeated by a Royal Navy squadron in 
November, there remained in the company only ‘thirteen White and six 
Negroes’ who stayed onboard their vessel, and a further six pirates who were 
arrested ashore at Bath.530 The 21 white pirates who left Blackbeard’s 
company presumably took their pardons and settled ashore, in North Carolina 
or elsewhere, but the fate of most of the 54 unaccounted-for black men is less 
certain. It has been suggested that in many cases black men aboard pirate 
vessels were treated as free men,531 and it has been argued that the ‘sixty 
Negroes’ who accompanied Blackbeard from Topsail Inlet are evidence of a 
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multiculturalism and racial tolerance practised by pirates.532 However, records 
indicate categorically that at least four of those black men were treated as 
slaves: when William Howard was arrested in Virginia, he had with him ‘two 
negros which he own'd to have been piratically taken’, and the corrupt Tobias 
Knight admitted the purchase of two more slaves from members of 
Blackbeard’s company.533 North Carolina’s principal economic crutch was the 
production of tobacco and, like its neighbouring colonies of South Carolina 
and Virginia, was a plantation economy, which relied on a labour force of 
slaves to produce the export crop.534 Thus it is unlikely that the pirates’ arrival 
in North Carolina offered any expectation of freedom for the black men 
brought away from Topsail Inlet, and in the light of evidence that at least some 
of their number were either kept or sold as slaves, it is likely that that was also 
the fate of the other fifty.  
The terms of the general pardon under which Blackbeard and his company 
surrendered only covered offences committed prior to January 1718, so by 
their actions at Charleston and elsewhere the pirates had made themselves 
ineligible. Nevertheless they made no delay in sailing to North Carolina to 
seek pardon, suggesting that they thought their chances of finding a governor 
compliant enough to overlook their most recent crimes were higher in that 
colony than elsewhere. In North Carolina there existed a unique set of 
circumstances that made the colony an absolutely ideal market for the pirates’ 
slaves. In the first place, Governor Eden and Tobias Knight, and possibly 
other figures of authority in the colony, were probably corrupt. Captain Ellis 
Brand certainly complained that Eden and Knight had been obstructive 
towards him, and that Knight had been deeply involved with the pirates, to the 
extent that the Admiralty complained to the Lords of the Treasury about ‘how 
their two Officers have misbehaved themselves, to the…incouragement [sic] 
of Pyrates.535 Knight was actually put on trial for his involvement with pirates, 
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but a weak prosecution and spirited defence secured his acquittal.536 The fact 
that North Carolina was a proprietary colony, administered not by the Crown 
but by private owners, meant too that it was that far removed from the power 
of a central authority. In the second place, North Carolina was a plantation 
colony, and so the pirates must have known that there was a market for 
slaves. In the third place, and most significantly, North Carolina had no well-
established deep water port to facilitate the importation of slaves, and the 
planters of the colony were forced to buy their labour force from the markets 
of South Carolina and Virginia, where they found only slaves who were both 
over-priced and poor quality.537 Thus, when Blackbeard and his company 
arrived in Bath in possession of sixty slaves, they found a market that was not 
only willing, but also probably eager to trade with them. Moreover, because of 
the prevailing circumstances in the colony, the value of slaves was over-
inflated to an incredible degree. For example, in September 1718, while 
Blackbeard and his company were dividing their time between Ocracoke and 
Bath, three slaves were exchanged for a 400-acre plantation with waterfront 
access facing Bath, immediately neighbouring Governor Eden’s own 
property.538 The high value of slaves in North Carolina would, in itself, have 
been a good enough reason for Blackbeard to have chosen the colony as the 
ideal place to sell his slaves. 
 
3.3. The ‘Common Chest’: Rewards, Pensions and Compensation. 
Pirates’ spoil and plunder, having been removed from their victim’s vessel, 
was handed over en bloc to the charge of an appointed officer, usually a 
quartermaster, who was responsible for keeping strict accounts. Several sets 
of articles codified this procedure, and laid down strict punishments for those 
who failed to adhere to it, such as John Taylor’s articles which specified that 
‘everything taken from a prize must be delivered up to the quartermaster, 
under pain of a flogging and forfeiture of all possessions’. In Thomas Anstis’ 
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company the quartermaster was even required to oversee the plundering 
while it was in progress, and their articles required that nobody ‘should go on 
board of any Prize and should break open any Chest without the knowledge 
of the Quarter Master’. Before any division was made of the spoil it was 
gathered together so that a proper account could be made. When Bellamy’s 
company took the Whydah they captured a large amount of coined money 
which ‘was counted over in the Cabin, and put up in bags’.539 Goods which 
were not easily divided, such as William Snelgrave’s three embroidered coats 
and his gold watch, were ‘put into the common Chest, to be sold at the Mast’. 
540 The main mast was the traditional place for auctions or sales held on board 
ships: slop clothing on Royal Naval ships was ‘sold always above deck, at the 
mainmast’, and the effects of seamen who died during the course of the 
voyage were likewise ‘sold at the Mast according to Custome’.541 In the case 
of pirates selling goods at the mast it is probable that the proceeds were 
placed with the rest of the spoil in the common fund. The quartermaster, 
acting as ‘custodian and distributor’, then took charge of the spoil and stored it 
‘in Chests between Decks without any guard, but none was to take any 
without the Quarter Master’s leave’.542 
The spoil having been gathered, counted, and recorded, there were numerous 
calls on it before it could be divided up amongst the pirates. When pirates 
captured Captain Knott’s ship, for example, and ‘took what they wanted out of 
the Merchant Man and gave him money and goods of a very considerable 
value for the same’, the money and goods would have come from the 
common chest.543 Similarly, some of Richard Shivers’ company victualled their 
ship out of their own pockets, but when they later captured a ship in the Indian 
Ocean they took ‘out of her abt two hundred pounds in mony and some 
provisions, they let her go, all ye said mony being paid to the men that bought 
provision at Madagascar and Nicobar to proceed upon this voyage’.544 On 
some privateers the vigilance of the first man to sight a prize was rewarded 
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with a lump-sum bonus, ranging in size from the twenty pieces of eight offered 
by Woodes Rogers on his circumnavigation, to the ‘one hundred pieces of 
eight to be paid out of the whole stock before any dividend be made’ 
stipulated by the articles of Kidd’s Adventure Galley. This practice may have 
been adopted by some pirate companies: though none of the surviving articles 
stipulate a cash reward, the articles of Lowther and Low assign ‘the best Pistol 
or Small Arm, on board’ to ‘he that sees a Sail first’. Any cash sum used to 
reward vigilance or courage within a pirate company would probably have also 
come from the common chest, as it did on Kidd’s ship. 
One practice that was certainly employed by both privateers and pirates was 
the reservation of some funds in the common chest to be paid out to 
individuals wounded in action. Morgan’s articles stipulated that wounded men 
should receive ‘recompense or reward’, and Kidd offered ‘smart money’ of 600 
pieces of eight for the loss of an eye or limb, and 100 pieces of eight for the 
loss of a toe or finger, or a flesh-wound, ‘to be paid out of the whole stock 
before any dividend be made’. The amount of smart money offered by pirate 
companies was remarkably consistent, both with other pirate companies and 
with privateer companies such as Kidd’s. Roberts, Anstis, and Philips all 
awarded 800 dollars (or pieces of eight) for the loss of a limb, and for the loss 
of a joint Anstis awarded 200 dollars, while Phillips offered 400 dollars. The 
amount of smart money offered is one of the few differences between the 
articles of Lowther and Low: Low’s articles offered 600 dollars for the loss of a 
limb, while Lowther’s specified a recompense of £150. However, with a rough 
exchange rate of about 4s 6d per dollar, established in 1704,545 Lowther’s 
smart money amounted to approximately 667 dollars, roughly equitable with 
Low’s.  
It has been suggested that the pirates’ employment of such a rudimentary 
‘social security system’ was an ‘astonishing’ anticipation of a ‘modern idea’,546 
but while modern readers might find it astonishing, it is doubtful than any 
contemporary with an understanding of marine affairs would have thought it 
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so. As early as 1590 Admirals Hawkins, Howard, and Drake had founded the 
Chatham Chest, a welfare fund for naval seaman into which every man 
employed by the navy paid sixpence per month out of his wages, and which in 
turn paid out pensions to seamen injured in the course of their service.547 
English privateers and merchantmen may have established a common fund, 
the ‘poor man’s box’, even earlier, into which were paid fines for swearing and 
similar offences.548 Earlier still, from 1514, members of the guild of mariners at 
Trinity House, Deptford, were required to pay a part of their wages to the guild 
who, in return, maintained almshouses for the relief of distressed seamen.549 
From 1696 onwards, all seamen, whether serving in the Royal Navy or the 
merchant marine, were required to pay sixpence per month out of their wages, 
for the upkeep of the newly founded Greenwich Hospital.550  
Thus, by the time Lowther’s or Roberts’ articles established a common fund 
for the payment of smart money, every single working seaman would have 
been intimately familiar with the idea, and the pirates’ common fund and smart 
money payments can be considered an extension of a common practice, 
carried out by men who were cut off from the benefits of the official funds and 
free of their obligation to surrender a part of their monthly wage, but who saw 
enough merit in the system to make it worthwhile emulating. The 
administration of both the Chatham Chest and Greenwich sixpences were 
criticised by contemporaries for their many practical failings. Throughout the 
seventeenth century the Chatham Chest was used regularly to provide private 
loans to individuals, including Charles I, leaving it short of funds with which to 
pay those eligible for a pension, and many of those who were paid from the 
Chest received their money in arrears.551 The Greenwich hospital nominally 
was founded for the relief of all seamen, but in practice was limited to 
supporting those injured in the service of the crown which, while it might 
include men serving in merchant ships hired by the government, largely 
precluded merchant seamen from reaping the benefits of their monthly 
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contribution unless they later served in the Royal Navy and were injured. 
Moreover, the number of places available at the hospital was limited, and they 
were quickly filled.552 Nevertheless, for all their faults, the seamen’s welfare 
systems employed by the government worked, to a degree, and injured and 
needy seamen had some access to rudimentary relief. It is not at all clear, 
however, that the pirates’ systems were any more effective practically: 
Rediker found only one example of a pirate who actually received smart 
money.553 It is likely that other sums were paid, and it may be that the judicial 
nature of much of the available evidence resulted in other payments escaping 
notice, it not being in the court’s interest to broadcast the fact that pirates took 
on a duty of care amongst themselves: but that only one example can be 
found is surprising nonetheless, unless such payments actually were 
uncommon. A probable reason for this apparent lack of practical application 
was that the sums of smart money mentioned in the articles were all relatively 
large in comparison to the amount of money actually available to the pirates. 
For an exceptionally fortunate pirate company, such as Bellamy’s, who had a 
reputed haul of £30,000 stowed in their hold, the problem may not have been 
so acute, but for most companies whose coffers were less full the strain of 
paying the full amount may have been impractical. After one engagement 
Anstis’ men each received a share of about £20, or around 87 dollars, so a 
lump sum of 800 dollars for a man who lost a leg or arm would have been 
hard to find, and even a payment of 200 dollars for a lesser injury would have 
strained the company’s finances.554  
 
3.4. Division of Spoil – the pay hierarchy. 
Once the spoil from a capture had been accounted for, usually by the captain 
and quartermaster together, though on John Quelch’s cruise the carpenter 
also took part in the process,555 the responsibility for the common chest 
usually lay with the quartermaster. In the case of a pirate company spread 
over more than one ship, a man might be made ‘Quarter Master to the Whole 
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Company’, as a ‘mulatto’ called Josephus was in the three-vessel company 
commanded by Richard Holland.556 In this case, the common chest was 
probably usually kept aboard the squadron’s flagship: for example, when 
Charles Harris and his crew were captured there was found on their ship only 
‘provisions and arms, the company’s chest (as they call it) being on board the 
other [vessel] with their commander’.557 The greatest call on the common 
chest was the distribution of rewards to the pirate crew. In some cases this 
was a solemn occasion in which the whole crew paraded to receive the whole 
of the share due to them: Kidd ‘called every Man by the List, and they came 
with their Hats in their Hands, and he gave them their Money, and they swept 
it up, and went away’, and after a successful cruise John Taylor’s company 
‘usually come to recuperate at Madagascar, where they divide of spoils which 
they dissipate in no time. This division is made by the quartermaster, 
overseen by four crew-members’.558 In other companies the practice was not 
to share out the whole of the common chest at once, but to keep the 
accumulated spoil together and allow individuals to draw from their own share 
of the fund whenever they wished, such as William Jones of Low’s company, 
who admitted at his trial that ‘he had Eleven Pounds of the Quarter-Master at 
one time, and Eight Pounds at another’.559 Such practice must have made the 
pirate quartermaster as much an accountant as he was arbiter of justice or 
deck officer, indeed, in Bellamy’s company each man ‘might have what money 
they wanted from the Quarter Master who kept a book for that purpose’.560 
Like the pirates’ supposedly radical welfare system, their division of spoil has 
been seen as highly enlightened and progressive: 
[The pirates’] pay system represented a radical departure from the 
practices in the merchant service, Royal Navy, and privateering. It 
levelled an elaborate hierarchy of pay ranks and decisively reduced the 
disparity between the top and the bottom of the scale. Indeed, this must 
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have been one of the most egalitarian plans for the distribution of 
resources to be found anywhere in the early eighteenth century.561 
As far as the surviving articles show, the pirates’ pay system was indeed fairly 
egalitarian, and the greatest disparity in pay between captain and crewman is 
to be found in Roberts’, Lowther’s and Low’s articles stating that the captain 
should receive two whole shares, compared to the crewmen’s single share 
apiece. Thomas Anstis’ articles are the most egalitarian in terms of rewards, 
being the only surviving set in which every man was allotted the same sum, 
regardless of rank. Nevertheless, three questions arise from this evidence and 
its use by historians to support comments such as that quoted above. Firstly, 
were the scales of shares set forth in the surviving articles rigidly adhered to? 
Secondly, were other pirates, whose articles have not survived, so egalitarian 
in their distribution of spoil as those whose articles have survived? And finally, 
was such an ‘egalitarian plan for the distribution of resources’ really so 
unusual in the decades surrounding the turn of the eighteenth century? 
The first question can be answered only unsatisfactorily: if the articles had not 
been adhered to in their division of spoil then there would have been little 
point in the pirates’ using them to set forth a scale of pay, but it is clear that 
there were exceptions. The articles of Bartholomew Roberts, for example, 
though they do not explicitly guarantee a full share of spoil for each pirate, do 
guarantee an ‘equal title’ to other resources for ‘every man’, and the 
specification that the company was not to be broken up ‘till each had shared 
one thousand pounds’, suggests an intent to award a full share to everyone. 
Yet soldiers who volunteered to join the pirates were so looked-down upon by 
their crew mates that they were given ‘only a fourth part share to shew their 
Contempt of them’.562 In Anstis’ company the articles stipulated that the whole 
company should receive one full share, regardless of rank, and one forced 
man testified that he was awarded a share that he did not want, and so gave it 
away to others.563 On the other hand, William Ingrams, who served as a 
gunner under Anstis, did not dispute the statement made at his trial that ‘he 
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(as being an Officer) receiv’d for his Part of [the spoil] one Share and a 
Quarter’.564 
Such exceptions to the written rules do not appear to negate the essential 
egalitarianism of the pirates’ division of spoil – the award of an extra 25 
percent to an officer is hardly an excessive disparity, and the mere quarter 
share given to the soldiers of Roberts’ crew is matched by the quarter share 
given to boys according to Taylor’s articles. Other pirate crews also certainly 
practised a division of spoil that was similarly egalitarian. The articles of the 
Camelion, written nearly forty years before those of Roberts’ or Taylor’s 
companies, awarded two and a half shares to the captain, and Henry Every 
received only two shares in 1695.565 The sailing masters of both companies 
received one share and a half. John Quelch’s share as captain in 1704 was 
reckoned to be ‘at least double to any other’.566 The relative parity of the size 
of shares awarded to pirate captains over several decades suggests a 
continuity of common practice. There are, however, some exceptions worth 
noting. When Kidd’s crew insisted on drawing up new articles, for example, 
Kidd himself was awarded five shares because he was the captain, and 35 
‘for the… ship’, out of a total of 160 shares, one quarter of the total profit, and 
testimony at his trial suggests that he really did receive forty shares in 
practice. The master was awarded two full shares, and other officers received 
a share and an additional ‘gratification’, the size of which was willed by Kidd. 
By contrast, ‘some of the Men had whole shares and some only half 
shares’.567 Such a disparity between the pay of a pirate captain and a pirate 
foremastman might be thought staggering and unprecedented, and after all, 
Kidd was an unusual pirate captain. However, when Thomas Shafto led his 
crew to piracy, ‘after some arguing it was agreed that the master should have 
for himself and his son a third part of the aforesaid money and five pieces of 
broad gold, and that the rest should be divided amongst the rest of the ship’s 
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company’.568 The reason for such exceptions is difficult to discern. It could be 
noted that both Kidd and Shafto were legitimate captains who led their 
companies into piracy and retained command in the process, thus giving them 
a certain natural authority with which to back their claims to excessively large 
shares. Nicholas Clough, however, also retained command in similar 
circumstances, and yet was awarded only two and a half shares. Alternatively 
it might be argued that Kidd and Shafto operated entirely removed from the 
influence of other pirate companies at the time the division of shares was 
agreed, and so escaped the influence of the spirit of financial egalitarianism 
that pervaded other pirate companies, but the same is also true of Clough’s 
and Lowther’s companies. It is possible, of course, that Clough’s and 
Lowther’s companies had heard of other pirates’ egalitarianism via the sailors’ 
scuttlebutt and demanded a similar division of resources, but in that case it is 
surprising that Kidd’s and Shafto’s companies had not heard similar rumours. 
Whatever the root cause of the disparity, the divisions of shares laid out in the 
surviving articles are not only similar to one another, but are also 
representative of many, but by no means all, other pirate companies. 
The question of whether the pirates’ pay scales were significantly more 
egalitarian than, or a radical departure from, the pay scales of the merchant 
service, Royal Navy, and privateers, can only be answered by direct 
comparison. Table 4 shows the comparative rates of pay on twenty-five 
different vessels or types of vessels from 1590 to 1746, including pirate 
vessels, privateers, Royal Navy ships, and merchantmen, both coastal and 
deep-sea, English and colonial. The companies of the pirate and fishing 
vessels, privateers, and the merchantman Ann, were paid by shares, while the 
companies of Naval vessels and the other merchantmen were paid fixed 
wages. Amongst the wage paying companies some were paid a monthly 
salary while others were paid a fixed sum per voyage. For the sake of 
comparison the data have been compiled in an indexed form: whether paid by 
share or wage, the return awarded to the various officers listed has been 
calculated as a product of the return awarded to an able seaman in the same 
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ship, while the return awarded to an able seaman in each ship has been 
reduced to a constant of one. Thus, what is measured in Table 4 is the scale 
of the relative rewards of captains, officers, and seamen within each service 
or company, rather than the parity or disparity between the pay of men in the 
same position in different services. Table 4 is not complete, inasmuch as the 
Royal Navy and some privateers instituted many more ranks than the twelve 
listed. The twelve ranks listed were selected on the basis that they are all the 
ranks mentioned in the pay scales laid down in surviving pirate articles. 
Scales listed in pirate articles are signified by bold text in the table. Wages of 
the Royal Navy varied depending on the size of the vessel: in Table 4 the pay 
scales of fifth- and sixth-rate ships, roughly equivalent to the largest and 
smallest pirate vessels, have been used.
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Table 4. Comparative rewards, 1590-1746 
 Captain Master Mate Pilot Quarter 
Master 
Boatswain Gunner Carpenter Doctor Able 
Seaman 
Ord. 
Seaman 
Boy 
Tudor privateers, c. 
1590 
3.3 2.3–
2.6 
1.6  1.3 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1 0.6 0.3 
Stuart privateers, c. 
1643 
4.5 4 3  2 2 2 2 2 1   
William (privateer), 
1667 
2         1   
Morgan’s buccaneers, 
c. 1670 
5-6  2       1  0.5 
Hopewell 
(merchantman), 1679 
1.4  1.3   1.1    1   
Camelion (Clough), 
1683 
2.5 1.5       1.5 1   
Ann (merchantman), 
1685 
2         1   
George 
(merchantman), 1688 
2.9  1.8       1   
Salem (privateer), 
1695 
3 1       1 1   
Fancy (Every), 1695 2 1.5        1   
Adventure (Kidd), 
1696 
5 2        1   
New England 
fishermen, 17th–18th 
century 
1-2         1   
Royal Navy, 1700 (5th 
rate) 
9.3 4.3 1.75 2.9 1.2 1.9 1.9 1.9 4.2 1 0.8  
Royal Navy, 1700 (6th 
rate) 
7 3.3 1.75 2.9 1.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 4.2 1 0.8  
Woodes Rogers, 1709 9.6 4 2.4 3.2 1.2 2.4 2.4 2.4 4 1 0.6  
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John Taylor, 1719-
1722 
1.25   1.25 1 1.25 1.25   1 0.5 0.25 
Bart. Roberts, 1719-
1722 
2 1.5   2 1.5 1.5  1.25 1   
Thomas Anstis, 
1721-1723 
1 1    1 1 1  1   
George Lowther, 
1721-1723 
2 1.5 1.25   1.25 1.25  1.25 1   
Edward Low, 1722-
1724 
2 1.5 1.25   1.25 1.25  1.25 1   
John Philips, 1723-
1724 
1.5 1.25    1.25 1.25 1.25  1   
Revenge (privateer), 
1741 
2.5 1.5 1.25  1-1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.5 1   
Terrible (privateer), 
1746 
12 5 4  1.5 3 3 3 4 1 0.75 0.75 
Royal Family 
(privateers), 1747 
14 4 3  1.25 3 3 3 4 1 0.75 0.5 
London merchantman 
(peace) 
4.8  3.2   1.6 1.2 2.4  1   
London merchantman 
(war) 
2.2  1.6   1.2 1 1.6  1   
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Sources: Oppenheim, Monson Tracts, pp. 19-20; Perrin, Boteler’s  Dialogues, pp. 39; 
Abstract of Wills, pp. 82, 84; Esquemeling, Buccaneers of America, pp.59-61; George 
Francis Dow (ed.). Records and Files of the Quarterly Courts of Essex County, vol. VIII, 
(Salem, 1921), p. 77; Davis, English Shipping Industry, pp. 133, 138; Hustwick, The 
George, p. 41; Howard M. Chapin, Privateer Ships and Sailors, the First Century of 
American Colonial Privateering (Toulon, 1926), p. 85; CSPC, 1696-1697, item 517. iv; 
Graham Harris, Treasure and Intrigue: the legacy of Captain Kidd (Toronto, 2002), pp. 
313-316; Gilje, Liberty on the Waterfront, p. 22; Rodger, Command of the Ocean, pp. 
623-624; Edward Cooke, A Voyage to the South Sea and Round the World (London, 
1712), p. xiv; Grandidier, Madagascar, p. 116-117; Johnson, General History, pp. 212, 
307, 342; Tryal of the Pyrates Taken by Captain Ogle, p. 43; Articles made on board 
the Good Fortune, ADM 1/4104; Boston News-Letter, 8/8/1723; Wyndham Beawes, Lex 
Mercatoria Rediviva (London, 1773), pp. 197-198; David J. Starkey, British Privateering 
Enterprise in the Eighteenth Century (Exeter, 1990), pp. 327-329
 
One fact that is immediately apparent from Table 4 is that the rewards for 
pirate captains, when laid down in articles, varied from a single share to no 
more than two and a half times the share of a foremastman. Only Thomas 
Anstis agreed to complete financial equality with his company, but we have 
seen that other officers in the company received larger shares, so it is 
probable that in practice Anstis did too. Anstis’ gunner received an extra 
quarter share, as gunners in the companies of Taylor, Lowther, and Low did. 
Anstis and Taylor both began their piratical careers in the company 
commanded by Howell Davis, so it is likely that in fact he may have received 
an extra quarter share as Taylor did, but possible that he received a whole 
extra share as Lowther and Low did. Whatever Anstis actually received, the 
size of the shares given to the pirate captains in surviving articles were 
roughly comparable: more than one share, and no more than two and a half. 
This holds true of Henry Every, the only other pirate captain apart from Kidd 
listed in Table 4. Kidd’s 35 shares ‘for the… ship’ have been discounted in the 
table, which takes no account of any extra income other captains may have 
derived from ownership or part-ownership of their vessel. Nevertheless, even 
the five shares that he was awarded as captain stand out as being the largest 
captain’s share amongst the pirate crews listed. 
Kidd’s five shares are comparable with the five or six shares awarded to 
Henry Morgan’s buccaneer captains in 1670, and they too received extra 
shares if they owned their own vessels.569 So, while Kidd’s crew may have 
been influenced by the buccaneers when they drew up their new articles, the 
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other pirates listed were not. What was it, then, in the pirates’ experience, that 
inspired the apparently egalitarian division of spoil that they practised? Some 
pirates who had served previously as seamen in the Royal Navy would have 
experienced a much greater disparity between their own wages and the pay of 
their captains, as would men who had earlier served on privateering voyages 
with reward scales akin to Woodes Rogers’. It is possible, therefore, that the 
pirates’ apparent egalitarianism was a reaction against the relatively poorer 
prospects that they faced in such legitimate service, as Rediker and others 
have suggested.570  
However, the men who became pirates had, as a group, a considerably 
broader seafaring experience than just the Royal Navy and certain privateers. 
Many, perhaps the majority, had served on merchantmen sailing from British 
and colonial ports, others were recruited from the fishing fleets that worked 
the Newfoundland coasts, and many more served at some point in their 
career on privateers, where the pay scale was not always so top-heavy as on 
Rogers’ ship.571 Given the essentially transient nature of seamen’s 
employment, it is probable that many men had served in more than one type 
of vessel before turning to piracy.572 This varied experience would have given 
pirate crews a wide variety of traditions and practices on which to draw when 
creating their articles and devising their scales of pay. Twelve of the captains 
in Table 4 received no more than five times the pay of an able seaman, 
making them as, or more, egalitarian than Kidd. Even in peacetime, when 
masters’ wages remained constant but seamen’s wages fell considerably 
lower than their wartime equivalents, masters of merchant ships sailing from 
London were likely to receive around 4.8 times the pay of their crew, slightly 
less than Kidd. In wartime, when the crew’s wages rose again, the same 
masters might receive only slightly more than twice the pay of their crews, 
proportionally less than Nicholas Clough was entitled to.573 Except for John 
Taylor, and Thomas Anstis who may have received more in reality than his 
articles suggest, Captain Patrick Evans of the merchantman Hopewell 
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received proportionally lower pay than any of the pirate captains.574 The pay 
of several merchant and privateer captains listed in Table 4 is comparable to 
most pirate captains. This relatively egalitarian division of rewards to 
merchant-ship captains had a long history, at least as far back as the 
thirteenth century when the ‘Laws of Oleron’, which formed the basis of much 
of English maritime custom, were first compiled, and which awarded ship-
masters a double share of any profit accruing from prizes taken in the course 
of a voyage.575 The reference to the Laws of Oleron in Cusack’s ‘obligation’ 
shows explicitly how pirates were influenced in their division of spoil by 
prevailing maritime tradition.   
Similar trends are visible in the pay of other officers listed in Table 4. Except 
for those serving on some privateers, boatswains and gunners in any service 
could expect less than twice the pay of their able seamen shipmates, usually 
a fractional extra share. Roberts’ company was apparently the only one in 
which the quartermaster received a share comparable to the captain’s, and it 
is remarkable, given the extra duties and responsibilities that fell on the 
quartermaster’s shoulders, that he was not compensated for his services in 
other pirates’ articles. Even in legitimate service the quartermaster generally 
received a slightly higher pay as a reflection of his status. It is possible that 
other pirate companies emulated John Taylor’s, in which the ‘quartermaster 
gets only one share, but everyone adds something for his trouble’.576 One 
trend that Table 4 makes clear is the relatively low rate of pay enjoyed by 
pirate carpenters and doctors, probably resulting from the fact that so many 
were forced men. Only Clough’s, Low’s and Lowther’s articles award an extra 
part-share to the doctor, suggesting that those companies may at one point 
have enjoyed the ministrations of a volunteer doctor. Roberts’ company 
certainly contained two volunteer doctors who, despite not being awarded any 
extra shares by the articles, in practice received an extra quarter-share.577 
Similarly, only in Philips’ company did the carpenter receive an extra part-
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share. According to Johnson, when Philips’ crew turned to piracy the 
carpenter, Thomas Fern, was present when the articles were devised, and so 
presumably he was able to argue for his own inclusion amongst those 
receiving extra shares.578 
The actual value of a share on a pirate ship varied enormously depending on 
how successful a particular cruise had been, and how many shares the 
accumulated profit was divided into. At one end of the scale, Anstis and his 
men shared out the gold and silver taken from a prize and each man received 
‘about ten or twelve pounds’, and on another occasion shared about £20 per 
man.579 Even Bellamy’s company, with thousands of pounds in the common 
chest, could only ‘put up in bags, Fifty pounds to every Man’s share’.580 Fifty 
pounds, to a foremastman in the merchant service, might represent a little 
over eighteen months’ pay at wartime wage levels, or forty months’ at 
peacetime wage levels, but against this must be weighed the fact that it took 
many months of work by the pirates to accumulate their haul.581 Anstis and his 
company had never really achieved any great success, and had certainly 
never taken any especially rich prize, and so had little spoil to share out. 
Bellamy and his men, on the other hand, had had a very successful cruise, 
culminating in the capture of the slave ship Whydah, which carried a 
substantial amount of gold and other valuable commodities, but the 
remarkable haul had to be shared between so many men that although 
individual shares were large compared to earnings in legitimate employment, 
they were not spectacularly so. One significant appeal of serving on a pirate 
ship as opposed to serving on a privateer may have been the fact that in 
privateering practice the division of shares amongst the ship’s company only 
occurred after the net proceeds of the voyage had been divided between the 
vessel’s owners, the company, and sometimes the victuallers of the 
expedition. The amount reserved for the owners and victuallers of privateers 
varied but was usually substantial, ranging from one-quarter to three-quarters 
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of the net proceeds.582 Pirates, as owners and victuallers of their own vessels, 
kept the whole of the proceeds of their depredations. The actual value of 
shares awarded to Antis’ and Bellamy’s companies make Roberts’ company’s 
declared goal of acquiring £1,000 per man seem like a pipe-dream, especially 
as Roberts’ company contained 267 men, but such amounts were not entirely 
unobtainable. In 1720, Edward Condent led his men in the capture of an 
Indian ship carrying a cargo of gold, coins, and other expensive articles. One 
of Condent’s crew later claimed that when they shared out the spoil it ‘came to 
nine hundred pounds for each man’.583 Earlier, in 1693, Thomas Tew and his 
company captured an Indian ship and ‘took as much in her as made the whole 
share run 1200 l. a man’, while Tew’s own share was reported as having been 
£8,000.584 When Henry Every and his men shared out the spoil taken from 
two Indian vessels, ‘some had 1000 l., some 500, others 3000’.585 
 
 
3.5. Disposal of spoil. 
With such wealth at their disposal, and so few opportunities to spend it, what 
did pirates do with their money? Small sums might be spent on board the ship 
at the sales of plunder conducted at the mast on frequent occasions, and 
where the pirates could buy articles such as clothes or ‘a very good going 
Gold Watch’.586 From time to time an occasion arose in which a pirate was 
able to send some of his money home to support his family: at his trial Henry 
Glasby acknowledged that he had given to Captain Lean, a sometime 
prisoner of the pirates, ‘two or three Moidores, desiring he would give ‘em to 
his Wife’.587 Ashore, the first thought for many pirates was to spend their 
money in debauchery and drink. The buccaneers of Esquemeling’s 
acquaintance, on their return to Jamaica, 
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wasted a few days in taverns and stews all they had gotten, by giving 
themselves to all manner of debauchery with strumpets and wine. Such 
of these [buccaneers] are found who will spend 2 or 3 thousand pieces of 
eight in one night, not leaving themselves peradventure a good shirt to 
wear on their backs in the morning. Thus upon a certain time I saw one 
of them give unto a common strumpet five hundred pieces of eight only 
that he might see her naked. [Another] would buy, on like occasions, a 
whole pipe of wine, and, placing it in the street, would force every one 
that passed by to drink with him; threatening also to pistol them, in case 
they would not do it. At other times he would do the same with barrels of 
ale or beer. And, very often with both his hands, he would throw these 
liquors about the streets, and wet the clothes of such as walked by, 
without regarding whether he spoiled their apparel or not, were they men 
or women.588 
Pirates certainly liked to spend their money in the same way if they could, and 
stories of their drunken follies regularly appeared in newspapers and other 
accounts to heighten the impression of the pirates’ depravity. When Roberts’ 
company cruised amongst the fishing fleets on the Newfoundland coast, ‘40 or 
50 of his Men go on Shore at a Time, and get all Hands drunk along with such 
Fishermen as remains in the Harbour’, and from there planned to sail South to 
New Providence, ‘where they intend to spend their Money with the Portuguize 
Negro Women’.589 Four pirates came ashore in Virginia in 1720 and  
brought in with them 3 Negro Men and a Boy, a considerable Sum of 
Money, and Some Gold Dust, but as they were some Days revelling 
about the Country before they were apprehended, they found Means to 
lodge Part of their Effects in the Hands of some of the Inhabitants.590 
These four pirates might have escaped detection were it not for their 
excessive spending, for 
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their first care was to find out a Tavern, where they might ease 
themselves of their Golden Luggage. They soon found a place to their 
mind, where for some time they lived very profusely treating all that came 
into their Company, and there being in the House English Women 
Servants, who had the good fortune by some hidden Charms, to appear 
pleasing to these Picaroons, they set them free, giving their Master 30 
Pounds, the price he demanded for their time. Their Extravagant way of 
living soon discovered they were not Passengers from London, as they 
pretended, but rather Pyrates, accordingly they were taken up and 
Commited on suspicion, as such, to the County [Jail].591 
For many pirates who were lucky enough to make their fortune, comfortable 
retirement was the greatest ambition. When John Taylor’s company arrived at 
the French colony of Réunion in 1721, a forced surgeon, Richard Moor, met 
with several of Edward Condent’s company who ‘had got Riches enough (by 
pirating) to maintain them handsomely as long as they lived and that therefore 
they had broak up, meaning they had left off pirating’.592 Several of Condent’s 
company had already left Réunion for France by the time Taylor visited the 
island, and shortly afterwards Condent himself followed them. Condent settled 
in Normandy, married, and lived in provincial respectability and moderate 
wealth.593 John Taylor, formerly an officer in the Royal Navy, ended his days 
in possession of a Spanish pardon and living comfortably on Cuba, the owner 
of a plantation and a trading ship.594 Several of Every’s company used their 
new-found wealth to purchase estates in the colonies, including several in 
Pennsylvania where one foremastman married the governor’s daughter and 
another purchased a house neighbouring the governor’s own residence. A 
bribe of £100 per man, paid to the governor on arrival, secured the pirates’ 
freedom from prosecution.595 In this case the scope of the available evidence 
is limited by the fact that the pirates who made the most success of their 
retirement were likely to be the ones who escaped notice. It is certain that 
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more pirates managed to retire ashore in some comfort than were recorded: 
none of the 21 men who left Blackbeard’s company in North Carolina  were 
ever captured, and so presumably managed to integrate themselves into 
legitimate society, and Henry Every came ashore in England with £3,000 in 
his possession and was never seen again.596 
 
• • • 
Pirates, then, operated a complex economy in which the accumulation of 
riches was the ultimate goal, but one that could only be fulfilled once the 
fundamental problems of feeding and clothing a large number of men, and 
maintaining vessels far away from regular dockyard facilities had been 
overcome. In extreme circumstances the necessities of survival at sea 
resulted in the relative value of different commodities becoming altered: when 
Kidd’s company were forced to use several pounds’ worth of myrrh in place of 
several shillings’ worth of pitch, for example, the actual worth of pitch, had it 
been available to the pirates, would have been considerably higher than its 
retail value in any legitimate port. By necessity, the pirates were forced to 
ransack vessels for food, drink, clothes, and equipment when they would 
doubtless have preferred to be hunting ships laden with coins and specie or 
other valuable commodities. Commodities, when they were seized, were only 
of value to the pirates if they could be either exchanged for provisions and 
equipment, or sold for a cash profit, but the unavailability of suitable markets 
again reduced the market value of most commodities, and this in turn made it 
very attractive for unscrupulous merchants to deal with pirates, either at sea, 
away from the watchful eyes of the authorities, or ashore, with the 
connivance, and sometimes assistance, of corrupt officials. The restrictions 
and difficulties placed in the way of pirates’ trading endeavours meant the 
creation of an illicit market which suited well both buyer and seller. When the 
pirates were selling it was as useful for them to have a buyer who would ask 
no questions as it was for the buyer to have access to a supplier whose prices 
were heavily discounted. When the situation was reversed, and the pirates 
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sought supplies from illicit merchants, they derived the benefit of being able to 
supply their wants without having to run the risk of capture and arrest, while 
the merchant could make a profit far in excess of the norm by charging the 
pirates a higher price for his wares than he could selling only in legitimate 
market places. 
Once tradable commodities had been converted into cash or other 
expendable wealth, the pirates adopted practices with which they had been 
familiar in regular employment and created a welfare system which was in all 
essential points the same as that from which some had perhaps benefited and 
to which virtually all had contributed, during their earlier careers as seamen in 
legitimate service. Rudimentary and often ineffective as the Chatham Chest 
and Greenwich sixpences had been as welfare systems, when pirates came 
to consider the same problem of providing for their wounded colleagues they 
came to the same solution, and do not appear to have been any more 
effective in their implementation of it than the authorities responsible for the 
maintenance of the legitimate welfare systems. 
Contributions to the ‘common chest’ having been made, the remaining profit 
was divided into shares of pay, which were distributed in an apparently 
egalitarian manner. The distinctive egalitarianism of the pirates’ pay hierarchy 
is, however, something of an illusion, perhaps created by comparison with 
naval pay scales or those of certain privateers such as Woodes Rogers’ 
company, but revealed as such when compared with the pay scales of many 
other privateers and merchantmen. The pirates therefore distributed their 
wealth, not in a new and progressive way, but in the way most favourable to 
themselves that they had encountered in legitimate employment. Exceptions 
existed in which pirate captains received pay relatively far in excess of that 
enjoyed by captains in any branch of legitimate service, and only one pirate 
company is known to have attempted a complete levelling of the pay 
hierarchy, an experiment that failed when it came to implementation, and in 
which company some officers are known to have received larger shares than 
foremastmen, despite the assurances of complete equality offered by their 
articles. 
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4. Social Control and the Maintenance of Community. 
‘The purpose of the pirate enterprise was not to achieve a “shipshape” 
environment, but to ensure maximum personal liberty for each of its 
members.’597 
The personal liberties enjoyed by pirates have been cited frequently as one of 
the principal attractions of piracy to seamen, but the extent to which personal 
liberty was granted or exercised is unclear. Maximum personal liberty was 
impossible on a ship whose crew’s lives depended on at least some of them 
working, and the continued existence of a community requires that at least 
some personal liberties are restricted for the benefit of others in the 
community.  
For pirates, both the integrity of the community and the rights of the individual 
were protected by the articles, but the relative prevalence of articles restricting 
the freedom of the individual for the benefit of the company shows most 
clearly that, contrary to the quotation above, the ‘shipshape’ community was 
of far greater importance than individual liberty. With the exception of Roberts’ 
article supposedly guaranteeing every man a vote in ‘affairs of the moment’, 
and Anstis’ article offering the right for any member of the company to seek a 
pardon if he so chose, and one was on offer, it is only in the division of 
plunder and victuals that any of the surviving articles offer anything to the 
individual pirate. By contrast, virtually all of the surviving sets of articles 
contain at least one clause, and usually more, restricting the individual rights 
of members of the company, such as the prohibition of gambling, fighting, or 
‘meddling with’ women. Perhaps the greatest stricture placed by many 
surviving articles on their signatories was the restriction of the individual’s right 
to voluntarily leave the company. 
This chapter will explore the extent to which pirates balanced the rights of the 
individual against the well being of their community, and the ways in which 
this was achieved. That the articles were used primarily to restrict the rights of 
the individual does not imply that the community was always given 
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precedence over the individual, and this chapter will consider the freedoms 
granted to individual pirates as well as the restrictions placed on them for the 
benefit of the company. 
 
4.1. Liberties. 
Paul Gilje has persuasively argued that for the most part sailors of the 
eighteenth century perceived ‘liberty’ as inherently rooted in the every day. 
Even on the eve of the age of revolution, a seaman’s liberty was personal and 
tangible rather than lofty and abstract. It was ‘personal independence’, the 
liberty to ‘drink, gamble, fight, and curse’, and to choose where he worked. 
The legitimate seaman did not, of course, enjoy all of these liberties at all 
times: drunkenness was a delight that could be indulged only sporadically, 
and more often ashore than afloat, and gambling and fighting were also 
generally restricted on board ship. The ability of a seaman to dictate his own 
working environment was limited to his right to choose for himself which 
vessel to sign aboard, and even this right might be curtailed by financial 
necessity or naval impressment. In theory, however, the seaman’s bondage to 
his ship was temporary and, at the expiration of his contract or when his ship 
was paid off, he was able, all things being equal, to choose for himself 
whether to enlist again on the same ship or a different one, or leave off the 
sea altogether and pursue a life ashore.598  
If these were the liberties sought by most seamen, it is not surprising that 
pirates’ ideas of personal liberty were similarly rooted in the every day. Pirates 
delighted in drinking and swearing, and if, as discussed below, gambling, 
fighting, and leaving the ship were restricted activities, alcohol and bad 
language were allowed to flow freely. William Snelgrave, no stranger himself 
to the mores of seamen, professed himself shocked by the language he 
encountered amongst the pirates: 
the execrable Oaths and Blasphemies I heard among the [pirate] Ship’s 
Company, shock’d me to such a degree, that in Hell it self I thought there 
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could not be worse; for tho’ many Seafaring Men are given to swearing 
and taking God’s Name in vain, yet I could not have imagined, human 
Nature could ever so far degenerate, as to talk in the manner those 
abandoned Wretches did.599 
Snelgrave’s description of the pirates’ language is perhaps a little sensational, 
and he might easily be thought guilty of exaggerating in his published 
account, were it not for the many other references to pirates’ excessive 
swearing made by those who came into contact with them. Reported dialogue 
of pirates in legal statements and witness accounts is frequently filled with 
interjections of ‘damn you’, ‘by God’, and ‘God damn’,600 and George Roberts, 
for example, was abused by his pirate captors as a ‘Rascally Son of a B----’, 
before they went on to insult the king ‘in such a virulent Manner, as is not fit to 
be repeated’.601 Prowess at swearing was even a desirable skill in some 
companies, and according to Johnson, Lowther’s company made no small 
effort  
to take their Diversion, which consisted in unheard of Debaucheries, with 
drinking, swearing, and rioting, in which there seemed to be a kind of 
Emulation among them, resembling rather Devils than Men, striving who 
should outdo one another in new invented Oaths and Execrations.602 
Neither was bad language limited to the lower deck: when Governor Benjamin 
Fletcher of New York met pirate captain Thomas Tew, he thought him a ‘very 
pleasant man’, but wished ‘in particular to cure him of a vile habit of 
swearing’.603 
The other reason to accept the substance of Snelgrave’s account is that, 
although he was certainly writing for an audience who were largely 
unsympathetic towards pirates, as he was himself, he comes across as a fair 
observer who, when he discovered some laudable attribute of his pirate 
captors’, was at pains to include it in his text. For these two reasons - 
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Snelgrave’s own apparent honesty in reporting, and confirmation by other 
observers – his description of the drunken revels enjoyed by the pirates can 
also be accepted as broadly accurate. They 
made such Waste and Destruction, that I am sure a numerous set of 
such Villains would in a short time, have ruined a great City. They 
hoisted upon Deck a great many half Hogsheads of Claret, and French 
Brandy; knock’d their Heads out, and dipp’d Canns and Bowls into them 
to drink out of: And in their Wantonness threw full Buckets of each sort 
upon one another. As soon as they had emptied what was on the Deck, 
they hoisted up more: And in the evening washed the Decks with what 
remained in the Casks. As to bottled Liquor of many sorts, they made 
such havoc of it, that in a few days they had not one Bottle left: For they 
would not give themselves the trouble of drawing the Cork out, but nick’d 
the Bottles, as they called it, that is, struck their necks off with a Cutlace; 
by which means one in three was generally broke: Neither was there any 
Cask-liquor left in a short time, but a little French Brandy.604 
Snelgrave’s experience was fairly typical. When Stede Bonnet’s company 
captured a vessel, for example, the first thing they did was make ‘Bowls of 
Punch, and went to Drinking… Then sung a Song or two’.605 George Roberts 
recounted that Edward Low ‘order’d the great Bowl to be fill’d with Punch, and 
Bottles of Wine to be set on the Table in the Cabbin, to which we all resorted’, 
and tiring of the ‘discourse, broke it off by singing a Song, and enjoining every 
one present to do the same’.606 These accounts by non-pirate observers were 
perhaps intended to illustrate to their audiences the pirates’ deplorable 
lifestyle, epitomised by their drunkenness, but the theme of hard drinking is so 
universal in sources relating to pirates, and indeed seamen in general, that 
there is no reason to doubt their substance.607 
While drunkenness in battle was prohibited by many privateering articles such 
as Kidd’s and Rogers’, it is significant that drunkenness under any 
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circumstances was prohibited only by one of the surviving sets of pirate 
articles, and then only in battle. Indeed, in Taylor’s company, inebriation was 
an accepted excuse (perhaps the only one) for regularly breaking an article, in 
this case, that clause prohibiting violence towards prisoners, which was 
otherwise ‘forbidden on pain of death’.608 Nevertheless, excessive and 
unrestricted drunkenness could be detrimental, even disastrous, to a pirate 
company. The captive crew of a prize taken by pirates in the Indian Ocean, for 
example, ‘found means to secure the Ship’s Arms and to kill 50 of the Pyrate 
Crew at a time they were making merry and were got drunk’.609 A crew sent 
onboard a prize by Samuel Bellamy ‘drank plentifully of the Wine on board’, 
and when a storm blew up were too drunk to prevent her being run ashore.610 
But these freedoms, swearing and drinking, were not new to pirates: they 
were enjoyed to some extent by most seamen. What set the ‘liberties’ of the 
pirates apart from those of their counterparts in legitimate shipping, then, was 
not the nature of the freedoms, but the extent to which they were practised. 
Swearing was commonplace enough on most ships, but was not always 
unrestricted. Isaac Webb of HMS Bristol was tied to the rigging for ‘an hour, 
and had speculum oris611 placed in his mouth for saying to a seaman in the 
Captain’s hearing: “Thou liest, like a son of a whore.”’612 Even on privateers 
swearing was not always acceptable: on Elizabethan privateers 
Whosoever do talk any beastly or filthy talk at his meat, he shall have a 
cobkin [beating] of his mess… whosoever do swear or blaspheme the 
name of God at cards, dice, or at his meat, shall pay a penny for every 
oath to the poor man’s box.613 
A century later, Daniel Plowman’s instructions when he took over command of 
the Charles enjoined him to ensure ‘that Swearing, Drunkenness and 
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Prophaneness be avoided’,614 and Woodes Rogers had ferrules made ‘to 
punish Swearing, by which we found the Men much cured of that Vice’.615 
Swearing on pirate ships, far from being restricted, was taken to such an 
extreme as to become competitive, and shocked even so veteran a seaman 
as William Snelgrave in its frequency, intensity and variety. Drunkenness, too, 
was nothing new to most seamen, but was, for the most part, associated with 
time ashore or specific periods of rest.616 Pirates by contrast, in the absence 
of any external authority, as outlined in Chapter 2.2, were free to drink to 
excess as often as they chose, and this dramatic enlargement of one of the 
seamen’s favourite liberties was perhaps one of the strongest attractions to 
the piratical lifestyle for many foremastmen. 
The liberties of drunkenness and language were among a series of petty 
freedoms long associated with communities who lived partly or wholly outside 
the law, such as highwaymen and beggars, epitomised by the lifestyle 
enjoyed in the greenwood by the doyen of English outlaws, Robin Hood, and 
his band of ‘merry men’. In the seventeenth century the beggar’s life was 
heralded in verse as fit 
…for a king. 
Eat, drink, and play, sleep when we list, 
Go where we will…617 
These ‘greenwood’ freedoms are more romantic than tangible, but certainly 
held appeal for a contemporary audience. Numerous popular works such as 
plays and ballads extolled the relative freedom of the outlaw over the 
hidebound restrictions on the propertied. Two very different ideas of ‘freedom’ 
existed: that which centred on the lofty freedoms of property and suffrage, 
which was upheld by the law; and that which was rooted in the every day, and 
perhaps baser, freedoms of drink and play, which was, according to some 
contemporaries’ perception, maintained in opposition to the law.618 One 
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significant distinction between the outlaw and those living within legitimate 
society is geographical, free from ties to the land, the outlaws were free to ‘go 
where we will’. Beggars and Robin Hood’s men lived on the roads and in the 
woods,619 that is, on the routes trodden by merchant and traveller, and in the 
wildernesses visited by neither. For pirates, the sea served the same purpose, 
crossed with regular trade routes which formed the pirates’ hunting grounds, 
but also filled with expanses of maritime wilderness where the pirates could 
find a relative sanctuary.  
Reports of pirates pretending to be ‘Robbin Hoods Men’620 have been 
interpreted as the pirates identifying themselves as social bandits who rob the 
rich to feed the poor,621 but the context of the original statement is ambiguous 
to say the least, and it could equally be a reference to the nature of the 
freedoms enjoyed by pirates, compared to those of the romantic greenwood 
outlaws, used as an enticement to others to join their company. It is in this 
context of opposing views of the nature of ‘liberty’, the one upheld by the law 
and the other opposed to it, that the observations of Snelgrave and others 
must be considered. By highlighting the pirates’ excessive drinking and 
swearing, contemporary observers were, consciously or not, placing pirates in 
the company of beggars, highwaymen, and forest outlaws: amusing subjects 
for works of popular fiction and May-Day misrule perhaps, but at root enemies 
of true civilisation and the freedoms of the propertied. This does not mean, of 
course, that the drunkenness describe by Snelgrave, for example, did not 
occur: there is nothing unlikely about a group composed predominantly of 
young men getting out of hand when confronted with an abundant supply of 
alcohol.  
 
4.2. Breaking up the Company. 
Joining a pirate company was a process similar to naturalisation, ‘a legal 
process involving a form of contract between the individual who chose a new 
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allegiance and a community that consented to adopt him as a member’.622 As 
we saw in Chapter 2, in order to become a ‘citizen’ of a pirate company, and 
enjoy fully the benefits and rights stipulated in the articles, it was a 
prerequisite that a new pirate was a volunteer, and ‘chose a new allegiance’ to 
the company and his new comrades, who, in turn, had to willingly accept the 
new pirate into their ranks. The articles themselves, which a new recruit was 
required to sign in order to be admitted into the company, formed the contract 
guaranteeing him the freedoms of pirate ‘citizenship’ on the one hand, while 
regulating and restricting his behaviour within the community on the other.  
One right that the new pirate frequently signed away when he joined the pirate 
community was the right to leave it. It is an odd ambiguity that pirates, who 
recognised that their communal integrity rested in large measure on the 
volitional membership of all concerned, should so vehemently oppose the 
right of their members to leave the company if they became disillusioned or 
dissatisfied. Nevertheless, several of the surviving sets of articles contain 
forthright and clear clauses prohibiting the individual leaving the company, or 
prohibiting the company, or elements of it, voluntarily disbanding. The 
punishments for such actions could be severe. John Philips’ articles stated 
that if ‘any man shall offer to run away… he shall be marroon'd with one Bottle 
of Powder, one Bottle of Water, one small Arm and shot’, and when some new 
recruits to Thomas Cocklyn’s company began to have second thoughts they 
begged captive William Snelgrave ‘to intercede for them, that they might be 
cleared again; for they durst not themselves mention it to the Quarter-master, 
it being death by their articles’.623 Low’s company were so afraid of the 
spectre of men wanting to leave the company that they were willing to 
abandon any kind of due process of law to prevent them, and formulated an 
article stating 
That if any man shall advise, or speak any thing tending to the 
separating or breaking of the company, or shall by any means offer or 
endeavour to desert or quit the company, that person shall be shot to 
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death by the quarter-master’s order, without the sentence of a court 
martial.624 
The risks to the pirate company of keeping dissatisfied members against their 
will were similar to the risks, explored in Chapter 2, of forcing men to join. Like 
forced men, disillusioned volunteer pirates could not wholly be trusted, had as 
much or more interest in escaping the company than they did in helping to 
ensure the company’s success, were more likely to agree to give evidence in 
court if captured and, since volunteers were generally entitled to bear arms, 
might rise up in violent protest if sufficient in number. Despite these problems, 
the risks of allowing members to leave at will were, or were at least perceived 
as, a greater threat to the operational efficiency and communal integrity of the 
pirate company. Disgruntled members who were allowed to leave the 
company and who succeeded in re-entering legitimate society would also 
have been potential witnesses against the remaining pirates if they were 
captured, and moreover, might be in a position to supply the authorities with 
information about the pirates’ bases, strength and future plans which would 
facilitate their capture in the first place. Pirates who quitted one company in 
order to join another not only deprived the first company of their manpower 
and expertise, but also augmented that of the second company, impairing the 
efficiency of their original company whilst making the ‘competition’ more 
efficient. Furthermore, if one member were allowed to quit the company it 
might provide inspiration for others to follow, beginning a tide of desertion 
which would be hard to stem. 
That the impairment of operational efficiency was, in some cases at least, 
perceived as a greater threat than the potential dangers arising from pirates 
deserting to legitimate society is suggested by Bartholomew Roberts’ article 
prohibiting any ‘man to talk of breaking up their way of living, till each had 
shared one thousand pounds’. Once Roberts’ pirates had achieved their self-
appointed target each man was, in theory, free to do as he chose, be it 
continue with the company, join a different company, or seek a pardon 
ashore, but until that time each man was committed to remain with the 
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company, and it was a commitment that could not be cast aside. Once the 
company had made enough money for each man to receive a thousand 
pounds, the danger posed by those who chose to go ashore and re-enter 
legitimate society to those who chose to remain pirating was not perceived as 
serious enough for the pirates to legislate against it. This state of opinion also 
found voice in the articles of one of Roberts’ successors, Thomas Anstis, 
whose articles are the only surviving set to establish explicitly the right of a 
pirate to leave the company if he chose, and which read, in part, 
11th: If any time we shall come in Company with any other Marooner 
[pirate] and they shall offer to sign their articles without the consent of the 
Company shall be Marooned, or run away shall receive the same. 
12th: But if any time we shall hear from England an Account of an act of 
Grace [pardon] they that are amind to receive it shall go with their money 
and goods, and the rest have the Privateer. 
Here too, although no financial or time constraint is specified, men who chose 
to seek a pardon were entitled to leave the company, but desertion in order to 
join a rival pirate company was punishable with marooning, as it was in John 
Philips’ company. There was, then, a clear distinction between leaving off 
piracy altogether and leaving a pirate company in order to join another. The 
former was forgivable, even understandable; the latter was to be severely 
punished. The form of the punishment, marooning a malefactor in an 
uninhabited place with minimal supplies, barely enough to survive, may help 
to explain the pirates’ attitude towards desertion. Clearly, a marooned man 
was no longer of any use to the company that marooned him, so the issue 
was less about retaining his manpower and expertise than it was about, firstly, 
depriving a rival pirate company and, secondly, making a clear statement that 
desertion would not be tolerated, discouraging others from trying. 
Two of Anstis’ company were later captured and tried, and evidence given at 
their trial indicates that the spirit, if not the letter, of the articles was observed 
by the pirates in relation to desertion. When a Portuguese member of the 
company attempted to escape, one of the pirates, William Ingram, used 
deadly force to try to prevent him: 
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While we were at Cuba on board the Good Fortune, we had a 
Portuguese with us, his Name was Mayork: This fellow desir’d leave to 
go ashore, which being granted him, he took his Gun with him and went; 
but Ingram had a mistrust that he intended to escape, and therefore he 
presently follow’d him. We lay so nigh the Shore that I could plainly see 
Mayork run off, and in running he dropt his Gun, which I believe he did 
designedly that he might make the more haste. Ingram ran after him with 
a drawn Cutlass in his Hand, and coming to the Gun he took it up and 
fir’d it at him, but the Portuguese made his Escape without receiving any 
Hurt. Ingram return’d to the Ship in a great Rage, and swore if he could 
have catch’d him he would have cut him in two for offering to run 
away.625 
The articles, however, only prescribed punishment for those who tried to 
desert ‘without the consent of the Company’, and the same evidence quoted 
above goes on to make it clear that the necessary consent was sometimes 
given, but that it had to be unanimous. 
One Benjamin Sapes was very desirous to leave the Ship and go home, 
all the Company voted in his favour except Ingram; and the Man was 
detain’d upon his Opposition alone, for every single Man among us had a 
Power to hinder any other from going aways. 
On another occasion, perhaps hoping to rid the company of its least 
committed members, ‘Captain Anstis openly declar’d, That he would keep no 
Man against his Inclination, and if any one was willing to go away, no body 
should hinder him’, upon which several men took the opportunity to quit the 
company. One man who tried to leave was told ‘you came on board 
voluntarily, and now you are leaving us’ as he was beaten, but does not 
appear to have been detained. Leaving the ship to seek a pardon ashore was 
not always as simple as the articles suggest though. When a group of forced 
men ‘made an agreement among themselves’ to take a boat an proceed to 
the nearest harbour in search of a pardon their plan was given away and they 
were prevented by the timely arrival more committed pirates. Shortly 
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afterwards, another group of forced men stole a boat from the pirates and 
succeeded in escaping. Later, however, after Thomas Anstis had been 
removed from command, his successor, John Fenn, gave permission for 
nineteen men, including forced men and disillusioned volunteers, to take a 
sloop and quit the company.626 There is no obvious reason for this change in 
attitude, and none of the relevant sources give any indication of why it 
occurred: it may simply have been that Fenn was personally less inclined to 
keep men against their will than Anstis and the change in leadership enabled 
men to freely quit the company if they chose, or it may have been a growing 
realisation of the danger to the company, outlined in Chapter 2, of forcibly 
keeping disillusioned or unwilling men aboard. 
Despite proscription in the articles and the risk of punishment, men 
nevertheless did successfully leave other companies, often with the consent 
of their comrades. John Taylor began his career in the company commanded 
by Howell Davis and, since he possessed the necessary navigation and 
seamanship skills to be appointed sailing master, must have been a valued 
member of the company.627 After he briefly replaced Davis in command of the 
company, and was deposed after only a few days, he transferred himself to 
the company commanded by Thomas Cocklyn, then sailing in consort with 
Davis’.628 Under Cocklyn, Taylor retained a position of authority, commanding 
a consort vessel for a time before succeeding Cocklyn as commander of the 
company.629 Later, however, when Taylor’s consort, la Buse, planned to quit 
the company, Taylor had him demoted and flogged.630 Such ambiguities are 
difficult to reconcile, and cases like Taylor’s were exceptional. The willingness 
of Davis’ company to let Taylor quit to join Cocklyn’s company was probably 
due in part to the fact that the two companies were at that time working 
together, and in part to the fact that Taylor, described later by du Bucquoy as 
severe, violent, and ‘easily angered’,631 was a volatile personality whose 
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presence as a subordinate aboard Davis’ ship, having once sampled 
command, was likely to become a source of strife and dissent. Later, secure 
in his own command, Taylor’s opposition to la Buse’s attempted desertion was 
rooted in the fact that, had they been successful, la Buse and his supporters 
would have become competitors rather than allies. 
On occasion, however, a group of men wishing to quit a pirate company was 
large enough to form, if not a majority, a significant minority, and their 
desertion could not be so easily suppressed by the remaining loyal members 
of the company. In these instances it was better for the pirate company to 
suspend the articles against desertion to avoid bloody, potentially fatal, 
internecine conflict, and to give their consent to the division of the company. 
Charles Vane’s company, for example, quarrelled after they attacked, and 
were beaten off by, a French warship. Vane himself, and the captain of a 
consort vessel, Robert Deal, together with fifteen others, set off in one vessel, 
while John Rackham, formerly quartermaster to the company, commanded 
the pirates left in the other vessel.632 Irreconcilable differences, which Charles 
Johnson attributed to charges of cowardice against Vane,633 meant that the 
pirates had little choice but to break up their company and go their separate 
ways. On another occasion ‘upon a difference arising amongst the English 
Pirats because Hornygold refused to take and plunder English vessels’, 
Bellamy was elected to replace Hornigold, who ‘departed with 26 hands in a 
Prize Sloop’.634 Such good natured partings were not always the case, 
however, and when a significant proportion of Paul Williams’ company argued 
in favour of disbanding the company and settling ashore they were opposed 
by the majority of the company who wanted to remain at sea. Fighting broke 
out, in which several men were killed and wounded, and once the uprising had 
been quelled three men were ‘condemn’d to the hang’d for Mutiny’.635 The 
difference in attitude here may be explained as a quantitive issue, when 
enough men simultaneously wanted to quit the company there was nothing 
their comrades could practically do, short of using physical force, to prevent 
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them, but that explanation is not entirely satisfactory as Williams’ men were 
quite prepared to use force against their own men to preserve the company. 
An alternative explanation is that the dissidents in Vane’s and Hornigold’s 
company wanted to split off into new companies, leaving their erstwhile 
comrades free to continue their own piracy, while those in Williams’ company 
were in favour of the whole company quitting piracy altogether, leaving their 
more committed comrades no alternative to conflict. 
The theoretical problems raised by pirates wishing to quit the company were 
rooted in one of the ambiguities of allegiance at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century. At the beginning of the previous century ‘subjectship’, in 
England at least, was a matter of perpetual allegiance based on a subject’s 
birth within a fixed and immutable hierarchy, and in a legal sense this attitude 
remained more or less in force until well into the eighteenth century. But 
throughout the course of the seventeenth century the revolutions and counter-
revolutions had shown that allegiance was also based on self-volition and 
consent. Thus, by the time the articles of Roberts’, Anstis and others were 
drawn up ‘on the one hand, society and government theoretically rested on 
individual consent and compact; on the other hand, the legal status and 
obligations of the individual remained natural, perpetual, and immutable.’636 
The issue faced by pirates was reconciling the notion that a contract 
voluntarily entered into could not be voluntarily discarded – to enjoy the 
freedom of choice of allegiance, pirates had to surrender their freedom of 
choice of allegiance.  
Pirates who, as far as the evidence shows, were not great readers of Locke, 
perhaps struggled less with this thorny and abstract problem than the later 
revolutionary governments of America and France who faced great difficulty in 
ensuring the liberty of the individual against tyrannical and dictatorial 
government while simultaneously protecting their existence against the 
detrimental effects of dissent and desertion. In America the individual had the 
right to choose their allegiance, but once the choice was made and the 
protection of the new government accepted, there was no going back and no 
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prescribed right to renounce newly found citizenship.637 In France ‘legislators 
had to distinguish between the principle of liberty and the principle that 
justifies suspending liberty’, and the Revolutionary government’s argument 
that ‘the state was the supreme guarantor of free circulation, a temporary 
limitation on that freedom in order to combat threats to the state was a 
restriction aimed at defending the very freedom to emigrate’ led to the 
adoption of anti-emigration laws somewhat less draconian than the pirates’.638  
The fact that pirates apparently struggled less than other groups when faced 
with the same problem and that different pirate companies independently 
came to the same conclusion, that quitting the company could not be allowed 
or tolerated, is strongly indicative that pirates gave substantially less 
consideration to the liberties of the individual than they did to the efficiency 
and integrity of the company as a whole. For pirates, the question of whether 
the individual should be forced to surrender their personal rights for the benefit 
of the community was a simple one. Although the end result was the same – 
that once membership of the community was accepted it could not simply be 
discarded – the rules of the pirates were more akin to the attitudes found in 
bodies such as the Royal Navy of their own time than they were to those 
expressed by liberty-loving revolutionary governments half a century later. For 
pirates, desertion and quitting the company were activities that threatened 
operational efficiency and communal integrity, and could not be tolerated, 
regardless of the loss of personal liberty that their curtailment might entail. 
However, this state of affairs was often temporary, and lasted only until the 
company had achieved their object of accumulating enough wealth to retire. 
Although absent from other sets of articles, this was embodied in Roberts’ 
article proscribing the breaking up of the company until each man had shared 
£1,000, but implicitly allowing it after that goal had been achieved, and the 
actions of other pirates outlined below suggest that Roberts’ company simply 
codified a common aim. Roberts’ company was defeated in battle, its 
survivors tried, and many of them executed before they achieved their self-
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imposed goal, but other companies did achieve enough success to consider 
disbanding their company and retiring from piracy. In 1720 a pirate company 
who had taken a ship containing ‘at least fifteen thousand moidores’, and 
‘haveing divided their plunder to the Windward of Barbados… it is concluded 
they have broke up and are shifting for themselves by dropping some in one 
place some in another.’639 Henry Every’s company, after dividing their haul of 
several hundred thousands of pounds worth of spoil, sailed for the Bahamas 
where they each went their own way, either individually or in small groups, 
having already left some of their crewmates at the French colony of 
Réunion.640 Even John Taylor, who had earlier ordered the flogging of his 
comrade Oliver la Buse, consented to the division of the company under his 
command after they had shared an estimated £900,000, and he too sailed for 
the Caribbean and retirement, leaving half his company in the Indian Ocean 
under la Buse’s command.641 
 
4.3 Freedom of Speech. 
Articles placing restrictions on desertion or breaking up the company 
extended, in some cases, to the mere discussion of such acts. In Low’s 
company, for example, the death penalty, without the benefit of trial, could be 
imposed on any man who ‘shall advise, or speak any thing’ that suggested 
leaving the company, and disaffected members of Cocklyn’s company ‘durst 
not themselves mention it to the Quarter-master’ for fear of being executed for 
it.642 Discussion of leaving the company and of disaffection in general was, 
perhaps, just as likely to breed further discontent and faction amongst the 
members of the company as the act itself, and so was discouraged in the 
strongest terms, but the permission of free speech in other respects might 
also prove detrimental to the integrity of the company and was often 
restricted. 
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Unsurprisingly, it was often the forced men aboard pirate vessels who 
suffered the most from restrictions on their freedom of speech. Forced men 
allowed to speak quietly and confidentially amongst themselves could, and 
did, plot the overthrow of their pirate masters and the sabotage of the pirates’ 
designs. John Fillmore, forced aboard John Philips’ ship, conspired with other 
forced men to kill Philips and the other pirate officers and ‘were incessantly 
seeking opportunities to confer with each other upon some mode of escape; 
but no proper opportunity occurred, nor indeed were [their] measures properly 
concerted’ until much later, when ‘a favourable opportunity now seemed to 
offer for us to improve in conferring upon some means for our escape’, and 
they ‘got together [and] held a consultation’ while the pirates were drunk.643 It 
was fortunate that their plans were ultimately brought to fruition, for their 
‘consultations’ were in direct violation of one of the company’s articles, which 
stated that if ‘any man shall… keep any Secret from the Company, he shall be 
marroon'd with one Bottle of Powder, one Bottle of Water, one small Arm and 
shot.’ 
Prisoners of the pirates, while perhaps not allowed so much freedom around 
the vessel as forced men, were similarly seen as a potential threat to the well 
being of the company if they were allowed to communicate too freely with one 
another, and a potentially divisive influence if they were allowed to speak too 
freely with members of the company. Captain Read, captured by Stede 
Bonnet’s company, ‘discours’d freely’ with a man he assumed to be a fellow 
prisoner, but was compelled to keep his conversation secret and hoped the 
other man would do likewise because ‘if he had discover’d [ie. revealed it], it 
had done me an Injury’.644 Such injuries might have been fatal in some cases. 
In Low’s company, for example, it was ‘one of their articles, it being 
punishable by death, to hold any secret correspondence with a prisoner.’645 
Even innocuous conversation could arouse a certain paranoia in the pirates. 
Captain Michael Cole was captured in 1700 by pirates who  
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would not suffer him to Speake to any of [the other prisoners], but was 
threatened to be Shot for Speaking only to one and asked (and that 
softly) what are you, who answered, I am a Carpenter who belonged to a 
vessel of about 110 Tons loaded in York River which they sunk.646 
The mechanisms by which the dangers of prisoners and forced men 
communicating with one another or with the rest of the company were 
minimised varied. The simplest method, and probably the most common in 
companies with few forced men or prisoners to worry about, was simply 
vigilance on the part of the rest of the company. Fillmore and his co-
conspirators found it impossible at first to plot the overthrow of their pirate 
captors simply because the pirates were constantly present around them, and 
only when the pirates were distracted by drink were they able to form their 
plans. Ned Low kept a prisoner locked in his cabin while the rest of the 
company were busy, and to ensure no secret conversation occurred ‘left 
nobody, and ordered nobody but the boy Jack, and him I bid stay at the Cabin 
Door, with-out-side, and not to go in or stir from the Door, ‘til I bid him’.647 
Naturally, prisoners and forced men could not be kept apart indefinitely, but 
‘should any two of these be seen to whisper together’, they were subsequently 
interrogated separately, and if ‘upon Examination, [they] should differ in the 
Account of what they whisper’d about, they would be set ashore…on an 
uninhabited Island’.648 
Restrictions on free speech were not limited to forced men and prisoners. The 
injunction in Philips’ articles against keeping secrets from the company was 
aimed as much at the volunteers as the forced men, perhaps more so since 
forced men did not sign the articles. Immediately after taking command, 
according to the testimony of one of his crew at his trial, John Gow declared 
that ‘if hereafter I see any of you whispering together’ they could expect to 
have their throats cuts and their bodies thrown overboard.649 On board 
Samuel Bellamy’s ship Whydah, ‘no Man was suffered to write a word, but 
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what was Nailed up to the Mast’.650 These examples of volunteer pirates 
suffering from a restriction of free speech are particularly interesting because, 
unlike injunctions against secret correspondence held by forced men and 
prisoners, their purpose was not only the protection of the pirate company 
itself, but also the maintenance of the status quo of the pirate company’s 
command structure, illustrating an, at times, dictatorial approach to 
maintaining authority and status by pirate captains but, in the case of Philips’ 
articles at least, supported by the original members of the company who had a 
hand in drawing up the articles.  The most striking example of measures taken 
by a serving pirate captain to preserve the status quo was that employed by 
John Taylor to keep control of the disparate national groups that made up his 
company: 
he divided his men into squads [messes] of seven men, consisting, for 
example, of a Frenchman, a Swede, a Portuguese and three or four 
Englishmen, so that the English, on whom he could depend, were always 
in the majority, and could warn him of all that was done or said on 
board.651 
Freedom of speech could also, though, be restricted in the interest of 
maintaining a harmonious community, and one of the most curious restrictions 
of pirate liberty was the clause in John Taylor’s articles forbidding discussion 
and disputes of a religious nature which, it was supposed, might lead to 
serious quarrelling amongst members of the company.652 One of the principal 
charges against pirates made by contemporary commentators, apart from the 
obviously illegal nature of the activities, was their general ungodliness,653 and 
yet there is evidence of religion amongst many pirate companies, albeit 
rudimentary and half-hearted. Much of this evidence is of too moralising a 
nature to be taken too seriously, such as an account given at their trial that 
some of Bellamy’s company, in fear of their lives during a great storm, begged 
                                                 
650
 Trial of Eight Persons, p. 24 
651
 Grandidier, Madagascar, p. 118 
652
 Grandidier, Madagascar, p. 116 
653
 see, for example, Cotton Mather, A Vial Poured out upon the Sea (Boston, 1726); Cotton 
Mather, Useful Remarks: An Essay upon Remarkables in the Way of Wicked Men (New 
London, 1723). George Cusack was accused of throwing the ship’s Bible out of the cabin 
window, The Grand Pyrate, p. 7 
 212 
one of their prisoners ‘to Read to them the Common-Prayer book’.654 And if 
the accounts of the ministers who tended to pirates in their final hours can be 
believed, virtually every pirate found God on his way to the gallows. 
Nevertheless, more prosaic sources suggest that pirates did not entirely 
abandon God and the church, even during the course of their crimes. Goods 
sent to Adam Baldridge’s trading post on St. Mary’s Island in 1693, for 
example, included catechisms and two Bibles,655 and there are numerous 
references to oaths being sworn on Bibles.656 Du Bucquoy, who spent time 
with the very pirates who legislated against religious discussion, believed that 
religion was of little real importance to them: 
They take oath upon the Bible, but they never read it. The only custom 
they observe which seems to show any respect towards God was that 
whenever they are able they rest on Sundays. When one of them dies 
they chant a psalm or canticle while escorting the body, but that it rather 
a custom left over from their earliest education than a sign of their 
submission to God.657 
This may have been what du Bucquoy saw, but if it had truly been the limit of 
the pirates’ religiosity they would hardly have needed to legislate against 
religious discussion, and firm opinions about God have never been dependent 
on the practice of formal religion. Nevertheless, it is a view which accords well 
with observations of other companies such as Roberts’, whose articles 
stipulated that musicians were not to play on Sundays, but all other work 
carried on as usual, again suggesting that adherence to the rites and forms of 
the church by pirates was minimal, but without eliminating the personal faith of 
individual members of the company – in fact, that Roberts’ company actually 
compiled any rule that paid lip-service to the sanctity of the Sabbath, however 
minimal, is a strong indicator that personal faith was common amongst them. 
Bellamy’s men damned a prisoner for a ‘Presbyterian Dog’, suggesting that 
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they held members of some churches in more contempt than others,658 and 
late night drinking sessions aboard Low’s ship involved an ‘abundance of 
Discourse concerning Church and State’, though when some of the company 
suggested that a prisoner should join them as a chaplain others exclaimed 
‘No, they wanted no Godliness to be preach’d there.’659  
 
 4.4 Quarrels and Arguments. 
Whether caused by religious differences or other disagreements, arguments 
which might erupt into violence between two members of the company, or 
worse, factionalise the company, were a serious threat to the harmony and, in 
the worst case, continued existence of the piratical community. Thus, several 
of the surviving sets of articles contained one or more clauses designed to 
keep quarrelsome behaviour to a minimum and  to formalise the procedures 
by which disputes could be settled without engulfing the whole company. 
If the prevalence of an issue in the surviving sets of articles can be taken as a 
measure of the prevalence of the problem that necessitated legislation to 
control it, then the greatest threat to the harmony of a pirate company was 
likely to come from gambling. John Taylor’s article not only prohibited religious 
dispute, but ‘in order to preserve the peace and union necessary between 
members of the’ company, all forms of ‘quarrels and insults…[and] gambling 
for money is also forbidden’.660 No form of punishment is specified by Taylor’s 
article for gambling, and the same applied according to Roberts’ articles which 
forbade gambling ‘at cards or dice for money’. 
Other articles, however, no only prescribed punishments, but also allowed 
some leeway in the matter, permitting gambling if it were limited to small 
sums. The sum and the punishment varied from company to company and, in 
the surviving sets at least, the severity of the punishment was in proportion to 
the sum it was permitted to gamble. In the companies commanded by Anstis 
and Low, men were permitted to gamble provided the sums involved were 
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less than one Reale (Spanish silver currency, widely accepted as tender in 
American colonies, and worth approximately six or seven pence),661 and those 
who exceeded that sum were to be punished with thirty-nine lashes or ‘what 
Punishment the Captain and the Majority of the Company shall see fit.’ 
Lowther’s articles also left the choice of punishment to the captain and 
company, but permitted gambling for sums less than one shilling (twelve 
pence). The punishment imposed by the captain and company may have 
varied depending on the extent of the crime, that is, the size of the sums being 
gambled. Both the largest permissible sum and the most severe punishment 
were set forth by Philips’ articles, which permitted wagers of up to one piece 
of eight (eight Reales, or four shillings and six pence), but gambling for 
amounts in excess of that sum was punishable by being ‘marroon'd or shot’. 
Nevertheless, it was inevitable that quarrels should arise despite the best 
efforts of pirate companies to prevent them. By no means could every 
potential cause for dispute be legislated against. So to make sure that 
quarrels did not spill over into violent affray, several sets of articles legislated 
instead against the indiscriminate use of weapons and force. Lowther and 
Low, for example, adopted the following clause in their articles: 
He that shall be found guilty of taking up any unlawful Weapon on board 
the Privateer, or any prize, by us taken, so as to strike or abuse one 
another, in any regard, shall suffer what Punishment the Captain and the 
Majority of the Company shall see fit. 
And John Philips’ article specified thirty-nine lashes for any man ‘that shall 
strike another whilst these Articles are in force’. However, proscription of 
indiscriminate in-fighting did nothing to resolve or arbitrate any disputes which 
might have arisen, and it is likely that many pirate companies endeavoured to 
formalise combat resulting from internal strife in the way that, for example, 
Roberts’ company did when they agreed to an article prohibiting ‘striking one 
another on board, but every man's quarrels to be ended on shore, at sword 
and pistol’. The formalisation of this combat was taken even further by 
Taylor’s company, for 
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When… quarrels arise on board, and the offence requires settling by 
force of arms, the quartermaster and the captain preside over the duel, 
which ends only with the death of one of the antagonists. A flag is then 
waved over the head of the victor.662 
The death of one of the combatants was not always necessary for the 
satisfaction of honour, and on other occasions ‘the first to draw blood would 
be declared the victor’.663 
Pirates were not the only seamen to adopt the practise of going ashore to 
settle their arguments by combat. In 1722, for example, two merchant-ship 
masters, 
Isaac Parker and Samuel Parsons, who having some Words and 
Difference, in their anger and rage challenged one the other to Fight with 
firelocks, and accordingly they went on shore, and at some Distance 
presented their Pieces, and Parsons shot Parker in his shoulder or 
breast, that he died of his wounds in five Days after.664 
Even amongst pirates the practise was a long-standing one. As early as 1684 
John Gursford and John Bell ‘went on shore to fight with their guns’, and Bell 
was killed.665 
Rediker has argued that by removing the scene of combat from the ship to the 
shore the pirates were consciously promoting ‘harmony in the crowded 
quarters belowdecks’, and thus taking the conflict ‘symbolically off the sea’.666 
This may be true to some extent, but three other explanations for the practise 
also offer themselves. In the first place, a pirate ship was a crowded place, 
with limited space at the best of times, few clear fields of fire in which to shoot 
pistols without risking damage to the ship or injury to bystanders, and almost 
nowhere that a sword could be swung freely without first having to take the 
position of rigging, bulkheads and deckheads, and comrades into account. It 
was not, therefore, physically the most suitable place for such formalised 
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combat to take place. Secondly, by insisting that disputes, if they had to be 
settled with violence at all, were settled on land, pirate companies ensured 
that combats did not take place in the rage of the moment, and in the 
intervening time between the combat being agreed upon and a suitable 
landing being made both protagonists had an opportunity to regain calm and 
settle their disputes peaceably. How many pirate deaths were avoided by this 
method is, of course, impossible to say, but it is likely that faced with the 
prospect of mortal combat at least some men chose to bury their differences 
before blood was shed. When, for example, an argument in John Taylor’s 
cabin became heated and he declared ‘”I am ready; come on and I’ll give you 
satisfaction with pistol or sword, whatever you please.” No one breathed a 
word, for all knew well enough not to dare to hazard single combat with 
him.’667 
Thirdly, the similarity between the formalised combats of pirates and the duels 
that were prevalent in legitimate society at the time cannot be overlooked. 
Duels to settle affairs of honour and disagreements on land were invariably 
conducted in cold blood and at some neutral and secluded spot, in order to 
avoid witnesses to, and arrest for, what was, since 1613, an illegal activity.668 
Pirates doubtless had little fear of being arrested for duelling, but the practice 
of removing the site of the combat away from the place at which the dispute 
arose was such an integral part of the formalised process that pirates may 
well have emulated without giving thought to the real reason behind the 
tradition. Furthermore, duelling by gentlemen ashore and formalised combats 
by pirates share other significant similarities.  
The duel, like the minuet, was above all a formal and well-mannered 
event. It contained and gave form to the passions which generated and 
animated it. By giving the passions a limited mode of expression, 
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duelling substituted a conventionalised, well-demarcated conflict for a 
potentially endless state of war.669 
The duel had developed in Europe in response to the ‘killing affrays’ involving 
large gangs of supporters or hired blades to settle disputes, which often 
resulted in multiple deaths and injuries, the ‘potentially endless state of 
war’.670 So, too, did pirates use formalised combats between single 
protagonists to prevent friends and supporters becoming involved in the 
disputes of individuals and the factions that were likely to develop from such a 
situation.  
As well as localising and limiting the violence arising from a quarrel, the duel 
served other purposes which were thought to be beneficial to society and 
which would also have been beneficial to pirates. The practice of duelling was 
thought to help produce a society of good fighters, inured to the fears that 
combat produces in most people, to whom self-preservation is an overriding 
concern.671 By encouraging men to settle their disputes with sword and pistol 
pirate companies helped to suborn the natural instinct to shy away from 
combat. Conversely, but perhaps just as importantly, duelling was also 
thought to improve manners, and the fear of being ‘called out’ may have 
prevented disputes being taken too far in the first place. For pirates, like many 
others who found self-expression in duelling in the early eighteenth century, 
the ritual of formalised combat was also a mark of gentility, class, and status. 
With the rise of what has been described as the ‘urban gentleman’, whose 
gentility rested not on their lineage or lands but on their wealth and behaviour, 
duelling was a way of demonstrating their new-found status.672 That pirates 
also adopted duelling as their principal method of settling disputes indicates 
most strongly that they too sought to improve their status, and demonstrated 
the fact by adopting the practices of those whom they had formerly considered 
their ‘betters’. 
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4.5 Women, Boys, and Sex. 
The jealousies and rivalries caused by the presence of one or a few women in 
a large gang of young men, and their potentially disastrous consequences, 
should not be hard to predict, and the risk was certainly well realised by the 
pirates cruising the African coast in 1719 who would not 
allow Women to be on board their Ships, when in the Harbour. And if 
they should take a Prize at Sea, that has any Women on board, no one 
dares, on pain of death, to force them against their Inclinations. This 
being a good political Rule to prevent disturbances amongst them, it is 
strictly observed.673 
Nevertheless, it would be surprising if men who gave such free abandon to 
satisfying their lusts for alcohol and gluttony were willing to exercise such 
complete control over their physical desires for sex and female company. It 
can be noted that however strictly the ‘good political rule’ mentioned above 
was observed, it does not, on the face of it, include women on prizes whose 
inclinations were to willingly provide for the pirates’ sexual desires, and the 
corollary to the ban on women aboard ship in harbour was that the pirates 
were free to go ashore in search of women if they chose to. This section will 
explore the nature of pirates’ relationships with women, the place of women 
who, contrary to expectations, did travel on board pirate vessels, pirates’ 
treatment of female victims and captives, their relationships with women in the 
ports and harbours they visited, and the issue of homosexuality within a pirate 
company. 
The articles themselves make several references to women. The successors 
of the pirates quoted above had similar rules preventing the rape of unwilling 
female captives: if Philips’ company should have chanced to ‘meet with a 
prudent Woman, that Man that offers to meddle with her, without her Consent, 
shall suffer present Death’, and death was also specified as the punishment 
for rape in the articles of Bartholomew Roberts and Thomas Anstis.  
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This does not mean, of course, that pirates never committed rape. When 
Henry Every’s company captured an Indian ship, there were on board 
numerous pilgrims returning from the Hajj and a troupe of young women 
destined to be concubines of the ship’s captain.674 As soon as the ship 
reached port the news spread of the pirates’ depredations, particularly against 
the women, one of whom was reputed to be a noblewoman ‘in her old age. 
She they abused very much, and forced severall other Women, which Caused 
one person of Quality, his Wife and Nurse, to kill themselves to prevent the 
Husbands seing [sic] them (and their being) ravished’.675 Rumours of such 
atrocities are liable to exaggeration, even when reported by the representative 
of so august an institution as the East India Company, so that by the time 
some of Every’s company were executed in London a year later, the author of 
their ‘last words’ was able to assert that they were very penitent of their 
‘Ravishing and Deflowering the Virgins and Women, and then turning them 
out naked, to starve upon shore’, and that they had ‘most inhumanly Ravisht a 
Young Princess, and the rest of her Female train’.676 Whether the most 
notable victim of the pirates’ lusts was an elderly noblewoman or a young 
princess (or neither), the rumours were undoubtedly based in fact. It would be 
surprising if all of a large gang of young men who had been more than two 
years at sea could retain self-control after a fierce battle when faced with so 
many women, and although most of the pirates glossed over the few days 
following the capture in their subsequent depositions, one, a lad whose tender 
years may have prevented him taking an active part in the sexual frenzy, 
admitted that ‘the men lay with the women aboard, and there were several 
that, from their jewels and habits, seemed to be of better quality than the 
rest’.677 
Such large-scale piratical orgies were not common by any means, but this is 
most likely due to the relative rarity of so many female passengers being 
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captured on the same vessel. Nevertheless, even when fewer women were 
available the pirates frequently exercised no better control, the threat of death 
prescribed by their articles notwithstanding. Even amongst those companies 
whose articles specifically forbade mistreatment of women, rape was a 
common occurrence: Roberts’ company captured a ship in 1720 and ‘abused 
several Women that were Passengers on Board’,678 and it was reported that 
on another occasion ‘21 of those Brutes [pirates] had forced a Woman 
Passenger one after another, and afterwards broke her Back, and flung her 
into the Sea’.679 According to Johnson, when some of Robert’s men were led 
to the gallows, one of them, David Simpson, spotted a woman in the crowd 
whom he recognised and exclaimed that ‘he had lain with that B——h three 
times, and now she was come to see him hanged’.680 And Charles Vane’s 
company kept two captured women ‘for their own Entertainment, contrary to 
the usual Practice of Pyrates, who generally sent them away, least they 
should occasion Contention’.681 The practice of sending women away only 
worked when there was a vessel available to send them in, but if the pirates 
decided to keep a captured vessel for their own use, any women found 
aboard had, according to Johnson again,  
a Centinel immediately [put] over her to prevent ill Consequences from 
so dangerous an Instrument of Division and Quarrel; but then here lyes 
the Roguery; they contend who shall be Centinel, which happens 
generally to one of the greatest Bullies, who, to secure the Lady’s Virtue, 
will let none lye with her but himself.682 
That the preservation of the pirate company’s harmony was a more important 
consideration than the physical well being of female prisoners or any chivalric 
notions regarding a lady’s honour and virtue, is shown by John Taylor’s article 
which, while prescribing ‘severe punishment’ for any pirate who was violent 
towards a female prisoner, also specified that women who could not 
conveniently be put ashore should be ‘given up to the hazards of the sea’. 
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Not all women who fell into the pirates’ hands, of course, were unhappy about 
their prospects. When Richard Worley’s crew captured a ship carrying 
transported felons, for example, it was reported that ‘some women… during 
so short a Space of Time as between there [sic] being taken by, and retaken 
from the Pirates, had got husbands among them’.683 In this case the future for 
the passengers after entering port was not particularly appealing, bound as 
they were for a life of forced labour not far removed from slavery,684 for a 
period measured in years. For the men on board, piracy was a far more 
attractive prospect and, having been freed from their shipboard incarceration 
by Worley’s men, most of them embraced piracy and ‘were observ’d to fight 
very desperatly’ when a ship sent to capture the pirates came up with them a 
few days later. Some were killed in the fight and several more were executed 
with the pirates. The rest were sold in the market-place of South Carolina.685 
The women, too, saw a better future as the ‘wives’ of pirates than as the 
slaves of planters. The observer’s assertion that the women had ‘got 
husbands’ in the pirate company may be too strong a phrase, though the few 
days they spent in company would have been enough for them to extract the 
verbal promises sealed with sexual intercourse that constituted the most basic 
form of marriage in the early eighteenth century,686 but it certainly implies a 
(probably) monogamous and long-term sexual union voluntarily entered into 
by women in immediate need of protection. Coming, as they did, from a 
criminal background of one sort or another, few of the women involved 
probably felt any scruples about settling down with a pirate, and any scruples 
they may have felt might have been overcome by contemplation of the 
alternative.  
The admittance of around thirty women into the pirates’ shipboard community 
was unusual, but so too was the capture by pirates of a vessel carrying such a 
number of women willing to marry them. Like the mass rape of Indian women 
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by Every’s men, the mass marriage to English women by Worley’s men may 
have been extraordinary because of the dictates of circumstances rather than 
because of any deliberate decision on the part of the pirates. It is true that 
there exists a large body of evidence suggesting that pirates preferred not to 
allow women to form a permanent part of their community at sea, but a letter 
written by a gentleman of South Carolina to the author of the General History 
of the Pyrates suggests that the wives of Worley’s company were not intended 
to remain on board ship indefinitely, but were 
designed to have been landed on one of the uninhabited Bahama 
Islands, where there was a proper Port for these Rovers to put in, at any 
Time, to refresh themselves, after the Fatigue of the Sea. And thus a 
most hopeful Colony would have commenced.687 
Another letter to Johnson, this time by Captain Evans of the Greyhound, 
relates the temporary presence of two women on the pirate ship that had 
captured him, female passengers from another ship taken by the pirates: ‘how 
they pass’d their Time I need not say; tho’ I fancy, as they had formerly made 
a Trip or two to the Bay [of Campeche], there was no Rape committed.’688 In 
the early eighteenth century the Bay of Campeche was largely inhabited by an 
almost entirely male community of logwood cutters, including many former 
seamen, known collectively as ‘baymen’, many of whom subsequently turned 
to piracy; so the fact that these two women had formerly spent time amongst 
the rough and ready baymen was enough to label them as ‘loose’ women.689 
These incidents, although illustrating that pirates’ objections to women in their 
community were sometimes overruled and the ‘good political rules’ sometimes 
flouted, also serve as exceptions that prove the rule. In both cases the 
presence of the women within the essentially masculine environment of the 
pirate ship was temporary, voluntary, and opportunistic. The pirates involved 
did not deliberately seek women willing to provide for their sexual needs at 
sea, and having fortuitously found them did not seek to permanently integrate 
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them into their communities, but nonetheless eagerly turned the women’s 
willingness to their own best advantage. 
On three occasions in the 1720s, however, records show women as having 
been permanent members of a pirate community. Most famously, Anne Bonny 
and Mary Read sailed with John Rackham’s company in late 1720, and less 
well known, Martha Farley and Maria Critchett were captured on board pirate 
vessels and tried for piracy in 1727 and 1729 respectively. 
The story of Anne Bonny and Mary Read has been recounted numerous times 
in a variety of contexts. It appears in histories of piracy, gender, and of sex 
and sexuality.690 Briefly, the story of Bonny and Read as it is usually told is 
one of two women who disguised themselves as men and, by coincidence, 
found themselves aboard the same pirate ship, commanded by Rackham, in 
the Caribbean in 1720. Bonny had shipped aboard as Rackham’s lover, while 
Read joined the crew when the ship she was travelling on was captured by 
Rackham’s pirates. In battle the women were fearsome hellcats who kept the 
deck when their comrades fled below, shouting and cursing and brandishing 
their weapons. Finally, when the pirates were captured and brought to trial, 
Bonny and Read’s true identities were revealed to the world. 
That modern renditions of Bonny and Read’s exploits differ so little from one 
another is unsurprising, since almost all are based principally on the account 
first published by Charles Johnson. Johnson’s chapters are the fullest 
contemporary account of the activities of the female pirates, and undoubtedly 
the most accessible. Moreover, Johnson’s is the only contemporary account 
to outline the lives of Bonny and Read prior to their turning pirate.691 
This version of the Bonny and Read story fits neatly into a genre of stories, 
common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, of women disguising 
themselves as men in order to pursue traditionally male-dominated careers. 
Conversely, recent scholarship has shown that women went to sea during the 
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age of sail in a surprising number of capacities, and in their own right as 
women. The wives and relations of officers and sometimes seamen were 
tolerated onboard merchant and naval vessels.692 Crucially, though, the duties 
of these seagoing women were generally restricted to feminine activities and 
except in extreme circumstances they were not considered active members of 
the ship’s crew. To be allowed to haul a rope or swing a cutlass it seems, 
then, that women had to resort to disguise. 
The issue of women disguising themselves as men to gain admittance to a 
ship’s crew has raised a number of questions, many of them relating to 
personal hygiene and toilet issues. Given the cramped confines of a sailing 
ship and the communal way of living, how did women successfully maintain 
their disguise? The problem must have been exacerbated on a pirate ship, 
which were usually small vessels with large crews. However, in Bonny and 
Read’s case these questions are not strictly relevant, for Johnson’s account 
contains at least one major error of fabrication: Bonny and Read were never 
disguised as men. 
According to the appendix of Johnson’s second volume, Bonny was well 
known on New Providence and was instrumental in the pirates’ theft of the 
sloop William belonging to John Haman.693 This was her first act of piracy, 
and it appears that Mary Read was also involved, for immediately the theft 
became known governor Woodes Rogers issued a proclamation, declaring 
Rackham and his crew pirates, and naming ‘two women… Ann Fulford alias 
Bonny and Mary Read’.694 Thus, from the very beginning of their piratical 
careers Bonny and Read were known to be women, and known by name. 
Witnesses at their trial likewise made it clear that Bonny and Read were not 
disguised as men. Dorothy Thomas, captured by Rackham’s company, stated 
that while Bonny and Read ‘wore Men’s Jackets, and long Trouzers, and 
Handkerchiefs tied about their Heads’, she recognized them as women ‘by the 
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largeness of their Breasts’. Two Frenchmen, also captured by Rackham, 
deposed that when the pirates ‘gave Chase or Attacked, they [Bonny and 
Read] wore Men’s Cloaths; and, at other Times, they wore Women’s 
Cloaths’.695 There is no doubt, then, that while Bonny and Read dressed in 
men’s clothes for practical reasons when circumstances demanded, they were 
never disguised in the sense that by wearing men’s clothes they were not 
attempting to conceal their gender or identities, which were well known to the 
authorities, to their victims and to the rest of the pirate company.  
This fact dramatically changes our understanding of the nature of Bonny and 
Read’s presence on board Rackham’s ship: no longer can they be considered 
in the light of other cross-dressing women as outlined above, but instead must 
be considered as women who overcame the pirates’ general antipathy 
towards the presence of women at sea, and established themselves, as 
women, in the otherwise masculine environment of the pirate ship. And 
although Bonny and Read remain the best known of the ‘female pirates’, they 
were not alone. In the summer of 1727 a band of pirates led by John Vidal 
engaged in a short-lived spree of piracy around Ocracoke Inlet. Vidal’s crew 
included Thomas Farley who, two days after their first successful capture, was 
joined by his wife Martha and her two children. Martha Farley does not seem 
to have taken such an active militant role in the business of capturing ships as 
Bonny and Read did, but she was certainly aboard when at least one capture 
took place, and was believed to have been used by the crew to eavesdrop on 
their prisoners’ conversations.696 Two years after Martha Farley’s trial the 
Vice-Admiralty court at Williamsburg again sat to hear a trial for piracy against 
five men and a woman, Mary Critchett, who had been taken on suspicion of 
piracy by Captain Long of HMS Shoreham. Five of the pirates, including 
Critchett, were transported felons who had run away from their labour in 
Virginia, stolen a boat on the Rapahannock river, and made their way into 
Chesapeake Bay where they captured the small sloop John and Elizabeth in 
the dead of night, quickly overpowering the old man and boy that they found 
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aboard. Mary Critchett was certainly involved in the initial capture of the John 
and Elizabeth, and when a boat appeared to be heading towards them some 
days later the prisoners were bundled into the cabin and kept there by 
Critchett sitting on the scuttle so that it could not be opened. A day or so later 
the old man and boy were released, but Critchett ‘blamed the rest of the crew 
for suffering them to go ashore’, fearing the consequences of leaving potential 
witnesses to their crimes.697 
Several factors contributed to the pirates’ willingness to allow these women 
into their communities, and in doing so to overturn the proscription, common 
in surviving articles, against having women on board ship. At their trial, Bonny 
and Read were sentenced to death, but escaped the noose by informing the 
court ‘that they were both quick with Child’, which, upon medical examination, 
proved to be true.698 Since their trial took place less than three months after 
their first act of piracy, this suggests that they became pregnant before they 
became pirates. Johnson’s account romantically linked Bonny with Rackham, 
and Read with an unnamed member of Rackham’s company and, under the 
circumstances, it seems likely that the fathers of the children were indeed to 
be found among the pirates. Martha Farley joined the pirates alongside her 
husband, and Maria Critchett was certainly a member of the runaway gang 
before they became pirates, and it cannot be ruled out that she was more 
permanently attached to one of them. Secondly, all three companies that 
included women were unusual in that they were each formed in one place with 
the specific intent to commit piracy. Most pirate companies originated once a 
vessel was actually at sea and the crew chose to mutiny or turn to piracy,699 
so if no women were aboard already, they could only join the pirate 
community after it had been formed, and for many companies that was 
directly prohibited by the articles. Thirdly, unlike the wives of Worley’s crew or 
the two women who had spent time in the Bay of Campeche, whose ‘duties’ 
were essentially womanly, Bonny and Read were apparently ‘very profligate, 
cursing and swearing much, and very ready and willing to do any Thing on 
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Board’, such as carrying arms and handing ‘Gun-powder to the Men’.700 As 
the authorities stepped up their efforts in the war against piracy in the late 17-
teens and early 1720s, so the popularity of piracy waned and volunteer pirates 
were harder to come by. This problem for the pirates became acute as the 
1720s progressed, but even by the time Rackham and his company left the 
Bahamas in a stolen vessel in September 1720 those islands had been 
pacified by governor Rogers for over two years and most of the committed 
pirates had already departed for other bases.701 The fact that these women 
were willing volunteers may therefore have been more important to the pirates 
than the fact that they were women. 
The status of women already established as stable consorts of one of the 
company may have defrayed the jealousies that could be expected to arise 
had they tried to join, as newcomers, a previously extant company. In this 
respect, it is worth noting that the pirate companies whose articles specifically 
forbade the presence of women on board their ships – Davis, Taylor and 
Roberts – all had their genesis in the mutiny led by Davis aboard the Buck, 
which was already at sea and away from port when the piracy began, and 
were all active at a time when new volunteer recruits were relatively easy to 
come by. They therefore had no women already established as part of their 
community before they turned pirate, nor any need to recruit women in place 
of men.  
The articles prohibiting women on board ship, however, did not apply on 
shore. The pirates encountered by Snelgrave on the African coast  
went on Shore to the Negroe-women, who were very fond of their 
Company, for the sake of the great Presents they gave them. Nay some 
White Men that lived there, did not scruple to lend their black Wives to 
the Pirates, purely on account of the great Rewards they gave.702 
Roberts’ men declared their intention to spend their money ‘with Portuguese 
negroe women’ of New Providence. These encounters, and others, were not 
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just romantic incidents, but also financial transactions, in which pirates were 
less likely to form permanent attachments than they might otherwise have 
done had the encounters primarily been based on mutual attraction followed 
by a period of courtship. Such permanent ties were to be avoided where 
possible if a man were to commit fully to the community offered by his pirate 
company. In some cases the pirates’ apprehension of the disruptive effects of 
women present onboard ship was extended to women ashore to whom 
members of the company felt or owed some loyalty. Married men, and those 
with children, might be reluctant to abandon their families as a piratical career 
demanded, such as William May, for example, who convinced a court of his 
innocence by claiming that ‘he had a Wife and Family, that was too near to 
him, to think of leaving for such a Life as Pyrating’,703 and it was a fairly 
common practice for pirates to avoid conscripting married men. Samuel 
Bellamy’s company, for example, captured nine seamen who ‘were sent away 
being Married Men’,704 and when George Roberts was taken by Ned Low’s 
company he was informed ‘we have an Article which we are sworn to, which 
is, not to force any married Man, against his Will, to serve us’.705 Six masters 
of fishing vessels were also taken by Low, who ‘with Pistol in hand, and with a 
full Mouth demanded, Are any of you married Men?’, and it appeared that ‘his 
Design was to take no married Man away with him’.706 Philip Ashton, taken 
aback by the surprising query, admitted that he was unmarried, but Roberts, 
forewarned, lied that he ‘had been married about ten Years, and had five 
Children when I came from Home, and did not know but I might have six now, 
one being on the Stocks when I came from Home’, in a successful attempt to 
avoid conscription.707  
Pirates, then, were prepared to legislate against their own sexual desires 
towards women for the preservation of the company, but only in Roberts’ 
articles is there any suggestion of a restriction of homosexual intercourse – a 
rather ambiguous proscription of allowing boys aboard. Whether Roberts’ 
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injunction against boys really related to homosexuality, and whether the 
absence of similar clauses in other articles is indicative of pirates’ acceptance 
of homosexuality, are questions that deserve examination. 
Despite the occurrence of several cases of homosexuality which were brought 
before Admiralty courts throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
and probably others which remained either undetected or were not 
prosecuted,708 there is not enough evidence of maritime homosexuality to 
assert that ‘there was a recognised penchant for buggery at sea’ in the 
eighteenth century.709 On the eve of the golden age of piracy, between 1703 
and 1710, only 6 men were convicted of buggery in Admiralty courts, a tiny 
percentage of the tens of thousands of men in the service.710 Nevertheless, 
acceptance of the fact that buggery undoubtedly occurred at sea (as it did on 
land) paved the way for B.R. Burg’s seminal work, Sodomy and the Pirate 
Tradition, in which he argued primarily that the lack of direct and unambiguous 
evidence of homosexuality amongst pirates could be rectified by a comparison 
between various elements of piratical society and modern communities in 
which homosexuality and pederasty occur with a greater frequency or 
intensity than in society as a whole, particularly prisons. Such comparisons 
ought, according to Burg, to shed light on unrecorded homosexual conduct 
amongst pirates, and enable the correct interpretation of possible but 
ambiguous references to homosexual interaction in pirate communities. 
Despite the many differences between pirates of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries on the one hand and modern convicts on the other, Burg 
argued that in several important respects – absence of women, long hours of 
monotony, lack of personal privacy and ‘few familiar social situations that call 
for sexual responses’ – the two groups are comparable. Some of these factors 
may serve to increase the incidence of homosexual contact while others serve 
to discourage it, but as long as the same factors are effective in both prisons 
and pirate ships comparisons can be drawn. On this basis, Burg used figures 
relating to prison studies, which showed that between thirty and forty-five 
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percent of inmates experienced homosexual contacts during their 
incarceration, to argue that homosexuality was rife amongst pirates.711 
In considering  same-gender sex under these circumstances a clear 
distinction must be drawn between homosexual preference, that is, the 
tendency of some men to prefer sex with other men even when sex with 
women is available, and the situational practice of homosexuality by men who, 
under other circumstances exhibit predominantly or entirely heterosexual 
behaviour, but participate in homosexual sex when separated from women for 
prolonged periods, and revert to their heterosexual preferences when their 
circumstances change, for example, on release from prison or when their ship 
comes into port.712 In the first case, it is probable that among the thousands of 
men who became pirates in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries some 
were homosexual by preference, and it is equally probable that, when two of 
these homosexual pirates met and recognised each other as such, some form 
of sex occurred. How many pirates were gay, how often they met, what form 
their sexual contact took, and how regularly, are questions which cannot be 
answered in any satisfactory way due to the complete absence of evidence of 
homosexual practice on pirate ships.713 
We can, however, give some consideration to the likelihood of situational 
homosexuality occurring amongst pirates. Based on Burg’s comparison of 
pirate communities to prison culture it seems likely that situational 
homosexuality occurred, and may even have involved as many as between 
one third and one half of pirates. But, Dr. Johnson’s famous equation of ships 
with prisons notwithstanding, the comparison is far from perfect. There are 
numerous differences between a pirate ship and a prison, most significantly 
perhaps the length of time that an inmate of either could expect to remain in 
the exclusively male community. Most convicts measure their incarceration in 
periods of months and years, often several years. Pirates, although they 
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sometimes undertook long journeys from one hunting ground to another, 
generally measured their separation from land in periods of days, weeks, and 
occasionally months.  
Although the cruise of Henry Every and his company, for example, began in 
Spain in May 1694 and ended in the Bahamas just under two years later, the 
longest passage between landfalls, while rounding the Cape of Good Hope 
from the Atlantic to Indian Oceans, lasted only twelve weeks.714 Richard 
Worley’s company began their piratical careers in New York at ‘the latter End 
of September, 1718’, and were all captured or killed by the end of November, 
having in that space of time barely left sight of land for more than a few days 
at a time.715 Pirates cruising up and down the African coast regularly put into 
shore to replenish their supplies, and pirates in the Indian Ocean had a more 
or less permanent base at St. Mary’s Island where many of them engaged in 
relationships with Malagasy women.716 Not every visit to shore involved 
meeting women, of course: when pirates stopped at uninhabited islands or 
stretches of coast to clean or refit their ships or to gather wood and water, 
there were no women to be found. Neither did every encounter with women 
on shore result in sex, but heterosexual pirates nonetheless did not have to 
face the prospect of years devoid of female company in the same way that 
convicts do. Women the pirates met with at sea, as we have seen, frequently 
became either the victims of rape or willing bedfellows to the pirates. 
The major factor, then, that encourages men into situational homosexual 
practice against their normal preference was, if not entirely eliminated from 
pirate cruises, at least reduced to a level far below that found in prisons. 
Additionally, although pirates worked perhaps less than their other maritime 
contemporaries, their labour was still arduous, and this may have reduced 
their sexual ardour and helped them to get through weeks at sea devoid of 
women without resorting to homosexual practice to dispel their sexual 
frustrations.  
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One important indicator of the relatively low incidence of situational 
homosexuality amongst pirates is the almost total absence of situational 
homosexuality in the Royal Navy where it ‘seems to have been rare, intensely 
disliked by the men, and very difficult to conceal’.717 However, it has been 
argued that because pirates were free of any external authority, unlike 
seamen in the Navy, they enjoyed ‘freedom from social and behavioural 
constraints’, and a modern ‘sense of sexual liberty, which their articles did little 
to regulate’, and that pirates cared little ‘one way or another about their fellow 
rogues’ sexual proclivities’.718 As I argued in Chapter 2 though, pirates were 
not entirely free of external authority, but rather they created their own 
‘external’ authority themselves within the physical confines of their ships. So 
to understand whether or not same-gender sex was more permissible or 
widely accepted on board pirate ships than it was in the Royal Navy, it is 
necessary to explore the pirates’ own attitude towards homosexuality. 
Burg’s assertion that most pirates grew ‘to adolescence or adulthood in a 
society where sexual experiences with members of the same sex were not as 
emphatically proscribed as is the case in the England or America of today’ is 
untrue.719 Between 1533 and 1861 sodomy was a crime in English common 
law punishable by death, a ‘monstrous sin against nature’. Naturally, sodomy 
occurred despite the law, but numerous publications in the popular press and 
the violent and humiliating treatment received at the hands of the multitude by 
sodomites sentenced to stand in the pillory attest to the general populace’s 
antipathy towards homosexuality.720 The willingness, sometimes eagerness, 
of seamen to testify as witnesses against their sodomite shipmates in the 
Admiralty Courts supports Rodger’s claim that homosexuality was ‘strongly 
abhorred’ by seamen, who shared the antipathy exhibited by the populace 
ashore.721 Whether seamen or landsmen, pirates were conditioned by their 
former experiences to revile homosexual behaviour and those who practiced 
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it. In the only example Burg was able to present of a buccaneer or pirate being 
accused of sodomy, the charge was levelled against buccaneer Edmund 
Cook in an attempt to discredit him during an internal power-struggle – hardly 
the actions of a group of men to whom homosexuality was an accepted and 
acceptable mode of behaviour.722 
Only Bartholomew Roberts’ articles contain any hint that homosexual practice 
was common enough to require legislation in the clause stating ‘No boy or 
woman to be allowed amongst them. If any man were to be found seducing 
any of the latter sex, and carried her to sea, disguised, he was to suffer 
death’, but this clause is ambiguous in the extreme. Certainly, the 
juxtaposition of boys and women in the article is suggestive of a sexual 
problem that had to be addressed, but it could equally be a question of 
masculinity and the article might be rephrased more simply as ‘men only’. 
Space, food, and water were all finite commodities on board a pirate ship, and 
perhaps Roberts’ article is a reflection of the pirates’ desire to ensure that 
every mouth that required feeding was also capable of pulling its weight in 
battle or the general labour of the ship. Furthermore, the pirate ship was not 
only an exclusively male environment, it was also a predominantly masculine 
one in which the ability to fight aggressively, drink heavily and swear fluently 
were held in high regard. Boys and women, either of whom might disrupt the 
essential manliness of the company, were not welcome. Homosexuality, 
which in the eighteenth century was closely associated with effeminacy, would 
have been seen as equally disruptive to the masculine nature of the pirate 
company, and so was probably just as unwelcome.723 
That no other surviving set of articles addresses the question of boys joining 
the company suggests further that pirates in general did not find the presence 
of boys amongst them distracting or divisive. Several companies are known to 
have included boys in their ranks without any observable detriment to the 
harmony of the community. James Sparks was a boy aboard the privateer 
Charles II when the company mutinied, remained a member of the 
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subsequent pirate company throughout Every’s cruise, and was executed for 
piracy in 1696.724 Sam Bellamy’s crew included the boy John King,725 and 
there were boys in the companies of John Quelch, Thomas Cocklyn and Ned 
Low. Even Roberts’ company, the only company known to have legislated 
against boys, actually included at least one.726 Boys were common enough in 
Taylor’s company that the articles stipulated the size of their share of the 
pirates’ spoil, and it is most likely that boys served in other pirate companies 
but went unrecorded as such.727 Boys, then, were generally an accepted 
feature of pirate companies in a way that women were not, and their presence 
was not seen by pirates as particularly disruptive to the harmony of the 
community. They were not, therefore, considered in the same way as women, 
their presence was not generally seen in any kind of sexual light, and there is 
no reason to conclude that pederasty was more rife amongst pirates than in 
any other contemporary group of men. 
What evidence there is for homosexuality amongst pirates, either between 
adult men or involving boys, is both sparse and ambiguous. Simon Jones, 
Captain Snelgrave’s first mate, volunteered to join Cocklyn’s pirates to free 
himself from ‘a Wife whom he could not love’, which might indicate that he 
preferred the company of men, but might equally just mean that he had 
married the wrong woman.728 John Wilson and Thomas Powell, a forced man 
and the gunner of Charles Harris’ crew, were alone together at the top of the 
mast when Powell declared to Wilson that ‘I wish you and I were both ashore 
here stark naked’, but what exactly he meant by the comment is unclear.729 
Even if Powell’s desire was sexual in nature, such isolated and fragmentary 
records are hardly evidence of any kind of widespread piratical homosexuality.  
The group of sources in which the absence of accusations of pirate 
homosexuality is most telling consists of the numerous pamphlets and articles 
written by clergymen and other authors denouncing the pirates’ behaviour in 
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general. Most of these writers, from the Mather family of clerics in New 
England to the Ordinaries of Newgate who tended the pirates’ spiritual needs 
in their last days, sought to highlight for the readers the corruption and 
wickedness of the pirates they met. Their sermons contain seemingly endless 
lists of the sins committed by pirates, from disrupting lawful trade to murder, 
rape, and general ungodliness, but nowhere is there any evidence of 
widespread homosexual practice, a charge which the pious ministers would 
hardly have overlooked. Cotton Mather, in one such pamphlet, mentioned ‘the 
abominable Sin of Uncleanness’, a phrase which can be indicative of 
homosexual practice, but read in context might simply refer to any form of sex 
outside wedlock. In any case ‘uncleanness’ is mentioned in a long list of sins 
to be avoided by readers, not a specific accusation against pirates.730 Other 
references of this nature are elusive, and the lack of them is strongly 
indicative of an absence of any widespread piratical acceptance of 
homosexuality. If pirates’ tolerance of either homosexuality or situational 
homosexual practice had been greater than the norm then it is remarkable 
that nobody mentioned it when cataloguing the pirates’ many sins. Observers 
like Snelgrave, Richard Hawkins, George Roberts, Philip Ashton, John 
Filmore and Jacob du Bucquoy spent prolonged periods in the company of 
pirates and wrote pages and pages detailing the transgressions of their 
captors, yet none of them mentioned even a single incident of homosexual 
practice. If homosexuality or situational homosexual practice was tolerated 
more by pirates than by society at large these captive-observers can hardly 
have failed to have been aware of it, and if they had been aware of it would 
have most certainly mentioned it in their texts. That they did not mention it can 
only mean that they did not observe it, and if they did not observe homosexual 
practice then it either did not occur, or occurred only behind closed doors. It is 
therefore safe to conclude, despite Burg’s hopeful thesis, that in general terms 
homosexual practice was neither common nor especially tolerated on board a 
pirate vessel. In itself, this fact is unsurprising: as I have argued throughout, 
pirates created their society and the articles by which it was governed by 
drawing on systems and prejudices that they had experienced in legitimate 
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society, prior to turning to piracy, and this is as true for their attitudes towards 
homosexuality as for democracy or economics. The fact that only one set of 
articles so much as hints at homosexuality (and then only ambiguously and in 
a negative way) is not indicative of pirates’ greater tolerance than society at 
large, but that they considered the subject too insignificant to warrant 
attention. 
 
• • • 
Pirates, then, did not seek to create a community in which the personal 
liberties of the individual took precedence over a ‘shipshape environment’. On 
the contrary, they imposed more restrictions upon themselves than they 
guaranteed themselves liberties, and some of those restrictions, such as the 
limitation of the right of the individual to renounce his pirate ‘citizenship’ and 
quit the company, were aimed at liberties that others at different times 
considered fundamental. The ‘freedom of the seas’, which has inspired an 
almost pathological sense of romance in so many people was, by and large, a 
myth. It is a construct based in fiction and misty-eyed nostalgia, supported by 
some evidence of pirates’ activities, but contradicted by an overwhelming 
body of similar evidence. Pirates, like almost every other community, sought 
refuge in rules and regulations to prevent disharmony and disintegration. 
Complete personal liberty could not be enjoyed in a community which needed 
to function on a practical level if it was to survive, and the personal survival of 
the individual depended in great measure on the survival of the community. 
Willingly, then, the pirates agreed to restrictions of their own freedoms for the 
benefit of the company; they agreed not to gamble for excessive sums which 
might breed discord, they agreed not to give in to their lusts and allow the 
presence of women to disrupt the masculine solidarity of their ship-board 
communities, they agreed not to allow the disputes which would inevitably 
arise to engulf the company. To be sure, they enjoyed the rights to drink and 
swear to their hearts’ content, but for men who had often experienced the 
restriction of even these rights, perhaps that was enough. 
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5. Justice and Punishment. 
Any organized community, especially one in which men live and work as 
close to one another, and depend on teamwork as much, as they did in 
the Navy, is bound to encounter the need to define and repress crime.731 
Pirates, as well as merchantmen and privateers, lived in close communities, 
and their need to define and repress crime was no less than that of the Royal 
Navy, and indeed society at large. And yet, the supposed brutality of discipline 
and punishment in both naval and merchant service has often been cited as 
one of the principal reasons for seamen to turn to piracy.732 Captains in 
legitimate service, wrote Frank Sherry, 
possessed the power of life and death over their crews, and savage 
mistreatment of helpless sailors formed an integral part of life aboard 
ship, whatever flag it might fly. All ordinary seamen, whatever their 
nationality, knew and feared the brutal discipline that called for whipping 
a man to death for losing an oar. Sadistic and psychopathic officers 
could – and did – indulge with impunity in the most atrocious 
mistreatment of sailors under their command… Under the lash, even 
loyalty to king and country eroded, until by the late seventeenth century 
thousands of resentful and rebellious sailors manned the ships of the 
seagoing nations. But life at sea did offer one escape route: if they 
became bitter enough, or rebellious enough, they could seize their ship 
and turn pirate.733 
This assessment is not a new one. Several contemporaries of the pirates, and 
indeed some pirates themselves, associated the ease with which pirates 
recruited seamen with the cruelty, arbitrariness, and brutality of masters in 
legitimate service. Howell Davis complained to William Snelgrave that ‘their 
Reasons for going a pirating were to revenge themselves on base Merchants 
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and cruel Commanders of Ships’.734 Pirate William Fly had taken command of 
his company after leading a mutiny and murdering the ship’s captain and, 
according to Cotton Mather, delivered a haranguing oration at the gallows, 
advising ‘the Masters of Vessels to carry it well to their Men, lest they should 
be put upon doing as he had done.’735 Three years earlier, Mather had 
reported another pirate’s desire ‘that Masters would not be Harsh and Severe 
to their Servants’:736 evidently the plight of those oppressed by their superiors 
struck a chord with the puritan divine. The anonymous author of a 1701 
pamphlet was not so credulous: 
The real Cause [of men turning to piracy] is undoubtedly, the general 
depravation of Seamen’s manners, and their little or no sense of 
Religion. The Pretended one, what the Pyrats usually alledge 
themselves, and are such as follow. 
1. The hard usage they met with at home during the War, by being 
press’d, and haled from their Families like Dogs on board the Men of 
War, and then for little or no faults cruelly beat and abus’d by their 
Officer…737 
Whether the abuse of seamen by their captains in legitimate service was a 
reason for turning pirate or an excuse, the implicit corollary is that discipline 
and punishment were more lax, less brutal, and less regular on pirate ships 
than on ships in legitimate service. In fact, however, the severity of the 
discipline meted out by naval and merchant captains has been questioned by 
historians. 
The first codified naval regulations were not put into force until 1731, but at 
that time were largely based on rules that had previously been in use but not 
collected in one publication.738 These regulations did not replace the criminal 
law of the land, but added to it, including nearly twenty extra offences 
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punishable by death.739 Nicholas Rodger has persuasively argued that, 
despite the apparent severity of the regulations in punishing often minor 
offences, Naval officers often preferred to exercise discretion in the 
application of punishments. Seamen accused of relatively serious offences 
which, by the regulations, warranted court martial proceedings, were punished 
with a dozen lashes, avoiding troublesome courts martial where the culprit 
might be sentenced to hundreds of lashes or death. Even when courts martial 
were convened there was a great deal of leeway employed, improbable 
excuses were accepted by judges who wanted to avoid the imposition of the 
death penalty, and legal loopholes were found to the benefit of the accused. 
Some men were punished severely, of course, and the death sentence was 
handed down with regularity, but in general naval discipline of the eighteenth 
century was characterised by ‘relative leniency and great flexibility’.740 
Discipline on merchant vessels was much less codified, relying instead on the 
often ill-defined ‘custom of the sea’ which, it was generally accepted by 
masters and men alike, required seamen to obey the master’s ‘commands in 
all lawful matters relating to the navigation of the ship and the preservation of 
good order’. Seamen who failed to obey the master’s commands could be 
punished at the master’s discretion or, on occasion, after a ‘consultation’ 
amongst the ship’s officers which took a form similar to a naval court martial, 
with confinement, flogging, or one of a variety of minor ‘corrections’, which will 
be outlined below.741 
An impression of the frequency and severity of naval punishment in the 
seventeenth century is gleaned from the diary of Henry Teonge. In the 
eighteen months that Teonge served as chaplain of HMS Assurance, between 
27 May 1675 and 17 November 1676, he recorded only four incidents of 
corporal punishment being meted out: two men who stole beef from the ship’s 
store were tied to the main mast for two hours with a piece of beef hanging 
around each of their necks, which every member of the crew rubbed in their 
faces in turn; two men and a boy guilty of swearing were trussed up for an 
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hour on deck, each with an iron marlinspike tied in their mouths; on ‘Black 
Monday’ the ship’s boys were ‘whipped with a cat with nine tails for their 
misdemeanours, by the boatswain’s mate’; and one man who went on shore 
without permission was ducked in the sea. Earlier in the voyage another man 
was found ashore without leave and sentenced to a ducking, but while he was 
stood on the side of the ship with his hands tied awaiting his punishment, 
some of the officers argued that since he was a known cuckold ‘he had 
injuries enough already as having a wife a whore and a scold to injure him at 
home, ergo had the more need to be pitied abroad’, and he was reprieved.742 
In general, the chances of being reprieved under naval law were higher than 
the chances of being reprieved under criminal law ashore: the number of 
actual executions following death sentences ashore varied according to time 
and location, but averaged at around 50 percent in the eighteenth century, 
while under naval discipline the figure was around 5 percent in the same 
period.743 
Of the punishments mentioned by Teonge, by far the most severe, it would 
appear, was the flogging of boys with a cat o’ nine tails for their petty 
misdemeanours, which seems paradoxically harsh considering the far milder 
punishments inflicted for the relatively serious offences of theft and 
unauthorised absence, and it therefore deserves further examination. Much 
has been written of the brutality of naval floggings with the feared cat o’ nine 
tails. By Nelson’s day, tradition had it that a cat o’ nine tails had tails 
measuring two feet long, capable of reducing a man’s back to a ‘discoloured, 
raw-beef-hued appearance’, so that one observer reckoned ‘they had better 
shoot a man at once: it would be greater lenity’.744 Flogging boys for their 
boyish offences, had this truly been the effect of the cat o’ nine tails, seems 
unreasonably harsh. However, when Hogarth’s idle ‘prentice was turned away 
and sent to sea in 1747, he was taunted in the boat which carried him off to 
his ship with a cat whose tails were only a few inches long (Figure 5). While 
no doubt unpleasant enough, it would hardly have been capable of inflicting 
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the injuries of its longer-tailed cousin. It is probable then, that the cat o’ nine 
tails used to whip boys on Teonge’s ship was not the fearsome instrument of 
popular lore. This view is supported by Nathaniel Butler, who wrote in the 
early part of the seventeenth century that 
the waggery and idleness of the ship boys [is] paid by the Boatswain with 
the rod. And commonly this execution is done upon the Monday 
mornings, and is so frequently in use that some mere seamen and 
sailors believe in good earnest that they shall not have a fair wind until 
the poor boys be duly brought to the chest; that is, be whipped every 
Monday morning.745 
Figure 5. William Hogarth, The Idle ‘Prentice turn’d away and sent to sea, c. 
1747 
 
 
By Teonge’s day the rod had been replaced with a whip, but the effect was 
the same. Both writers described ‘Black Monday’ in much the same spirit as 
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they might have described a schoolboy being caned by a master, or a lazy 
apprentice being thrashed.746 In this sense, the flogging of ships’ boys was 
less a punishment per se than an educational encouragement. To raise a 
wind it was not unheard of for boys to be made to flog one another, and one 
seaman recalled a practice known as ‘running the hoop’ in which the ship’s 
boys had ‘their left hand tyed to a hoop, and in their right hand a cat-of-Nine-
Tails to flog the boy before them’.747  
Discipline in the merchant service could be hard, and Rediker has illustrated 
ample cases of sadistic cruelty and excessive violence on the part of 
merchant officers against their men, but notes that they were ‘extreme cases, 
and in fact are preserved among admiralty records because they represented 
transgressions of both custom and law’. In general, discipline on 
merchantmen was characterised by paternalism rather than sadism, and the 
presence of cases of cruelty in Admiralty Court records shows that cruelty 
occurred on occasion, but was generally kept in check by the law as well as 
the masters’ own attitudes.748 
Ashore in England the severity of the punishment of criminals, and the 
number of crimes for which they could be punished, increased throughout the 
period. The ‘Bloody Code’, as English criminal law was known, gradually 
became more encompassing and the number of felonies which carried the 
death penalty grew from fifty, in 1688, to 160 by 1765, with around fifty capital 
felonies being added in May 1723 with the passage of the notorious Black 
Act.749 But on land, as at sea, the number of offences for which a sentence of 
death could be imposed in theory bore little relation to the number of 
executions actually carried out. Certainly, many men and women were 
hanged or suffered lesser punishments for a variety of crimes, but  
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it would be a travesty of eighteenth-century history to suggest that the 
grisly ritual at Tyburn was inevitable and unending. One hundred 
executions a year in England was thought to be the limit the [Bloody] 
Code could order without bringing the entire notion of justice into 
disrepute. Judges and juries mitigated the law’s sanguinary provisions by 
discretionary actions. Often juries would flagrantly flout the evidence 
placed before them in order to avoid sending a felon to the gallows.750 
Patterns of law enforcement and judicial punishment in the American colonies 
are harder to summarise, largely because there was no uniform code of law 
applicable across the colonies and the relative youth of the colonies 
themselves meant that their systems of law were in a process of rapid 
evolution throughout the period, so that  
From a modern and somewhat ahistorical perspective… to choose 
between living in New Haven or Maryland in the seventeenth century 
would have been to choose between tyranny and chaos.751 
In puritan New England the greatest concern was with offences against 
morals which could be punished with excessive severity, such as the man 
who was executed in the New Haven colony for public masturbation, and 
similar trends can be detected in other ‘religious’ colonies, such as Quaker 
Pennsylvania where, for a few years at the turn of the eighteenth century, 
sodomy and rape could theoretically be punished by castration.752 For most of 
the seventeenth century the colonies of New York, Maryland, and Virginia 
were marked by a certain level of lawlessness and the regular operational 
failure of law enforcement, and little heed was paid to moral offences: for 
example, only one conviction for fornication occurred in Maryland throughout 
the whole of the seventeenth century. Crimes against person or property were 
considered more serious offences, but even so, the punishment of them was 
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often haphazard and more often than not took the form of restitution and 
public service rather than penal sentences.753 
In most of the colonies, the sentencing of convicted criminals was tempered, 
as in England, by the discretion of judges and juries. In Massachusetts, over 
twenty-five offences were prescribed sentences in the 1648 code, Laws and 
Liberties of Massachusetts, ranging from small fines for swearing to fifteen 
offences for which the death penalty was imposed, but also included scope for 
‘such punishment as the Court of Assistants or County Court shall think meet 
to inflict.’754 In Pennsylvania, judicial castration was never actually carried out, 
and forty-eight percent of death sentences ended with pardon or reprieve 
during the course of the colony’s existence. Sentences requiring the forfeiture 
of property were sometimes mitigated by the jury finding that the defendant 
‘hath no goods or chattels’, and often floggings could be avoided by the 
alternative payment of a fine.755 In North Carolina in the eighteenth-century 
three quarters of cases brought before the courts ended in acquittal or 
dismissal.756 
This, then, is the backdrop against which pirates’ notions of crime and 
punishment must be measured. In Britain, the colonies, and at sea, codes of 
law often called for strict punishment of offences, many of which were quite 
trivial by modern standards, but which left plenty of opportunity for leniency. A 
proper understanding of pirates’ systems of crime and punishment must be 
based on comparison with the same systems in legitimate society which were 
frequently inconsistent. At one end of the scale on land, a man could be 
executed for public masturbation while, at the other end of the scale, a stolen 
purse containing several guineas could be valued by a jury at less than forty 
shillings in order to secure a less severe punishment for the convicted thief 
than their capital crime would otherwise have warranted.757 The collective 
experience of pirates encompassed all of these variations: pirates like Ned 
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Low who, according to Johnson, grew up with a career-criminal brother and 
himself operated a juvenile extortion racket,758 would have been familiar with 
the English judicial system from the point of view of the petty criminal; the 
many pirates who at one time or another inhabited the colonies would each 
have had very different experiences of the process of law; and there can be 
little doubt that the majority of pirates were intimately familiar with naval 
punishments and the discipline of merchantmen. 
This chapter will consider how these experiences were combined, adopted, 
and altered by pirates to form their own codes of law and, especially, 
punishment. By examining the nature of the crimes legislated against in the 
pirates’ articles, it will address the issue of what constituted unacceptable 
behaviour. By exploring the nature of punishments specified in the articles, 
and comparing them to punishments employed outside the pirate 
communities, some understanding may be reached concerning the relative 
abhorrence with which certain crimes were viewed, as well as an 
understanding of the previous experiences of different systems of justice 
which influenced the pirates in the creation of their own judicial codes. And by 
exploring the way in which punishments were inflicted, as well as their 
incidence, this chapter will attempt to draw conclusions about the way the 
concepts of crime and punishment were viewed by pirates. It will argue that 
pirates’ codes of punishment were, at times, every bit as harsh as those laid 
down in the statutes of English and colonial law, and naval codes of discipline. 
Further, it will argue that, like other relatively closed communities such as the 
puritan colonies of New England, sentences handed down by a pirate ‘court’ 
were less likely to be mitigated by the discretion and mercy of the judiciary 
than they were in other communities. Finally, it will explore the role of judicial 
punishment in the social construction of the pirate company, and seek to show 
how the articles were used as tools of power and control. 
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5.1. The Process of Justice. 
The chain of events which led a criminal (or indeed, an innocent person) to 
punishment in British and colonial law varied depending on the exact 
circumstances of the crime, and the place where the crime was committed. 
The details of the process were not always the same in the colonies as they 
were in England, Scotland, or in other colonies, nor, for seamen, and 
particularly for those in the Royal Navy, was it necessarily the same process 
as they might experience on land. Nevertheless, an explanation of the 
process can be simplified by examining the common features: trial, conviction, 
and sentencing. 
Criminal trials, especially in England, were affairs of great pomp and 
ceremony, from the judges dressed in scarlet and ermine gowns and full 
bottomed wigs to the constables, attorneys and other officials that made up 
party of the court. Legalistic Latin phraseology added to the mystique of the 
ritual, and the prescribed order of addresses and indictments and the 
eloquence of the speakers all contributed to the ceremony. In the counties, 
the twice-yearly assizes were great occasions of considerable local 
importance. People flocked to the town where the assizes were held, not just 
practitioners of law there to conduct their business, but tradesmen and 
labourers to enjoy the celebration and watch the proceedings. Local worthies 
came out in force, and sent their carriages to act as escorts to the arriving 
judges, who entered the town to the sound of bells and trumpets.759 In 
London, where criminal courts sat more regularly and the sense of occasion 
was presumably diminished as a result, the spectacle was maintained by the 
Old Bailey, site of most trials, being an open-air structure, so that ‘so far as 
the Old Bailey was concerned, “theatre” is less a metaphor than a literal 
description.’760 
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The spectacle of the court was intended to impress onlookers with the 
awesome majesty and power of the judiciary, probably even more than it was 
intended to overawe the defendant, and the point is driven home by the 
opening addresses given by judges. Ostensibly provided as a reminder to the 
jury of the magnitude of the offences with which the defendants were about to 
be charged and the necessity for them to do their duty according to the law, 
the judges’ addresses were generally made in such a way as to similarly 
remind all of the spectators, and indeed the readers of the published accounts 
of criminal trials which regularly appeared, of the power of the law and the 
respect which it ought to be accorded. They were also intended, for the 
benefit of both jury and crowd, to clarify the legal arguments which they, as 
laymen, could not be expected to fully understand in many cases.761 
Following the opening address came the indictments, in which the crimes of 
the defendant were detailed, their nature and the location and date of their 
being committed. This too could be a highly formalised affair, employing 
prescribed formulae of language, and frequent references to religion: many 
crimes apparently were committed by persons ‘not having the fear of God 
before their eyes’. Evidence was then heard for the prosecution, the nature of 
which naturally varied from case to case, but which usually (except, of course, 
in murder trials) involved statements from the victims of the crime as well as 
witnesses, and the defendant was given a chance to cross-examine them. 
When the evidence against them was complete, defendants were invited to 
speak in their own defence and, if they could, call their own witnesses. A 
further speech from the judge usually followed, exhorting the jury to do their 
duty honestly, after which the jury considered their verdict. In the case of a 
guilty verdict, the trial ended with the judge’s sentencing the defendant. 
During the whole process of bringing an accused criminal to justice, from 
identification and prosecution to sentencing, the fate of the accused thus 
rested successively in many hands, from the victim of the crime who, in the 
absence of a regular police force could, in many cases, choose not to 
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prosecute at all, or to settle the matter without going to court,762 to the jury and 
judge who could exercise doubt or leniency, or indeed severity, if they felt so 
inclined.763 When sentence of death was passed down by a judge, a 
defendant might still be able to appeal to some interested party to prevail 
upon the crown for a pardon, or petition the crown directly, in which case their 
fate rested further in the hands of others, who might be merciful or severe as 
circumstances or whim dictated.764 Between crime and punishment there were 
four stages, five in capital cases, at which leniency or mercy might be 
employed – the victim might choose not to prosecute; a judge might choose 
not to try; a jury might acquit or downgrade the crime to one carrying a lesser 
sentence; if they did not then the judge might choose to pardon or mitigate the 
sentence; if a death sentence was given, the crown might decline to ratify it – 
and if mercy was employed at any one of these stages then the process 
stopped. Only if all four (or five) stages were carried out with the full rigour of 
the law was a criminal brought to punishment. Of course, many criminals were 
punished to the full limit of the law, and in England alone around one hundred 
people were hanged each year, but many more who might have been hanged 
were not, and mercy was as much a characteristic of eighteenth-century 
justice as relentless prosecution was.765 
Pirates’ methods of dealing with transgressors from within their own ranks 
were based on the procedures that they had witnessed or experienced in 
legitimate society, but in a much modified form. Although the evidence relating 
to pirate trials is fragmentary and incomplete, the most obvious difference 
between a trial on land and a trial aboard a pirate vessel must have been a 
considerably reduced level of pomp and ceremony. Pirates, like other 
seafarers, had no ready-made courtrooms, and no local worthies flocked in 
their finery to attend a pirate assizes. Even a full Naval court martial was 
carried out with a level of pomp far below that of a court on land.766 Few pirate 
ships, if any, can have contained the necessary scarlet and ermine robes to 
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give the presiding judges the necessary appearance of majesty. Indeed, 
Johnson related that when pirates were play-acting a trial, their judge was 
dressed in a shaggy thrum cap in place of a wig and ‘a dirty Tarpaulin hung 
over his Shoulders’ for a robe.767 The other issue that influenced naval use of 
courts martial, and must have been a consideration for pirates as well, was 
the impairment to efficiency and unprofitable use of time that resulted from 
important officers being tied up for long periods in elaborate trials.768  
Not only were most of the rituals of legitimate trials on land impractical for 
pirates, they would also have been superfluous. One of the main purposes of 
the ceremony of trials on land was to impress upon the onlookers and 
defendants the majesty of the law, the lawmakers, and the bench, and to 
widen the gulf between the judiciary and the populace, giving the judges an 
air of power that was almost holy in appearance.769 If this was effective on 
land, it would have been almost farcical on a pirate ship, where all of those 
present at the trial, including jury, defendant and spectators, all lived in close 
proximity with one another on a day to day basis. Defendant and judge would 
have known each other personally, even intimately, and under other 
circumstances probably called one another by their first names or even 
nicknames. There was every chance that the defendant had sat next to 
members of the jury to eat and drink, and this every-day familiarity must have 
substantially limited the awesome effects of any attempts by pirates to 
incorporate much, if any, of the ‘mummery’ of legitimate courts. 
This is not to say that pirate trials were entirely informal, though some 
doubtless were. As we saw in Chapter 2.2 one of the features of legitimate 
courts that pirates did adopt was the jury of twelve members, and the 
evidence of the presence of juries in trials held aboard a number of different 
pirate ships suggests that the practice was fairly widespread.770 The best 
description of trials held aboard a pirate ship illustrates well the level of 
formality that was possible for them: 
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When a crime has been committed by a member of the band, the 
quarter-master proceeds against him in the name of the law in front of a 
jury of a dozen members, of whom half are chosen by the accused. The 
latter, having presented his defence, retires, and the jurors pronounce 
judgement which the quarter-master executes with fairness and 
impartiality.771 
Pirate juries were not, however, always limited to twelve men, and the 
surviving articles make frequent references to punishments being determined 
by ‘the Captain and the Majority of the Company’. This collective voice in the 
punishment of malefactors, the decisions of which will be explored more fully 
below, is indicative of one of the other major differences between pirate and 
legitimate trials, the personal interest of members of the court in the crime and 
its punishment. 
Unlike crimes committed on land, which might escape punishment through 
mitigating circumstances or the clemency of the judiciary, there was no real 
mechanism in place for mercy to be extended in pirate trials. Certainly there 
was no option of formal pardon, and nor was there likely to be, because in the 
enclosed community of the pirate ship there was no higher authority to which 
convicted wrong-doers could appeal than the court which had convicted them. 
Similarly, since many of the offences covered by the articles were crimes 
against the community there was little or no scope for the ‘victims’ to choose 
not to conduct some form of trial, since any consultation amongst the victims 
over whether to pursue a punishment would have been, de facto, a trial of 
sorts. Transgressions committed against individuals within the pirate 
community might have been overlooked or excused by the victim, but 
offences against the company could not be. And once a pirate was brought to 
trial for some infraction against the articles the jury trying him was always 
made up of members of the company who, naturally, had a personal interest 
in his crime. In John Taylor’s company, whose trial process is quoted above, 
the defendant had the right to choose six of the twelve jurors himself, but 
there was no escaping the fact that pirate jurors could not be entirely 
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disinterested – on land, jurors may not always have been disinterested, but on 
board a pirate ship they never were. The nature of the evidence precludes any 
possibility of a quantitive analysis of acquittals and convictions in pirate trials, 
but such records as there are suggest that few, if any, outright acquittals 
occurred. 
The pirate accused of a crime, then, was on a much more certain path 
towards punishment than his counterpart in a legitimate court, and his only 
real hope of escaping punishment was through the intercession of an 
influential ally. Rowland Sharp, sentenced to be shot by Stede Bonnet’s 
company, was lucky enough to be supported by the boatswain who ‘went 
about to get Hands to beg [him] off’, and Harry Glasby, also sentenced to be 
shot by Bartholomew Roberts’ company, ‘escap’d it only by one of the leading 
Pyrates being his Friend, and bullying the rest’.772 
 
5.2. Punishments.  
The nature of punishments inflicted by legitimate authorities in criminal cases 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries can be broadly described as 
serving one or more of four purposes: retribution against the wrong-doer; 
prevention by example; reform of the wrong-doer; and protection of the 
person, moral sensibilities and property of law-abiding members of society. 
Most common punishments served at least two, and usually more, of these 
purposes. For example, the public execution of a criminal, it was hoped by 
some, would serve as a warning to others not to imitate the offence,773 but 
alongside the deterrent effect execution was at least partly retributive by its 
very nature and, also by its very nature, helped to protect the law-abiding, if 
only in a very limited way, by permanently removing a known criminal from the 
community. It did not, could not, contribute to the moral reform of the criminal 
of course. On the other hand, a death sentence that was subsequently 
commuted to a lesser punishment such as transportation might have given the 
condemned time and reason to reflect on the folly of law-breaking, while still 
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serving the purposes of retribution and protection of the innocent, but at the 
same time reducing (though not eliminating) the deterrent effect of the 
punishment.774 
In practice, almost all forms of punishment imposed by courts in legitimate 
society served all four purposes to some degree or another. Any punishment 
which was unpleasant for the culprit served as a deterrent to some extent, and 
any deterrent effect that a punishment had worked, at least indirectly, towards 
the protection of the law-abiding. Unpleasant punishments, and surely all 
punishments are unpleasant, also served a retributive end, and it was to be 
hoped that by suffering a punishment the criminal might be inspired to behave 
better in the future. The difference between the purposes of different 
punishments was therefore in the emphasis ascribed to each purpose. The 
imposition of a fine, for example, was primarily retributive and, for poorer 
members of society perhaps also helped towards reform, but as a very private 
form of punishment did not necessarily have such an exemplary effect as 
more public punishments might. Corporal punishment, such as a flogging or a 
stint in the pillory, was usually a very public punishment and served as a very 
visual example to others, while also offering the public retribution against the 
criminal, but only served indirectly to reform the criminal or protect the 
innocent. 
Pirate articles specified only four different kinds of punishment, all of which 
had some parallel in legitimate systems of punishment: loss of a share, which 
was roughly comparable with a fine, albeit a large one; flogging or beating, 
which is directly comparable with similar punishments on land and at sea in 
legitimate service; marooning which, as the forcible removal of a wrong-doer 
from the community, can be equated to the transportation of criminals 
employed by legitimate courts; and execution, the effect of which on the 
criminal is ultimately the same whenever it is used as a punishment. Each of 
these punishments, their severity, frequency, and comparison to their 
legitimate counterparts, will be considered here. Additionally, this chapter will 
also address the question of ‘corrections’, that is, informal minor punishments 
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such as a blow with a cane, used on an every-day basis in most ships, and 
indeed many parts of society. 
 
5.2.1. Corrections. 
As Rodger observed, discipline, such as it was on ships in the eighteenth 
century, was largely a product of the  
collective understanding of seamen. A ship at sea under sail depended 
utterly on disciplined teamwork, and any seaman knew without thinking 
that at sea orders had to be obeyed for the safety of all.775 
This is not to say, of course, that officers in the Royal Navy did not chastise, 
verbally and physically, the men under their command for tardiness, 
clumsiness or ignorance, and there was a certain level of violence that was 
acceptable not only to officers but also to the seamen under their command, 
perhaps because they understood so well the very real need for prompt 
obedience and efficiency at sea. A lieutenant who struck a cooper with a stick 
was exonerated because the cooper was idle and drunk, and other similar 
cases illustrate the general acceptance by mariners of a certain amount of 
physical encouragement or ‘starting’.776 
A similar state of affairs existed in merchantmen, where masters and seamen 
both accepted that an officer had the right to ‘lawfully correct in a reasonable 
manner’ dawdling and inefficient seamen, but that ‘there were limits to such 
correction’. Most ships, Earle reckoned, ‘got along with no more than a lot of 
shouting, [and] the occasional punch or blow from a rattan or rope’s end’.777 
Seamen rarely, if ever, objected to the use of informal correction while it 
remained within the limits of the ‘custom of the sea’, which was only loosely 
defined but more or less understood by all. Several of the cases cited by 
Rediker as examples of maritime brutality involve masters or other officers 
exceeding acceptable limits of correction, rather than excessive formal 
punishment for more serious misdemeanours. These cases were brought to 
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court (and thus recorded), not because they involved men being struck by 
their officers, but because they involved men being struck too often, too 
viciously, too many times, or with unusually cruel weapons, and thus 
represent the extreme, the excessive, and the unacceptable. Captains who 
beat their men to the extent that they could not fulfil their duties, or were left 
partially crippled or deformed, or who struck their men with a knife, 
marlinspike, stone jar or dried elephant’s penis, were guilty of overstepping 
the limits of acceptable violence, but a master who gave a man a moderate 
number of strokes with a rope’s end or cane was unlikely to be censured or to 
arouse the enmity of his men.778 
Given the arguments, outlined at the beginning of this chapter, that many men 
turned to piracy because of the cruelty of officers in both naval and merchant 
service, it is important to understand this distinction between acceptable and 
unacceptable levels of every day ‘correction’ when considering the way in 
which similar corrections were used on board pirate ships. Just as seamen in 
legitimate service accepted a certain level of physical violence as being a 
necessary, or at least customary, part of life aboard ship, so, it seems, did 
pirates. John Taylor ‘struck left and right’ to resolve quarrels, but ‘was well 
loved by his people’,779 and nobody seems to have complained when Taylor’s 
predecessor, Cocklyn, rebuked some of the newer members of his company 
who expressed their apprehension before a battle, ‘and caned them 
heartily.’780 In Roberts’ company, William Main, the boatswain, acted ‘briskly 
on all Occasions on Board the Pyrate Ship, like a  Man of War’s Officer’, 
which included beating men ‘for not being brisk enough’, and the cooper, 
Abraham Harper, ‘always had a Rattan like an Officer in his Hand’, with which 
he directed the men working under him.781 
Minor corrections were so much a part of the accepted lifestyle of seamen that 
on some pirate ships they became almost a joke. Richard Hawkins, captured 
by Spriggs’ company, reported that 
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In the Morning they enquire who was drunk the last Night, and 
whosoever is voted so, must either be at the Mast-Head four Hours or 
receive a Ten-handed Gopty, (or ten Blows in the Britch) from the whole 
Watch. I observ’d it generally fell on one or two particular Men; for were 
all to go aloft that were fuddle over Night, there would be but few left to 
look out below. They seldom let the Man at Mast-Head cool upon it, but 
order him to let down a Rope to hawl up some hot Punch.782 
Like seamen in legitimate service though, pirates were less ready to accept 
what they perceived as excessive or unwarranted violence from their officers, 
and this is best exemplified by the case of Captain Kidd. Kidd was not averse 
to using threats and violence to keep his crew in order, and though they had 
little enough respect for him they put up with it for the most part.783 Kidd really 
lost control of his crew however in the autumn of 1697, and the turning point 
may have been occasioned by Kidd’s striking the gunner of his ship, William 
Moore, with an iron-bound bucket, apparently without any real provocation 
beyond some slightly disrespectful words. The gunner died the following day, 
and the ship’s surgeon attested to the company that the blow with the bucket 
had been the cause of death. From that point on the company often overruled 
Kidd in operational matters, and as soon as an opportunity presented itself all 
but thirteen of the company deserted Kidd’s command. When Kidd was 
brought to trial in 1701, the first indictment against him was not for the piracies 
he had committed, but for the murder of the gunner, and several of the crew 
were prepared to testify against him.784 
 
5.2.2. Losing Shares. 
Monetary fines were one of the least aggressive forms of formal punishment 
available to dispensers of justice in legitimate society, and were imposed for a 
variety of relatively minor, usually ‘civil’, offences. In Britain, theft of goods 
worth less than a shilling, as might minor assaults, for example, might be 
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punishable with a fine.785 Fines, it was stipulated, should not exceed the 
amount that the culprit could afford to pay without endangering his livelihood, 
and if the culprit was unable to pay the required amount the court could order 
instead that they be flogged. A similar system was employed in the colonies 
where, in Massachusetts for example, punishments for public drunkenness 
varied according to whether it was a first, second, or third offence of its kind: 
the first offence being punishable with a fine of ten shillings, the third with a 
fine of thirty shillings, but in the case of those unable to pay, a flogging was 
substituted, with one stroke of the whip being equivalent to one shilling.786 The 
exchange rate in Pennsylvania, where one stroke of the whip was equivalent 
to nine shillings and six pence, was more likely to encourage whipping as a 
punishment, for there fornication and producing a bastard were punishable 
either by twenty-one lashes or a £10 fine. The wide variety of crimes 
punishable in Pennsylvania by a fine is only matched by the staggering 
variation in the size of fines payable. Petty theft and some forms of riot might 
carry a fine of as little as six pence, while offences such as illegally trading 
with Indians or cutting ferry ropes carried a fine of £50, and in extreme cases 
grand larceny might be punished by a fine of over £800.787 
In general, but in the colonies particularly, fining convicted criminals was an 
attractive form of punishment for magistrates and justices. In the first place, 
fines could form a significant part of the local revenue which, when public 
money was relatively scarce, made fines one of the few punishments that 
actually served a positive purpose, by strengthening the local economy and 
funding public works. Secondly, the imposition of a fine was thought to be a 
truly effective deterrent. And thirdly, it did not reduce the manpower available 
in the area, as flogging, imprisonment, and execution did. In Pennsylvania, the 
imposition of fines in some cases actually served to augment the indentured 
workforce, because in the case of an indentured servant being unable to pay 
a fine, it could be paid by their master in exchange for in increase in the term 
of the indenture. 
                                                 
785
 McLynn, Crime and Punishment, pp. 91, 281 
786
 Cahn, ‘Punishment’, p. 133 
787
 Fitzroy, ‘Punishment of Crime’, pp. 262-263 
 257 
At sea, the protection of the available manpower was an even greater 
concern, but fining was a less practical punishment to impose because the 
ability of a seaman to pay a fine was largely dependent on their employer 
paying them. The solution was to withhold wages or shares as an equivalent 
to a fine, though small fines might still be payable for very minor offences. 
Men who swore or blasphemed aboard Elizabethan privateers, for example, 
were required to ‘pay a penny for every oath to the poor man’s box’,788 
another example of fines being used for the public good. In general, though, 
larger fines had to be taken from the wages that were due to a seaman rather 
than from the small change in his pocket. Withholding pay was not a common 
punishment in the Navy, but it occurred occasionally, as, for example, when 
some officers lost their pay and two petty officers were sentenced to ‘forfeit all  
pay due to them’ as well as receive a flogging for concealing a mutiny in 
1698.789 In merchantmen, however, fines were regularly used. Stoppage of 
pay when the seamen were held responsible for damaged or perished cargo 
was commonplace, but more often than not this was a deduction taken from 
the wages of the whole crew rather than individuals.790 Fines were also used 
against individuals who transgressed the shipboard rules or damaged ship’s 
equipment, the most common being a fine of 2s 6d for each unauthorised 
night spent ashore.791 
Aboard privateers, who were usually paid by shares, the loss of part or all of 
their share was equivalent to a fine, and the same system was used by 
buccaneers of the seventeenth century. Raveneau de Lussan related how the 
buccaneers of his acquaintance ‘enacted orders whereby those were 
condemned to lose their share of the booty got in the place, that should be 
found guilty of Cowardice, Violence, Drunkenness, Disobedience, Theft, and 
straggling from the main body without orders.’792 Woodes Rogers’ articles, 
adopted by George Shelvocke’s company, stipulated the loss of a share, of 
the plunder only, for a variety of offences including drunkenness in action, 
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disobedience, cowardice, and concealing plunder. Pirates like Captain Kidd 
and his company, who began their cruise operating under privateering 
articles, and retained the same articles when they degenerated into piracy, 
would therefore have been familiar with the use of fines to punish some 
offences. Like Rogers’ and Shelvocke’s articles, Kidd’s articles specified loss 
of share as a punishment for disobedience, drunkenness (specifically, before 
any prisoners taken were secured – presumably drunkenness in the aftermath 
of battle was acceptable), cowardice, and theft from the company, as well as 
mutiny or riot aboard ship. 
Other pirates, who had no pre-formulated privateering articles to fall back on, 
also specified the loss of a share as a punishment for various infractions. 
Anstis’ company’s articles specified that ‘If any p[er]son or p[er]sons should be 
found guilty of neglecting in keeping their Arms clean unfitting for an 
Engagement [he] shall lose his share or shares.’ John Philips’ articles 
prescribed the same punishment for the same offence, but left the clause 
open for the culprit to receive an additional unspecified punishment as well. 
John Taylor’s articles imposed the biggest fine of all by specifying that any 
pirate who failed to hand over plunder to the quartermaster was to forfeit ‘all 
possessions to the good of the company,’ as well as being flogged. This 
combination of fining alongside another punishment for pirates, and indeed for 
some privateers, such as Kidd, who also imposed fines in addition to another 
punishment, did not prioritise the preservation of manpower as highly as other 
groups who imposed fines as an alternative to other punishments. For mutiny 
and disobedience, Kidd’s articles specified a fine in addition to ‘corporall 
punishment’, and those who stole from the company were fined and 
marooned. The other benefit of fining, then, the swelling of the communal 
coffers, was apparently much more significant to the pirates, and with good 
reason. Since all of the money accrued by a pirate company eventually found 
its way into the pockets of the company itself rather than some external 
authority or the ship’s owners, the fining of one man meant an increase in the 
size of share for everybody else. There was therefore a certain amount of 
cupidity involved in the system, and its attraction to pirates was rooted in 
direct personal advantage. 
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5.2.3. Flogging. 
Flogging has popularly been seen as a peculiarly maritime form of 
punishment, but the application of the whip to punish a variety of crimes and 
misdemeanours was more or less universal in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. We have seen that in England and the colonies flogging 
could be ordered as an alternative or supplement to a fine, but it could be, 
and was, administered as a punishment in its own right. Sometimes the 
flogging was administered behind the walls of a prison, but more often it was 
a public spectacle, in which the culprit was tied to the back of cart and 
paraded through the streets, while the public hangman or a constable 
administered the flogging as they travelled along a prescribed route. 
Opponents of public flogging drew attention to the arbitrariness of the 
punishment, for there were many variables that could determine the severity 
of each individual flogging: no number of strokes was specified by civilian 
courts, so the number of lashes each culprit had to endure could depend on 
how quickly or slowly the cart was drawn, and the injury inflicted by each lash 
could be varied according to the temper of the man responsible for 
administering the punishment. The variety of crimes for which a flogging was 
ordered was similarly varied, from petty thefts to incest or body-snatching.793 
In the colonies there seems to have been a greater effort to regulate the 
practice of flogging and for the most part specific crimes were punishable by a 
specific number of strokes with the whip. In the colonies, flogging was 
considered  
the method best adapted to frontier conditions; it was expeditious, 
following immediately on the sentence; it was extremely painful and was 
therefore a punishment to be avoided; and the fact that floggings were 
public gave this penalty a further deterrent quality. However, it had the 
virtue of releasing the culprit for work to be done within a reasonable 
time, and it was especially attractive to the propertied magistrate, 
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because, unlike imprisonment, it did not burden the taxpayers with the 
costs of maintenance.794 
It may have been the relative popularity of flogging as a form of punishment 
that led to its stricter regulation in the colonies. In Massachusetts, only the 
‘vitious and profligate’ could be flogged, and the number of strokes was 
restricted to the Biblical precedent of forty.795 In Pennsylvania, rape was 
punishable by 39 lashes, a somewhat traditional number, specified so that in 
the event of an accidental miscounting the number of strokes actually applied 
would not exceed the Biblical forty, and the same punishment was inflicted for 
other offences such as horse-theft, serious perjury, and a second conviction 
for theft. Pennsylvanian Quakers may have been less pious than New 
England Puritans, because some crimes merited more than the prescribed 
forty lashes: a third conviction for theft was punishable by up to fifty strokes, 
for example. Usually, floggings were administered at the public whipping post, 
but on occasion were carried out ‘at the cart tail’ as in England, but even then 
the actual number of strokes as well as the route was specified, such as ‘one 
square of the city of Philadelphia with five lashes on his bare back at each 
corner’. Moreover, the arbitrariness of the severity of each stroke was 
reduced by enjoinders that floggings should be administered ‘on the bare 
back well laid on’.796 
In the Royal Navy too, regulation of floggings removed some of the 
arbitrariness inherent in civilian floggings. Officially, captains were limited to 
sentencing seamen to a maximum of twelve lashes on their own authority, 
and serious offences meriting more serious punishment had to be referred to 
a court martial. In practice, captains often exceeded the twelve-stroke 
maximum, but rarely ordered more than twenty-four. Courts martial could 
order several hundred lashes if they felt it the appropriate punishment for the 
crime, but these tended to be exceptional cases, and in general captains 
preferred to avoid troublesome court martial proceedings if possible. 
However, the points remain, that whether imposed by a captain on his own 
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authority or by a court martial, the number of lashes was specified and they 
were applied with an almost ceremonial formality, and that for ‘every-day’ 
offences the Royal Navy seaman was unlikely to suffer more than two dozen 
strokes, and often fewer.797 
Formal punishment by flogging on merchantmen was likely to  be less 
frequent, but perhaps no less severe, than in the Royal Navy. The need for 
discipline was the same in both merchant and naval vessels, but generally 
higher wages offered aboard merchantmen and the entirely volunteer nature 
of their crews probably served to reduce the incidence of criminal activity and 
thus the incidence of formal punishment. Peter Earle’s analysis of floggings 
ordered aboard East-Indiamen and slavers of the eighteenth century paints a 
picture of harmony in which floggings were a relatively unusual occurrence, 
only 37 floggings being ordered in twenty years’ voyages. Nevertheless, when 
floggings were ordered these tended to be in the same order of severity as 
those ordered in the Royal Navy: a man found stealing water while the ship 
was on short allowance was sentenced to thirty lashes, and his three 
accomplices sentenced to ten each; five recaptured deserters received a 
dozen lashes each; thirty-six strokes were ordered for a man who sold ship’s 
supplies for his own profit; and a mutinous petty-officer on a slaver was given 
‘two dozen stripes’. Taken as a whole, the recorded punishments analysed by 
Earle suggest that twelve was the most common number of lashes ordered 
aboard merchantmen.798  
By contrast, the use of flogging by pirates was likely to be both more arbitrary 
than in the Royal Navy and more severe than on naval or merchant ships. 
Thomas Anstis’ and John Philips’ articles are the only ones to specify the 
number of lashes to be inflicted, in both cases ‘Moses Law (that is 40 stripes 
lacking one) on the bare Back’, for carelessly risking fire on the vessel or, in 
the case of Anstis, gambling, and in the case of Philips, brawling. There is no 
suggestion that this represented a maximum number that could be inflicted, it 
was simply the stipulated punishment for crimes which, in legitimate society, 
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were unlikely to be punished so severely. ‘That man that shall strike another’ 
would, provided the assault were not a serious one, probably suffer a fine on 
land, or a dozen lashes in the Royal Navy. The relative severity of these 
punishments is probably indicative of the increased threat they posed to 
members of a fragile pirate community, where the creation of factions could 
be disastrous.  
The other articles that mention flogging as a form of punishment, Kidd’s and 
Taylor’s, make no specification about the number of strokes that could be 
applied. In some cases this may have meant that lesser infractions were 
punished by fewer strokes, but equally, there was no upper limit to the 
number that could be administered. It is also probable that some pirate 
companies, whose articles have not survived, used flogging as a form of 
punishment, such as Stede Bonnet’s company, in which two ‘Men was 
ordered to the Mast to be whipt’ for an unspecified offence,799 or Thomas 
Cocklyn’s, who voted their boatswain to be flogged for mistreating a prisoner 
in contravention of ‘that Maxim strictly established amongst them’. In the 
boatswain’s case, it was the fact that he had broken the articles rather than 
his mistreatment of the prisoner that raised the pirates’ ire against him, 
though Snelgrave, the prisoner in question, ‘thought it prudent to plead for 
him’ and, arguing that drunkenness was the cause of the boatswain’s 
behaviour, successfully had his sentence commuted to a general rebuke.800  
That flogging, even when not specified by the articles, was a common 
punishment is attested to by the number of floggings ordered by various 
pirate companies, and when unrestricted by the regulation of the articles, 
pirate floggings could be severe. Peter Hooff, recaptured after attempting to 
desert Bellamy’s company ‘was severely whipped,’801 and the chief mate of 
the Lloyd Galley, captured by Roberts’ company in 1721, was ‘brought… to 
the Gears, and Whipt… within an inch of his life.’802 This may well be 
hyperbole, but the excessive number of lashes inflicted by, and upon, 
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members of Roberts’ company is well attested to. At the Cape Corso trial of 
the survivors of Roberts’ company, witnesses testified that Benjamin Jeffrys 
‘had 6 Lashes of every Man’. Shortly before that punishment was delivered 
Roberts’ company, split over two ships, was reckoned to consist of ‘250 Men 
and 50 Negroes’ in one ship, and ‘46 Men and 20 Negroes’ in the other. 
Depending on whether the witness was including black men or not, and 
whether or not both ship’s crew were present at the flogging, the total number 
of lashes might have been anything from 1,500 to over 2,000. Not 
surprisingly, Jeffrys  ‘sicken’d, and continu’d so three or four months’ after the 
punishment.803 Jeffrys claimed that the flogging had been inflicted on him for 
decrying the pirates’ criminal ways, but that was most likely a poor attempt to 
influence the court in his favour, and his actual crime was probably something 
far more serious. According to Johnson, a few months earlier, Thomas Jones 
(who himself probably related the story to Johnson) threw Captain Roberts 
over a gun and beat him, for which he was sentenced to only ‘two Lashes 
from every one of the Company’.804 According to one of his later victims, 
Jones in turn was wont to order excessive punishments: two men who 
attempted to desert from Anstis’ crew were sentenced by a jury, of which 
Jones was a member, ‘to receive five hundred Lashes each’.805 Such 
punishments were not limited to Roberts and his associates however: Charles 
Dimmock, mate of the Perry Galley, testified that when he was captured by 
pirate Joseph Cooper and his company in the Night Rambler, he was ‘tied to 
the Geers, and received two hundred Lashes with a Cat and nine Tails, which 
the Prisoner Upton had made for that Purpose; after which they pickled 
me.’806 A forced man in Spriggs’ company was asked whether he would 
prefer to stay with the company or take the opportunity to leave onboard a 
merchantman they had captured. On answering that, given the choice, he 
would prefer to leave, ‘Yes, yes, they said, you shall go, and we will give you 
your Discharge on your Back; whereupon he was sentenced to receive ten 
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Lashes with a Mannatie Strap from every Man and Boy in the Ship, which 
was rigorously executed.’807 
 
5.2.4. Marooning. 
Marooning, that is the forced expulsion of a member of a pirate company, 
usually onto an uninhabited island or stretch of coast, while not entirely unique 
to pirates, was a practice employed often enough by them, and rarely enough 
by others, to have influenced their very language. In their articles, for 
example, Thomas Anstis’ company referred to themselves and other pirates 
as ‘marooners’, and Thomas Jones described how they determined to ‘to live 
a marooning Life’.808 When Woodes Rogers arrived to take up the government 
of the Bahamas he ‘was received with a great deal of seeming Joy, by those 
that stile themselves Marrooners,’809 and one pirate company even ‘had a 
Ship of thirty Guns, called, the Murrune galley’.810 
Forms of marooning did occasionally occur in merchant shipping, such as the 
case of Thomas Powell, who was put ashore in West Africa with ‘nothing upon 
him but a shirt, wastcoate, a cap, a hat, a pair of trousers, and pair of shoes 
and a pair of buckles’.811 In the Royal Navy, marooning was virtually unheard 
of, and on the exceptional occasions when it did occur was enough to ruin 
professionally the officers involved.812 Nevertheless, despite occasional 
incidents of marooning in legitimate seafaring service, it was not a practice 
that ever gained much popularity and, for the most part, remained a 
characteristic ‘pirate’ punishment. 
On land, however, the principal of marooning, that is, the physical removal of 
a troublesome criminal from society, and his relocation to a distant 
environment, found expression in the practice of transporting criminals from 
England to the colonies. From the early seventeenth century, when the 
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transportation of convicts began, the system was employed by courts as a 
useful half-measure between execution and pardon, but the number of 
criminals actually transported remained fairly low.813 From the middle of the 
seventeenth century onwards transportation was seen not only as a way of 
punishing malefactors, but also as a way of removing large numbers of 
political undesirables, such as the 850 or so of the Duke of Monmouth’s 
adherents who were transported in the wake of his failed uprising, mostly to 
the Caribbean colonies.814 In the second half of the seventeenth century the 
number of criminals transported to the American colonies, both the Caribbean 
island colonies and those in the North American mainland, was in excess of 
4,500.815 The Transportation Act of 1718 brought about radical changes in the 
number of felons sentenced to be transported to the colonies, which rose to 
around 30,000 people in the first half of the eighteenth century. Following the 
introduction of the act, ‘judges began to use transportation sentences routinely 
unless good cause could be shown why’ some other form of punishment was 
more appropriate.816 Even in the colonies, whence transported convicts were 
sent from England, banishment could be used as an alternative to the death 
penalty and in eighteenth-century Pennsylvania, for example, a high 
proportion of convicted felons were pardoned on the condition that ‘the guilty 
party leave the province never more to return’.817 
When a pirate determined to make a man ‘Governor of the first Island he 
came to’,818 it could be a very formal affair. Anstis’ and Philips’ articles both 
stipulate that a marooned man should be supplied with ‘one Bottle of Powder, 
one Bottle of Water, one small Arm and shot’. It has been suggested that the 
gun and powder were provided so that the marooned man could take his own 
life in preference to dying of starvation or thirst,819 and if that were the case 
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then supplying a marooned man was a cruel refinement intended to prolong 
his agony. However, the fact that he was also given a bottle of powder 
suggests that marooning was not intended to be a certain death sentence, 
and that by supplying a marooned man with enough water to survive, even 
though perhaps only for a few days, and enough ammunition to kill more than 
just himself, pirates were giving a marooned man a fighting chance of survival. 
If he could survive a few days on his wilderness island, a marooned man 
might have a chance to find fresh water and learn what food stuffs the island 
could provide, before he died of thirst or hunger. Deserters from John Taylor’s 
company who were ‘condemned to have their ears and noses slit and be 
marooned naked on a deserted island’ stood less chance of survival, but for 
the most part, marooned pirates were not sure to die on their islands. The 
essential idea that a marooned pirate was expected to survive was made 
clear by Johnson, when he wrote 
if they Defrauded the Company to the Value of a Dollar, in Plate, Jewels, 
or Money, Marooning was their Punishment. This was a barbarous 
Custom of putting the Offender on Shore, on some desolate or 
uninhabited Cape or Island, with a Gun, a few Shot, a Bottle of Water, 
and a Bottle of Powder, to subsist with, or starve. If the Robbery was 
only betwixt one another, they contented themselves with slitting the 
Ears and Nose of him that was Guilty, and set him on Shore, not in an 
uninhabited Place, but Somewhere, where he was sure to encounter 
Hardships.820 
Johnson’s description of marooning, especially the idea that the victim was to 
‘subsist or starve’ was probably culled from the trial testimony of Joseph More, 
which described marooning in almost exactly the same words, and further 
added that marooning was a punishment roughly equivalent to receiving two 
lashes from each member of the company.821  
In this sense, then, marooning might be viewed in comparison to sentences of 
transportation imposed by legitimate courts. The culprit was guilty of an 
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offence that warranted a harsher sentence than a regular flogging or other 
corporal punishment, but not so villainous as to justify execution, and so they 
were removed by society from their respective community and deposited in a 
place where life would be hard, but not impossible. 
While some pirates who suffered marooning for their infractions against their 
comrades surely died, alone on their island, the records naturally speak most 
strongly of those who survived to tell their tale. Samuel Burgess, for example, 
was turned out of his position as quartermaster and marooned on the coast of 
Madagascar in August 1691, for supposedly cheating the company over 
provisions. In March the following year, though ‘destitute of Cloaths and the 
very Necessaries of Life and without any meanes to obtaine a reasonable 
sufficiencie’ thereof, he was still alive when his old ship arrived back on the 
coast and he was allowed to rejoin the company.822 Edward England, 
deposed from his command for showing perhaps too much humanity to a 
prisoner with whom he had formerly been acquainted, was at the same time 
marooned on Madagascar. He managed to join up with another former pirate, 
John Plantain, who had set himself up as ruler of a petty kingdom, and with 
whom he lived for a while, but ‘being very weak… he did not live above a 
Month’.823 Whether England’s death was ultimately caused by his being 
marooned, or was a natural end, it was not the solitary suicide to avoid 
starvation that is traditionally associated with marooning.  
Even when a man was marooned on an uninhabited island there was no 
certainty that he would die, as is proven by the case of Alexander Selkirk, the 
most widely known desert island denizen of the eighteenth century and 
probable model for Robinson Crusoe. Selkirk was an officer of a privateer, the 
Cinque Ports, engaged on a cruise in the Pacific Ocean when, in the autumn 
of 1704, at the island of Juan Fernandez, he fell out with the captain,824 
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which together with the Ship’s being leaky, made him willing rather to 
stay there than go along with him at first, and when he was at last willing 
to go, the Captain would not receive him.825 
Despite his entreaties, he was not permitted to rejoin the ship and the captain 
ordered ashore ‘his Cloths and Bedding, with a Firelock,826 some Powder, 
Bullets and Tobacco, a Hatchet, a Knife, a Kettle, a Bible, some practical 
Pieces, and his Mathematical Instrumens and Books’. He was therefore better 
provided for than many other marooned men, but not much. The pound of 
gunpowder with which he had been left enabled him to hunt the goats that ran 
wild on the island, and when it ran out he took to chasing them on foot. His 
diet of goats was supplemented with crayfish, turnips, cabbage, and peppers, 
and he shared his goat meat with wild cats that had bred on the island until 
they were tame enough to live with him and protect his feet from the rats 
which gnawed at them while he slept. In all, Selkirk lived alone on Juan 
Fernandez for four years and four months before another privateer, 
commanded by Woodes Rogers, arrived at the island in 1709 and he was 
rescued.827 
The chances of survival for a marooned man could be greatly increased by 
other factors: on occasion groups of men were marooned together and so 
were able to pool their resources and strength, and marooning did not always 
involve a desolate island. Thomas Cocklyn’s company originated when, 
having been with one Captain Moody, a famous Pirate, some Months 
before, in a Brigantine, which sailed very well, and took the Rising Sun, 
they were marooned by him, (as they call it) that is forced on board that 
Ship, and deprived of their share of the Plunder, taken formerly by the 
Brigantine. These People being obliged to go away in her, with little 
Provision and Ammunition, chose Cocklyn for their Commander, and 
made for the River Sierra Leon; where arriving, they surprised in his 
Sloop, one Segnor Joseph, a black Gentleman, who had been formerly 
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in England, and was a Person of good account in this Country. This 
Man’s Ransom procured the Pirates a sufficient supply of Provision and 
Ammunition. Moreover, several Bristol and other Ships arriving soon 
after, were likewise taken.828 
Three men forced by Ned Low’s company into an open boat about eighty 
miles from land also survived their ordeal, ‘having with them a Compass, 
some Water, and a few Biskets, and it being good Weather, they providentially 
got safe to Nantucket, beyond all Expectations’.829 They may not have been 
entirely expected to come through safely, but by providing them with a 
compass and provisions the pirates ensured they had a chance. It is harder to 
discern the intentions or expectations of Blackbeard when he marooned 
seventeen men together ‘on a small Sandy Hill or Bank, a League distant from 
the Main; on which Place there was no Inhabitant, nor Provisions.’830 Only 
three miles from the mainland any resolute swimmer could have gone ashore 
and found a boat for his stranded comrades, but there was no need for 
anyone to do so because,  between the sand bank and the shore, Stede 
Bonnet was anchored with his ship. The marooned men nevertheless spent 
two uncomfortable nights on the sand bank before Bonnet sent a boat to pick 
them up. Why Bonnet waited so long is unclear, but it is fairly certain that 
Blackbeard didn’t intend the marooned men to die. 
If the majority of pirate maroonings were not intended or expected to result in 
the death of the marooned men, that was by no means the case on every 
occasion. When a company of pirates consisting ‘mostly of foreigners’ abused 
English seamen they had captured, it came to the attention of Henry 
Jennings, the ‘commodore’ of the New Providence Flying Gang. Jennings set 
out in pursuit of the foreign pirates and captured them, ‘and afterwards setting 
the Crew on a Rock a few Leagues off Cuba, the Men all perish’d.’831 
Perhaps the most vindictive marooning (in the sense of evicting a man from 
the pirates’ community) of a pirate occurred after John Gow declined battle 
                                                 
828
 Snelgrave, New Account, pp. 196-197 
829
 Weekly Journal or Saturday’s Post, 21/9/1723 
830
 Tryals of Stede Bonnet, p. 46 
831
 Weekly Packet, 19/1/1717 
 270 
with a French merchantman whose spirited crew put up ‘a Shew of Defence’ 
when the pirates tried to capture her. Gow’s lieutenant, James Williams, 
accused him of cowardice and threatened to shoot him. When two of the 
company managed to prevent him carrying out his threat he ran to the powder 
store, apparently with the intention of blowing the ship up. There he was 
apprehended, hand-cuffed, and imprisoned below decks. Two days later the 
pirates took a Bristol ship and, having taken provisions and supplies, agreed 
to let her go, on condition that her captain agreed to take Williams with him 
and hand him over to the authorities on land or transfer him to the first Royal 
Naval vessel he met with at sea. Williams was eventually handed over to 
Captain Bowler of HMS Argyle and carried to England for trial, but in the 
meantime Gow and the rest of the company were captured in the Orkneys 
and arrived in London in time to stand trial with him.832  
 
5.2.5. Execution. 
Gow’s handing over of Williams was certainly intended as a de facto death 
sentence, but that being the case, they could just as easily have shot him, 
hanged him or cut his throat themselves. Why they did not is something of a 
mystery, unless it was pure vindictive spite, for pirates in general were not 
averse to punishing members of their own community with death. In fact, 
execution is mentioned in more sets of articles than any other sentence, and 
it is only absent from Lowther’s articles. 
The pirates’ willingness to execute malefactors mirrored trends then prevalent 
in legitimate judicial systems, where execution was a punishment that could 
be inflicted for a wide variety of offences. The ‘Bloody Code’, as England’s 
judicial code was known, was so-called because of the number of capital 
offences it encompassed, and although, as we have seen, juries and judges 
were often reluctant to impose sentence of death for many offences for which, 
by law, it was prescribed, there were a number of offences for which death 
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was the most usual punishment, including highway robbery, treason, murder, 
burglary, forgery and, of course, piracy.833  
In the colonies, where the Bloody Code was not always in force, the number 
and scope of capital offences differed. When William Penn founded 
Pennsylvania along Quaker principles it was argued by Quaker thinkers that 
the death penalty was unsupportable, and so in Pennsylvania’s first penal 
code it was applied only to the crime of murder, and this remained the case 
until the colony brought its own code more in line with English law in 1718.834 
Puritan Massachusetts, by contrast, was possessed of a code which 
stipulated fifteen capital crimes, which included such moral offences as 
‘cursing or smiting parents, rebelling against one’s father, and raping a “maid 
or single woman”’.835 Capital offences in other colonies followed no set 
pattern: in New Haven men were executed for public masturbation and 
bestiality, but not, apparently, for murder (it may have been that the radical 
Puritanism of the colony and the closed community combined to produce a 
society in which murder did not occur, even when they failed to prevent men 
having sex with pigs), and in Maryland, despite ‘unusually severe 
punishments’, a serious labour shortage meant that convicted thieves who 
might have been executed in England were required only to make 
restitution.836 In virtually all of the colonies in which men (and occasionally 
women) were actually brought to trial for piracy, the sentence of the court was 
invariably death for all or most of the defendants who were found guilty.  
The willingness, even eagerness, of courts on both sides of the Atlantic to 
convict pirates and inflict the supreme punishment upon them can be 
explained by a number of factors. The ancient labelling of pirates as Hostis 
Humani Generis,837 enemies of all mankind, summed up the general attitude 
of the courts towards pirates, ‘with whom neither faith nor oath is to be 
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kept’.838 Their crimes were not only against the individual or his property, but 
against society as a whole. The whole economic stability of Britain and her 
colonies rested in large measure on maritime commerce, and by disrupting 
that commerce pirates were attacking the whole country, and everyone who 
lived within it, and so heinous was the crime that it was ‘allowed to be lawful 
for those who take them, to put them to Death, if they cannot, with Safety to 
themselves, bring them under some Government to be try’d’.839 
Conversely, however, in many ways the very fact that so many of the courts 
which sat to try pirates had a deep seated personal interest in the crimes of 
the pirates made their conviction and subsequent execution virtually assured. 
Throughout the later seventeenth and early eighteenth century many pirates 
were tried in London, and indeed up until the opening years of the eighteenth 
century the mechanisms for trying pirates in the colonies were so unwieldy as 
to make it simpler to send pirates to London for trial than to try them at or 
near the place of their capture. Until Jamaica passed its own piracy law in 
1681, no colony had the jurisdiction to try pirates, which was the prerogative 
of the High Court of Admiralty, and although the Jamaica law was urged on 
other colonies in 1684 the lack of a single encompassing law that covered all 
colonies left plenty of room for doubt.840 In 1690, for example, William 
Coward, arraigned for piracy before a Massachusetts court, did not deny the 
charges against him, but argued that 
The Crimes and offences in the said Indictments supposed to be done 
[and] committed by the said Wm Coward, If any such there were, [were] 
done and Committed in or upon the sea or in some haven, river, Creek, 
or place where the Admiralty hath or pretends to have power, Authority, 
or Jurisdiction etc. not within the Jurisdiction of this Court.841 
The Massachusetts Bay colony at that time had no Royally commissioned 
Vice-Admiral available to exercise the Admiralty’s jurisdiction, and Coward 
walked free. In 1700, however, a new Act made effective provision for the 
                                                 
838
 A Discourse of the Laws Relating to Pirates and Piracies (London, 1726), p. 4 
839
 Discourse of the Laws, pp. 4-5 
840
 Baer, Pirates, p. 25 
841
 Jameson, Privateering and Piracy, p. 166 
 273 
establishment of Vice-Admiralty Courts in the colonies, and trial overseas 
became the norm for pirates captured away from the immediate reach of the 
High Court of Admiralty in London.842 The majority of pirates tried between 
1700 and 1730, then, were tried in the colonies, or occasionally in courts set 
up by naval officers with the single purpose of trying captured pirates, as was 
the case at Cape Corso, Africa, in 1722, when 52 of Roberts’ company were 
convicted and executed by a court presided over by Captain Herdman of 
HMS Weymouth, in the largest mass-execution of pirates of the eighteenth 
century.843  
Colonial Vice-Admiralty courts were invariably presided over by members of 
the colony’s ruling body, or other officials, who naturally had a deep, and 
often personal, interest in the protection of the trade on which their colonies 
relied. 36 ships, of nearly 4,000 tons altogether, were taken by pirates en 
route to or from South Carolina alone between 1717 and 1721, some of them 
by Blackbeard and Bonnet while they lay offshore near Charleston for five or 
six days in 1718.844 The problem of piracy was felt so acutely in South 
Carolina that several private vessels were fitted out at the expense of the 
colony to cruise in search of the pirates. The first expedition, led by  a local 
militia officer, Colonel William Rhett, succeeded in capturing Stede Bonnet, 
and the second, led by Governor Johnson himself and utilising Bonnet’s old 
sloop along with other local vessels, captured Richard Worley and his 
company.845  When Bonnet and his crew were brought to trial the court was 
presided over by the Chief Justice of South Carolina, Nicholas Trott, whose 
zeal and evident bias against the accused during the trial may have been 
rooted in a desire to purge his family name of the opprobrium it attracted 
when his cousin and namesake was embroiled in a scandal involving the 
protection of Every’s company in the Bahamas.846 The ten ‘Assistant Judges’ 
had less familial, but no less personal, concerns in the trial. That eight of them 
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were landowners in South Carolina is not surprising but, given the statistics 
quoted above, meant that they had a vested interest in securing the colony’s 
trade against depredation. Furthermore, of those eight, George Logan was a 
‘prominent merchant’, member of the Governor’s Council and Speaker of the 
Assembly; Benjamin de la Conseillere was a member of the Assembly; 
Samuel Dean and Edward Brailsford were merchants; Alexander Parris was a 
merchant and one-time Receiver of Customs; John Croft was a one-time 
Assistant Collector of Customs and a personal friend of Colonel Rhett. The 
remaining two assistant judges were sea captains, whose ships had been 
used by the colony in the capture of Worley and his company, and whose 
abhorrence of piracy requires no further explanation.847 In the trial of 
Blackbeard’s quartermaster, William Howard, in Virginia, two of the three 
judges were Royal Navy captains, Ellis Brand and George Gordon, who were 
actively involved in pirate-hunting expeditions at the same time,848 and similar 
trends of employing merchants, sea captains, naval officers, and customs 
officials can be found in other colonial piracy trials which resulted in mass 
executions in the early eighteenth century. 
Charles Johnson’s account of the activities of Thomas Anstis and his 
company contains an interesting anecdote which may shed light on the 
pirates’ views on the capital punishment inflicted upon members of their 
community by legitimate courts. While ashore on an uninhabited island near 
Cuba, the pirates conducted mock trials as a form of entertainment, taking it 
in turns to portray the defendant, judges and attorneys. Johnson’s version of 
the event might easily be dismissed as a fanciful, if amusing, fiction, the but 
author himself claimed that he ‘had an Account given me of one of these 
merry Tryals’, and it should be noted that several members of Anstis’ 
company, particularly Thomas Jones, were to be found in London at the very 
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time he was preparing the story for print.849 The ‘judge’ having heard of the 
‘defendant’s’ crimes of piracy, rape and - ‘worse Villainies than all of these’ - 
drinking weak beer, insisted that they proceed straight to sentencing, when 
the defendant  pleaded that the court listen to reason: 
Judge: D’ye hear how the Scoundrel prates? What have we to do with 
Reason? I’d have you know, Raskal, we don’t sit here to hear Reason; 
we go according to Law. Is our Dinner ready? 
Attorney General: Yes, my Lord. 
Judge: Then heark’ee, you Raskal at the Bar; hear me, Sirrah, hear me. 
You must suffer for three Reasons: First, because it is not fit I should sit 
here as Judge, and no Body be hang’d. Secondly, you must be hang’d, 
because you have a damn’d hanging Look: and thirdly, you must be 
hang’d, because I am hungry; for know, Sirrah, that ‘tis a Custom, that 
whenever the Judge’s Dinner is ready before the Tryal is over, the 
Prisoner is to be hang’d of Course. There’s Law for you, ye Dog. So take 
him away Gaoler.850 
This somewhat comic view of the legal process that led to execution must be 
tempered by the observation that pirates were not the only people in the early 
eighteenth century who took such a view. Alexander Pope, for example, wrote 
that ‘wretches must hang, that jurymen may dine’, and at least one modern 
historian has observed that a  
well-known problem about trials on capital charges was that they usually 
took place in the afternoon, after the jurymen had dined and drunk 
liberally. Many fell asleep during the proceedings and were prodded 
awake merely to give a verdict on evidence they had not heard.851 
Given that pirates lived so surely in the shadow of the noose, and were 
apparently so aware of the fact, it is small wonder that they so readily 
embraced the death penalty in their own legal codes. What is remarkable, 
however, given the very personal nature of the prosecution of pirates in 
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legitimate courts, is that the transgressions for which pirate articles prescribed 
the death penalty were frequently those committed by pirates against people 
who were not part of their own community, rather than crimes committed 
against one another. John Taylor’s articles, for example, prescribed death for 
the mistreatment of prisoners who had surrendered, and according to 
Johnson it was written in Davis’ articles ‘that Quarters should be given 
whenever it was called for, upon Pain of Death’, which was adopted to some 
extent by Cocklyn’s company who had a ‘Maxim established amongst them, 
not to permit any ill usage to the Prisoners after Quarter given’.852 The crime 
for which death was most commonly prescribed in the pirates’ articles was 
rape or the mistreatment of female prisoners (which presumably amounted to 
much the same thing). The ‘good political rule’ established by Cocklyn’s 
company, not to force women taken at sea ‘against their inclinations’ was 
obeyed ‘on pain of death’,853 and Anstis’ articles stipulated that ‘if any p[er]son 
or p[er]sons shall go on board of a Prize and meet with any Gentlewoman or 
Lady of Honour and should force them against their will to lie with them shall 
suffer death.’. John Philips, who adopted many of the articles he was familiar 
with from his time in Anstis’ company, also had enshrined in his own articles 
that ‘if at any time you meet with a prudent Woman, that Man that offers to 
meddle with her, without her Consent, shall suffer present Death.’ 
The crimes against the pirates themselves that were punishable by death 
according to the articles tended to be those likely to most damage the 
communality of the company. Roberts’ articles made no provision for the 
punishment of rape, but did order death for any pirate found ‘seducing any 
[woman], and carried her to sea’ to ‘prevent ill Consequences from so 
dangerous an Instrument of Division and Quarrel’.854 John Philips’ articles, the 
bloodiest of all the surviving sets (excepting John Gow’s, dealt with below), 
not only stipulated death as the punishment for raping female prisoners, but 
also for theft and gambling. In that case, death by shooting was prescribed as 
an alternative to marooning: presumably the severity of the punishment was 
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determined by the value of the goods stolen or wagered, the circumstances of 
the crime, the nature of the transgressor, or perhaps even just the whim of the 
company in the moment. 
The other crime punishable by death in some pirate articles was disloyalty to 
the company, which in practice meant desertion. John Taylor’s second article 
‘obliges all to remain loyal and to assist their brethren in danger, on pain of 
death’, and in Robert’s company ‘to desert the ship or their quarters in battle, 
was punished with death’. Low’s company reportedly had an article, though 
not codified into their written articles, that any man that ‘shall by any means 
offer or endeavour to desert or quit the company, that person shall be shot to 
death by the quarter-master’s order’, without even the benefit of a trial.855  
Of the articles prescribing death for offences likely to damage or destroy the 
communality of the pirate company none were more encompassing or 
draconian than those of John Gow, whose articles were last of the surviving 
sets to be drawn up. Gow’s articles list only five crimes: disobedience, 
unequal disposal of the ship’s provisions, revealing their piracy to others, 
unauthorised absence from the ship, and failure to adhere to the designated 
times of duty. All of which were offences against the pirate community rather 
than outsiders, and all of which offences ‘shall be punish’d with Death, or 
otherwise, as we shall find proper for our Interest.’ The reason for the relative 
severity of Gow’s articles could be one, or more, of several. Gow and his 
company appear to have been unusually violent, even by pirates’ standards, 
and their treatment of their lieutenant, Williams, is suggestive of an unnatural 
vindictiveness. It ought to be noted, perhaps, that Gow’s articles are the only 
surviving set drawn up by pirate who had left England after the passage of the 
notorious Black Act which added so many capital offences to the ‘Bloody 
Code’,856 and it is possible that they were influenced by its sanguinary 
approach to law and order. Most likely, though, is that at the time the articles 
were drawn up the company were in grievous peril, their ship stranded on a 
sand bank within shooting range of the shore, from where in fact they were 
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eventually overcome and captured.857 The tension and fear caused by their 
precarious and virtually defenceless position made the cohesion of the 
company of even more immediate importance to them than it normally was to 
pirates, and any threat to that cohesion was to be discouraged in the 
strongest possible way. 
In practice, desertion or mutiny were the crimes for which a pirate was most 
likely to be sentenced to death by his comrades. Despite the strictures of the 
articles, no case of the death penalty actually being applied by pirates in 
cases of rape or gambling appears to exist, and we saw in Chapter 4.5 that 
rape did occur on pirate ships, apparently without being prosecuted by a 
pirate judiciary. By contrast several cases exist of pirates sentenced to death, 
or actually executed, for attempting to desert or stir up mutiny. A group of 
mutineers on Paul Williams’ ship, for example, were overcome by force and 
several of them killed in the affray, ‘and 3 other were condemn’d to be 
hang’d’.858 The mention of hanging is unusual, and most of the other records 
of pirate executions, if they mention a method at all, tend to describe 
convicted men being shot, or at least sentenced to be shot. Carpenter 
Richard Luntly was fortunate to escape with his life when he and some of his 
comrades were overheard planning to desert. Roberts and the quartermaster 
were informed of their plan and the company was assembled to debate the 
would-be deserters’ fate. ‘Some of them was for shooting of us, other some 
not, and so they consented to put us away upon a Desolate Island.’ In the 
end, the chance appearance of a potential prize put paid to the pirates plans 
to maroon Luntly and the others, and they were spared, in Luntly’s case only 
to be hanged for piracy in Scotland a few months later.859 Had the prize not 
put in its fortuitous appearance it is likely that the pirates would have carried 
out their punishment, for pirate justice was as swift as it was brutal. Four 
attempted deserters from Anstis’ company were recaptured and tried by a jury 
of twelve pirates, ‘and two of the said four persons were by the said jury 
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ordered to be shott to death which was immediately executed on them.’860 
Three deserters from Roberts’ company were also recaptured and tried by a 
jury who ‘sentenced [them] to Death over a Bowl’, and two of them ‘were 
actually shot’.861 The third was fortunate enough to secure the support of one 
of the principal pirates, and so escape execution. Similarly fortunate was 
Rowland Sharp of Stede Bonnet’s company, who was saved from being shot 
by the intercession of the boatswain, Ignatius Pell, but had already been told 
that he ‘was to be shot, and… had the liberty to chuse the four Men that 
should do it.’862 
 
5.3 ‘As the Majority of the Company Think Fit’.  
Several pirate articles prohibited certain actions without specifying a particular 
punishment, substituting instead the catch-all and ambiguous statement that 
transgressors should ‘suffer what Punishment the Captain and the Majority of 
the Company shall think fit.’ The kinds of offences that merited such 
potentially arbitrary punishment varied from company to company and 
included, in Philips’ band, joining a rival company or failing to keep weapons 
clean and ‘fit for an Engagement’, or in Low’s company, cowardice, 
drunkenness in battle, gambling, or brawling. Several of the offences 
punishable according to the decision of the company illustrate one probable 
reason for the pirates’ not laying down specific punishment in the article, the 
fact that the same crime might be of variable seriousness depending on 
circumstances. Punishment for, say, drunkenness in battle might depend on 
just how drunk the culprit was: a man who was too drunk to shoot straight 
might still contribute to the pirates’ success simply by being seen on deck and 
firing at a victim, whereas a man who was too drunk to stand contributed 
nothing. Similarly, in Anstis’ company, fraud and disobedience were punished 
according to the will of the company, and their decision probably rested to 
some extent on the amount by which they were defrauded or the seriousness 
of the disobedience. 
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Sadly, there is little or no evidence to tell us exactly how a pirate company 
chose to punish those who broke those rules that specified a collective 
decision over punishment. Philips’ company never met with any other pirates 
during the whole of their existence, and nobody seems to have left their guns 
to rust; perhaps nobody in Anstis’ company did ‘Disobey any Lawful 
Command of the Commanding Officers’, or if they did and were punished for 
it, nobody recorded it for posterity. We can, however, begin to guess at the 
severity with which a pirate company might punish its members by examining 
one or two examples of punishments meted out for crimes not covered by the 
articles. We have already seen that Thomas Jones received ‘two Lashes from 
every one of the Company’ for fighting with Captain Roberts, and Benjamin 
Jeffrys received six lashes from each man in the same company, allegedly for 
nothing more serious than ‘telling these Pyrates, that none who could get their 
Bread in an honest way would be on such an Account.’863 When Richard 
Luntly and his co-conspirators were caught merely planning to desert, the 
debate that followed was whether they should be shot or marooned.864 ‘If any 
one’ in Spriggs’ company ‘commits an Offence, he is tried by the whole 
Company’, and it was probably by such collective will that a man was 
sentenced to ten lashes from the whole company, for no more than 
expressing a desire to leave.865 
Sometimes, though, the will of the company could be used to mitigate the 
punishment laid down in the articles for a serious offence, and on at least two 
occasions men escaped death despite breaching articles which supposedly 
required a capital response. The case of Cocklyn’s boatswain was mentioned 
earlier, in which the victim of an unlawful beating, William Snelgrave, 
successfully protected his attacker from punishment by persuading the pirate 
company that he had been drunk and should be forgiven.866 They had, 
however, been debating whether to flog him for the crime of giving ‘ill usage to 
their Prisoners’ which, at least in the articles of Cocklyn’s consort, Howell 
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Davis, was punishable with death.867 On another occasion, Oliver la Buse and 
several of his officers plotted to desert Taylor’s company (in which la Buse 
appears to have been captain of a consort vessel and subservient to Taylor), 
but were discovered. The pirates on la Buse’s ship who ‘did not hold the same 
opinions, fired a cannon shot and displayed the black flag’ as a signal for 
Taylor to come to their aid. According to Taylor’s articles, desertion was an 
offence punishable with death, but on this occasion the pirates held ‘an 
enquiry [and] degraded la Buse who was, along with his accomplices, 
condemned to be flogged at the foot of the mainmast, and all that they 
possessed to be confiscated into the common stock.’868 
Limited though this evidence is, it does suggest that when they held a 
consultation amongst the company to determine the proper punishment for a 
wrong-doer, pirates chose to inflict the same punishments laid down in the 
articles for other offences. Floggings, beatings, marooning, forfeiture of goods 
and execution were all used, or at least considered, as suitable punishments 
for offences which had no set response specified by their articles and which, 
in some cases, could be of variable heinousness.  
 
5.4 Transgressions.  
According to the surviving articles, pirate legislated against seventeen 
different offences. The partial nature of Davis’ articles limit the analysis of 
offences somewhat, but is unlikely to make any substantial difference to some 
trends. In nine surviving sets of articles (Kidd’s, Davis’, Roberts, Taylor’s, 
Anstis’, Lowther’s, Low’s, Phillips’ and Gow’s) the offence most commonly 
legislated against was defrauding the company, usually by hiding plunder 
rather than handing it over to the quartermaster or whoever else was 
responsible for its safekeeping and fair division, which was legislated against 
in six sets of articles. Desertion and rape were each mentioned in five sets of 
articles, and cowardice and gambling in four sets each. Disobedience to 
superior officers, theft and brawling were proscribed and carried attendant 
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punishments in three sets of articles, and mistreatment of prisoners, joining a 
rival company, neglecting arms, risking fire and drunkenness in battle were all 
mentioned in two sets. Finally, four offences were mentioned only in John 
Gow’s articles, at least three of which probably related specifically to the 
circumstances the pirates were in when they drew up the articles, and other 
odd articles, such as Low’s article ‘punishable by death, to hold any secret 
correspondence with a prisoner’869 can be found in various sources but were 
not included in the surviving sets of articles and are not replicated in other 
sets. 
In order to understand the significance ascribed by pirates to individual 
offences it is necessary to examine not only the frequency with which they 
were legislated against in the articles, but also the severity of the punishments 
the articles prescribed for them. Table 5 shows the punishments associated 
with the thirteen offences mentioned in the complete sets of articles of 
Roberts, Taylor, Anstis, Lowther, Low and Philips, with information from 
Davis’s partial set of articles and Kidd’s prescribed punishments for the 
offences mentioned, included by way of comparison. Gow’s articles, which list 
four offences not found in any other set, and prescribe death for every 
offence, have not been included. The entries have been arranged in 
decreasing order of the severity of the punishments associated with them, 
assuming death to be the severest sentence, followed by marooning, flogging, 
as the company think fit (which we have seen usually resulted in a flogging at 
least) and finally loss of a share, in that order. 
From Table 5 it can be seen that the rape of female victims and desertion 
were the crimes most abhorred by pirates, and both offences were legislated 
against in five sets of articles. The next three offences most abhorred, 
according to the punishments prescribed in the articles at least, were 
mistreatment of prisoners, theft from fellow pirates, and defrauding the 
company. The five offences most rigorously  punished, therefore, were those 
which either directly attacked the communal integrity of the company itself, or 
those which were committed against the pirates’ victims.
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Table 5. Crimes and Punishments.  
Crime Kidd Davis Roberts Taylor Anstis Lowther Low Philips 
Rape  Death Death ‘severe punishment’ Death   Death 
Desertion   Death or 
Marooning 
Marooning Marooning  Death Marooning 
Mistreatment of 
prisoners 
 Death  Death     
Theft   Marooning  Marooning   Marooning or death 
Fraud Marooning  Marooning Loss of share and 
flogging 
As the company 
think fit 
As the company 
think fit 
As the company 
think fit 
 
Cowardice Loss of 
share 
   Marooning As the company 
think fit 
As the company 
think fit 
 
Gambling     Flogging As the company 
think fit 
As the company 
think fit 
Marooning or death 
Joining rival 
company 
    Marooning   As the company think 
fit 
Risking fire 
below decks 
    Flogging   Flogging 
Striking one 
another 
     As the company 
think fit 
As the company 
think fit 
Flogging 
Disobedience Loss of 
share or as 
the 
company 
think fit 
   As the company 
think fit 
   
Neglect of arms     Loss of share   Loss of share or As the 
company think fit 
Drunkenness Loss of 
share 
     As the company 
think fit 
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Nevertheless, despite the severity of the punishments laid down by the 
articles, crime against non-members of the community were committed 
regularly, and with impunity. For example, we have seen in Chapter 4.5 that 
rape was not uncommon amongst pirates, even those who legislated against 
it: the gang-rape of one woman by 21 pirates was probably committed by 
Roberts’ company.870 The fact that so many of the company joined in the 
atrocity suggests that Roberts and his men were prepared to turn a blind eye. 
In fact, although the records mention numerous cases of rape being 
committed by pirates on their female victims, they appear to be entirely devoid 
of any record of a pirate being punished for it.  
Pirates’ attitudes towards the mistreatment of prisoners were ambiguous. 
Although surviving articles suggest that it was a capital offence, it is only 
mentioned in two sets: Davis’ and Taylor’s. According to William Snelgrave, 
Thomas Cocklyn’s company had a ‘Maxim established amongst them’871 
prohibiting the mistreatment of prisoners and carrying an attendant 
punishment. Whether this constituted a formal article or not is impossible to 
determine, but the punishment suggested for a man who broke the maxim 
was flogging, and when the pirate boatswain, who was a ‘great favourite’ of 
the company, threatened Snelgrave with a cutlass it was only by Snelgrave’s 
intervention that he escaped being whipped. During his confinement, 
Snelgrave also met Howell Davis, ‘a brave generous Man’ who ‘kept his 
Ship’s Company in good order’, who expressed his regret that Snelgrave had 
been mistreated by fellow pirates.872 Walter Kennedy, at that time quarter 
master of Davis’ company, gave Snelgrave some useful advice:  
never to dispute the Will of a Pirate: For, supposing I had cleft your Scull 
asunder for your Impudence, what would you have got by it but 
Destruction? Indeed you may flatter your self, I should have been put to 
death for killing a Prisoner in cold Blood; but assure your self my Friends 
would have brought me off on such an Occasion.873 
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John Taylor, who had sailed under both Davis and Cocklyn before rising to 
command, had an article stating that it was ‘forbidden on pain of death to kill 
or wound in cold blood anyone who has surrendered’, and for the most part 
this article seems to have been observed. His captive, du Buquoy, wrote that: 
He was polite towards prisoners and received the officers at his table, 
advising them to resign themselves to their fate and sometimes warning 
them not to whisper amongst themselves, so as to avoid the ill-will of the 
crew.874 
Even when angered by perceived defiance from a captive, Taylor appears to 
have kept his temper. When Captain McCrae was captured, after a stiff fight, 
by a pirate band that included Taylor’s company he 
obtain’d Leave to go on board the Pyrates, and a Promise of Safety, 
several of the Chief of them knew me, and some of them had sailed with 
me, which I found of great Advantage; because notwithstanding their 
Promise, some of them would have cut me, and all that would not enter 
with them, to Pieces,875 
In the end, though, McCrae and the majority of his company were given a ship 
and allowed to proceed on their way. The injunction not to kill or wound did 
not, however, cover minor beatings. When Thomas Grant was captured by 
Roberts, Walter Kennedy hit him ‘with great Violence upon his Mouth which 
occasioned his nose and mouth to bleed.’876 Richard Lazenby, second mate 
of McCrae’s ship, was detained by Taylor to act as a navigator his inability to 
tell Taylor the private signals used between East India Company ship angered 
Taylor, ‘whereupon he abused me, calling me scurrilous names shook his 
broadsword at me, and said he would plague me like the dog I was,’877 but still 
did not actually harm him. When Lazenby again aroused Taylor’s wrath he 
was not so fortunate, but was saved from any worse a fate than a stiff caning 
by other members of the pirate company:  
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According to his desire Captain Taylor fetched his cane and began to 
belabour me so unmercifully that in the end some of the people hindered 
him and said that he should be ashamed to so abuse me.878 
Despite the beating he received, Lazenby was fortunate to have been 
captured by Taylor, whose articles protected him from serious injury, and 
perhaps even saved his life. To some extent, though, Lazenby’s escape 
rested on his general acquiescence to the pirates’ demands, and the 
protection that Taylor’s victims received from the articles was dependent on 
that. Lazenby reported another occasion when the crew of a captured ship 
would not, or could not, give Taylor’s pirates the information they demanded, 
so the pirates ‘squeezed their joints in a vice to extort confession.’879 Other 
pirates, whose articles did not prescribe any punishment for the mistreatment 
of prisoner, could be vicious and unrelenting in their abuse of their victims, 
and apparently considered it no crime to do so. Edward Green and his ship’s 
crew were all ‘barbarously treated’ when they were captured by Charles 
Vane’s company, who abused them  
by beating them and using other cruelties particularly to one, who they 
bound hands and Feet and ty’d (upon his Back) down to the Bowspritt 
with Matches to his eyes burning and a Pistol loaded (as he supposes) 
with the Muzzle into his mouth, thereby to oblige him to Confess what 
money was on board.880 
Richard Hawkins was captured by Francis Spriggs’ company and  
was surrounded by fifteen Men with keen Cutlashes in their Hands, who 
all made at me, and soon laid me on the Deck, some giving me the 
Edge, others favour’d me with severe Blows with the Flat. 
He escaped with his life, but only through the intervention of one of the pirates 
who had previously sailed with him and begged for him to be spared. Later, in 
the evening, when the pirates were ‘very merry’, 
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they wanted a little more Diversion, for Mischief is their sole Delight: I 
was sent for down to the Cabbin to Supper; what should be provided for 
me but a Dish of Candles, which I was forc’d to eat, they having a Pistol 
at my Head, and a naked Sword to my Breast, whilst others beat me with 
Swords call’d Tucks. After that I had eat to their Satisfaction, I was 
buffeted and tump’d forwards to the Bag, among the rest of the 
Prisoners, who had much the same Fare with myself. 
Then they consulted for more Diversion, which was to sweat me: It was 
agreed on and all Preparations made thereto. The Manner of a Sweat is 
thus: Between Decks they stick Candles round the Mizen-Mast, and 
about twenty five Men surround it with Points of Swords, Penknives, 
Compasses, Forks, etc. in each of their Hands: Culprit enters the Circle; 
the Violin plays a merry Jig; and he must run for about ten Minutes, while 
each Man runs his instrument into his Posteriors.881 
‘Sweating’ was just one of several refined tortures used by pirates, some of 
which were probably designed to cause psychological as well as physical 
trauma in their victims. Charles Vane’s company captured the crew of the 
merchantman Diamond, and ‘hang’d up one of them by the neck until they 
thought he was almost dead and then let him down upon the deck and cut him 
with a Cutlass over his collar Bone.’882 Edward Green, captured by Roberts’ 
company, suffered a similar fate when they  
put a Rope about his Neck and drew him up under the main top and kept 
him hanging there about a Minute and then let him down again and then 
put a Rope round his Head and tyed it cross his Ears and twisted it until 
he was almost blind and insensible.883 
The catalogue of beatings, murders and tortures committed by pirates against 
their victims is too exhaustive to list completely, but some examples stand out 
and serve to show that such behaviour was not limited to one pirate or group 
of pirates. Henry Hunt was captured by Edward England’s company, later 
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consorts of John Taylor, who ‘beat him with their Cutlaces’,884Charles Vane’s 
company ‘beat a boy’ to extract information from him,885 and on another 
occasion one of Stede Bonnet’s company ‘fell to beating and cutting the 
People with his Cutlash, and cut one Man’s Arm.’886 When Captain Lone was 
captured by pirates in 1717 the ‘Pyrates said, that about 5 Days before they 
had taken a Vessel, which when they had plunder’d, they burnt, and shot the 
Men at the Mast.’887 Philip Lyne, a cohort of Francis Spriggs, admitted after 
his own capture ‘that he had kill’d 37 Masters of Vessels, besides Foremast 
Men, during the Time of his Piracy,’888 and Edward Low, also an associate of 
Lyne and Spriggs, had a reputation for excessive cruelty founded on accounts 
that he and his company had committed atrocities such as having ‘whipped 
some Men to Death, and slit and cut off the Ears and Noses of several.’889 
Low’s quartermaster, Nicholas Lewis, admitted that Low had once captured a 
ship and ‘cutt off the said Masters lipps and broyl'd them before his face, and 
afterwards murder'd the whole crew being thirty two persons.’890 In the 
catalogue of beatings, torture, and death meted out by pirates to their victims 
there is little distinction made between different types of prisoner, 
foremastmen, passengers, and masters alike were subject to physical 
violence if they crossed their pirate captors, as I have shown above. Not even 
rank served as a protection: ‘The Account of the Life, Behaviour &c of Walter 
Kennedy’, published in a newspaper after his execution, includes an 
admission to the murder of the ‘French Governor of an American Island’.891 
None of these incidents, or indeed any other incidents of mistreating 
prisoners, with the exception of the whipping that Cocklyn’s boatswain was 
threatened with for mistreating William Snelgrave, appear to have resulted in 
any kind of punishment or even censure for the perpetrator. Since most pirate 
articles did not legislate against the mistreatment of prisoners nor punish it 
when it occurred, it must be assumed that it was not considered an offence by 
                                                 
884
 The Examination of Henry Hunt, 27/9/1720 HCA 1/54, f. 115 
885
 The Deposition of William Hall, CO 37/10, f. 51 
886
 Tryals of Stede Bonnet, p. 23 
887
 Original Weekly Journal, 31/8/1717 
888
 Evening Post, 28/5/1726 
889
 Evening Post, 28/11/1723 
890
 CSPC, 1724-1725, item. 102 
891
 Weekly Journal or British Gazetteer, 29/7/1721 
 289 
the majority of pirate companies. On the other hand, those few companies 
who did legislate against the mistreatment of prisoners prescribed the sternest 
punishment in response to it. This apparent contradiction is hard to explain. 
Possibly it lay in the nature of the commanders: John Taylor claimed to have 
been an officer in the Royal Navy, and may have been possessed of some 
notion of honour about the treatment of prisoners,892 and Howell Davis, while 
not exactly a gentleman, ‘was a generous Man.’ Thomas Cocklyn, by 
Snelgrave’s account, had risen to command ‘on account of his Brutality and 
Ignorance’, but his company may have continued using the articles originally 
drawn up under their previous ‘Gentleman-like Commander.’893 This 
explanation is profoundly unsatisfactory for, as we have seen, the gentleman-
pirate Stede Bonnet did not (although, perhaps he could not) prevent his men 
cutting victims with their cutlasses, and the articles of George Lowther, drawn 
up under auspices of Lowther himself, who had been a ship’s officer, and 
John Massey, who had been a military captain, contained no clause 
protecting their victims. Rediker has argued that pirates became more violent 
towards their victims as time progressed, and particularly after early 1722, in 
response to the increased intensity of the authorities’ war against them.894 
This may well be true of the level of depravity in their violence, for there are 
no records of pirates slicing off their victims lips before 1722,895 but it might be 
as simple as that Low and his associates were more psychopathic in their 
tendencies than earlier pirates, and it does not address the fact that pirates 
prior to 1722, such as the companies of Charles Vane and Edward England, 
though less imaginative in their tortures, were no less willing to abuse 
captives, and did so without fear of retribution from their shipmates.896  
In practice, the most common offence for which pirates were routinely 
punished under the articles seems to have been desertion, legislated against 
specifically by five sets of articles, but abhorrent to any pirate company. The 
difficulty with establishing the incidence of desertion and its attendant 
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punishment is that most of the sources that describe desertion are 
compromised in some way. Many pirates and forced men who were captured 
claimed in their depositions or in the court room that they had either tried to 
desert themselves,897 and been punished for it, or had witnessed someone 
else being severely punished for attempting to desert.898 In the former case, a 
failed attempt to desert was a good explanation as to why they were still in the 
company of pirates at the time of their capture, without compromising the 
illusion of unwillingness that they tried to maintain. The punishment that they 
had received for trying to desert once was an implicit reason for their not 
having tried a second time. In the latter case, by highlighting the danger to life 
and limb of a failed attempt to desert, they were paving the way for their own 
excuses as to why they had not tried themselves to leave the pirate company. 
Even innocent witnesses, or those who had successfully escaped, often had a 
vested interested in highlighting the difficulty and risk that they had been put 
to.899 
Even so, tales of desertion and subsequent punishment cannot all be 
dismissed out of hand. At his trial, several witnesses appeared in defence of 
Harry Glasby: one witness had been told by a forced surgeon in Roberts’ 
company that Glasby, ‘with two more were sentenced to Death, for attempting 
an Escape from them, and that the other two were really shot for it,’ and 
another witness was told by no less a person than the pirates’ ‘Quarter-
master, “he is a very good Man, and we never venture him from on board, 
being suspicious that he designs to make his Escape, for,” says he, “he once 
endeavoured it before.”’ Glasby himself declared that  
making his Escape once in the West Indies, and being taken, he was 
sentenced with two more to be shot, and escap’d it only by one of the 
leading Pyrates being his Friend, and bullying the rest. A second time he 
ran away at Hispaniola, carrying a Pocket Compass, but the 
Barbarousness of than part of it he fell upon, and unacquainted with what 
path to follow, obliged him down to the Water-side again, where some of 
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the Pyrates found him, and challenged him for running away, he was 
forced to protest he did not design it, for fear of their shooting him.900 
Given the testimony, albeit second-hand, from two other members of the 
pirate company, that he only narrowly escaped execution for trying to desert, 
Glasby’s testimony has a ring of truth about it, and the execution of two 
deserters from Roberts’ company can be taken as fact. William Williams also 
claimed at his trial to have been punished with two lashes from every member 
of Roberts’ company for attempting to desert, which, the court noted, ‘was 
confessed by the other Prisoners.’901 Similarly, Edward Evans, captured by 
Anstis’ company, was under no compunction to give evidence at all when he 
voluntarily testified against Thomas Lawrence Jones, saying the Jones had 
been instrumental in the execution of two men for desertion, and the flogging 
of two others.902  
Of the other two offences which pirates considered the most serious, theft and 
fraud, there is very little evidence either of the offence being committed or an 
offender being punished. Perhaps ‘honour among thieves’ was a feature of life 
on a pirate ship, and members of a pirate company, recognising the 
communal nature of their society, were unwilling to steal from their fellows. Or 
perhaps, realising that theft or fraud would have been difficult to conceal for 
long in the close confines of the ship, the severity of the punishments 
prescribed and a fear of being marooned were enough to deter would-be 
thieves. In all likelihood, it was a combination of both. The most notable 
example of pirates attempting to defraud one another occurred shortly after 
Henry Every’s company, in consort with other vessels, had taken the 
fabulously wealthy Gang-i-Sawai. After the gold and silver taken from the 
Indian vessel were divided up between the ships’ companies, the crew of the 
Pearl, one of Every’s consorts decided to stay in the Indian Ocean and 
continue robbing while Every’s own company elected to sail to the Americas 
and endeavour to break up and go ashore. ‘For the conveniency of Carriage,’ 
Every’s men exchanged that part of their share which was made up of silver 
for the Pearl’s gold of equal value but smaller bulk. However, before the 
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exchange took place, the Pearl’s company clipped their gold coins, that is, 
shaved small slivers of the precious metal from the edge of the coins. When 
Every’s company discovered the fraud they used the threat of their 
overwhelming fire power to demand the return of both gold and silver, gave 
the Pearl’s company 2,000 pieces of eight to purchase provisions, the 
equivalent of less than a boy’s share, and sent them on their way, in effect, 
collectively marooning them.903  
 
5.5 The role of punishment in social control. 
In the discussion of eighteenth-century law, much has been made of the class 
element, that laws were made and maintained by one class of people, the 
elite and the propertied, in order to control another class, the unpropertied 
commoners. Douglas Hay argued that  the ‘Glorious Revolution of 1688 
established the freedom not of men, but of men of property,’904 and the very 
first sentence of Thompson’s study of the Black Act states that ‘the British 
state, all eighteenth-century legislators agree, existed to preserve the property 
and, incidentally, the lives and liberties of the propertied.’905 Hay and 
Thompson, and other writers, have a number of contemporary observers from 
whom to quote in support of their argument. John Locke, for example, wrote 
that ‘Government has no other end but the preservation of property,’ and legal 
commentator William Blackstone declared that ‘there is nothing which so 
generally strikes the imagination, and engages the affections of mankind as 
the right of property.’906 Even the Levellers of the seventeenth century argued 
that suffrage, and thus the right to participate in law-making, should be denied 
to servants, wage-labourers, and anyone who was not a householder.907 It is 
difficult, then, if not impossible, to argue with the assessment of Hay, 
Thompson, and others, that English law was a tool of the propertied. And a 
powerful tool it was too. Frank McLynn explained that as far as the law was 
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concerned, ‘deterrence was not the primary purpose of the elite. What they 
aimed for, above all, was an ordered hierarchy of authority, deference, and 
obedience… Their principal aim was social control.’908 The severity of the 
‘bloody code’, he argued, was necessary for the propertied class because  
The grip exercised by the eighteenth-century elite was precarious, 
reflecting the ‘half-State’ twilight characterized by parasitism when a 
ruling class has not yet sunk its roots deeply enough. What was needed 
was an ideology to provide social cement and legitimate the entire 
system… To fill the ideological gap, the elite invoked the law, insinuating 
the idea that every man was equal before the law, that the law was 
dispassionate, impartial, and blind to social stratification. As Gramsci 
was later to explain it, social hegemony is only truly attained when a 
ruling class can persuade those it rules that the norms and sanctions of 
society, which in reality benefit only the privileged few, are devised for 
the good of all.909 
But how does this apply to the laws of pirates? In theory, like English law, the 
articles applied equally to everyone who lived within their influence, but we 
saw in Chapter 2 that pirate society was hierarchical, and so the question of 
whether, or to what extent, the pirates’ articles were a tool of the pirate ‘elite’ 
and ‘propertied’ must be considered. The pirate equivalent of the ‘elite’ was a 
cadre of men that usually included the captain, quartermaster, other officers, 
and perhaps a few of the ‘old hands’. But just as the propertied class of 
legitimate society encompassed a much larger body of people than the ‘elite’, 
so too did the number of ‘propertied’ pirates extend beyond the pirate ‘elite’. 
By dint of their part-ownership of the very vessel in which they sailed and their 
right to a share in the profits of the voyage, the majority of volunteer pirates 
constituted a propertied class, similar to the householders and incorporated 
tradesmen ashore who, while they were not members of the ruling cadre per 
se, nonetheless had a say in its creation and actions. Parallels can be drawn 
further: just as on shore it was the propertied class who enabled the creation 
of laws which applied to the unpropertied who had no hand in their creation, 
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so on a pirate ship it was the volunteer pirates who created the articles which 
applied not only to themselves, but also to the slaves, forced men, boys, 
soldiers, and landsmen who made up the pirate unpropertied. And just as on 
land the actual implementation of the law fell to judges and justices drawn 
from the ruling elite, assisted by juries drawn from the propertied class, so on 
pirate ships the quartermaster or other members of the ‘elite’ became judges 
and attorneys, while juries were drawn from the ranks of volunteer pirates, or 
included every voting pirate.  
Like McLynn’s conception of the eighteenth-century elite, the pirates’ elite also 
exercised a grip that was perilous, and except in a few cases, had sunk its 
roots barely any depth at all. The captain, quartermaster, officers, and a few 
‘old hands’ might have formed the basis of a ruling class, but they were 
usually outnumbered by the majority of the company who could, at any time, 
rise and overthrow them. And in many cases, the ‘unpropertied’ elements of a 
pirate community formed a majority, or at least a significant minority. The very 
nature of pirate justice explored in this chapter is an indication of the perilous 
nature of the grip exercised by the pirate ‘elite’ and ‘propertied’ classes. 
McLynn observed a stark contrast in the prosecution of crimes by the servants 
of aristocratic masters, whose position in society was virtually assured, 
compared with the prosecution of crimes by the servants of the ‘middling sort’, 
many of them urban, whose social superiority was more fragile and often 
newly-acquired. Aristocratic masters, on the whole, preferred not to punish 
their servants with the law, knowing firstly that in many cases it would lead to 
the servant’s execution, and secondly that they had other means of 
punishment at their disposal, such as dismissal and refusal to give a 
reference, leading to disgrace in the local community. Urban masters, on the 
other hand, did not have such tools at their disposal since the anonymity of 
the city diminished any disgrace they could inflict upon their miscreant 
servants, which meant that most eighteenth-century  
prosecutions for theft by servants were not by the rich but by middling 
farmers or traders, who wanted exemplary sentences to cow their 
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employees, since they lacked the power or status to disgrace them 
informally.910 
By invoking the power of the law to defend their property, these ‘middling’ 
men were therefore using it to protect, and even enhance, their status in the 
community. The pirate ‘elite’ also lacked the power and status to disgrace 
those who committed offences against the articles, and therefore had to 
invoke the articles in order to assert their superiority. Merely admonishing a 
transgressor of the articles would not have had much effect on the lowest 
members of the pirate community such as the forced men and slaves, so in 
order to establish the superiority of the pirate ‘elite’ and ‘propertied’ classes 
exemplary punishments were necessary. 
It is significant, therefore, that most of the evidence of men being punished for 
infractions of the pirate articles relates to the punishment of forced men. 
William Whelks, ‘severely whipp’d’ with two others was a forced man,911 and 
so was the member of Spriggs’ company who was given ten lashes from each 
of the crew with a manatee strip. Bridstock Weaver was found guilty at his 
trial, but pardoned after several people testified to his forced status, ‘was 
twice confined in irons at Sea (to wit) at the first time about five Days and the 
other time about 2 Days.’912 Harry Glasby, also a forced man, escaped 
exemplary punishment, but his co-offenders did not and Glasby himself had 
restrictions placed upon his movement by the rest of the company. By 
contrast, volunteer pirates, especially those who were members of the ‘elite’, 
had little fear of punishment. Walter Kennedy, quartermaster under Davis,  
lieutenant under Roberts, and eventually captain in his own right, was 
confident that his ‘Friends would have brought [him] off’, even if he had 
murdered a captive, and although Snelgrave imputed the escape from 
punishment of Cocklyn’s boatswain to his own intervention, only part of the 
company was in favour of having him flogged, for ‘he was a great Favourite of 
several others’.913 Richard Hawkins reported that when ‘a Man was killed on 
board of Loe in cold Blood; which being contrary to their Articles, Spriggs 
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insisted upon having the Murderer hang’d.’ Spriggs was Low’s quartermaster 
at the time of the incident, but despite his position as the nominal dispenser of 
justice, Low overruled him and the murderer went free.914 
Pirate punishments, then, were directed primarily at the ‘unpropertied’ men 
aboard the pirate ship, the forced men who had no ownership stake in the 
vessel and were not part of the ruling ‘elite’. Their punishment under the 
articles, by the ‘propertied’ volunteers of the company was a demonstration of 
the power of the ‘propertied’ over them, who used the articles, their own form 
of law, in the same way that the propertied and elite of legitimate society 
enforced their own superiority through the use of law. The few cases of 
volunteer pirates being formally punished by their comrades bear this point 
out. When Oliver la Buse was flogged and disrated for attempting to leave 
John Taylor’s company it was, nominally, for an infraction of the articles, but it 
is clear that Taylor himself was instrumental in the punishment, preserving his 
own status as commander of the two-ship company. La Buse and Taylor were 
arguing over their drink one evening, reported their captive, du Bucquoy, 
when  
la Buse came to provoke Taylor, and challenged him to a combat 
between their vessels. Taylor, who was easily angered, told him that the 
proposition was absurd and shameful and asked if, perhaps, he had 
made it from rancour that he had previously been reduced, with his 
accomplices, to serve as common sailors for having plotted desertion. ‘It 
was I,’ he said, ‘who punished you, so it is not for my crew to pay on my 
behalf.’915 
When Thomas Lawrence Jones was sentenced to be flogged by the whole of 
Roberts’ company for throwing Roberts over a gun and beating him, it was 
because ‘the Majority of the Company were of Opinion that the Dignity of the 
Captain, ought to be supported on board.’916 For crimes against others, 
‘propertied’ pirates were likely to escape punishment, and it was only when 
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they threatened the hierarchical structure of the pirate community that they 
risked prosecution by their shipmates. 
 
• • •. 
Pirates, for all their talk of revenging themselves on the cruel and arbitrary 
punishments and corrections meted out by masters and officers in legitimate 
service, recognised that their own ships required discipline, and that in order 
to attain that discipline they too required a judicial code which set down the 
potential offences that might be committed within or against their community, 
and stipulated the punishments to be inflicted on offenders. Moreover, in 
accepting the need for a certain level of discipline they also accepted, like 
seamen in legitimate service, that a certain level of violence was concomitant 
with the maintenance of discipline. When men made the transition from being 
seamen in legitimate service to being pirates, their notions of what constituted 
an acceptable level of violence on the part of their operational superiors did 
not change, so while a pirate captain using his cane to chivvy along new 
recruits who were afraid before their first battle was acceptable, a pirate 
captain beating a man to death with a bucket for minor insubordination was 
not. John Taylor could use his fists to maintain order, just as could a captain 
or mate of a merchantman, without arousing either the wrath or enmity of the 
company under his command. 
When pirates came to draw up their formal codes of punishment for more 
serious offences, they utilised punishments that they were familiar with from 
their experience of legitimate society: fines, flogging and execution. Only 
marooning was a peculiarly ‘pirate’ punishment, but even so, it was not 
entirely unheard of in legitimate seafaring, and in many ways was the pirates’ 
answer to transportation, inasmuch as it served to remove unwanted persons 
from the community and inflict hardship upon them, without necessarily, or 
even often, entailing death. In their judicial process of trial by jury, pirates also 
followed forms they were familiar with, though their circumstances and the 
intimate nature of their courts, forced them to dispense with much of the 
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frippery designed to overawe and impress the multitude attendant on trials 
held in a legitimate court.  
What set the pirates’ systems of justice and punishment apart from those 
prevalent on land and in legitimate seafaring practice was, firstly, that all of 
the offences legislated against by pirates were ‘criminal’ offences, and no 
regular provision was made in the articles for dealing with the ‘civil’ offences 
which were less likely to occur frequently on a pirate ship. Secondly, the 
excessive force of the punishment transgressors were likely to have inflicted 
upon them, was much greater than the punishments for similar offences in 
legitimate society. Finally, pirates’ systems of justice and punishment were 
notable for the lack of any real mechanism whereby mercy might be extended 
to a culprit. Once a member of a pirate company had been formally accused 
of an offence, his only real hope of escaping punishment was the rather 
arbitrary favouritism which existed on a pirate ship, so that three men might 
be tried for the same offence and while two were immediately shot to death 
the third escaped scot-free because he was possessed of a powerful friend 
and supporter. A pirate convicted of an offence against the company or an 
infraction of the articles could expect, on the whole, a more severe 
punishment than his counterpart in legitimate society. A pirate who was 
deprived of his share of the company’s profit might lose anywhere between 
twenty and 1,000 pounds, depending on the success the company had 
enjoyed, an amount far in excess of the shillings that constituted most fines in 
legitimate society. While twelve lashes was the theoretical maximum that 
could be inflicted upon a seaman in the Royal Navy on the captain’s authority 
alone, and was the usual, though not the maximum, number inflicted on 
merchantmen, pirate articles stipulated thirty-nine lashes as the standard 
number, even in response to some relatively minor offences. And though, by 
means of a court martial, a naval seaman might be sentenced to several 
hundred lashes, pirate juries handed down sentences in excess of one 
thousand lashes on a regular basis. 
Finally, it was widely accepted that laws in legitimate society were in place for 
the protection of the propertied class against crimes committed by the 
‘unpropertied’, and pirates also adopted this aspect of the law they had 
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experienced before leaving legitimate society. Most pirates would have been 
drawn from the ‘unpropertied’ class in legitimate society, but instead of 
recognising the inherent unfairness in a system  which, although all men were 
supposed to be equal, served some people better than others, they chose to 
emulate it rather than discard it. By directing the actual imposition of 
punishments primarily against the lowest strata of their own society, and 
largely allowing their volunteer comrades, and especially the ‘elite’ favourites 
among the company, to escape punishment they too sought to reinforce the 
gulf between propertied and ‘unpropertied’ members of their community 
through the power of the law. In the hands of pirates, the law became not just 
a means of maintaining and enforcing the discipline that was necessary on 
board ship, but like the law on land, a means of social control.  
 300 
Conclusion. 
 
Throughout this thesis I have shown that pirates established their laws and 
their society in emulation of the legitimate Anglo-American society in which 
they had lived before turning to piracy. In Chapter 1 I showed that pirate 
society of the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries emerged as a 
distinct entity, in some respects similar to, but by no means the same as, 
buccaneer society, the so-called ‘brethren of the coast’, whose communities 
were run along the lines of the ill-defined ‘Jamaica Discipline’. There was 
some integration between buccaneers and some of the earlier pirates who 
sailed the Indian Ocean in the 1690s, but it was limited. Pirates of the 
eighteenth century, and many of their seventeenth-century predecessors, had 
little or no contact with buccaneering culture. Despite this, several historians 
such as Christopher Hill, Jan Rogozinski, and J.S. Bromley,917 have 
suggested that pirate culture evolved directly from buccaneering culture, but 
the similarity between the articles of Cusack and Morgan, and the reference to 
the medieval Laws of Oleron in Cusack’s articles, suggests that both groups 
were influenced independently by earlier privateers.  
In Chapter 2 I addressed the issues of pirate hierarchies and the democracy 
practiced by pirates, and argued that it is inaccurate to consider the structure 
of a ship’s crew in terms of a single hierarchy. First, I examined the command 
hierarchy of a pirate company, and how authority and command filtered from 
the commander or captain of a vessel down to the foremastmen. Particular 
attention was paid to the selection of pirate officers, especially captains, and 
their career paths, arguing that although some officers were elected into their 
position, that was only one of several ways in which they might attain 
command and that their status prior to becoming captain was an important 
consideration in their selection. 
In Chapter 2.2 I showed that, unable to turn to any higher authority to settle 
their problems of command, pirates created their own higher authority, located 
within their immediate community rather than external to it, but functioning 
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nonetheless in much the same way. They filled a dual role, as workers on the 
vessel on which they sailed, but also as owners of it, and they fulfilled the 
functions of both roles simultaneously, but separately. When the day to day 
running of the ship required their obedience to the captain and officers, they 
gave it, and moreover they promulgated punishments for themselves should 
they fail to give it, but when they had need of recourse to a higher authority 
they took that authority on themselves. 
But in giving themselves that authority they endeavoured to act in the same 
way that they had seen merchant ship-owners act, with the same license and 
restrictions. Chapter 2.3 explored the issue of pirates ‘democracy’ and 
showed that even as owners of their vessel, not everyone in the company was 
allowed as say in how the vessel was run, and not everybody aboard the 
vessel was considered an owner. By limiting the power of decision making to 
just a proportion of the ship’s crew, and by investing more power in some 
hands than in others, they recreated in miniature the hierarchical system of 
the society they had abandoned. The pirates’ professional hierarchy was 
examined in Chapter 2.4, in which I showed that aboard a pirate ship the 
officers, skilled tradesmen such as gunners and carpenters, old hands, and 
volunteer members of the company received rights and privileges denied to 
the forced men, slaves, and boys: they voted on important issues, looked 
forward to accruing profit from their voyages, and, by and large, escaped the 
punishments that their system of justice inflicted on their less fortunate 
shipmates. Finally I considered the pirates’ social hierarchy, and will argue 
that for all their talk and gestures of egalitarianism pirates employed a social 
hierarchy in which men were respected for their rank and status as well as for 
their merits.  
All of this argued against some of the most deeply-held tenets of the Rediker-
dominated historiography, and effectively overturned the ideas that pirates 
created a new and original social order, characterised by ‘their own kind of 
democracy and equality’, and ‘class hostility’.918 In fact, pirates ran their 
societies along hierarchical, sometimes arbitrary, lines, and exhibited a certain 
amount of respect for social class as well as professional merit. There was 
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little new or revolutionary about pirate society, it was influenced almost 
entirely by the experience of pirates in legitimate society. The importance of 
this new assessment is far-reaching. The democratic and egalitarian model of 
pirate society has not seriously hitherto been challenged, and has been 
accepted widely by historians as the basis for their own assessments of pirate 
culture, as explained in the Introduction.  
The theme of pirates’ emulation of pre-existing systems was continued in 
Chapter 3, in which I showed that the economic systems employed by pirates 
followed very closely those of legitimate seafarers, both in their use of money 
to provide a ‘common chest’ from which expenses could be met and from 
which injured members of the company might be compensated, and in their 
pay hierarchy which, while more egalitarian than some contemporary maritime 
pay hierarchies such as that of the Royal Navy and certain privateers, was 
roughly comparable to those found in other services, such as the 
Newfoundland fishing enterprise, various privateers, and the merchant 
shipping industry. Both of these practices were rooted in common maritime 
practice with which pirates would have been very familiar and which, far from 
creating their own unique systems of reward and compensation, pirates 
adopted and adapted only slightly, if at all, to fit their own unique 
circumstances. Finally, I considered the question of what pirates actually 
spent their wealth on, and argued that the accumulation of wealth, along with 
the seizure of certain commodities, especially clothing, was one of the ways in 
which they sought to elevate their social standing. This elevation was, I have 
argued throughout the thesis, the main aspiration of many or most pirates. 
Piracy was, for most of them, the means to an end rather than an end in itself. 
Men did not turn to piracy in the hope that they would find a new egalitarian or 
libertarian society on the pirate ship, but because piracy was, for them, the 
simplest and quickest way to climb a rung or two on the ladder of respectable 
and legitimate society. 
This view is reinforced in Chapter 4, in which I argued that pirates’ articles 
restricted their behaviour far more than they guaranteed liberties. First I 
examined what kind of freedoms were guaranteed by pirate articles, and how 
extensive those freedoms were compared to the liberties enjoyed by seamen 
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in legitimate service. Secondly, I explored the articles denying individual 
pirates the right to leave the company, and argued that for many pirates this 
was a most unwelcome restriction which was sometimes found to be 
unworkable in practice. I also tackled the question of freedom of speech 
aboard pirate vessels, and argued that pirates’ restrictions of free speech 
were sometimes far more draconian than those found in legitimate seafaring. 
Fourth, I looked at how pirates sought to restrict and control potentially 
divisive quarrels and arguments, and minimise the impact of internecine 
conflict. Finally I explored the articles’ stance on women and sex, and 
dispelled the myth of pirates’ sexual libertarianism by showing that the 
presence of women on pirate ships was severely restricted and that 
homosexuality and situational homosexual practice were, contrary to the 
arguments of B.R. Burg, no more common amongst pirates than any other 
group of seafarers. The maintenance of their community was so important to 
pirates that, far from enjoying unparalleled freedoms, pirates imposed upon 
themselves social controls and restrictions that in all significant respects 
followed, and sometimes exceeded, those found in legitimate society. Apart 
from the rights to drink heavily and swear profusely, pirates enjoyed no 
greater level of social freedom than any other group in the early-modern 
period. Faced with the same problem of the conflict between establishing the 
rights of the individual and restricting them for the benefit of the community as 
a whole, pirates and legitimate societies reacted in comparable ways. 
In Chapter 5 I will explored the articles’ role as codes of ‘criminal’ law, and 
their use in punishing malefactors. By comparing the sequence of events from 
crime to punishment in legitimate society and in pirate society, with particular 
attention to the pirates’ manner of trying transgressors against the articles, 
and the nature of punishments inflicted by pirates on members of their own 
community, I argued that pirates’ systems of justice were, again, largely 
copied from the systems with which they were familiar in legitimate society, 
but were frequently more severe in their punishment and contained no real 
mechanism by which mercy might be extended to a malefactor. Fines, 
flogging, and execution were common sentences handed down by legitimate 
and pirate juries alike, and pirates adopted the practice of transportation as a 
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punishment, and adapted it to suit their own peculiar circumstances, by 
marooning errant members of their company in inhospitable territories. 
Moreover, the actual use of punishments by members of the pirate ‘elite’ 
against ‘unpropertied’ members of their companies emulated one of the most 
complained-of abuses prevalent in the legitimate judicial systems of Anglo-
American society. By maintaining laws for the protection of the ‘propertied’ 
volunteer pirates and officers against the ‘unpropertied’ forced men and 
slaves, members of the pirate ‘elite’ placed themselves on the other side of 
the judicial fence from that on which they had found themselves in legitimate 
society, but made no effort to break the fence down. 
Traditionally, pirate society has been depicted as original, a hitherto untried 
experiment: pirates ‘dared to imagine a different life, and they dared to try to 
live it.’919 But this thesis has cut through the romance and ideology of previous 
interpretations of pirate society, and has continually shown that in reality there 
was nothing new or original about any of the methods by which a pirate ship 
was run. The emulation of legitimate systems of government and society by 
pirate crews was, to some extent, rooted in the fact that pirate communities 
faced many of the same problems and dilemmas as communities in legitimate 
society: for entirely practical reasons, somebody had to take charge of the 
running of the pirate company; members of the community required money of 
their own and so had to have the opportunity to earn it; individual freedoms 
needed to be restricted to prevent the community dissolving in anarchy; and 
those who failed to respect the laws of the community had to be punished, 
both to prevent further transgressions and to discourage transgressions by 
others. However, the particular ways in which certain members of pirate 
companies were able to use the emulated systems to their advantage is 
indicative of a much deeper trend, the desire to improve their status. By taking 
on the role of shareholders in their ship, as outlined in Chapter 2.2, pirates 
immediately improved their status from that of waged employee to property 
owner, and by taking an active part in some aspect of the running of their 
community they adopted the status of the propertied freemen who enjoyed the 
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franchise in legitimate society. By owning of slaves, employing servants, and 
wearing new clothes, pirates broadcast their new status to all whom they met. 
That pirates sought to acquire riches for themselves cannot be in doubt, but 
for many pirates that aim was not only based on the intrinsic value of their 
accumulated wealth, but also on what that wealth meant in terms of their 
relative status. The great heyday of social mobility may have been coming to 
an end by the late seventeenth century, but the rise of the merchant, 
especially after the Restoration, meant that wealth was becoming as 
important an indicator of status as birth.920 Coupled with, and related to, the 
rise of the merchant came the rise of the ambiguously-defined ‘middle sort’, 
that disparate group who existed somewhere between the commoners and 
the nobility. There is no clear consensus on what criteria established 
someone as of the ‘middle sort’, or even that any one criterion or set of criteria 
can be used to do so, but wealth certainly played a part. Other possible 
criteria for inclusion in the ‘middle sort’ include occupation, associations, and 
local office-holding.921 Entry into the ‘middling’ class might be possible by 
commoners, including pirates, and was enough for many men to style 
themselves ‘Gentleman’.922  
This, then, was one of the goals of pirates, both in their accumulation of 
wealth and in their recreation of legitimate society in such a way as to improve 
their own local standing. Certainly, the ultimate goal of many, perhaps most, 
pirates was to retire and re-enter legitimate society with enough wealth to be 
able to establish themselves in at least ‘middling’ status. This can be seen 
clearly in the actions of those pirates who came ashore in Virginia in 1720, 
already in possession of a slave apiece, who used some of their wealth to 
purchase indentured servants,923 and Blackbeard’s decision to end his 
piratical career dealing slaves in North Carolina suggests not only the pursuit 
of wealth but also the pursuit of gentility. Bartholomew Roberts’ insistence on 
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the acquisition of £1,000 per man before the company could be broken up, 
and his references to himself as future Governor of the Leeward Islands, differ 
from Blackbeard’s aspirations only in terms of scale.924  
But before they could hope to acquire sufficient wealth to retire as members of 
the ‘middle sort’, pirates endeavoured to place themselves in that status 
bracket as part of their recreation of legitimate society aboard their ships. On 
land, the existence of a ‘middle sort’ was essentially a local phenomenon in 
which status was defined by comparison to neighbours and associates, but 
bore little significance in wider society,925 and the same was true of the pirate 
propertied ‘elite’. Away from their pirate community, their elevated status 
meant little, but aboard their own ships their status as local rulers was 
assured by their domination of the ‘unpropertied’ through established 
hierarchies and judicial systems, as outlined in Chapters 2 and 5 When 
Howell Davis promised prospective recruits that ‘he would make Gentlemen of 
them all’,926 there was no deliberate rhetoric in his words. On board the pirate 
vessel, volunteer pirates would be admitted to the local elite who would enjoy 
the franchise in local matters, were protected by the company’s laws against 
those who were not members of the local elite, and from whose ranks local 
office-holders were drawn.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. The ‘Obligation’ of George Cusack, 1667. 
Following the arrest and trial of Cusack and his company in 1674, a pamphlet 
appeared in print, detailing Cusack’s career and containing a description of an 
‘obligation’ signed by the company.927 Very little corroborative evidence can 
be found to support the account, but neither is there any real reason to doubt 
its integrity. The anonymous author would certainly have had the opportunity 
to meet and interview Cusack and his pirates while they were incarcerated in 
the Marshalsea prison awaiting trial, and it may be that, if his account of the 
‘Obligation’ was not pure invention, it came from the personal recollection of 
Cusack or another. Cusack’s ‘Obligation’ was the first time the substance of 
pirate articles appeared in print, and the fact that there was no pre-existing 
literary tradition of including pirate articles in published accounts tends to 
support its authenticity. The ‘Laws of Oleron’ mentioned in the text was a code 
of laws established in England in the thirteenth century, which by the 
seventeenth century formed the basis of a ‘custom of the sea’. The ‘Laws of 
Oleron’ established various rights and responsibilities for mariners and 
masters, including the division of spoil. Under the laws, half the value of any 
prize taken belonged to the owners of the captor vessel, while the other half 
belonged to the master and crew. The master received a double share, 
making Cusack’s own share of any profit comparable with other pirate 
captains of the period, such as Roberts and Lowther.928 The text of the 
‘Obligation’ follows. 
…declaring their resolution of running away with the Ship and Cargo, 
and of taking or sinking all Ships or Vessels they should meet with 
belonging to any Nation, English only excepted: promising to all persons 
aboard that joined with them, their proportion and shares of the Ship and 
Cargo; together with all other Ships they should afterwards take or 
surprise, according to the Lawes of Oleron: to which end he ordered to 
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be drawn up in Writing an Obligation to himself as Captain, and the said 
Parslow as Lieutenant, expressing the Resolutions of the Subscribers 
upon their Oaths to live and die with them in this their present design.929 
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Appendix 2. Articles aboard the Camelion, 1683.  
The crew of the Camelion, a London slave-ship who mutinied and turned to 
piracy in 1683, were tried for piracy in New York, and recorded amongst the 
indictments was a copy of an agreement drawn up and signed by the crew. 
This document is the closest thing surviving to an original copy of piratical 
articles, recorded in full with the names and marks of its signatories 
attached.930 
June the 30th day, 1683. Articles of Agreement between us abord of the 
Camillion, Nich. Clough Comander, that wee are to dispose of all the 
goods thatt are abord amongst us, every man are to have his full due 
and right share only the Commander is to have two shares and a half a 
share for the Ship and home [whom] the Captain please to take for the 
Master under him is to have a share and a half. Now Gentlemen these 
are to satisfy you, as for the Doctor a Share and half, and these are our 
Articles that wee do all stand to as well as on and all. 
These are to satisfy you thatt our intent is to trade with the Spaniards, 
medling nor make no resistances with no nation that wee do fall with all 
upon the Sea. Now Gentlemen these are to give you notice that if any 
one do make any Resistances against us one any factery hereafter shall 
bee severely punish according to the fact that hee hath comitted and as 
you are all here at present you have taken your corporall oath upon the 
holy Evangelists to stand one by the other as long as life shall last. 
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Appendix 3. Articles of William Kidd, 1696.  
Kidd’s piratical voyage began in England as a privateering and pirate-hunting 
voyage, but his recruitment in New York of a number of former- and would be-
pirates led ultimately to the company turning to piracy. The first sign that Kidd 
may have had difficulty controlling his company came four days after leaving 
New York, bound for Madagascar, when members of his company, still on the 
pretence of a privateering voyage, demanded that the articles they had signed 
be re-written as follows. The articles survived in Kidd’s possession until they 
were confiscated from him on his return from the Indian Ocean by Governor 
Bellomont, who sent a copy to the Board of Trade and Plantations.931 
Articles of Agreement made and concluded upon this tenth day of 
September Anno Domini 1696 between Captain William Kidd, 
Commander of the good ship the Adventure Galley, on the one part, and 
John Walker, Quarter-master to the said ship’s company, on the other 
part, as followeth: 
Imprimus. That the above said Capt William Kidd shall receive for the 
above said ship (Hee finding the said ship in wear and tear) thirtie five 
shares; as also five full shares for himselfe, & his commission, of such 
treasure, wares and merchandises as shall from time to time be taken by 
the said ship & company by sea or land. 
2ndly. That the master for his care shall receive two shares of all such 
treasures, and the Capt shall allow all the other officers a gratification 
above their owne shares out of the said ships shares as the said Capt or 
other in his place shall deem reasonable 
3rdly. That the above ships company do oblige themselves to pay out of 
the first money or merchandise taken for all such provisions as were 
received on board the said ship in the River of Thames according to the 
tradesmens bills, and for what provisions the said Wm Kidd shall from 
time to time purchase for victualling the said ship and company in 
America or elsewhere, the said ships company do oblige themselves to 
pay for the said provisions such advance as shall be demanded by the 
inhabitants of the places where the said provisions shall be purchased. 
4thly. That the said ships company shall out of the first purchase taken 
after the victualling of the said ship is paid, pay for the surgeon’s chest 
and all ships debts by the said voyage contracted. 
5thly. That if any man shall lose an eye, legg or arm or the use thereof in 
the ship or company service, shall receive as a recompense for the loss 
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thereof six-hundred pieces of eight or six able slaves to be paid out of 
the whole stock before any dividend be made 
6thly. That if any man shall receive a flesh wound or lose a finger or toe 
in the said ship or company service, he shall receive for smart money 
one hundred pieces of eight out of the whole stock before any dividend 
be made. 
7thly. That if any man lose his life in time of engagement or by ay 
accident in the ship, or companys service, his share shall be paid to his 
attorney for the use of his family or friend. And if no purchase twenty 
pounds out of the stock. 
8thly. That man who shall first see a sayle, if she prove to be a prize, 
shall receive one hundred pieces of eight to be paid out of the whole 
stock before any dividend be made. 
9thly. That whosoever shall disobey command shall lose his share or 
receive such corporall punishment as the Capt and major part of the 
company shall think fit. 
10thly. That man that is proved a coward in time of engagement shall 
lose his share 
11thly. That man that shall be drunk in time of engagement before the 
prisoners then taken be secured, shall lose his share. 
12thly. That man that shall breed a mutiny or ryot on board the ship or 
prize taken shall lose his share, and receive such corporall punishment 
as the Capt and major part of the company shall think fitt. 
13thly. That if any man shall defraude the Capt or company of any 
treasure, as money, goods, wares, merchandise or any other thing 
whatsoever to the value of one piece of eight either on board the man of 
war, prize or prizes taken shall lose his share and be put on shore upon 
the first inhabited island or other place that the said ship shall touch at. 
14thly. That such men as go on board of any prize taken by the said 
ship, if such prizes should be retaken the men notwithstanding shall 
receive their share of what stock is left in the man of war or elsewhere. 
15thly. That what money or treasure shall be taken by the said ship and 
company shall be put on board of the man of war, and there be shared 
immediately, and all wares and merchandise when legally condemned, 
to be equally divided amongst the ships company according to articles. 
16thly. That what prizes shall happen to be taken by the said ship and 
company, that shall be found on board the said prize that may be 
convenient for the man of war as anchors, cables, sayles or riggen or 
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other things needful and necessary that the man of warr shall be 
supplied therewith for the better fitting of her to proceed her voyage. 
17thly. That all those that have taken up arms of Capt Wm Kidd as guns, 
pistells, cartouche boxes, and cutlasses, shall pay for one gun, one 
pistell, one cartouche box and one cutlass six pounds, to be paid out of 
the first money that shall be shared, and the said Capt to find 
ammunition convenient for the said voyage. 
18thly. That the said Capt doth oblige himself to use all proper meanes 
and take all diligent care to proceed from place to place where he shall 
think convenient for making himselfe and ships company a voyage, and 
not to return, want of provisions and other absolute necessities excepted 
before the said [voyage?] be made.932 
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Appendix 4. Fragments of the Articles of Howell Davis, 1719.  
No complete set of the articles drawn up by Howell Davis’ company has 
survived, which is to be lamented as Davis consorted and associated with a 
number of other pirate crews, including those of Thomas Cocklyn and Oliver 
la Buse, who had been members of the Flying Gang.933 More importantly, 
Davis, at one time or another, commanded John Taylor, Bartholomew 
Roberts, and Thomas Anstis – all of whom later went on to become pirate 
captains themselves, and all of whom created their own articles which have 
survived.934 Therefore, three sets of articles under consideration here may 
owe something of their conception and construction to the set in force in 
Davis’ company. Three clauses were recorded by William Snelgrave, one time 
captive of Thomas Cocklyn, which may have been in force in Davis’ crew. 
During the time that Snelgrave was a prisoner of Cocklyn, on the African 
coast in 1719, he spent an almost equal amount of time with Davis, whose 
company he seemed to enjoy and whom he described as ‘a brave generous 
man’.935 When describing the pirates’ articles where they were relevant to his 
narrative he couched his account in slightly ambiguous terms, leaving some 
doubt as to whether the articles he described belonged to Cocklyn’s crew 
only, or to Davis’ crew as well. The relevant extracts from Snelgrave’s account 
run as follows: 
‘…that maxim established amongst them, not to permit any ill usage to 
their prisoners after quarter given’.936 
‘Several of these unhappy people… desired me to intercede for them, 
that they might be cleared again; for they durst not themselves mention it 
to the Quarter-master, it being death by their articles’.937  
‘It is a rule amongst the pirates, not to allow women to be on board their 
ships, when in the harbour. And if they should take a prize at sea, that 
has any women on board, no one dares, on pain of death, to force them 
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against their inclinations. This being a good political rule to prevent 
disturbances amongst them, it is strictly observed.’938  
Two clauses were also attributed to Davis by Johnson, in his General History: 
According to Davis’s Articles, it was agreed, that Quarters should be 
given whenever it was called for, upon Pain of Death  
and 
According to their Articles, he who first espies a Sail, if she proves a 
Prize, is entitled to the best Pair of  Pistols on board, over and above his 
Dividend.939 
 
                                                 
938
 Snelgrave, New Account, pp. 256-257 
939
 Johnson, General History, p. 191 
 315 
Appendix 5. The Articles of John Taylor, c.1720.  
John Taylor, protégé of both Davis and Cocklyn, commanded Cocklyn’s 
company following that captain’s death. Like Davis, Taylor consorted with a 
number of other pirates and became one of the most successful pirate 
captains operating in the Indian Ocean in the early eighteenth century. 
Taylor’s articles were described, if not transcribed, by a Dutch captive, Jacob 
du Bucquoy, whose account of his time as a prisoner is both detailed and 
observant. His portrayal of Taylor as a tough and efficient sailor and a leader 
of great courage is also borne out by descriptions of the pirate written by other 
captives who had met him, such as the East India Company officer Richard 
Lazenby,940 and William Snelgrave.941 There is, then, little reason to doubt the 
integrity of du Bucquoy in his description of Taylor’s articles. 
The first article of their code declares as enemies all those who are not 
part of their association, permits the use of force or guile to take their 
goods, commands each man to give no consideration or mercy to 
anyone and to put to death any who resist or defend themselves, even 
his own father. 
The second article obliges all to remain loyal and to assist their brethren 
in danger, on pain of death. 
All plunder taken from a prize must be handed over to the quartermaster, 
on pain of a flogging and forfeiture of all possessions to the good of the 
company 
Women taken in a prize are to be put ashore or given up to the hazards 
of the sea. No violence is to be offered to female prisoners on pain of 
severe punishment 
Deserters are condemned to have their ears and noses slit and be 
marooned naked on a deserted island. 
No victim who surrenders is to be harmed, on pain of death. (It is 
necessary to observe that this article is generally not applied to the 
pirates who are drunk) 
No man to be forced against his will 
Arguments, insults, gambling, and discussion of religion are prohibited 
Captain, boatswain, master-gunner, and pilot to have one share and a 
quarter. The rest of the crew to have one share, except for those held of 
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no account, who are to have a half share, and boys, to have a quarter-
share. The quartermaster is to receive one share, to which each man 
adds something for his pains.942 
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Appendix 6. The Articles of Bartholomew Roberts, d. February 1722.  
When Howell Davis was killed, Roberts was appointed his successor,943  and 
led the company on a spectacular cruise. At some point during Roberts’ 
extensive career new articles were drawn up.944 The articles drawn up by 
Bartholomew Roberts’ crew are quoted in Johnson’s General History, and 
thus the accuracy of their recording is in some doubt. Three reasons exist, 
however, to suppose that their recording was substantially accurate. Firstly, 
Johnson, for all his faults, was not in the habit of inventing articles where none 
were available for him to recount, and 31 of the 34 chapters that make up his 
work are devoid of articles. Secondly, Johnson has been described as ‘more 
reliable about Bartholomew Roberts than of other pirates’.945 As well as his 
probable association with captured pirates from Roberts’ crew, Johnson 
almost certainly met and interviewed John Atkins, who was not only present at 
the eventual destruction of Roberts’ gang, but also acted as Register at their 
trial in 1722, and it was probably from Atkins that he heard of the articles.946 
Thirdly, the published account of the trial contains evidence that directly 
corroborates some of the material in Johnson’s version of the articles.947  
1. Every man has a vote in affairs of moment; has equal title to the fresh 
provisions, or strong liquors, at any time seized, and may use them at 
pleasure, unless a scarcity makes it necessary, for the good of all, to 
vote a retrenchment. 
2. Every man to be called fairly in turn, by list, on board of prizes 
because, (over and above their proper share) they were on these 
occasions allowed a shift of clothes: but if they defrauded the company 
to the value of a dollar in plate, jewels, or money, marooning was their 
punishment. If the robbery was only betwixt one another, they contented 
themselves with slitting the ears and nose of him that was guilty, and set 
him on shore, not in an uninhabited place, but somewhere, where he 
was sure to encounter hardships.  
3. No person to game at cards or dice for money. 
4. The lights and candles to be put out at eight o'clock at night: if any of 
the crew, after that hour still remained inclined for drinking, they were to 
do it on the open deck;  
5. To keep their piece, pistols, and cutlass clean and fit for service.  
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6. No boy or woman to be allowed amongst them. If any man were to be 
found seducing any of the latter sex, and carried her to sea, disguised, 
he was to suffer death;  
7. To desert the ship or their quarters in battle, was punished with death 
or marooning. 
8. No striking one another on board, but every man's quarrels to be 
ended on shore, at sword and pistol.  
9. No man to talk of breaking up their way of living, till each had shared 
one thousand pounds. If in order to this, any man should lose a limb, or 
become a cripple in their service, he was to have eight hundred dollars, 
out of the public stock, and for lesser hurts, proportionately. 
10. The captain and quartermaster to receive two shares of a prize: the 
master, boatswain, and gunner, one share and a half, and other officers 
one and quarter. 
11. The musicians to have rest on the Sabbath Day, but the other six 
days and nights, none without special favour. 948 
 
                                                 
948
 Johnson, General History, pp. 211-212 
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Appendix 7. The Articles of Thomas Anstis, April 1721 – April 1723.  
Thomas Anstis’ company broke away from Roberts’ company after some 
disagreement and spent fourteen months cruising on their own account before 
submitting a petition to be pardoned. Not receiving any response to their 
petition, nineteen pirates elected to return to England in order to surrender 
themselves to ‘the King’s Mercy’.949 One of those who surrendered was 
William Whelks, who claimed to have been captured by Anstis’ crew in 1721 
and kept prisoner for a period of twenty months, during which time he was 
‘compelled’ to sign the crew’s articles. Appended to the deposition given by 
Whelks to Somerset magistrate William Blake is a copy of the ‘Articles made 
on board the Good Fortune’. The accuracy of Whelks’ memory cannot, of 
course, be determined, except to say that in other respects his testimony 
correlates well when compared to the testimony given by the other pirates of 
Anstis’ crew, and there seems little reason to doubt Whelks’ honesty, at least 
as far as the substance of the articles is concerned. The ninth clause reported 
by Whelks is independently corroborated as being in use by Anstis’ 
successor, John Fenn.950 
 
1st: That the Capt. shall have one share as the rest of the Company. The 
Master, Gunner, Carpenter, and Boatswain the same. 
2d: If any man should Disobey any Lawful Command of the 
Commanding Officers shall suffer punishment the Company and Capt. 
shall think fit. 
3d: If any p[er]son or p[er]sons should go on board of any Prize and 
should break open any Chest without the knowledge of the Quarter 
Master shall suffer what punishment the Company and Capt. shall think 
fit. 
4th: If any p[er]son or p[er]sons shall be found guilty of thiefery from one 
another to the value of one piece of Eight shall be marooned on an 
Island with one Bottle of Powder, one Bottle of water and shot 
equivalent. 
5th: If any p[er]son or p[er]sons should be found guilty of neglecting in 
keeping their Arms clean unfitting for an Engagement shall lose his share 
or shares. 
                                                 
949
 CSPC 1722-1723, item. 331.i; The Examination of Thomas Lawrence Jones, 13/2/1723, 
HCA 1/55, f. 51 
950
 The London Journal, 28/9/1723 
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6th: If any p[er]son or p[er]sons should be found to snap their arms or 
cleaning in the hold shall suffer Moses’ Law, that is forty lacking one. 
7th: If any p[er]son or p[er]sons shall be found backwards in the time of 
an engagement shall be marooned. 
8th: If any p[er]son or p[er]sons shall be found to game on board the 
privateer of the value of one Real plate shall suffer Moses’ Law 
9th: If any p[er]son or p[er]sons shall go on board of a Prize and meet 
with any Gentlewoman or Lady of Honour and should force them against 
their will to lie with them shall suffer death. 
10th: If any p[er]son or p[er]sons should lose a leg or a limb or a joint 
shall for a limb have Eight hundred pieces of Eight, and for one joint 200. 
11th: If any time we shall come in Company with any other Marooner and 
they shall offer to sign their articles without the consent of the Company 
shall be Marooned, or run away shall receive the same. 
12th: But if any time we shall hear from England an Account of an act of 
Grace they that are amind to receive it shall go with their money and 
goods, and the rest have the Privateer. 951 
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 The Information of William Whelks, 23/4/1723, ADM 1/4104 
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Appendix 8. The Articles of George Lowther, May 1721 – October 1723. 
George Lowther’s articles were the second of three sets published in 
Johnson’s General History, and so must be treated with caution. However, as 
noted in Appendix 6, there is no reason to suppose that Johnson deliberately 
fabricated any of the sets of articles he recorded. Johnson’s most likely 
source of information regarding Lowther’s articles was John Massey, 
Lowther’s lieutenant, whose trial took place in London in 1723 (see Chapter 
1.4) The similarity of Lowther’s articles to his consort, Low’s (see Appendix 9), 
is also indicative of their authenticity. 
1. The Captain is to have two full Shares; the Master is to have one 
Share and a Half; The Doctor, Mate, Gunner and Boatswain, one Share 
and a Quarter. 
2. He that shall be found guilty of taking up any unlawful Weapon on 
board the Privateer, or any prize, by us taken, so as to strike or abuse 
one another, in any regard, shall suffer what Punishment the Captain 
and the Majority of the Company shall see fit. 
3. He that shall be found Guilty of Cowardice in the Time of Engagement, 
shall suffer what Punishment the Captain and the Majority of the 
Company shall think fit. 
4. If any Gold, Jewels, Silver, &c. be found on Board of any Prize or 
Prizes, to the Value of a Piece of Eight, and the Finder do not deliver it to 
the Quarter-Master in the space of 24 hours shall suffer what 
Punishment the Captain and the Majority of the Company shall think fit. 
5. He that is found Guilty of Gaming, or Defrauding another to the Value 
of a Shilling, shall suffer what Punishment the Captain and the Majority 
of the Company shall think fit. 
6. He that shall have the Misfortune to lose a Limb in Time of 
Engagement, shall have the Sum of one hundred and fifty Pounds 
Sterling, and remain with the Company as long as he shall think fit. 
7. Good Quarters to be given when call’d for. 
8. He that sees a Sail first, shall have the best Pistol, or Small Arm, on 
board her. 952 
 
 
 
                                                 
952
 Johnson, General History, pp. 307-308 
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Appendix 9. The Articles of Edward Low, May 1722 – Spring 1724.  
The articles of Edward Low’s company were printed in the Boston News-
Letter,953 following the capture and trial of Low’s consort, Charles Harris, and 
his crew. They were printed along with a list of ships captured by the pirates, 
supplied in the form of a deposition by one of Harris’ crew who had recently 
been executed. This is the source from which they have usually been quoted, 
however, they were also included as an appendix to the printed account of the 
trial of Harris and his crew, also published in 1723. There is no indication in 
the newspaper who that source might have been, but we can be on surer 
ground with the version of the articles printed in the trial account, which were 
provided, ‘to the best of his remembrance’ by John Kencate, a surgeon who 
had been forced to join the pirates and ‘had often seen them’.954 The fact that 
two virtually identical versions of Low’s articles have been preserved in 
apparently independent sources, suggests a reasonable degree of 
authenticity. The text below is quoted from the Boston News-Letter version. 
1. The Captain is to have two full Shares; the Master is to have one 
Share and one Half; The Doctor, Mate, Gunner and Boatswain, one 
Share and one Quarter. 
2. He that shall be found guilty of taking up any Unlawfull Weapon on 
Board the Privateer or any other prize by us taken, so as to Strike or 
Abuse one another in any regard, shall suffer what Punishment the 
Captain and the Majority of the Company shall see fit. 
3. He that shall be found Guilty of Cowardice in the time of Ingagements, 
shall suffer what Punishment the Captain and the Majority of the 
Company shall think fit. 
4. If any Gold, Jewels, Silver, &c. be found on Board of any Prize or 
Prizes to the value of a Piece of Eight, & the finder do not deliver it to the 
Quarter Master in the space of 24 hours he shall suffer what Punishment 
the Captain and the Majority of the Company shall think fit. 
5. He that is found Guilty of Gaming, or Defrauding one another to the 
value of a Ryal of Plate, shall suffer what Punishment the Captain and 
the Majority of the Company shall think fit. 
6. He that shall have the Misfortune to loose a Limb in time of 
Engagement, shall have the Sum of Six hundred pieces of Eight, and 
remain aboard as long as he shall think fit. 
7. Good Quarters to be given when Craved. 
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 Boston News-Letter, 8/8/1723 
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 Tryals of Thirty-Six Persons, pp. 191-192 
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8. He that sees a Sail first, shall have the best Pistol or Small Arm 
aboard of her. 
9. He that shall be guilty of Drunkenness in time of Engagement shall 
suffer what Punishment the Captain and Majority of the Company shall 
think fit. 
10. No Snaping of Guns in the Hould.955 
 
In his account of his time as a prisoner of Low’s company, George Roberts 
mentioned several other ‘articles’ which, if accurate, may have been unwritten 
rules rather than codified articles. Doubt has been cast on the authenticity of 
Roberts’ account, but if it is indeed a fabrication it is at least a well-researched 
one, and I can find no satisfactory reason to ignore the account. 
 
…we have an article which we are sworn to, which is, not to force any 
married man, against his will, to serve us.956 
…one of their articles, it being punishable by death, to hold any secret 
correspondence with a prisoner.957 
That if any man shall advise, or speak any thing tending to the 
separating or breaking of the company, or shall by any means offer or 
endeavour to desert or quit the company, that person shall be shot to 
death by the quarter-master’s order, without the sentence of a court 
martial.958 
…[the articles] enjoin you by all means, not repugnant to them, to 
increase and fill your company.959 
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 Boston News-Letter, 8/8/1723 
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 Roberts, Four Years’ Voyages, p. 53 
957
 Roberts, Four Years’ Voyages, p. 61 
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 Roberts, Four Years’ Voyages, p. 62 
959
 Roberts, Four Years’ Voyages, p. 80 
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Appendix 10. The Articles of John Philips, August 1723 – April 1724. 
John Philips began his piratical career as carpenter of Anstis’ company, and 
was among those who returned to England with William Whelks (see 
Appendix 7) before returning to piracy.960 Of the three sets of articles recorded 
in the General History, John Phillips’ is the most difficult to analyse in terms of 
authenticity. The activities of Phillips’ crew were well reported in contemporary 
newspapers, and it was probably from these that Johnson drew most of his 
information,961 but none of these accounts recorded the articles used by 
Phillips, and there is no other corroborative evidence of the articles’ contents. 
Thus, the credibility of Phillips’ articles rests solely on the credibility of 
Johnson, but the are some points which may give clues as to Johnson’s 
accuracy as far as Phillips’ articles are concerned. Firstly, as noted above, 
Johnson does not appear to have been in the habit of inventing articles, and 
of the three sets in the General History, the other two can be shown probably 
to be fairly faithful recordings, so, it would not be unreasonable to suppose 
that Johnson’s version of Phillips’ articles is also substantially accurate. 
Secondly, seven of the nine clauses which comprised Phillips’ articles were 
similar or virtually identical to clauses in the articles of Philips’ mentor, 
Thomas Anstis. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Johnson’s account cannot 
be corroborated. 
1. Every man shall obey civil Command; the Captain shall have one full 
share and a half in all Prizes; the Master, Carpenter, Boatswain and 
Gunner shall have one Share and quarter.  
2. If any man shall offer to run away, or keep any Secret from the 
Company, he shall be marroon'd with one Bottle of Powder, one Bottle of 
Water, one small Arm and shot.  
3. If any Many shall steal any Thing in the Company, or game, to the 
Value of a Piece of Eight, he shall be marroon'd or shot.  
4. If at any Time we should meet another Marrooner that Man that shall 
sign his Articles without the Consent of our Company, shall suffer such 
Punishment as the Captain and Company shall think fit.  
5. That Man that shall strike another whilst these Articles are in force, 
shall receive Moses’ Law (that is 40 stripes lacking one) on the bare 
Back.  
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 The Information of Henry Treehill, 13/2/1723, HCA 1/55, ff. 65, 68; Johnson, General 
History, pp. 341-342  
961
 Johnson, General History, p. 680 
 325 
6. That Man that shall snap his Arms, or smoak Tobacco in the Hold, 
without a cap to his Pipe, or carry a Candle lighted without a Lanthorn, 
shall suffer the same Punishment as in the former Article.  
7. That Man that shall not keep his Arms clean, fit for an Engagement, or 
neglect his Business, shall be cut off from his Share, and suffer such 
other Punishment as the Captain and the Company shall think fit.  
8. If any Man shall lose a Joint in time of an Engagement he shall have 
400 pieces of Eight; if a limb 800.  
9. If at any time you meet with a prudent Woman, that Man that offers to 
meddle with her, without her Consent, shall suffer present Death.962  
 
                                                 
962
 Johnson, General History, pp. 342-343 
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Appendix 11. The Articles of John Gow. 1725.  
By the time John Gow turned to piracy in late 1724 the publication of 
Johnson’s General History had helped create an enormous public demand for 
tales of piracy. Thus, a great deal of printed material concerning Gow, as well 
as the manuscript copies of his crew’s examinations, exists. The fullest 
account printed at the time, An Account of the Conduct and Proceedings of 
the Late John Gow, contains a record of the articles written aboard Gow’s 
ship.963 There is no other source to corroborate the Account’s version of the 
articles, but in general the Account compares well to the numerous other 
sources relating to Gow’s career. Furthermore, the articles related in the 
Account are quite dissimilar to other articles, including those published in the 
General History the previous year. The author of the Account did not, 
therefore, copy or even draw inspiration from any published set available to 
him. There is therefore no evidence to show that Gow’s articles were not a 
literary invention, but little reason to suppose that they should be.  
 
I. That every Man shall obey his Commander in all Respects, as if the 
Ship was his own, and we under Monthly Pay 
II. That no Man shall give or dispose of the Ships Provisions, whereby 
may be given Reason of Suspicion that every one hath not an equal 
share 
III. That no Man shall open or declare to any Person or Persons what we 
are, or with what Design we are upon; the Offender shall be punished 
with Death upon the spot. 
IV.That no Man shall go on Shore till the Ship is off the Ground, and in 
readiness to put to Sea. 
V. That every Man shall keep his Watch Night and Day, and precisely at 
the Hour of Eight leave off Gaming and Drinking, every one repair to their 
respective Stations. 
VI. Whoever Offends shall be punish’d with Death, or otherwise, as we 
shall find proper for our Interest. 964 
 
                                                 
963
 Defoe, John Gow, p. 54 
964
 Defoe, John Gow, p. 54 
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Appendix 12. Comparative table of pirate articles. 
Table 6 is a summary of the information contained in Appendices 1,2, and 4-
11. William Kidd’s articles have been omitted as they were originally 
composed for a privateering voyage, even if they were later used by pirates. 
Davis’ articles are problematic because of their incomplete nature. It should 
not be assumed, for example, that because no article relating to the division of 
shares is noted in Table 6 that no such article was adopted by Davis’ 
company; it is quite probable that they predetermined how shares were to be 
divided, but the details escaped record. Finally, Low’s articles as recorded by 
George Roberts have not been included because they are not all included in 
the canonical lists printed in the Boston News Letter and trial account, and 
may well have been verbal rules rather than codified articles. 
 
Table 6. Comparative table of pirate articles. 
 Cusack Clough Davis Taylor Roberts Anstis Lowther Low Phillips Gow 
Fair vote and 
equal provision 
          
Robbery from 
the company 
          
Limitations on 
gambling 
          
Lights out           
Proper 
maintenance 
of weapons 
          
Bringing 
women and/or 
boys aboard 
          
Desertion and 
cowardice in 
action 
          
No fighting 
aboard 
          
Nobody to talk 
of breaking up 
the company 
          
Division of 
shares 
          
Set 
working/resting 
hours 
          
Lawful           
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command to 
be obeyed 
Snapping arms 
in the hold 
          
Rape           
Compensation 
for injury 
          
Running away 
from the crew 
          
Right to accept 
pardon if 
offered 
          
Quarter to be 
given when 
called for 
          
Extra 
shares/perks 
          
Drunkenness 
in action 
          
Loyalty to the 
company 
          
Good 
treatment of 
prisoners 
          
No man to be 
forced against 
their will. 
          
Oath of 
secrecy 
          
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Appendix 13. The buccaneering articles of Henry Morgan.  
The articles drawn up by buccaneers under the command of Henry Morgan, 
together with the privateering articles in Appendices 15 and 16, are included 
for comparative purposes. Morgan’s articles were recorded and published by 
Alexander Esquemeling, who accompanied Morgan across the Isthmus of 
Panama. 
In this council, likewise, they agree upon certain articles, which are put in 
writing, by way of bond or obligation, which everyone is bound to 
observe, and all of them, or the chiefest, do set their hands unto… In the 
first place they mention how much the Captain ought to have for his ship. 
Next the salary of the carpenter or shipwright, who careened, mended, 
and rigged the vessel… Also a competent salary for the surgeon and his 
chest of medicaments… Lastly they stipulate in writing what recompense 
or reward each one ought to have that  either wounded or maimed in his 
body… a very exact and equal dividend is made of the remainder among 
them all. Yet herein they have also regard unto qualities and places. 
Thus the Captain, or chief Commander, is allotted five or six portions to 
what the ordinary seamen have; the Master’s Mate only two; and other 
Officers proportionable to their employment. After whom they draw equal 
parts from the highest even to the lowest mariner, the boys not being 
omitted… They observe among themselves very good orders. For in the 
prizes they take, it is severely prohibited unto every one to usurp 
anything in particular unto themselves. Hence all they take is equally 
divided, according to what has been said before. Yea, they make a 
solemn oath to each other not to abscond, or conceal the least thing they 
find amongst the prey. If afterwards any one is found unfaithful, and has 
contravened the said oath, immediately he is separated and turned out of 
the society.965 
                                                 
965
 Esquemeling, Buccaneers of America, pp. 59-61 
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Appendix 14. The Articles of Woodes Rogers, October 1708.  
Like Kidd’s men, Rogers’ privateering company also insisted on a new set of 
articles, though in Rogers’ case there was no degeneration into piracy. 
Impr. That all Plunder on board each Prize take by either ship, shall be 
equally divided between the Company of both ships, according to each 
Man’s respective whole Share, as ship’d by the Owners or their Orders. 
2. That what is Plunder shall be adjudg’d by the superior Officers and 
Agents in each Ship. 
3. That if any Person on board either ship do conceal any Plunder 
exceeding one Piece of Eight in value, 24 hours after the Capture of any 
prize, he shall be severely punish’d, and lose his Shares of the Plunder. 
The same Penalty to be inflicted for being drunk in time of Action, or 
disobeying his superior Officer’s Comands, or concealing himself, or 
deserting his Post in Sea or Land Service.; except when any Prize is 
taken by Storm in Boarding, then whatsoever is taken shall be his own, 
as followeth: A Sailor or Landman 10 l. Any Officer below the Carpenter 
20 l. A Mate, Gunner, Boatswain, and Carpenter 40 l. A Lieutenant or 
Master 80 l. And the Captains 100 l. over and above the Gratuity 
promis’d by the Owners to such as shall signalise themselves. 
4.That publick Books of Plunder are to be kept in each Ship attested by 
the Officers, and the Plunder to be apprais’d by Officers chosen, and 
divided as soon as possible after the Capture. Also every Person to be 
sworn and search’d so soon as they shall come aboard, by such Persons 
as shall be appointed for that purpose: The Person or Persons refusing, 
shall forfeit their shares of the Plunder as above. 
5. In consideration that Capt. Rogers and Capt. Courtney, to make both 
Ships Companies easy, have given the whole Cabin-Plunder (which in all 
probability is the major part) to be divided as aforesaid; we do voluntarily 
agree, that they shall have 5 per Cent. each of ‘em, over and above their 
respective Shares, as a Consideration for what is their Due of the 
Plunder aforesaid. 
6. That a Reward of twenty Pieces of Eight shall be given to him that first 
sees a Prize of good Value, or exceeding 50 Tons in Burden. 
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7. That such of us who have not sign’d already to the Articles of 
Agreement indented with the Owners, do hereby oblige our selves to the 
same Terms and conditions as the rest of the Ships company have done; 
half Shares and half Wages, &c.966 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
966
 Woodes Rogers, A Cruising Voyage round the World (London, 1712), pp. 30-31 
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Appendix 15. Hypothetical Privateer Articles, 1746 
 
Articles agreed between Captain A.B. Commander of the Private Man of 
War, called the Terrible, (with twenty guns mounted, carrying nine pound 
shot, twenty brass pattereroes, four mortars, and some Wall-Pieces, 
manned with two hundred Men, now lying at Church Hole, designed to 
cruize against the French and Spaniards) on the one Part, and the said 
Ship’s Company on the other, witnesseth, 
1. That the said Captain A.B. for himself, and in Behalf of the Owners of 
the said ship Terrible, shall put on board her, great Guns, Swivels, 
Powder, Shot, and all other warlike Ammunition necessary for them, as 
also small Arms, and Provisions sufficient for the said Ship’s Company 
for a six months cruise at sea, from their Sailing from the Downs; in 
consideration of which, the Owners, or their Assigns, shall be reimbursed 
(out of the first Prize or prizes taken by the said ship Terrible, before any 
Dividend is made thereof) the whole Charge of warlike stores (great guns 
and small arms excepted), Victualling, Advance-Money, and the 
Expences the Owners are at for the Surgeon’s Chest and a set of 
Musick; after which one half of the neat Proceeds of such Prize or Prizes 
as shall be taken, to be for the account of the Owners, and at the 
Disposition of the Managers; and the other half of such neat Proceeds to 
be the sole property of the Ship’s Company; the Captain’s share of which 
to be 6 (in some 8) per Cent. and the Residue to be divided in the 
Proportions mentioned in the eleventh Article of these Presents. 
2. That for preserving a Decorum on board the said Private Man of War, 
no man is to quit, or go out of her, on board of any other vessel or 
vessels, or on Shore, without Leave obtained of the commanding Officer 
on board, under the Penalty of such Punishment as shall be esteemed 
proper by the Captain and Officers. 
3. That it shall be entirely in the Captain’s Power to cruise where he shall 
esteem most beneficial, for the Interest of the Owners, and Ship’s 
Company. 
(In some, it is, to cruise where the Managers, and in others, where the 
Owners shall direct.) 
4. That if any Person be found a Ringleader of a Mutiny, or causing a 
Disturbance onboard, refuse to obey the Command of the Captain and 
Officers, behave with Cowardice, or get drunk in Time of Action, he or 
they shall forfeit his or their Share, to be divided amongst the Ship’s 
Company; and be otherwise punished according to Law. 
5. That all Clothes, Bedding, Watches, and Rings in wear, Buttons, 
Buckles, and what else is deemed small Plunder by Custom, is to be 
divided amongst the Ship’s Company, according to their several 
Stations, the Captain not to interfere with them; the Cabin Utensils in 
present Use for the Commander. 
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6. That if any Person shall steal, or convert to his Use, and Part of the 
Prize or Prizes, or be found pilfering any Money or Goods, and be 
convicted thereof, he shall forfeit his Share to the Ship and Company. 
7. The Captain has the Power of taking out of any Prize, or Prizes, 
whatever Stores he may judge necessary for the ship Terrible, without 
paying for them; provided the Prize is not disabled thereby. 
8. That whoever first spies a Sail, which proves to be a Prize, shall have 
seven pounds (in some only one Guinea, in others five) and the first Man 
proved to board and Prize before she strikes, shall have a Gratuity of ten 
Pounds, (in some ten, and in others fifteen Guineas) for his Bravery, to 
be deducted out of the gross Sum of the Prize. 
9. That if any Private Man shall lose a Leg, Arm or Eye in Time of Action, 
or in the Ship’s Service, he shall, besides the Advantage at Greenwich 
Hospital, have a Gratuity of 25l. and in Proportion to the Officers, 
exclusive of shares (in others only 20l. to a private Man, 50l. to the 
Captain, 40l. to the first Lieutenant, and 30l. to each of the other 
Lieutenants, Master and Surgeon) the said sums to be deducted out of 
the gross Sum of the Prize; and in Case of Mortality under Cure, the said 
Gratuity and Share to be made good to their Assigns. 
10. That for the farther Encouragement of the said Private Man of War’s 
Company, it is agreed, that the chief Officers shall have six Guineas, the 
petty Officers and able Seamen five Guineas, able bodied Landmen 
three Guineas, and Boys one Guinea, advanced to them in the Hope, (in 
some, the Officers and Seamen have only five Guineas, and the 
Landmen two.) 
11. That half of the neat Proceeds of all Prizes, taken by the Ship 
Terrible which is appropriated to the Ship’s Company, be divided 
amongst the in the Manner following, after the Captain’s 5, or 8 per Cent. 
(as shall be agreed) is taken thereout as above. 
When the Captain has not the above-mentioned 6, or 8 per Cent. but 
divided with the Ship’s Company, he commonly has twelve Shares, as 
follows, viz. 
Shares    
The Captain        12 
The first Lieutenant       5 ½ to 6 
The second Lieutenant      4 ½ to 6 
The third Lieutenant       3 ½ to 5 
The Master        3 ½ to 5 
The first Mate        3 to 4 
The second Mate       2 ½ to 2 
The Surgeon        3 to 4 
The Surgeon’s Mate       2 ½ to 2 
The Lieutenant of Marines      3 to 4 
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The Gunner        3 
The Gunner’s Mates, to each     2 
The Carpenter        3 
The Carpenter’s Mates, to each     2 
The Boatswain        3 
The Boatswain’s Mates, to each     2 
The Purser        3 
The Cooper        1 ½ to 2 
The Musick, to each of them      2 
The Caulker        2 
The Master at Arms       1 ½ to 2 
The Armourer        1 ½ 
The Midshipmen, to each      1 ½ to 2 
The Quarter Masters, to each      1 
½ 
The Quarter Gunners, to each      1 
¼ to 1 ½ 
The Corporals, to each      1 ¼ to 1 
½ 
The Sailmaker        1 ½ 
The Yeoman of the Powder Room     2 
The Ship’s Steward       2 
The Captain’s Ditto       1 ½ 
The Master of Languages      1 ½ 
The Captain’s Clerk       2 
The Ship’s Cook       1 ½ to 2 
The Captain’s Ditto       1 ½ 
The able Seamen, to each      1 1/10 to 
1 
The able Landmen, to each      ¾  
The Sea Boys, to each       ½ 
or ¾ 
The Land Boys, to each      ⅓ to ½ 
12. That on the Death of the Captain, the Command to devolve on the 
next Officer, and so in Rotation; and for the Encouragement of the able 
Seamen, and others, on the Loss of Officers, they are to be replaced out 
of the Ship’s Company, according to their gallant Behaviour, as the 
Captain shall appoint. 
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13. That whosoever deserts the said Ship Terrible, within the Time here 
under mentioned, shall forfeit his Prize Money to the Owners and 
Company, to enable them to procure others in their Room. 
14. All and every one on board, does covenant and agree to serve on 
board the said Ship Terrible, the Term of six Months, beginning at the 
said Ship’s Departure from the Downs. 
15. And lastly, for the true Performance of all and every the 
aforementioned Covenants and Agreements; each, and every of the said 
Parties do bind themselves, their Heirs, Executors, and Administrators, in 
the penal Sum of five hundred Pounds, lawful Money of Great –Britain, 
firmly by these Presents: In Witness whereof, the said Parties to these 
Presents have hereunto severally set their Hands and Seals, the … Day 
of … in the Year of our Lord 1746, and the Twentieth Year in the Reign 
of our Sovereign Lord King George the Second.967 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
967
 Wyndham Beawes, Lex Mercatoria Rediviva (Dublin, 1773), pp. 196-198 
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Appendix 16. Pirate Captains, 1660-1730 
The following three tables represent data concerning the career paths of 
pirate captains, particularly their position prior to assuming piratical command, 
the method of their appointment as captain, and the way in which their 
command was terminated. Information concerning a sample of 82 Anglo-
American captains has been collated, but is incomplete in some cases. The 
career path of each of the 82 captains has provided data for at least one table 
in every case, for two tables in twenty cases, and for all three tables in 43 
cases. What exact proportion of the number of pirate captains active from 
1660-1730 this data represents is impossible to ascertain: Rediker quotes 30-
32 pirate crews active at once during the height of the pirates’ strength,968 but 
these figures cannot be corroborated with lists of named pirate captains. The 
82 pirate captains examined here represent the great majority of those who 
can not only be named, but about whose career paths something is known. In 
each table the captains have been divided into six groups, representing pirate 
captains active prior to 1690; captains involved in the mass-outbreak of Indian 
Ocean piracy between about 1690 and 1710, known colloquially as ‘Red Sea 
Men’; their counterparts in the Atlantic and Caribbean from 1690-1715, during 
a relative lull in piracy in those regions; members of the Flying Gang, who 
rose to prominence in the Bahamas after 1715, and their direct successors; 
members of the group descended from the crews of George Lowther and 
Edward Low; and pirate captains active in the 1720s, but not associated with 
the Flying Gang or Lowther/Low group. Figures are given for each group, as 
well as totals for all of the groups combined. 
The 82 captains included in all three tables are: Pre 1690s, George Cusack, 
Nicholas Clough, Joseph Bannister; Red Sea Men, 1690-1715, Henry Every, 
Thomas Wake, Richard Want, Joseph Farrell, William Maze, Thomas Tew, 
Robert Culliford, Richard Shivers, William Kidd, John Halsey, Richard Glover, 
Jacob Mason, George/Josiah Raynor, Edward Coats, Captain Bobbington, 
John Hore, John Kelley, George Booth, John Bowen, Thomas Howard, 
Nathaniel North, Thomas White, Thomas Mostyn, Joseph Bradish; Atlantic, 
                                                 
968
 Rediker, Villains of all Nations, p. 29 
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1690-1715, Captain Burk, John Quelch, Thomas Pound, Thomas Shafto, 
James Allison; Flying Gang and their successors, Blackbeard, Charles 
Vane, John Rackham, Walter Kennedy, Howell Davis, Bartholomew Roberts, 
Thomas Anstis, John Fenn, Stede Bonnet, Henry Jennings, Leigh Ashworth, 
Francis Fernandez, Captain Leslie, Thomas Nichols, Captain Porter, James 
Fife, Benjamin Hornigold, Samuel Bellamy, Paul Williams, Thomas Cocklyn, 
William Moody, Edward England, John Taylor, Jasper Seagar, Robert 
Sample, Captain Lane, Edmund Condent, James Skyrm, John Phillips, John 
Cockram, John Martel, Captain Kennedy, Ignatius Pell , Richard Worley, 
Captain Burgess, John Augur; Lowther/Low group, George Lowther, Ned 
Low, Charles Harris, Captain Shipton, Frank Spriggs, Phillip Lyne, Joseph 
Cooper; Post Flying-Gang group, William Fly, John Gow , Philip Roche , 
John Evans, Edward Williams, John Vidal, and Alexander Wyat 
Table 7. Pre-Command.  
Table 7 sets out data concerning the position held by captains immediately 
prior to their assuming pirate command, taking no account of their earlier 
careers when such information is available. Henry Every and John Taylor, for 
example, both served as officers in the Royal Navy much earlier in their sea-
going careers, but immediately prior to becoming a pirate captain were the 
mate of a privateer and sailing master of a pirate ship respectively. Henry 
Every therefore has been entered into this table as an officer in legitimate 
shipping, but Taylor has been entered as a pirate officer. Most of the ‘officers’ 
were either masters or mates, or, in the case of some of the pirate ‘officers’, 
quartermasters or lieutenants. ‘Petty Officers’ were mostly boatswains or 
gunners, but include one carpenter (John Philips). 
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Table 7. Pre-command 
 Officer 
(legit.) 
Officer 
(pirate) 
Petty 
Officer 
(legit.) 
Petty 
Officer 
(pirate) 
Unknown 
Pre 1690 (3) 1 (33%) 0(%) 1 (33%) 0(%) 1 (33%) 
Red Sea 
Men (24) 
15 
(62.5%) 
1 (4.2%) 3 (12.5%) 0 5 (20.8%) 
Atlantic 
1690-1715 
(5) 
4 (80%) 0 0 0 1 (20%) 
Flying Gang 
(36) 
11 
(30.6%) 
5 (13.8%) 0 2 (5.6%) 18 (50%) 
Lowther/Low 
(7) 
3 (42.8%) 2 (28.6%) 0 0 2 (28.6%) 
Post Flying 
Gang (7) 
4 (57.1%) 0 1 (14.3%) 0 2 (28.6%) 
Total (82) 
38 
(46.3%) 
8 (9.7%) 5 (6.1%) 2 (2.4%) 29 (35.4%) 
Sources.Abstract of wills, pp. 83-84; The Grand Pyrate, p. 5; The Petition of Jane May et al, 
CO 388/4, f. 49; Jameson, Privateering and Piracy, pp. 167, 206-211; Chapin, Privateer 
Ships, pp. 71-73, 116, 119-120, 128, 179-181; Rogozinski, Honor Among Thieves, p. 191; 
Tryal of Captain Kidd, p. 27; Ritchie, Captain Kidd, p. 117; Dow and Edmonds, Pirates of the 
New England Coast, p. 54; Tryal of John Quelch, p. 5; Tryals of Thomas Shafto, p. 3; 
Snelgrave, New Account, pp. 272, 281; The Information of Thomas Grant, 28/4/1721, HCA 
1/54, f. 120; Tryals of Stede Bonnet, pp. 44-46; Boston Newsletter, 11/11/1717; Petition of 
Robert Massey, EXT 1/261, ff.197-198; Humphrey Orme to the Admiralty, 17/5/1723, ADM 
1/2242; British Journal, 22/8/1724; Tryals of Sixteen Persons, pp. 14-15; Proceedings on the 
King’s Commission,  pp. 5-6; The Information of Henry Treehill, 21/3/1723, HCA 1/55, f. 65; 
Daily Journal, 2/11/1725; Weekly Journal or Saturday’s Post, 25/4/1724; British Journal, 
17/8/1723; Benjamin Bennett to Council of Trade and Plantations, 31/5/1718, CO 37/10, f. 12; 
Daily Courant, 8/8/1722; At an Especial Admiralty Sessions, 10/12/1718, CO 23/1, f. 76; A 
True Relation, p. 1; CSPC, 1716-1717, items 240 i, 308 i, 411; Johnson, General History, pp. 
64, 67, 114, 148, 337; At a Court of Admiralty Held at the Court House at Nassau, 2/8/1722, 
HCA 1/99 
 
Table 8. Rising to Command. 
Table 8 relates the ways in which men actually became pirate captains. 
‘Command from below’ implies that the captain’s rank and power were 
invested in him by the crew he subsequently commanded. In some cases this 
was in the form of a popular vote, but in other cases the exact method is hard 
to distinguish from such phrases as ‘chosen to be captain’ or ‘was made their 
captain’. ‘Command from above’ has been applied in any case where there is 
clear evidence of a captain being appointed by a more senior captain, as was 
sometimes the case, for example, when the commander of a pirate company 
himself conferred command of a smaller consort vessel or prize on his own 
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chosen candidate. ‘Progressed to command’ has been applied to cases in 
which a man was the senior surviving officer on the death or other demise of 
the previous captain, and rose into command without any evidence of formal 
election, or in which the senior surviving officer took command following a 
mutiny. ‘Retained command’ implies that a man led a company into piracy, 
having formerly been their commander in legitimate employment. 
Table 8. Rising to command 
 Command 
from 
below 
Command 
from 
above 
Progressed 
to 
command 
Retained 
command 
Unknown 
Pre 1690 (3) 0 0 1 (33%) 1 (33%) 1 (33%) 
Red Sea 
Men (24) 
6 (25%) 0 5 (20.8%) 13 
(54.2%) 
0 
Atlantic 
1690-1715 
(5) 
0 0 3 (60%) 1 (20%) 1 (20%) 
Flying Gang 
(36) 
10 
(27.8%) 
3 (8.3%) 4 (11.1%) 6 (16.7%) 13 
(36.1%) 
Lowther/Low 
(7) 
2 (28.6%) 3 (42.8%) 1 (14.3%) 0 1 (14.3%) 
Post Flying 
Gang (7) 
1 (14.3%) 0 4 (57.1%) 0 2 (28.6%) 
Total (82) 
19 
(23.2%) 
6 (7.3%) 18 (21.9%) 21 
(25.6%) 
18 
(21.9%) 
Sources. Abstract of wills, New York, pp. 83-84; The Grand Pyrate, p. 5; The Petition of Jane 
May et al, CO 388/4, f. 49; Jameson, Privateering and Piracy, pp. 167, 206-211; Chapin, 
Privateer Ships, pp. 71-73, 116, 119-120, 128, 179-181; Rogozinski, Honor Among Thieves, 
pp. 95, 104, 187, 189, 191-192; Tryal of Captain Kidd, p. 27; Ritchie, Captain Kidd, p. 117; 
Dow and Edmonds, Pirates of the New England Coast, p. 55; Tryal of John Quelch, p. 5; 
Tryals of Thomas Shafto, p. 3; Snelgrave, New Account, pp. 197, 284; The Examination of 
Richard Moor, 31/10/1724, HCA 1/55, f.95; The Examination of Walter Kennedy, 28/4/1721, 
HCA 1/54, f. 121; The Trials of Eight Persons, p. 23; Tryals of Stede Bonnet, pp. 44-46; 
Information of Henry Treehill, 21/3/1723, HCA 1/55, f. 67; Examination of Thomas Lawrence 
Jones, 13/2/1723, HCA 1/55, f. 51; Petition of Robert Massey, EXT 1/261, ff.197-198; 
Seybolt, Captured by Pirates, p. 659; British Journal, 22/8/1724; Tryals of Sixteen Persons, 
pp. 14-15; Proceedings on the King’s Commission,  pp. 5-6; Daily Post, 17/9/1725; British 
Journal, 17/8/1723; Benjamin Bennett to Council of Trade and Plantations, 31/5/1718, CO 
37/10, f. 12; Daily Courant, 8/8/1722; At an Especial Admiralty Sessions, 10/12/1718, CO 
23/1, f. 76; A True Relation, p. 1; CSPC, 1716-1717, items 240 i, 308 i, 411; Grey, Pirates of 
the Eastern Seas, p. 308; Burl, Black Barty, pp. 81, 208; Johnson, General History, pp. 64, 
67, 71, 148, 337, 342; At a Special Court of Admiralty for the Tryal of Piracys Felonys and 
Robberys held at the Town House in Newport in the Colony of Rhode Island, 24/2/1724, HCA 
1/99; At a court of Admiralty held at Williamsburg, 14/8/1729, HCA 1/99 
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Table 9. End of command. 
Table 9 charts the means by which tenure of command was terminated. 
‘Retired’ includes those pirates who sought and accepted a pardon for their 
crimes, and those who deliberately slipped into obscure anonymity. The data 
presented in Table 9 is very probably skewed by the large proportion of pirate 
captains captured by the authorities, as much of the information contained in 
all three tables has been gathered from trial accounts, newspaper reports of 
naval success against pirates, and government correspondence, much of 
which deals, naturally, with captured and tried pirates. There is a similar body 
of official evidence regarding pardoned pirates, and this may, on the one 
hand, explain the large number of ‘retired’ pirates in this table but, on the 
other hand, helps to balance out the number of ‘captured’ pirates. 
Nevertheless, the death of a pirate captain in battle was equally newsworthy, 
especially if he died at the hands of the Royal Navy or privateers employed as 
pirate-hunters by a particular colony, and much of the evidence for pirates 
killed also comes from official sources. Yet, the number of pirates killed in 
action is relatively low, suggesting that the data might not be quite as skewed 
as they at first appear. 
Table 9. End of Command 
 Killed in 
action 
Captured Retired Deposed 
by vote 
Deposed 
violently 
Natural 
death 
Unknown 
Pre 1690 (3) 0 3 (100%) 0 0 0 0 0 
Red Sea 
Men (24) 
4(%) 2(%) 9(%) 1(%) 0 4(%) 4(%) 
Atlantic 
1690-1715 
(5) 
0 3 (60%) 0 0 0 1 
(20%) 
1 (20%) 
Flying Gang 
(36) 
4 
(11.1%) 
8 
(22.2%) 
10 
(27.8%) 
4 
(11.1%) 
3 (8.3%) 2 
(5.6%) 
5 
(13.8%) 
Lowther/Low 
(7) 
0 5 
(71.4%) 
0 1 
(14.3%) 
0 0 1 
(14.3%) 
Post Flying 
Gang (7) 
0 6 
(85.7%) 
0 0 1 
(14.3%) 
0 0 
Total (82) 
8 
(9.8%) 
27 
(32.9%) 
19 
(23.2%) 
6 (7.3%) 4 (4.9%) 7 
(8.5%) 
11 
(13.4%) 
Sources. Abstract of Wills, New York, pp. 83-84; The Grand Pyrate, p. 23; Jameson, 
Privateering and Piracy, pp.206-211, 370; Chapin, Privateer Ships, pp. 179-181; Rogozinski, 
Honor Among Thieves, pp. 95, 148, 187, 190-191, 193; Tryal of Captain Kidd; Grey, Pirates 
of the Eastern Seas, pp. 128-131, 307; Dow and Edmonds, Pirates of the New England 
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Coast, pp. 39, 65; Tryal of John Quelch; Tryals of Thomas Shafto; Snelgrave, New Account, 
pp. 199, 284; Tryals of Thirty-Six Persons; The Examination of Richard Moor, 31/10/1724, 
HCA 1/55, f.95; The Further Information of Richard Moor, 5/11/1724, HCA 1/55, f.97; The 
Trials of Eight Persons, pp. 23, 24; Tryals of Stede Bonnet; Grandidier, Madagascar, p. 114; 
Information of Henry Treehill, 13/2/1723, HCA 1/55, f. 67; The Examination of Walter 
Kennedy, 28/4/1721, HCA 1/54, f. 121; Tryals of John Rackham; Seybolt, Captured by 
Pirates, p. 659; Weekly Journal or Saturday’s Post, 26/7/1718; Tryals of Sixteen Persons; 
Proceedings on the King’s Commission; Weekly Journal or British Gazetteer, 28/2/1719; 
Weekly Journal or British Gazetteer, 25/4/1719; London Gazette, 21/4/1718; London Gazette, 
1/7/1718; London Gazette, 19/5/1687; Evening Post, 14/5/1726; Evening Post, 28/5/1726; 
Weekly Journal or Saturday’s Post, 2/5/1724; Daily Journal, 15/8/1723; Tryals of the Pyrates 
taken by Captain Ogle, p. v; At an Especial Admiralty Sessions, 10/12/1718, CO 23/1, f. 76; A 
True Relation, p. 3; A List of the Names of such Pirates as Surrender’d themselves at 
Providence to Capt. Vincent Pearse, ADM 1/2282; Johnson, General History, pp. 67, 339; At 
a court of Admiralty held at Williamsburg, 14/8/1729, HCA 1/99; At a Court held at 
Williamsburg, 15/8/1728, HCA 1/99; At a Court of Admiralty Held at the Court House at 
Nassau, 2/8/1722, HCA 1/99 
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CO 152/14. Leeward Islands correspondence, 1721-1724 
CO 152/15. Leeward Islands correspondence, 1724-1727 
CO 239/1. St. Kitts, Nevis and Anguilla correspondence, 1702-1812 
CO 388/4. Petitions of merchants, 1695 
 
EXT 1/261. Items extracted form CO 28/17 
 
HCA 1/9. Indictments and subsequent proceedings filed, 1660-1674 
HCA 1/10. Indictments and subsequent proceedings filed, 1674-1677 
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HCA 1/11. Indictments and subsequent proceedings filed, 1677-1684 
HCA 1/12. Indictments and subsequent proceedings filed, 1684-1688 
HCA 1/13. Indictments and subsequent proceedings filed, 1692-1696 
HCA 1/14. Indictments and subsequent proceedings filed, 1696-1700 
HCA 1/15. Indictments and subsequent proceedings filed, 1700-1702 
HCA 1/16. Indictments and subsequent proceedings filed, 1702-1712 
HCA 1/17. Indictments and subsequent proceedings filed, 1713-1724 
HCA 1/18. Indictments and subsequent proceedings filed, 1724-1735 
HCA 1/51. Examinations of pirates and other criminals, 1674-1683 
HCA 1/52. Examinations of pirates and other criminals, 1683-1694 
HCA 1/53. Examinations of pirates and other criminals, 1694-1710 
HCA 1/54. Examinations of pirates and other criminals, 1710-1721 
HCA 1/55. Examinations of pirates and other criminals, 1721-1725 
HCA 1/56. Examinations of pirates and other criminals, 1725-1737 
HCA 1/98. Papers relating to Samuel Burgess and Frederick Philipse 
HCA 1/99. Proceedings of Vice-Admiralty Courts: America, West Indies, 
Africa, India. 1722-1739 
HCA 13/81. Instance and Prize courts, examinations and answers, 1693-1698 
HCA 49. Vice-Admiralty Court Proceedings, 1635-1875 
 
SP 34/36. State Papers Domestic, Anne 
SP 63/358. State Papers Ireland, Elizabeth I to George III 
 
T 1/227. Treasury Board Papers and In-Letters, 1720 
 
Newspapers. 
 
American Weekly Mercury, 17/3/1720 – 14/5/1724 
Applebee’s Original Weekly Journal. 25/7/1719 – 22/4/1721 
Boston Gazette, 17/10/1720 – 17/5/1725 
Boston News-Letter, 6/5/1717 – 22/4/1725 
British Journal, 22/8/1724 – 3/1/1730 
Daily Courant, 15/12/1715 – 12/6/1724 
Daily Journal, 28/4/1721 – 2/11/1725 
Daily Post, 17/10/1719 – 7/5/1729 
Dublin Mercury, 21/2/1724 
Evening Post, 22/1/1713 – 28/5/1726 
Flying Post, or the Post-Master, 14/4/1698 – 21/5/1705 
London Gazette, 10/5/1675 – 22/10/1723 
London Journal, 2/7/1720-28/9/1723 
New England Courant. 7/8/1721 – 7/5/1726 
Observator, 10/3/1703 
Original Weekly Journal, 31/8/1717 – 24/1/19 
Parker’s Penny Post, 23/6/1725 
Post Boy, 18/8/1696 – 27/4/1721 
Post Man, 10/10/1696 – 5/8/1697 
Weekly Journal, or British Gazetteer, 10/12/1715 – 3/4/1725 
Weekly Journal, or Saturday’s Post, 5/10/1717 – 2/5/1724 
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Weekly Packet, 19/1/1717 – 30/1/1720 
Whitehall Evening Post, 5/2/1719 
 
 
